Spenser’s Narrative Figuration of Women in The Faerie Queene by Anderson, Judith H.
Western Michigan University 
Medieval Institute Publications/Arc Humanities Press 
Research in Medieval and Early Modern Culture Medieval Institute Publications 
3-31-2018 
Spenser’s Narrative Figuration of Women in The Faerie Queene 
Judith H. Anderson 
Indiana University - Bloomington, anders@indiana.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/mip_rmemc 
 Part of the Literature in English, British Isles Commons, Modern Languages Commons, and the 
Women's Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Anderson, Judith H., "Spenser’s Narrative Figuration of Women in The Faerie Queene" (2018). Research in 
Medieval and Early Modern Culture. 1. 
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/mip_rmemc/1 
This Monograph is brought to you for free and open 
access by the Medieval Institute Publications at 
ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Research in Medieval and Early Modern Culture by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For 
more information, please contact 
maira.bundza@wmich.edu. 

Spenser’s Narrative Figuration of Women
in The Faerie Queene
RESEARCH IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN CULTURE
Medieval Institute Publications is a program of
The Medieval Institute, College of Arts and Sciences
Western Michigan University
Spenser’s Narrative Figuration of Women  
in The Faerie Queene
Judith H. Anderson
Research in Medieval and Early Modern Culture
M E D I EVA L  I N S T I T U T E  P U B L I C AT I O N S
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo
Copyright © 2017 by the Board of Trustees of Western Michigan University
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Anderson, Judith H., author.
Title: Spenser's narrative figuration of women in the Faerie Queene / Judith 
 H. Anderson.
Description: Kalamazoo : Medieval Institute Publications, 2018. | Series: 
 Research in medieval and early modern culture | Includes bibliographical 
 references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017046483 | ISBN 9781580443173 (hardback : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Spenser, Edmund, 1552?–1599. Faerie queene. | Women in 
 literature.
Classification: LCC PR2358 .A924 2018 | DDC 821/.3--dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017046483
ISBN: 9781580443173
eISBN: 9781580443180
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part 
of this book may be reproduced, stored in, or introduced into a retrieval system, or trans-
mitted, in any form, or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or 
otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of 
the book.
Every effort has been made to obtain permission to use all copyrighted illustrations 
reproduced in this book. Nonetheless, whosoever believes to have rights to this material is 
advised to contact the publisher.
in memory of A. C. Hamilton 
“This page intentionally left blank”
Contents
 Acknowledgments ix
 Introduction: Spenser’s Narrative Figuration of Women 1
1 Parody and Perfection: Spenser’s Una 13
2 Belphoebe’s “mirrours more then one”: History’s Interlude 49
3 Britomart: Inside and Outside the Armor 75
4 Phantasies, Pains, and Punishments: A Still-Moving Coda 121
 Notes 149
 Index 189
“This page intentionally left blank”
Acknowledgments
THIS BOOK HAS gROWN out of my teaching, writing, and talk-ing about Spenser over many years. Its debts are numerous, among 
them to the scholar and friend to whom it is dedicated, A. C. Hamilton. 
I regret that he did not live to see this effort, since he once challenged me 
to write it. Every student of Spenser has benefitted from Bert Hamilton’s 
many scholarly achievements, including his pioneering book The Structure 
of Allegory in “The Faerie Queene,” his collection of Essential Articles for the 
Study of Edmund Spenser, his editorship of The Spenser Encyclopedia, and 
his indispensable, annotated edition of The Faerie Queene. His encourage-
ment, out of the blue, meant a great deal to me. It came early, the time 
when encouragement is most needed.
With respect to the project at hand, I want to thank Tamara 
goeglein for reading and thoughtfully responding to the evolving project 
in manuscript form, and William Oram for his invaluable comments first 
on the initial chapter and later on the whole manuscript once it was fin-
ished, or, as it turned out, nearly so. Earlier, I also had the benefit of a 
convivial and provocative conversation with my colleague Kathy Smith 
about chapter 1. A grant from the Office of the Vice-Provost of Research 
at Indiana University funded the final stage of my project.
With the permission of the original presses, three essays pub-
lished earlier have been revised and recontextualized for inclusion in this 
book: “‘In liuing colours and right hew’: The Queen of Spenser’s Central 
Books,” in Poetic Traditions of the English Renaissance, edited by Maynard 
Mack and george deforest Lord (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1982), 47–66; “Busirane’s Place: The House of Rhetoric,” Spenser Studies 
17 (2003): 133–50; and “Britomart’s Armor in Spenser’s Faerie Queene: 
Reopening Cultural Matters of gender and Figuration,” English Literary 
Renaissance 39 (2009): 74–96. These essays have been repurposed, 
expanded, and greatly revised to become parts of chapters 2 and 3. 
“This page intentionally left blank”
Introduction: Spenser’s Narrative  
Figuration of Women
THE FOCUS OF THIS book is the figuration of women within Spenser’s narratives in The Faerie Queene. Its introduction addresses 
my reason for using “figuration” in the title and begins to show why “nar-
rative” is also featured—begins, because the proof of this pudding is in 
the showing, the demonstrable effect of the moving, temporal dimension 
of narrative on meaning as each chapter explores it. My use of “women” 
in the title is lexical, the designation of an initial, recognizable grouping. 
Within Elizabethan society and culture, including poetry and drama, 
women was a functioning term, however much diversity it masked, ena-
bled, or suppressed. I use the term in this historical, yet still open, still 
moving, sense.1 In Rethinking Feminism in Early Modern Studies, Ania 
Loomba and Melissa E. Sanchez observe that a key issue in early feminist 
criticism and theory—and one currently “far from settled”—was “how to 
define ‘woman,’” to which I would add, “and especially how to respect and 
account for a multitude of differences between women.”2 Each chapter that 
follows contributes to the significance of these terms in Spenser’s cultur-
ally encyclopedic text, refining and modifying what they encompass. In 
this way, each illuminates women’s plights and possibilities in the age of 
Elizabeth.
In emphasizing an unsettled use of language in its plural form, 
however—women, not woman—I am implicitly privileging history, ana-
lytics, and difference over universalization, psychosociology, and theory, 
although I am not excluding the latter trio, and in fact will bring it into 
discussion when productive, clarifying, or in some other way helpful for 
my purpose to do so.3 Simply, if not too simply, put, my allegiance is more 
Aristotelian than Platonic in this study. One entailment of such prioritiz-
ing is my commitment to textual detail and specifics, and this means close 
reading.
* * *
2  INTRODUCTION: SPENSER’S NARRATIVE FIgURATION OF WOMEN 
Spenser’s figuration of women in The Faerie Queene is widely various, with 
figures ranging from static to mobile, from mono- to multidimensional, 
from monstrous to idealized, from purely fictive to strongly historicized, 
with many a variant in between. Like the figures of men, they develop with 
respect to the thematic focus of each book, some crossing from book to 
book. Metaphorically and analogously, that is rhetorically, they also relate 
to one another in interwoven, textual ways that resemble a network or web 
and resonate with social and cultural structures, past and present. Political 
and religious connections of this sort, together with gendered ones, have 
been in evidence for decades, as have legal ones more recently. Spenser’s 
richly figured text is a cross section of all these, and all further resonate with 
my own longstanding interests in rhetoric and figuration, which, accompa-
nied by a heightened attention to narrative, this book engages. The ancient 
roots of rhetoric and law, for example, are thoroughly intertwined, as a 
number of studies have emphasized with respect to intention, probability, 
inference, equity, and character.4 To these, I would add the suggestive rela-
tion to the Spenserian text of the accumulative, comparative role of pre-
cedents in English common law and of the case-based reasoning of casuistry 
in ethics and religion.5 My central concern, however, is with the interwo-
ven, resonating, paralleling, developing Spenserian text itself—a text that 
is variously parodic, analogous, allegorical, and intertextual. This concern 
accords with other broad structural phenomena, even as it connects the 
figures of women in Spenser’s more epic narratives in The Faerie Queene 
with those in his more romantic ones—Una with Florimell, for instance.
Renewed interest in character in the past two decades and the con-
troversies it has spawned and continues to spawn, especially in Shakespeare 
criticism, have also generated additional angles from which to view 
Spenserian figuration, and vice versa, and I have incorporated them. 
Perhaps above all, these developments, together with others mentioned, 
have further highlighted the critical function played by the lenses we choose 
through which to examine early modern writings. This critical function will 
be salient throughout my argument, as will the multiple lenses I openly 
use—a different lens, sometimes more than a single lens, in each chapter.
Relevant terminology, itself a basic lens, has been prominent in 
recent studies of Shakespearean character, involving word-concepts 
such as personification, person or persona, figure, and character itself. 
Personification and character in their modern senses, it turns out, are not 
properly Renaissance terms, although this fact in itself does not disqualify 
their informed use with respect to Renaissance texts.6 André g. Bourassa 
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offers a thorough discussion of the history in French of the word-concepts 
personnage and caractère from ancient greece to the Renaissance, which is 
virtually the same as that of the cognate terms in English (83–85). Person 
goes back to Latin persona, or “mask,” and george Puttenham’s term in 
his English rhetoric for the counterfactual in “personation,” namely pro-
sopopoeia, similarly goes back to greek prosôpon, “something covering the 
face.”7 Both terms involve fiction and identity, or questions of identity, 
and both imply rhetoric, poetry, and, still more broadly, culture, society, 
and civilization itself. Once freed from Proteus’s cave in Spenser’s fourth 
book, for example, Florimell “mask[s]” her affection “with modestie” as 
she prepares to return to society.8
The term I prefer with reference to The Faerie Queene is nonethe-
less figure, with an occasional exception, notably in chapter 3, which treats 
Britomart, the figure of a woman in Spenser for whom the term character 
also makes considerable sense, as it does in the criticism of Shakespeare’s 
plays. For the same reason, notably in chapter 3, I also bring the modern 
theories of figuration of Paul Ricoeur and Jean-François Lyotard into the 
discussion, as well as theories of psychoanalysis and important discussions 
of gender. These theoretical excursions, and several others, are relatively 
brief, not focal, however. Their purpose is specific, meaningful connec-
tion, rather than overarching explanation for the entirety of the present 
book. The Faerie Queene packs the sort of variety found in the panoply 
of Shakespeare’s plays into the 35,000 lines (rounded) of an evolving nar-
rative written over many years. The word-concept figure is particularly 
useful with respect to Spenser’s massive poem and greatly various figures 
of women because it encompasses a continuum from an emblem such 
as Speranza, to an emotive image such as Acrasia, to a character such as 
Britomart in dialogue with her motherly nurse about love-sickness. It fur-
ther encompasses the vital connection between rhetoric and personation. 
Characters in Shakespeare’s plays can also be, and variously have been, 
called figures too.
Like persona and prosopopoeia, the English word-concept figure has 
an ancient and expansive, revealing genealogy.9 It derives via Latin figura 
from fingere, “to form or fashion by art,” and, like its Latin parent, was the 
customary rendering for greek schema, “perceived shape.” The range of 
historical significations the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) affords for 
figure, notably cross-referenced with the verb feign, which is also derived 
from Latin fingere, serves my present purpose well. These significations 
start most generally with “form, shape,” then proceed to “the proper shape 
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or distinctive shape or appearance (of a person or thing ),” specifically 
including “an embodied (human) form”; a “represented form” or “ image, 
likeness,” including an imaginary one; “a phantasm”; a “statue, image, or 
effigy,” or even a part enacted; “an emblem, type”; “a written character,” 
whether alphabetical, musical, or mathematical; or “any of various forms 
of expression, deviating from the normal arrangement or use of words 
. . . a figure of speech.”10 The list might be said to suggest a movement from 
top to bottom, from finished creation to basic materials, from objective, 
embodied person or thing to signs and their uses—notational or poetic, 
purely referential or creative. The developing process of figuration within 
the narrative, specifically as it affects Spenser’s major figures of women, the 
ones about whom lesser figures constellate, is at the heart of this book. My 
term for it is narrative figuration.
The role of the narrator in The Faerie Queene also bears on terminol-
ogy and, as I inescapably found in writing this book, it recurrently bears 
on the interpretation of Spenser’s figures of women. It does so all the more 
because the function of Spenser’s narrative in the portrayal of these figures 
is crucial—more than perhaps we have thought. Long since, writing a book 
on Spenser and the medieval poet William Langland, I encountered the 
importance of the narrator’s role and at first attempted to keep the term 
“poet,” that is, the poet’s voice in the poem, apart from the term “narrator,” 
but I found this distinction increasingly difficult to maintain as Spenser’s 
poem developed. I finally abandoned it, explaining this fact in my discus-
sion of the 1596 installment.11 These Spenserian voices recurrently interact 
with and blend into each other, as do voices in Chaucer’s general Prologue, 
another of Spenser’s models. More recently, in a chapter on “Chaucer’s 
and Spenser’s Reflexive Narrators,” I compared the narrative personae of 
Chaucer and Spenser, making use of poststructural theory; in another 
chapter, “What Comes after Spenser’s But in The Faerie Queene,” I consid-
ered both these narrators from the perspective of linguistic minutiae, in 
Spenser’s instance the diction, rhetoric, and grammar of his sixth proem.12 
In the present book, I have referred in specific contexts of The Faerie 
Queene to the “perceptual unreliability of the narrator” or to the “some-
times unreliable narrator,” to the narrator as “a persona, himself a mask, 
now to be trusted, now not, now within the fiction, now apart from it,” and 
to a Spenserian narrator who is inconsistent “even in his masking.” Like the 
other figures of Spenser’s poem, “its narrator also evolves and shifts. His 
own figure is contextualized.” These views reflect those in my earlier publi-
cations, but I have found them newly pertinent in considering Spenser’s fig-
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ures of women, as will be evident in the chapters to follow. In these, I have 
used the terms “poet,” or “Spenserian poet,” and “narrator,” or “Spenserian 
narrator,” as the context has invited them. In passing, I’ll mention that I 
encountered similar issues regarding poetic and narrative voices in discuss-
ing Milton’s Paradise Lost, whose poet considered Spenser his “Original.”13
Another issue this project raises is that of separating out Spenser’s 
figures of women for discussion. This separation risks decontextualization, 
as to varying extents do any other kinds of selection, for that matter. I hope 
to have lessened this danger by being keenly aware of it and by having con-
siderable familiarity with the poem, enough (I hope) to recognize when 
more context is needed. Spenser’s massive poem is verbally intricate, and 
its interwoven plots and multiple characters are challenging to remember, 
not unlike those in Shakespeare’s King Lear or his earliest Henry plays. 
Overlooking Spenserian specifics blurs or distorts Spenser’s poem, which 
responds most fully to careful, reflective reading. The relation of reading 
to rereading is another issue bearing on interpretation as well as on teach-
ing, which analysis should consider, and I do.
A compensating advantage of choosing to focus on Spenser’s nar-
rative figuration of women has been the surprising perceptions and con-
nections that have not been seen before or have not been seen the same 
way, something that I found happening both with new chapters and with 
those that incorporate revised segments of earlier publications. Despite 
my interest in the narratives of The Faerie Queene over the years, focusing 
on its figured women has highlighted the importance of these narratives 
still further. Taken together, their stories themselves have a distinct tale to 
tell about the function of narrative in The Faerie Queene. Storytelling is a 
basic, perhaps the most basic, age-old way of organizing and understand-
ing experience, and the multiple, multiplying narratives of Spenser’s poem 
are not an exception. That the stories of the figures I treat in detail are 
moving narratives—at points or in instances sadly stilled ones—is vitally 
important in itself. As the figure that Spenser names Mutability realizes, 
only what moves lives and, while living, changes. In addition to illuminat-
ing the work of Spenser’s storytelling, his narrative figurations of women 
also differ to such an extent that they resist easy generalizing, or indeed, 
isomorphic theorizing, in this respect reflecting his still moving, meta-
morphic poem as a whole. The Faerie Queene is fundamentally committed 
to process and exploration, and a reading of it should be as well.
* * *
6  INTRODUCTION: SPENSER’S NARRATIVE FIgURATION OF WOMEN 
In the first three of the chapters that follow, I have concentrated on 
the three major figures of women in The Faerie Queene, namely, Una, 
Belphoebe, and Britomart, including the interlinked relations of their 
stories with those of Florimell, Amoret, or both. Other women-figures 
enter the discussion as well, certainly Duessa, Una’s wicked double.14 Each 
of these chapters, as their titles signal, makes the figure of a woman the 
focal subject. The fourth chapter groups other figures of women on the 
basis of stillness and movement, constancy and change—figures found in 
a single location or situation and those that move into different places and 
contexts. It then concentrates on several figures in the mobile grouping, 
namely, Aemylia, Serena, Mirabella, and Pastorella—particularly Serena. 
Although these figures lack the prominence of the titular figures of my 
first three chapters, they are much more than features of an allegorical 
landscape and prove particularly challenging with respect to reading it.
Some years ago, I passed up an invitation to write an article on 
“Spenser’s Women” for The Spenser Encyclopedia because I did not see 
how to treat them together compactly for that format without producing 
something that looked like essential femininity or “Woman.” As already 
noted, they are much too various. Accordingly, each of the following chap-
ters takes an approach that fits the narrative figures in it, using a different 
lens and sometimes more than a single lens. Chapter 1 approaches Una 
through the history of parody and specifically through Spenserian parody. 
In the early cantos of every book of The Faerie Queene, parody plays a sig-
nificant role, which includes parodic self-citation. It also includes both 
parodic content and parodic expression and both criticism and sympathy. 
Its subject is often sacred, as in the instance of Una and as it frequently is 
in the Middle Ages and, much later, in the poetry of John Donne. Broadly 
conceived as “comic quotation, imitation, or transformation,” parody ena-
bles a shift of perspective that makes Una at once less simple and more 
accessible.15 Parody is committed to play, not simply in its ludic sense but 
also in its open, or loosening, complicating, moving, one.
A telling instance of Spenserian parody that I examine in chapter 
1 links the sexual assaults on Una, Florimell, and Duessa (faked in her 
case). The memorably onomatopoeic word “blubbered,” which applies in 
the 1590 poem only to these three figures, occurs in all three assaults. The 
contextualized precedent of Una’s blubbering, defined by similarity to 
and difference from that of the other two figures and vice versa, opens up 
larger issues that pertain to her figuration more generally and to the widely 
contrasting critical responses that it has evoked in recent publications. A 
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number of these responses make Una either wicked or otherworldly, mere 
flesh or mere spirit. They miss the integrity of her figural being.
Other salient instances of parody in the first chapter that pertain to 
Una include the opening cantos of Book I and the satyrs’ forest, a place of 
Ovidian myth and kindness in every punning sense of this word and one 
that only Una in Book I and Hellenore in Book III get to visit. A major 
portion of this chapter concerns the culminating return of Una to Eden, 
together with Redcrosse, her chosen dragon-slayer. This is a return that 
extensively parodies both the biblical garden that is lost forever and its 
restoration. Many readers of The Faerie Queene, including me, have again 
and again used the words “parodic” or “parody” with reference to specific 
parts of it. My argument in this chapter is that a shift of perspective to 
recognize parody more fully and openly enables the recovery of Una’s 
figural being, which is distinctly that of a woman. That it should do so 
with respect to Una, a human figure of Truth, affords a particularly strin-
gent test and meaningful confirmation. That this shift should occur in the 
opening book of the poem, moreover, makes it especially notable in what 
follows, as appropriate—that is, not as a totalizing template but as a single, 
recurrent possibility.
Taking a different approach, chapter two focuses on Belphoebe, 
who enters the poem in Book II. Belphoebe is named after a classical 
moon goddess, a mythologized aspect of nature, and not, like Una, named 
after a metaphysical conception. Further unlike Una, who is betrothed 
to her human lover at the end of her story, Belphoebe is relentlessly vir-
ginal and never reconciled with her twin sister, Amoret—“Love.” In fur-
ther contrast to Una, Belphoebe appears in three successive books, each 
a different thematic context. Increasingly, these books seek some form 
of balanced relationship that progressively involves others. Depiction 
of Belphoebe begins with a long, all-inclusive, idealizing portrait of her 
early in Book II, a momentary pause narratively framed by the parodic, 
low-life figure of Braggadocchio, her lustful contrary. Nothing comes 
of this meeting of opposites, which abruptly ends with Braggodocchio’s 
lecherous lunge and Belphoebe’s raised javelin, then her flight.The open-
ing portrait of Belphoebe is full of suspended tensions between mythic 
and mortal realities that the narratives of Books III and IV must further 
confront, and as early as the third proem, these tensions involve Queen 
Elizabeth’s sometime-favorite, Sir Walter Ralegh. At the same time, they 
conspicuously affect the poet-narrator’s role as recurrently he turns to lyric 
and myth. In Book III, a narrative impasse in the eroticized relation of 
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Timias and Belphoebe issues in the strange glorification of Belphoebe’s 
rose, which is a virtual apotheosis, and then, in Book IV, in the entan-
glement of Amoret in the relation of Timias and Belphoebe. Amoret’s 
plight becomes a thinly disguised reference to the secret marriage of 
Ralegh to Elizabeth Throckmorton and the disgrace of them both in the 
eyes of the queen. The poem becomes openly subject to history, as does 
my approach to it and as the subtitle of chapter 2, “History’s Interlude,” 
signals.
Although Timias and Belphoebe are reconciled, Amoret, first cap-
tured by Lust and later abandoned in the forest by Belphoebe and Timias, 
is subsequently found by Prince Arthur. Seeking shelter, Arthur unwit-
tingly takes Amoret and her female companion to the House of Slander, 
an old hag whose figure is a hideous cartoon alluding unmistakably to the 
queen. Although parody is not my focus throughout the present book, 
here I would nonetheless stress that allusion itself is ludic (< ludere, “play,” 
alludere, “play with”). Serio ludere is a Renaissance commonplace that 
embraces parody, from its more benign expressions to the more biting 
expressions into which it can blend. Again, parody persists as a possibility 
in The Faerie Queene, although it never encompasses the whole as it does 
in contemporary works by Rabelais and Cervantes. All or nothing is not 
the Faerie way.
Belphoebe never leaves the woods in the course of the poem, and 
her portrayal gives us no sense of her developing interiorly or consistently 
from one of her appearances to another. Her virginity is the only other 
consistency about her, and it begins to look like fixation. Whereas Una, 
another allegorical figure, learns from experience, Belphoebe evidently 
does not. In another figural contrast to Belphoebe, her twin, Amoret, is 
nearly always found in Houses or more broadly in cultural topoi in the 
poem—in situations set apart from the moving narrative of quest, if also 
in some sense part of it as a sort of way station. But even as The Faerie 
Queene invites categories and distinctions, it seems always to breach the 
one and trouble the other when read closely. The woods—in extreme 
intertextualized form the Wandering Wood—can be considered a topos as 
well, yet, in its wilder forms, the woods can still be distinguished from the 
more cultivated places. If, unlike her twin sister, Amoret herself ever really 
changes, she does so in the company of the questing Britomart, a subject 
treated in the third chapter, which focuses on this cross-dressed knight. 
Both Amoret and Florimell are part of Britomart’s story. As earlier noted, 
I make Florimell a comparative part of Una’s as well.
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Britomart is the most complex of Spenser’s figures of women. 
Instead of looking at her through a single lens, I use several sequentially in 
chapter 3, which not surprisingly is the longest in this book. The first lens 
derives from recent discussions of Shakespearean character, particularly 
Alan Sinfield’s, and then shifts to a primarily rhetorical focus, as does Book 
III itself in its culminating episode of the House of Busirane.16 My focus 
next becomes primarily mythic, iconological, and thereby gendered, trac-
ing Britomart’s arming and her armor itself from early episodes in Book 
III, through Book IV, to her final battle in Book V. Although the lenses 
I use are, like those of others, still selective, together they seem relatively 
more adequate to the nuances and development of her figuration than a 
single lens could ever be. Even so, they do not exhaust the possibilities.
From the opening episode of Spenser’s Book III, Britomart’s 
agency, her mind, and her inside, which differs from her armored outside, 
are emphasized. She has a father rather than a myth of origin, a kindly 
old nurse, and both a history and a projected future set firmly on earth. 
From the outset, moreover, she and her adventures are defined by their 
relationships to and differences from those of numerous others. She has 
a social existence more pronounced and complex than that of other fig-
ures of women in the poem. A number of additional “character effects” 
Sinfield finds in Shakespeare’s women are also found in Britomart, for 
example self-reference and self-questioning , which include soliloquy 
and lying (58–59). Also included are indecision, decision-making, and 
informative conversations overheard by the audience (or readers), which 
raise questions about intentionality (59). Although I do not want to make 
Britomart into a cross-dressed Shakespearean heroine, I am not alone in 
having seen similarities between her and Shakespeare’s Rosalind, Viola, or 
his other, ostensibly female cross-dressers.
Britomart’s experiences prior to the House of Busirane lead into 
it and, like this place, they specifically increase her awareness—Sinfield’s 
“developing interiority” or “consciousness” (62, 65). For Britomart, this 
perverted rhetorical House of Ovidian myths and Petrarchan conceits 
that spread over two cantos is a further education and initiation into the 
erotic culture in which she, too, has functioned to this point. The abu-
sive Busirane, a poet-magician, has captured Amoret, transfiguring her 
from what she was in the garden of Adonis to the Ovidian-Petrarchan 
love object, and Britomart’s task is to free her from Busirane’s spell and 
thus to enable arrested love. Busirane represents a fantasy and a culture 
of rape, but his ultimate wish remains only that. Britomart frees Amoret, 
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and Busirane’s artworks vanish, in 1590 leaving behind only a trace, an 
ambivalent hermaphroditic image.
When a continuation of the 1590 installment comes in 1596, this 
image and the actual reunion of Amoret with her knightly lover, which 
was imaged in the hermaphrodite, are gone. Instead, the action of Book 
IV opens with Amoret and armed Britomart on a single horse, thus in 
silhouette another hermaphroditic image. Britomart masks her identity 
as a woman from the apprehensive Amoret, who thinks that her fully 
armed rescuer is a man. Thus abusing Amoret by playing with and on her 
responses, Britomart performs and thereby explores her own manhood, 
as contemporary readers of myth could have imagined it. Thus feigning, 
abusing , and likely faining , she inherits something of Busirane’s role, 
along with Amoret, whose role as victim Britomart had earlier entered 
empathetically while rescuing her. Psychologically oriented readers might 
recognize here a doubled traversal of fantasies.
The combined silhouette of Britomart and Amoret on the horse 
further anticipates the hermaphroditic statue of Venus within her epony-
mous Temple later in Book IV. Britomart by herself is an armed Venus—
traditionally, a Venus armata—however, and for my purpose she is most 
significantly a combination of Venus and Mars, not simply a Venus-
Virgo or even a Minerva/Athena. The principle of erotic coupling in The 
Faerie Queene, embodied in its principal couple, Britomart and her lover 
Artegall, requires four terms, not just two opposites. Each member of the 
couple variously includes the male or female other, and this is why the 
grotesque, immobile, hermaphroditic image of binary opposites at the end 
of Book III in 1590 proves inadequate. This is also why the true Britomart 
is not simply within the armor and why she is crucially wearing her armor 
when she finally fights Artegall in hand-to-hand combat and is reconciled 
to him. Her armor and her agency have become effectually the same in the 
course and process of Books III and IV. In Britomart’s close combat with 
Artegall (disguised as the Salvage Knight), he is wounded, but she is not, 
although her horse is, and her ventail, or mask, is sheared off to show her 
face, framed by wisps of hair. As in the House of Busirane, she remains in 
control, and Artegall yields to her before she accepts him.
Britomart is an evolving figure in Books III to V, and, in their 
course, her armor figures the development of her integrity and its loss. 
Though armed in Book V, she is no longer armed distinctively in her own 
armor. Recurrently, her identity is mistaken or misinterpreted—first by 
Dolon, ironically named for a Trojan who betrayed his own side, and then 
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by the ascetic priest of Isis, who ignores the personal and suppresses the 
passionate in Britomart’s experience, overwriting them with dynastic con-
cerns. What makes a crucial difference, however, is the extent to which 
the poem goes out of the way to expose the fact that Britomart herself does 
not realize what is happening in this process of transference and substitu-
tion—misappropriation, in another lexicon, still rhetorical but now also 
economic, or structural. It is openly done to, not by, her figure, bearing in 
this respect some similarity to Busirane’s transfiguration of Amoret, with 
the significant difference that Britomart has not spent her whole preced-
ing life in the sheltered garden of Adonis (then in the similarly enclosed, 
protective Temple of Venus, if we factor in the 1596 installment). 
Accordingly, the description of Britomart’s final battle with Radigund, 
Artegall’s jailor, is specifically wasteful in sexual and generative terms. It 
witnesses the abuse of Britomart’s figural integrity. Britomart pays a high 
cost for rescuing Artegall. Killing Radigund, she loses too much of herself, 
and, with this loss, the many inconsistent, problematical figures of women 
in Shakespeare that Sinfield and others address—characters with a “con-
tinuous consciousness” until it fails or falls silent—also come back into 
view, returning to memory like so many cultural ghosts.
As the main title of my fourth and final chapter, “Phantasies, Pains, 
and Punishments,” signals, in it I shift from the single focal subject of the 
earlier chapters to take stock of the rest of Spenser’s narrative figures of 
women. I have subtitled it “A Still-Moving Coda” for the relative brevity 
and generality of its first third, while signaling that this coda escapes its 
own generalizing soon after.17 As earlier indicated, my approach to the rest 
of these fictive women has a basis in the paradoxical combination of still-
ness and movement—still moving. This basis derives from discussions in 
chapters 1 to 3, with respect to which it is a recurrent drumbeat. They lay 
the groundwork for it, as also happens in the developing context, book by 
book, of the poem itself. Both terms, stillness and movement, have positive 
and negative extensions: for example, stillness suggests stability, constancy, 
conceptualization, and lyric sublation or, conversely, fixation and death; 
movement suggests life, time, change, and narrative or, conversely, insta-
bility and inconstancy. On this inclusive thematic basis, one grouping of 
Spenser’s fictive women consists of those found in a single location and 
condition—thus situated or placed. As presiding genius, any of these good 
or evil figures might move within her site, as do Lucifera and Alma, but 
not beyond it. The chapter offers Acrasia as a contained example of this 
group, insofar as her figure is central to questions about sex and gender in 
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the poem. Explicitly mythological figures and statues of them I mention 
but do not pursue, because my concern is primarily with figures more dis-
tinctly human. Many of the former I have also discussed extensively else-
where (and endnote as appropriate).18
My chief concern in the fourth chapter is with the relatively lesser 
figures of women who move into different places and contexts. While 
Duessa and Hellenore get attention, as Duessa already did in chapter 1, the 
mobile figures mainly treated in chapter 4—Aemylia, Serena, Mirabella, 
and Pastorella—are all in the 1596 installment, Aemylia in Book IV, and 
the other three in Book VI. With their inclusion in this project, all six 
books of the 1596 Faerie Queene are represented. Although relatively 
minor compared with Una, Belphoebe, and Britomart, each of the main 
figures of chapter 4 has narrative life—a story. Aemylia’s is a story of trans-
gression, suffering, and reform whose conclusion stands in marked con-
trast to that of Amoret. The interlinked stories of Serena and Mirabella 
are profoundly psychological studies of female misery, and they further 
extend and transfigure Amoret’s and Belphoebe’s twinned stories as well. 
The story of Serena in particular is simultaneously and significantly the 
story of her figuration. There is less to the story of Pastorella, but she is 
the last fictive woman of note in The Faerie Queene of 1596, and her story 
brings my discussion back to that of Una and Redcrosse at the end of 
chapter 1.19 Like their story, Pastorella’s ends with restoration. This ending 
is at once fit and parodic, the same yet also quite different—still moving.
Chapter 1
Parody and Perfection: Spenser’s Una
THIS CHAPTER BEgINS WITH background that enables and introduces my focus on Una’s figuration, while deferring her thematic 
dominance for a time. It moves from the general to the more specific, from 
a discussion of parody as a historical form to parody in the 1590 Faerie 
Queene, especially with respect to Una, Duessa, and Florimell, all three of 
whom resonantly “blubber” in the charged context of near-rape. Building 
on their parodic relation, the chapter then examines the problematizing of 
Una in stark terms of good or evil in recent criticism, which I interweave 
with my own readings of her experiences throughout Book I. It concludes 
with a substantial treatment of parody in Eden, where Una’s story achieves 
a divinely comic ending.
* * *
My opening question is whether we have fully appreciated the extent 
and degree to which The Faerie Queene, like contemporary masterpieces 
by Rabelais, Shakespeare, and Cervantes, makes a defining use of parody, 
albeit not an exclusive or overwhelming use. Without denying the serious 
moral and religious force of the poem, might we do so? Would a great-
er, more specific recognition of the presence and function of parody in 
Spenser’s epic, as apart from irony, satire, or simple contrast, shift our 
sense of it? In asking such questions, I am deliberately seeking a shift in 
perspective that will make Una both more accessible and less simple as a 
figure.
Each book of the epic uses comic parody early enough for it to be 
a formative influence and thereby signals a fundamental commitment to 
play in both the ludic and open senses of the word. This is also a com-
mitment to process and exploration, which a reading of each book should 
reflect as well: just for example, in Book I, Archimago’s parodic imperson-
ation of Redcrosse initiates and intermittently propels a comic subplot; 
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in Book II, the figure of Braggadocchio reflects back parodically on both 
guyon and his Palmer; the parodic Malecasta in Book III, together with 
Florimell, frames its first canto, and Florimell quickly accords with the 
thematic “mirrours more then one,” her figure later to be parodied specifi-
cally by her double, the False Florimell.1 Additional examples abound in 
the 1596 installment: in the opening cantos of Book IV, the outrageous 
parody of friendship by the false foursome; the parody that relentlessly 
dogs the execution of Artegall’s justice in the early cantos of Book V; the 
parody in Calidore’s quest throughout Book VI, evident in the ironic jux-
taposition of pastoral and violence from the earliest cantos to Melibee’s 
idyll. In the first of the Mutabilitie Cantos, Mutability’s rebellion, itself 
already parodic, is then further parodied by Faunus. Such familiar exam-
ples are only a start, but, coming early in each book, they are, like other 
first impressions, important and lasting. Of course, as each narrative 
progresses, it is subject to modification and, in the instances of each book, 
to significant, even radical modification. The paired protagonists of Book 
I, Redcrosse and Una—perhaps Una most of all—afford an especially tell-
ing test of the parodic potential of Spenser’s epic romance, and they will 
appear recurrently in subsequent discussion.
Whatever early preview of The Faerie Queene Spenser’s friend 
gabriel Harvey saw, parody aligns suggestively with his familiar response 
to it as “Hobgoblin runne away with the garland from Apollo.” Harvey’s 
critical jest contrasts with the enthusiastic praise of Spenser’s lost com-
edies that it follows.2 In context, Harvey further compares what he has 
seen of The Faerie Queene unfavorably with Ariosto’s model romance and 
instead recommends that Spenser return to the generic model of ancient 
and contemporary writers of dramatic comedy, including Aristophanes. 
Perhaps the academic Harvey was more of a generic purist than Spenser 
or, perhaps, less of a one. Anciently, Aristophanes also affords a familiar 
model—perhaps the model—of parody.
Parody might well be the major term from ancient greece that 
describes “comic quotation, imitation, or transformation,” although par-
ody is also a practice that readily overlaps, merges with, or even blends 
into satire and irony, two other ancient terms.3 Additional terms of rel-
evance, such as burlesque, travesty, pastiche, double-coding, and meta-fiction 
are all more recent. Although these terms have variously been identified 
with parody, by themselves they are generally narrower or even other with 
respect to it. Both great parodies—the usual historical examples being by 
Aristophanes, Rabelais, Cervantes, and Sterne—and the ancient roots of 
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parody are more complex and inclusive; they are capable of criticism, sym-
pathy, or both at once—that is, of balance, ambivalence, or simple ambi-
guity. They include both parodic content and parodic expression, either 
of which can also constitute parody by itself. These, too—complexity and 
ambivalence, criticism and sympathy, and content, expression, or both—
are further points of emphasis.4
John Florio’s Italian–English dictionary of 1598 refers to parody, 
as does Henri Estienne’s greek dictionary in 1572. The widely read J. C. 
Scaliger discusses parody in his Poetices libri septem of 1561 (Rose 9–10). 
Strictly English sources, namely the clergyman Thomas Walkington (The 
Optick Glasse of Humors, 1607) and Ben Jonson in Every Man in His 
Humor (performed 1598, published 1616), employ the term. Anciently, 
the term parody occurs in Aristotle’s Poetics, referring to the comic writings 
of Hegemon and Nicochares, parodists of epic style and matter.5 Ancient 
commentators on the writings of Aristophanes extend the term to “all 
sorts of comic literary quotation and allusion” (Rose, 15). Quintilian also 
refers to parody as imitation and as an abuse of language, a sort of extended 
catachresis.6 (Catachrestic form is a thought to ponder: in miniature, con-
sider, analogously, the paradoxical phrases “coy submission” and “modest 
pride” to describe Milton’s Eve, for whom either word alone is insufficient 
and a single, proper word is lacking.)7 In the Middle Ages, comic wit and 
structural doubleness are notable in biblical parody, in musical and visual 
parody, in such an elaborate comic subplot as that of The Second Shepherd’s 
Play, and in Chaucer’s self-reflective Tale of Sir Thopas and Tale of Melibee, 
both tales important to Spenser. In medieval England and germany, par-
odies of the Mass were endemic in “the underworld of clerical writing,” 
as well as in the margins of religious and legal books; according to Miri 
Rubin, readers, hearers, and viewers were continually reconstructing the 
“eucharistic symbolic,” using “old materials to signify new perceptions and 
to express altered points of view.”8 By the later Renaissance, Petrarchan 
parody is so widespread as to have become a subject in itself. Under Queen 
Elizabeth and King James, John Donne parodies sacred subjects in erotic 
poems and erotic poetry in holy sonnets. The historical, complementary 
co-existence of such parody signals its play, its double-sidedness, its loos-
ening of boundaries, its potential for inclusion and connection.
Etymologically, parody derives from the greek word for song or ode, 
oidē, and para, a prefix indicating “beside” or “against”—that is, either 
nearness or opposition—and by extension implying either sympathy, on 
the one hand, or contention, on the other. Use of the same prefix, para, in 
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words such as paradox and parallel are analogously suggestive, particularly 
since they also convey notions of doubleness—with paradox, doubleness 
of thought; with parallel, doubleness of representation. Margaret A. Rose, 
to whose work I owe much, allows that humor was not always or necessar-
ily present in ancient parody, but her own definition, sensitive to sourer 
and narrower modern theories, requires it: “the comic refunctioning of pre-
formed linguistic or artistic material” (52). By refunctioning, she wants to 
signal creativity and, by preformed material, to get beyond the mislead-
ing reduction of parody only to style. Again, she stresses the comic nature 
of parody, while nonetheless acknowledging exceptions. The word comic 
itself, I would add, also has a range of meaning, applicable both broadly to 
humor and to a tale with a happy ending, for example.
For my present Spenserian purposes, parody has a specific connec-
tion with imitation and citation, including self-citation and self-reflection, 
and, in short, with mirroring, including refraction, or bending. It also 
involves incongruity and revisionary recreation, typically comic in some 
sense. Irony, probably the term most often used for a number of relevant 
passages in Spenser’s epic, is at once broader and less specific. Although 
irony can describe a recurrent or continuing attitude, such as that of 
an eiron like Socrates or Chaucer, irony is traditionally classed as a fig-
ure—Puttenham’s “Drie mock.”9 Although parody, like irony, can apply 
to a single sentence, it typically has more formal substance; we might 
announce an intention to write—to compose—a parody, less likely one 
to compose an irony. If extensively applicable, irony becomes an adjective; 
parodic becomes a noun—parody. granted this last distinction, I note that 
it appeals to our experience of literature, which evokes responses. Again, 
however, I would stress both the tenuousness of provisional distinctions 
such as that between irony and parody and their usefulness for thinking.
Parody, as my description of it has indicated, is a flexible term. 
Maddening to anyone rigorously logical as this lack might be, parody has 
fuzzy edges, as do most other literary terms, such as those of rhetoric. 
Ideally, these terms outgrow the taxonomic fixation useful for beginning 
students, and the same applies to the distinctions of genre, whose most 
striking characteristic is that its forms are ever developing and changing.10 
Parody overlaps with other techniques, forms, and categories, and vice 
versa. Among these, in addition to irony, are allusion, comparison, and, 
in their loose senses, analogy and intertextuality, all of which are broader 
and less specifically—that is, neither exclusively nor absolutely—commit-
ted to the comic, in all the breadth of this happy term itself, than parody is. 
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Literary terminology is most valuable as a platform for the exploration of 
thoughtful, affective, exploratory response, not as a means of pigeonhol-
ing. Platforms are important, but they are only a start.
Parody and the 1590 Faerie Queene
Before returning to Archimago’s impersonation of Redcrosse early in the 
second canto of Book I, which I briefly mentioned in the section above, I 
want to go back to the beginning of the first canto of this same book. In 
its initial stanzas, St. george’s armor on a knight seeking a dragon, accom-
panied by a lady with a lamb on a leash, lends parodic potential to this 
overdetermined figure of the popular, as well as of the more elevated, ima-
gination.11 The knight and the lady, both nameless and set against a blank 
landscape at the outset, also trigger memories, further parodic, of many 
an iconic illustration in a book of hours or other devotional volume.12 Of 
course, this is not all the initial descriptions suggest, but only what is to 
the immediate point: at the outset, these figures, which take shape pro-
gressively, remain silhouettes and outlines, still to be filled in—and filled 
out. The many verbal ambiguities inhering in them, especially in the figure 
of Redcrosse, only increase their potential. The narrator speculates that 
the figure of Una, whose whiteness is obscured by her black stole, “inly” 
mourns, a heavy care in her heart.
Skimming, for the present, over multivalent parodies in the first 
book, such as the Wandering Wood, its abiogenetic reptilian resident, 
the helpful heavenly maiden’s advising Redcrosse to spend the night with 
Archimago, this tempter’s mumbo-jumbo, his sprite’s comic katabasis to 
the Cave of Morpheus, and more, I now return to Archimago’s imper-
sonation of Redcrosse. It is of particular interest because it involves the 
narrator’s parodic self-citation. It begins when Archimago, having sepa-
rated Una from Redcrosse and set her “wandring” once again through 
the woods, decides to disguise himself, trying out his extensive repertoire 
of “formes and shapes” (I.ii.9–10). These, especially his dragon number, 
unsettle him, “That of himselfe he ofte for feare would quake, / And oft 
would flie away.” His fright anticipates the target of this proleptic parody, 
namely Redcrosse, who, fourteen lines later, is said to be fearfully running 
away from himself (“still flying from his thoughts and gealous feare”: 12). 
Properly, the prolepsis belongs to the narrator, who sets up the parodic 
echo. Between prolepsis and subsequent echo, Archimago dons armor and 
accoutrements matching those of Redcrosse, and the narrator lingers over 
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a detailed description of this impersonation, as if to savor its ourageous 
wickedness: “the mighty armes,” the “siluer shield,” a “bloudy crosse,” 
a “bounch of heares” upon the helmet (11). Then comes the narrator’s 
parodic self-citation of the opening stanza of the poem, in which we got 
our earliest glimpse of Redcrosse:
Full iolly knight he seemde, and wel addrest,
And when he sate vppon his courser free,
Saint George himselfe ye would haue deemed him to be.
 (I.ii.11)
For the first time in the poem, the saint is named, if only as a seeming false-
hood. As we know, the words, syntax, and stanzaic location of these breezy 
lines parody the first stanza of canto i: “Full iolly knight he seemd, and 
faire did sit, / As one for knightly giusts and fierce encounters fitt.” Doing 
so, they simultaneously unsettle the identity of the figure within the armor 
we first met and the perceptual reliability of the narrator. Uncertain relia-
bility becomes a heightened possibility upon which the poem will play—
and play variously—thereafter. No figure, including the narrator, will be 
wholly exempt from it. Whether considered locally as parody or under an 
overarching umbrella of parody, such play takes on a role that need not 
be abrasive, corrosive, or, indeed, destructive, although in theory it could 
be. In striking examples from later books, the parody even of Artegall 
or Calidore in their first cantos does not cancel the fact that they are, as 
we say, more on the side of the angels than their vicious opponents 
are. Their virtues may be modified and redefined, critically scrutinized 
and profoundly questioned, but not wholly undermined or simply 
invalidated.
At the outset of Book II, there is again parody aplenty even before 
Braggadocchio’s debut. guyon’s response to Redcrosse, then to Duessa, is 
itself parodic, and the Castle of Medina is surely a parody of true temper-
ance. But my favorite instance is Duessa’s so overplaying the part of violated 
virgin that the disguised Archimago has to tell her to dial it down (i.16). 
By parodic contrast, details of Duessa’s botched audition recall Una’s ear-
lier response to the actual assault of Sans Loy in Book I. Duessa’s “fowly 
blubbered” face and “garments rent,” for example, disfigure Una’s “ruffled 
rayments, and fayre blubbred face.”13 In response to this parody, what is 
called for, finally, is judgment—sensitive, critical judgment, which by its 
very nature is subject to demonstration, dispute, and, when justified, revi-
sion. Embracing the possibility of revision, such judgment is provisional, 
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working within an ongoing process that includes play rather than exclud-
ing or shutting it down. Tonally, the difference between torn garments 
and ruffled raiments is both subtle and considerable, not to mention that 
between fair and fowl. Raiments, a word deriving from an Old French verb 
meaning to array, suggests finery, and “ruffled rayments” suggests merely 
disordered ones, whereas Duessa’s ripped clothes and disheveled hair sug-
gest something more brutally physical—cruder and rawer.
The memorably onomatopoeic word “ blubbered” applies in 
the 1590 Faerie Queene only to Una, Duessa, and Florimell, linking 
their assaults, while further description radically differentiates them.14 
“Blubbered,” is a word that originates in connection with bodies of water. 
It could well have been used to initiate an Ovidian metamorphosis into 
a brook or a spring, part of the landscape on the order of the nigh-raped 
nymph’s “bubling fountaine” in Book II.15 Applied to a human being, it 
is, at least potentially, an undignifying, even ugly and degrading, word, 
in all the weight of the notion of dignity, or human worth, in this period. 
This weight is religious, not simply social, insofar as it enters discussions of 
merit, justification, and punishment.16 In short, “blubbered” is a carefully 
chosen word that befits a context of rape, whether actual or feigned.
I’ll turn next to the events that open Book III and begin to define 
its context. They start with Britomart’s unseating guyon, proceed to the 
vision of the fleeing Florimell, and finally turn to the episode of Malecasta, 
an obvious parody of chastity. Recalling the figure of Verdant in the Bower 
of Bliss, at the outset of Book III the “fiery feete” of guyon’s horse “burne / 
The verdant gras” and doing so, parodically reinforce the comic justice, not 
to say the condignity, of this knight’s come-down at the end of Britomart’s 
spear (i.5). Biblically, “all flesh is grass,” and, with Florimell on the narra-
tor’s horizon—proleptic but also close by—“all the goodliness thereof is 
as the flower of the field”: Isaiah 40:6.17 The castle of Malecasta displays a 
tapestry that is further mindful of the mythic potency of Acrasia’s Bower, 
now transposed to a social landscape—a court, not an isolated island-
coupling. This tapestry features eros and death in the story of Venus and 
Adonis, ending with a fictive woman bending over a dying man, another 
parodic recollection of the Bower.
Near the outset of Book III, Florimell bursts onto the scene as a sud-
den, striking impression that is gone almost as soon as it comes, although 
it also lingers memorably.18 The forest setting is deeply shaded, and her 
appearance “out of the thickest brush” is white, gold, and sparkling 
against it:
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Vpon a milkwhite Palfrey all alone,
A goodly Lady did foreby them rush,
Whose face did seeme as cleare as Christall stone,
And eke through feare as white as whales bone:
Her garments all were wrought of beaten gold,
And all her steed with tinsell trappings shone,
Which fledd so fast, that nothing mote him hold,
And scarse them leasure gaue, her passing to behold.
Still as she fledd, her eye she backward threw,
As fearing euill, that poursewd her fast;
And her faire yellow locks behind her flew,
Loosely disperst with puff of euery blast:
All as a blazing starre doth farre outcast
His hearie beames, and flaming lockes dispredd,
At sight whereof the people stand aghast:
But the sage wizard tells, as he has redd,
That it importunes death and doefull dreryhedd.
 (III.i.15–16)
The impression Florimell’s figure creates is beautiful, fearful, ethereal, 
portentous, ominous, and, paradoxically, both fleeting and lasting. At 
first, the view of the lady is frontal, starting with her face. In the second 
stanza, the view is from behind her as she passes from sight. The phrase 
“Still as she fledd” suggests movement and its opposite, stillness; she is at 
once fleeing and frozen in fear—like the nymph of the fountain in Book 
II. Comparison of her hair to the tail of a comet with “flaming lockes dis-
predd” enlarges her significance, associating her with anticipated sorrow 
and death, of which there is much in Book III. Notably, she is not named 
in the text until canto v, where her dwarf finally recounts the cause of her 
leaving the court to find Marinell, her wounded love. The fact that this 
cause is withheld until then resists identification of her in canto i too sim-
ply with “flower honey,” a translation of the name Florimell. As ever in 
Spenser, we read the image as we go, not rushing to the typically reductive 
label that the narrator deliberately (parodically?) withholds until later.
In years past, this image of Florimell was identified primarily with 
Neoplatonic beauty. More recently, it has been read as desire or, specifi-
cally, male desire. In all instances, eros would be a better, broader, his-
torically more accurate term. The fleeing beauty, after all, is followed by 
an image specifically of male lust in the figure of the forester with his 
punny, phallic “bore speare.” The two male knights who join the chase are 
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motivated by eros to pursue a beautiful and wondrous object of desire, 
rather than by lust in itself. Comic as may be the sight of two knights on 
a single horse in pursuit of their fleeing vision, guyon, however given to 
outbursts of wrath, is still the patron of temperance, if now without the 
exclusion or denial of eros.19 Bestial lust flees in another direction, and 
Timias, who, Harry Berger observes, is here first named in the text, goes 
after the would-be violator. Timias’s proper name, deriving from “honor” 
in greek, deflects readings of his motivation as merely its opposite.20 By 
the same reading, honor may not be motivating the eros of guyon and 
Arthur, but neither is animal lust.
The cross-dressed Britomart, now also named for the first time in 
the text, is constant to her own quest, indeed, explicitly to her own “mind,” 
declining pursuit of either forester or Florimell. She cares not to “fol-
low beauties chace” or “Ladies Loue” (i.19). Although these phrases are 
ambiguous (the chase of beauties, beauties’ or beauty’s chasing; the love of 
ladies, ladies’ or lady’s loving), Britomart’s rejection of them simply comes 
down to the facts that she is not interested in chasing a fleeing woman or 
in flight as a means of escape. Florimell’s fear of the slobbering boor who 
chases her is entirely justified, as later is her continued flight from a helm-
eted knight with unfamiliar insignia, not to mention the reader’s aware-
ness that the sight of her has erotically motivated this knight. Projection of 
Florimell’s fear onto Britomart, however, is textually unjustified.21 On the 
one hand, a flightly female is just not Britomart’s type, and, on the other, 
Britomart, far from rejecting eros, actively and aggressively seeks Artegall. 
In the Castle of Malecasta, she also feels misplaced empathy for its impas-
sioned seductress. Although Book III makes the theme of “mirrours more 
then one” focal, every figure is not interchangeable with every other one. 
Spenser’s figures of women all have some relevance to one another, but 
they are not simple projections or doubles of Britomart. Their differences 
and contrasts are as defining as are their similarities and likenesses. Parody 
is well suited to enable the complexity of this mirroring.
Since I have made an issue of the word blubbered, I propose to fol-
low it to its reappearance in Florimell’s would-be rape by the fisherman, 
and then back to Una’s by Sans Loy. The parodic relationship between 
these scenes is further defining. Ultimately, it will introduce consideration 
of what might be termed “the problem of Una.” Recurrently analogized 
by the narrator to small, frightened, fleeing animals—a “light-foot hare,” 
“a fearefull Doue”—and later to Ovidian figures fleeing in fear—“fearfull 
Daphne” and, more puzzlingly, “wicked Myrrha”—Florimell progresses 
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from the natural fear of a predator to a fear that is culturally and mythi-
cally defined. This defining fails to distinguish Daphne’s choice of virgin-
ity from Myrrha’s incestuous guilt.22 In short, Florimell’s travel takes her 
from the erotic context on the near side of the garden of Adonis into 
the seamier context on the far side, a context that at moments infects the 
narrator’s perspective, too, as in the conspicuous instance of Myrrha. A 
similar development will bear on the depiction of Serena in Book VI, who 
might be seen to have stepped carelessly into the allegorical landscape that 
the Blatant Beast inhabits (iii.23–24).23
On the far side of the garden, an impressive assortment of parodic 
perversions of eros emerges: the witch, her son, and her other misbe-
gettings, namely the hyena-like beast and False Florimell; Argante and 
Ollyphant, twins in lust, incest, and predation; the Squire of Dames, a 
promiscuous figure who belongs in a fabliau; the dirty old fisherman and 
shape-shifting Proteus, exemplar of instability; Malbecco, Hellenore, 
and Paridell, who parodically figure the destructive force of eros in his-
tory; and finally Busirane and his aestheticized house of erotic horrors. 
Florimell’s continual flight through the woods to the sea seems to descend 
through a scale of being : her flight into and through the woods, then 
the monstrous destruction of her signature white horse and the loss of 
her identif ying girdle, the mixing of her garments with fish scales, 
and her abduction by the flux of the ocean. She suffers a near-metamor-
phosis into what her blubbered face portends—the foam or airy bubbles 
of the sea: faced by Proteus, she is “Ruffled and fowly raid with filthy 
soyle, / And blubbred face with teares of her faire eyes” (III.viii.32). 
The words “Ruffled” and “raid” (arrayed) echo the description of Una’s 
raiments when the satyrs frighten Sans Loy away; “fowly” and “faire,” 
respectively, recall Duessa’s faking and Una’s distress in comparable 
situations, as well. “Soyle” could indicate genital fluid, presumably 
spilled by the fisherman.24 More obviously here, the victim is soiled by the 
victimizer.
I can’t say that I find anything funny about Florimell’s shame and 
fear when Proteus claims her. Now she is compared to “a fearful partridge, 
that is fledd / From the sharpe hauke,”
And fals to ground, to seeke for succor theare,
Whereas the hungry Spaniells she does spye
With greedy iawes her ready for to teare.
 (III.viii.33)
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Florimell comes closer to the physical brutality of rape than any other 
figure of a woman in the poem, with the partial, elusive exception of 
Serena and, still more symbolically and psychologically, of Amoret. Yet 
the run-up to Florimell’s terror is a shameless parody of double entendres, 
such as her prayer to the old lecher “to guide the cock-bote well,” since 
“the great waters gin apace to swell” (24). Whether this doubleness is 
perversely shameless or innocently so, as well as for whom it is either, are 
open questions, although at least we know that the old lecher—hardly 
offered as a role model—responds to Florimell’s hapless words by “fondly 
grin[ning]” (24).
Nevertheless, Florimell’s rescue from the fisherman parodies Una’s 
from Sans Loy in Book I. Like Florimell’s, the extremity of Una’s fear, evi-
dent in her “fayre blubbred face,” also finds expression in an image of natu-
ral instinct:
She more amazd, in double dread doth dwell;
And euery tender part for feare does shake:
As when a greedy Wolfe through honger fell
A seely Lamb far from the flock does take,
Of whom he meanes his bloody feast to make,
A Lyon spyes fast running towards him,
The innocent pray in hast he does forsake,
Which quitt from death yet quakes in euery lim
With chaunge of feare, to see the Lyon looke so grim.
 (I.vi.10)
Although wolf, lamb, and lion carry biblical associations not found in 
Florimell’s hawk, partridge, and spaniels, the affective content is similar.
Florimell’s rescue, again like Una’s, is preceded by an evocation of 
providential care that attests to her chastity and innocence, making the 
narrator’s earlier comparison of her to Myrrha even more dubious, indeed, 
hasty and foolish:
See how the heauens of voluntary grace,
And soueraine fauor towards chastity,
Doe succor send to her distressed cace:
So much high god doth innocence embrace.
 (III.viii.29)
Proteus, hearing the shrieks of Florimell, hastens to her aid, much as do 
the satyrs to Una’s. Less benign than the “wyld woodgods,” as the satyrs are 
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called in Book I (vi.9), however, the shape-shifting Proteus and the restless 
sea in which he lives realize Florimell’s movement in some sense, even as 
he imprisons her because of her constancy—once again her stillness (“Still 
as she fledd”: III.i.16)—in the rocky cave from which she then can fly no 
more. Movement and stillness, like eros and death, continue to inform her 
figure and parodically to recall the nymph of the fountain in Book II.
The evocation, or rather the invocation, of providence in anticipa-
tion of Una’s rescue is more elaborate and emotional than in Florimell’s, 
although the extremity of their peril is similar. Yet the “heauenly virgin” 
Una, who teaches truth among the satyrs, is a different figure in the narra-
tive context of a different book, and her plight asks for discrimination.25 
Having snatched Una’s veil from her face, Sans Loy tries flattery first, then 
force. At this point, the narrator exclaims, “Ah heauens, that doe this hid-
eous act behold, / And heauenly virgin thus outraged see, / How can ye 
vengeance iust so long withhold” (vi.5)? The “shiekes” and “cryes” of the 
“pitteous mayden” follow, together with her “plaintes” to the heavens,
That molten starres doe drop like weeping eyes;
And Phoebus flying so most shamefull sight,
His blushing face in foggy cloud implyes,
And hydes for shame.
 (I.vi.6)
Whereas Florimell, like Serena later on, feels shame before her rescuer and 
hides her face in fear, here it is Phoebus who both flies from the shame- 
ful sight of violent assault and, hiding his own face, exhibits, as if by 
contagion, its shaming effect on him. The extravagant figure of stars that 
melt into tear drops could be considered either hyperbole or catachresis 
by Renaissance standards, in either case a figure associated with an excess 
befitting the situation.26
What happens next in stanza 6, however, is more controversial, and 
my own relationship to it has wavered over the years. Ending this stanza, 
the Spenserian narrator asks a question that might first be taken at face 
value: “What witt of mortall wight / Can now deuise to quitt a thrall 
from such a plight” as Una’s? The answer comes instantly, at the outset of 
the next stanza, “Eternall prouidence exceeding thought, / Where none 
appeares can make her selfe a way: / A wondrous way it for this Lady 
wrought” (7). In retrospect, the question that ends stanza 6 might be con-
sidered rhetorical, but only if we overlook the difference between the wit 
of a human being and eternal providence, obviously god here. Yet Berger’s 
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observation that the sequence is comic, comparable to “operatic parody” 
and calculated to remind us that “in spite of all the fuss, everything is well 
under control,” has traction. When Berger adds that the question and its 
answer “serve mainly to alert the reader to Spenser’s own inventiveness,” 
however, his reading offers to replace parodic multivalence with deflat-
ing skepticism and to exclude “Eternall prouidence” from the Spenserian 
equation.27 The special virtue of parody is to enable a balance of empathy 
and comedy, seriousness and play. Una’s plight engages, not only operatic 
excess, but also the violence of rape and the doctrine of grace—god’s con-
cern for truth and for human beings. If “the heauenly virgin” Una is never 
as physically imperiled as Florimell, her figural being modulates all these 
possibilities, and, in the immediate instance, it does so through the inclu-
sive, nuanced potential of parody.
Parody and the Problem of Una
Una’s blubbering, even more than that of the other figures of women, has 
opened up larger issues pertaining to her figuration, to critical response, 
and to parody. Una is conspicuous in the first book of the epic, and this 
book, as opening, is ground and backdrop for the working of the books 
that follow. Since the subject of Book I is religious—by its nature bear- 
ing on the most serious, ultimate of concerns—it also offers a particu-
larly stringent test of the extent to which the poem might be considered 
parodic and its very allusiveness ludic (cf. allusive, < ludere, “play”). Serio 
ludere is a Renaissance commonplace that embraces parody. The concep-
tion of allusive parody, including the self-citational sort, begins to grasp 
the complex tonality of Book I, as the preceding section has suggested.
To judge from recent criticism, Una’s figural being, the kind of figure 
she presents, has become more problematical than it was in days gone by. 
Without the extremities of recent criticism, in fact, Una might not be a 
problem or have one. We live in extreme times. Truth being the daughter 
of time, to cite the old adage, recent enlightenment might well be progress, 
although it is difficult to see how the extreme diversity of current views can 
all be equally enlightened. A number of readings find that Una is deficient, 
overbearing, emasculating, or simply evil, especially in the early cantos of 
Book I, whereas others have continued to find her benign or heavenly in 
updated or reinvigorated ways. My point is that the current problem of 
Una inheres in the reception of her in recent criticism and is made acces-
sible by it. Accordingly, my plan is to interweave diverse, recent, broadly 
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representative views of her figure—historicist, comparative, psychoana-
lytical, and theological—with my own readings and especially with the 
parodic potential of her figuration, thereby to recognize and include, if 
not to reconcile, them. Already in this chapter, I have found her figure 
touched by allusive parody, at once in retrospective rereading and imme-
diately. In the end, discussion of parody in the twelfth canto, which treats 
Spenser’s Eden, will offer a possible resolution of issues that bear on Una’s 
figural being there and elsewhere.
One driver of the negative readings of Una is the fact that we never 
get inside her in the way or to the extent we do with Redcrosse. Her lamb-
like innocence—is it instead her simplicity, her oneness?—is hard to 
bear. Briefly, at least, Una, seeming to mourn “inly” from our first sight 
of her, comes to experience emotions such as grief, fear, anger, compas-
sion, doubt, and joy, which connect her to the realm of human passion 
and indeed to humanity as we mortals know it, but she remains upright, 
despite her brief, despairing swoon when she encounters the dwarf with 
the armor that Redcrosse abandoned before Orgoglio seized him. If she 
falls, she does so ritualistically “Thrise” (I.vii.24), and we know she will 
get up: not operatic parody this time but an experience—yes, ritualized 
experience—that touches her and does so without causing a sustained and 
damaging descent.28 Notably, she gets up before Arthur comes to the res-
cue, her renewed resolve and strenuous effort seeming to coincide with 
his arrival in the narrative (vii.27–29). Experience is not by definition 
corrupting (except in the mouth of Milton’s Satan). Moreover, Una is a 
figure who, from start to finish in Book I, occupies substantial portions of 
text and even whole episodes, making her a major player in this book. Her 
experience, not only Redcrosse’s, plays a defining role.
Claire McEachern calls Spenser’s epic “This least inward of poems,” 
and Una might well be the major figure to whom McEachern’s remark 
most nearly applies.29 More recently, Kathryn Walls has described Una as 
primarily an emblematic character, to an extent a designation compara-
ble to McEachern’s, although for Walls Una figures the Invisible Church, 
whereas for McEachern she figures the contemporary, national church of 
the Tudors: if there is similarity in these two views, there is more substan-
tial difference.30 Yet Una is not only an autonomous figure in the narrative 
of the poem, but sometimes crucially she also represents an aspect—an 
interior dimension, if you will—of Redcrosse, as, for example, when she 
intervenes both physically and psychically to stop his suicide. After she 
and Redcrosse are divided into “double parts” early in canto ii, neither 
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is complete without the other, and both are potentially—not necessarily 
or always already—inside and outside one another.31 Their relationship 
thereafter depends on demonstrable context; often, it is ironic, parodic, or 
both and therefore a sign of difference and distance—of divisive double-
ness. Their reunion signifies wholeness, first incipient and in the end, if 
not perfected, at least assured.
From the beginning, when Una and Redcrosse wander through the 
Wood and stumble upon Error, Una is clearly characterized in the narra-
tive as contingent truth, or truth in this fallen, human world. She does not 
possess infallibility or even the intuition of an angel. Complaints about 
her evil, deceptions, or failures arise from a reductive conception of her 
either as only a woman or else from too simple an assumption of her ideal-
ity, one so exaggerated as to replace the unfolding narrative by an a priori 
idea of her as purely an abstraction or a mystical sign. This is a false divi-
sion of concept and signifying figure from narrative. Either extreme, Una 
merely as woman or merely as ideal, effectually replaces the working of 
narrativized figuration in Book I and bifurcates or denies her integrity as 
a figure.
When Una is abandoned by Redcrosse, she or, rather, her unfold-
ing experiences organize the evolving forces of nature, history, and grace 
that will rescue Redcrosse—the lion, the satyrs, Satyrane, and eventually 
Arthur, in sum an ascending scale, as well as one that implies a histori-
cal progression. As Coelia puts it in canto x, Una “Hast wandred through 
the world,” leading her “weary soles” (an obvious pun) and guided by 
grace, while the benighted Redcrosse has sunk into the darkness of him-
self (I.x.9). When Una mistakes the disguised Archimago for Redcrosse 
in canto iii and later, in canto vi, for a pilgrim, her error, which parodies, 
by similarity and difference, the initial response of Redcrosse to Duessa, 
again bears witness to the inescapable human fallibility of her figure. 
In a relevant, religious commonplace of the period, only god sees into 
the mind and heart and alone unerringly penetrates hypocrisy, which is 
Archimago’s moral aspect (I.i.arg.). Not to be divinely unerring is not sim-
ply, in a sinful sense, to err; it might instead be an honest mistake and, if 
culpable at all, not willfully so: to err, the saying goes, is human, and, in 
Una’s characterization, it is at once inevitable and further humanizing.
When Una’s “pet lion” (as Richard Halpern comically dubs him) 
also fails to respond to Archimago’s evil in canto iii, it is first and fore-
most because he is a lion, not because Archimago has morphed into Judas, 
as Walls suggests, nor because the lion has become Una’s projection, as 
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Halpern indicates.32 At the same time, Judas, as hypocrite, like any other 
egregious, historical expression of hypocrisy, could be considered a spe-
cific aspect of what Archimago conceptually represents, if this reading is 
invited by the context. Satan himself, the guileful father of lies, is surely 
another candidate, should we want one, since Archimago is said to hate 
Una “as the hissing snake” in the garden of Eden, that is, as the shape-
shifting Satan (I.ii.9).33 In short, in the episodes involving Una, the figure 
of Archimago, when present, is a larger term for hypocritical guile even 
than the historical Satan, although Archimago’s figure alludes more than 
once to Satan and will do so again in Spenser’s Eden.34
In the developing narrative of The Faerie Queene, figures often repre-
sent many historical singularities, whether once or recurrently, rather than 
just a single one. Una’s lion does not recognize Archimago because this 
guiler does not use force, as do Sans Loy and earlier Kirkrapine. In this 
failing, the lion is analogous—again, analogous, not an identical projec-
tion—as variously elsewhere, to Redcrosse, who can recognize and deal 
with the direct, martial threat of Sans Foy but fails to recognize anything 
wrong with the disguised, deceitful Duessa. The lion, after all, whatever 
else he might be, is an animal. He is evidently also truth-loving by nature, 
or kind, as are all god’s human creatures and instinctively his nonhuman 
ones, too, especially when contextually animated—anima, or ensouled to 
an extent, as the word animal signals.35
McEachern’s argument about Una concerns history, politics, and 
ideological representation—more exactly, the coding of ideological dis-
tinctions onto the female body. McEachern recognizes that Una is associ-
ated with the invisible Church but focuses instead on the challenges of 
representing this church, or Christian truth, in the world by the figure of a 
woman whose binary opposite, Duessa, is another such figure. McEachern 
observes that the very clothing of Una renders her vulnerable to imitation, 
and as supporting evidence she offers contemporary, overlapping illustra-
tions of Queen Elizabeth and the Romish whore of Babylon (53–58). 
She suggests that Una’s visibility as a clothed, attractive figure of a woman 
necessarily compromises her absolute purity by embodiment and her self-
sameness, or identity, by susceptibility to duplication (45–46). Notably, 
however, Una only appears unveiled in her “self-resemblance” when 
restored to Eden, as distinct from her unveiled distortion by “blubbred” 
terror before Sans Loy (I.xii.8, vi.4, 9–10).36 Although McEachern’s gen-
eralization about the absence of inwardness in Spenser’s epic is mistaken 
in my view, her problematizing of Truth’s gendered expression in clothing 
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and as beauty is valuable.37 Berger seems to agree when he finds that, “Una 
is no less visible than Duessa and no less an idol,” but then he explains 
this overlap as the product of androgenesis, because Una, no less than 
Archimago’s specter of her, Duessa, is under male instruction—simply the 
same from this perspective.38 Such views as McEachern’s and Berger’s seem 
extreme. Put most simply, Una and Duessa, one and two, are not equal—
period; yet, as numbers or numerical concepts, in addition to whatever 
else they are, they are both comparable and differential.
In contrast to McEachern’s historicism, Syrithe Pugh’s emphases 
are primarily comparative and generic. Her perceptive discussions of Una 
include the Ovidian features of the Wandering Wood, Ovid’s literary 
compassion for his heroines, and the Ovidian forest of Spenser’s satyrs.39 
Deserted by Redcrosse, Una, in Pugh’s reading, resembles Vergil’s Dido 
and Ovid’s Ariadne in the Heroides, the opening of whose epistle Una’s 
meeting with the lion and subsequent complaint recall (66). Ariadne is 
also rescued by Bacchus and his satyrs in “one of Ovid’s favourite myths” 
(67), and Pugh notes that Redcrosse and Una’s retreat from a rainstorm 
into the Wood of canto i alludes to that of Aeneas and Dido from a rain-
storm into a cave. All these episodes qualify as sympathetically comic par-
ody. Pugh further observes that the “innocent wandering” in the Wood 
by Spenser’s couple turns into confusion, however—an implicit criticism 
of the Vergilian antecedent—as, unwittingly, they draw closer to Error’s 
cave (50). A sharp difference exists between Pugh’s allusive reading of 
Redcrosse and of what she terms Una’s “innocent wandering” and that of 
Walls, who speaks of “complicity” in the couple’s mutual desire to enter 
the Wood and of their guilty fear before god, from whom they “run away” 
into it (26, 29). But the rain-making deity of canto i is significantly Jove, 
not simply the Christian god, and his violent emission into his leman’s—
that is, his mistress’s—lap is more suggestive of an Olympian rape than of 
the biblical flood found in Walls’s reading (28). Redcrosse and Una don’t 
run into the Wood; they just enter it, being “Enforst” by nature (rain) to 
do so (I.i.7). They seek shelter in the Wood because, in a relevant pun, they 
have enough sense to get out of the rain. The pagan culture of the ancient 
world and nature, especially human nature, which includes common sense 
and the fleshly senses, are thematic throughout Book I. The pagan is also 
the (merely) natural until nearly the end of this book. Yet nature has been 
divinely created and, if in time fallen, in time also redeemed, as it will be 
decisively first in the eighth canto by Arthur and then progressively by 
Una and Redcrosse in the rest of Book I.
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Pugh’s description of the forest in canto vi—another woody, or nat-
ural, and mythological place (topos)—to which the satyrs take Una after 
her narrow escape from “the paradigmatic Ovidian danger, that of rape,” is 
especially attractive:
[This forest] is the world of Ovidian myth, metamorphosis, and 
natural magic as a benign and sheltering place, characterized by pity 
for the unprotected female and by a natural instinct of religious 
awe, though ill-expressed as idolatry. By making Sylvanus’s crew 
the agents of divine providence, Spenser begins to suggest a certain 
compatibility between Ovid and Christianity, especially in his pity 
for the weak and vulnerable, and in his interest in the miraculous 
[67].
The satyrs’ forest, benign if idolatrous, fits well the parodic ambivalence, 
or doubleness, that repeatedly touches the figures of Book I and affects our 
response to them. At its sharpest point, it includes the notoriously benigh-
ted but comic efforts of the satyrs to worship Una’s “Asse” when she dis-
courages their idolatrous worship of her own person (vi.19). Naturally, in 
a resonant word, the satyrs do not quite desist.
For Halpern, Una represents “the invisible Church or Christian 
Truth,” a distinction that has always seemed a bit fuzzy to me, too (1). He 
carefully asserts that Una’s “lion becomes to some degree a psychic projec-
tion of Una” and therefore intuits Una’s wishes in clawing open the door 
to Corceca’s cottage (2). But soon, Halpern’s Corceca likewise signifies 
Una’s “blindness of heart” for two reasons: first, Una does not interrupt 
“her lion’s murderous rage,” and second, “When a Spenserian hero arrives 
at a particular locale, we generally understand the place to embody his or 
her spiritual condition at that moment” (2). This generalization, although 
plausible, is an oversimplification. The simultaneous presence of two (or 
more) visitors in the Houses of Book I, not to mention evidence from the 
Houses of subsequent books, instead suggests that every House has some 
special pertinence to each visitor, not an identity with each: Redcrosse is 
not Coelia, and Britomart is not Amoret, the latter a distinction that I 
pursue in chapter 3. If, in some ways and to some extent, Una represents 
the Church, in addition to Truth, she has a distinctly social, cultural, and 
historical dimension, to which the role of an abbess (Abessa) and Corceca’s 
incessant use of prayer beads perversely pertain. Details, particulars, and 
distinctions, not only similarities and generalizations, are ever impor-
tant to the working of Spenserian allegory. Those who are deficient, or 
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lacking, and blind of heart—Abessa and Corceca—pertinently contrast 
with Una’s presence and needs as an abandoned woman, as Truth, or as 
Church, rather than simply exposing her interiorized hang-ups. The other 
problem, Una’s not restraining the lion, vanishes if we do not just assume 
that he is her projection. Lions respond instinctively to violence, as does 
Una’s lion to the violent intrusion of Kirkrapine.
Insofar as Una figures Truth, she certainly has some degree of intui-
tion, as philosophers assert we all do, and she also has some knowledge 
of the ur-dragon, that dragon of dragons, that is besieging Eden. To ask 
why Una, who eventually recognizes the Wandering Wood as the site of 
Error’s den, should be “familiar at all” with such a place overlooks this 
background (Halpern, 2). No more than experience need knowledge be 
corrupting : “Evil into the mind of god or Man / May come and go, so 
unapprov’d, and leave / No spot or blame behind,” to recall Paradise Lost, 
for whose poet Spenser was the “Original.”40 Una is noticeably quicker 
than Redcrosse to read the signs of danger in the Wood and then to rec-
ognize Error. She cannot do so sooner precisely because, as this episode 
signals, she is contingent truth here. She is no longer in Eden or even in 
the court of gloriana, having entered the world of quest in order to end 
the siege of Eden by evil. Now she participates in a quest narrative that 
is committed to experience, to encountering its perils and learning from 
them. That she does learn from them is one reason she can see through 
Archimago’s disguise in canto xii, as she cannot earlier, in cantos iii and vi. 
Of course, in canto xii, she is also back in Eden, and the dragon is dead, at 
least for now.
Halpern takes Una to task for advising Redcrosse to stay the night 
with Archimago, and his doing so invites a closer look at her advice, 
which, on the face of it, does seem odd. There is something parodic about 
it, since her role recalls the damsels who people romances and either help 
the hero or, alternatively, entrap him. The stated reasons for Una’s advice 
are that night is approaching and the battle-weary Redcrosse needs some 
sleep. True: these reasons respond sensibly to natural needs, of which 
Una evidently and appropriately has knowledge, and, as elsewhere until 
canto xii, she is unable to penetrate the hypocritical Archimago’s disguise. 
Again, the truth she embodies is contingent, not divinely omniscient, and 
she is about to learn a hard lesson concerning the natural condition of her 
chosen knight.
Halpern’s reading merges Una and Archimago at this moment, 
however, and tellingly, he cites as evidence a sequence of two stanzas in 
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which, he suggests, we might suppose at the outset of the second, that 
Archimago, not Una, is speaking (3). In the first of these stanzas, Una 
addresses Redcrosse:
Now (saide the Ladie) [it] draweth toward night,
And well I wote, that of your later fight
Ye all forwearied be: for what so strong,
But wanting rest will also want of might?
The Sunne that measures heauen all day long,
At night doth baite his steeds the Ocean waues emong.
The next stanza continues,
Then with the Sunne take Sir, your timely rest,
And with new day new worke at once begin:
Vntroubled night they say giues counsell best.
Right well Sir knight ye haue aduised bin,
Quoth then that aged man [Archimago].
 (I.i.32–33)
In the middle of the second stanza, Archimago reinforces, indeed cleverly 
exploits, Una’s advice, but the reasonable and grammatical supposition at 
its start is that Una is still speaking. If the identity of the speaker wobbles 
for a line in the middle, unless we already suspect Una of evil, there is no 
more reason to pin the wobble on her than to give the guileful Archimago 
due credit for it. Without a reason to blame Una here, Halpern’s already 
having identified her with Corceca and the murderous lion in canto iii, 
thereby having violated the narrative sequence of the poem in order to 
imply a reason in canto iii to suspect Una’s motive here in canto i, is sus-
pect but strategic. Simultaneously, this strategy welcomes, even provokes, 
reexamination of the text, as well as of the method of reading it, which is 
hardly separable from Halpern’s critical argument. Ironically, it is useful to 
my purposes in highlighting the importance of narrative sequence to the 
development, the unfolding process, of the poem. From the Wandering 
Wood to the battle with Error, to Archimago, Redcrosse and Una travel 
through an increasingly perilous landscape that requires greater discrimi-
nation from all who encounter it, not only from the immediate travelers 
in the poem. The challenge to reading, whether figures and landscape or 
verbal text, is tricky.
Another of Halpern’s arguments is provocative, since it aligns 
with his shift from a defining lack in Una to Freud’s notion that castra-
tion defines the psychological condition of woman and doing so aligns 
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with other engagements of psychoanalytical readings in this chapter and 
the third one. Halpern reads Una (woman) as a lack that becomes a “pro-
miscuous unity . . . drift[ing] into” Archimago or other unsavory figures, 
because her very basis is an absence of substantive being. This argument is 
comically seductive, and, indeed, there is a certain tongue-in-cheek qual-
ity throughout Halpern’s essay, initially delivered as a luncheon address—
more serio ludere, perhaps? The argument starts by claiming that the Latin 
word una is exclusively a modifier, an adjective or adverb, and not a gram-
matical entity, or noun (5).41 According to Latin or English lexicons, this 
claim is mistaken. English one or Latin unus/-a/-um as a noun variously 
signifies a numeral equally represented by the figure 1 or the word one; it 
can also signify the concept of singleness, or unity, and someone, a sin-
gularity. The relation of the noun to the adjective is often ambiguous—a 
dynamic, portentous pun that simultaneously looks two ways, to heaven 
and earth, for example, and in short, to a unity. In an unfolding temporal 
narrative, such unity becomes at most continuity in this world, which is, 
to my mind, what Una comes actually to embody.42
A maxim in Spenser’s Book V comes to mind: “truth is one in all”—
that is, one always and everywhere one, an inspiring thought that the 
immediate context challenges in the later, more secular book (xi.56).43 But 
how does this familiar maxim apply to Una in Book I? The argument to 
its second canto specifically refers to Una as “Truth,” which is the only sin-
gular, specific name besides Una she gets. Truth, understood as medieval 
trouthe, which is an understanding readily available in the sixteenth cen-
tury, has ontological, epistemological, and personal dimensions—as the 
godhead, objective reality, and subjective, affective loyalty (cf. modern, 
plighted troth)—all of which pertain to Una. If I had to choose between 
Una as invisible Church or as Truth, the options Halpern specifies, I 
would choose Truth hands down as the broader, more conceptual term 
and regard the invisible Church as one important expression of it—more 
exactly, as one expression of the poetic figure of Una when justified by the 
text, and never as an exclusive expression.
Aside from the awkward fact that Una is quite visible, the pres-
ence in Augustine of the Protestant doctrine of the invisible Church is 
itself debatable. This doctrine, which, for Walls, Una represents, is cer-
tainly present in Calvin, who probably thought he found it in Augustine, 
and it is earlier present in Luther. The Protestant reformers had some-
how to account for what the Spirit was doing during all those centuries 
of blindered Catholicism, whereas, in quite a different historical context, 
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Augustine had had to fend off the Donatists by defending the institutional 
church, something he did vigorously. Many are the versions of Augustine’s 
ecclesiology to be found, whether in the Renaissance or the present. Such 
a learned bishop in the English Protestant Church as Lancelot Andrewes, 
a contemporary of Spenser, speaks not of the invisible Church, but more 
traditionally of the “mystical body of Christ,” referring this to Saints Paul 
and Augustine.44 But I am not choosing between Una’s conceptual identi-
ties, merely prioritizing one, namely Truth.
Between 1998 and 2004, Berger published three related articles, all 
of which treat the figure of Una to some extent.45 In them, his approach is 
theorized and frankly psychoanalytical, for example, including the castra-
tion principle, narcissism, scapegoating displacements, redistributed com-
plicities, and what he calls the discourses of victims and sinners, both of 
which are forms of false consciousness. He interprets Spenser’s Book I in 
modern terms of gender and sexuality, thereby to show that Christianity 
scapegoats woman (1998:177–80). He also intends to demonstrate that 
Spenser exposes this scapegoating and its associated expressions of bad or 
diseased conscience, rather than participating in them (1998:180).
The proof of the critical pudding is how well it works with Spenser’s 
text. Berger reads by the light of a laser beam, and his localized insight is 
always illuminating, but I am not so sure that his larger argument holds 
up. His discussion of the end of Despair’s canto in Book I affords a striking 
example, as well as an opportunity to consider the relevant text: here, Una, 
who has entered the cave of Despair with Redcrosse (ix.35), intervenes 
suddenly to snatch the dagger from her knight’s suicidal hand, sharply to 
reproach him (52), and urgently to remind him of divine mercy and of 
his own election (53). At the very end of the canto, Redcrosse does what 
Una advises, “Arise . . . and leave this cursed place,” namely, the landscape 
of Despair (I.ix.53). His doing so recalls his cooperation with Una early in 
the book to defeat Error, however temporarily, and it is a small, imperfect 
sign of their reunion as they leave Despair for the House of Holiness. In 
Berger’s reading of this episode, however, Una’s intervention effectually 
infantilizes, emasculates, and castrates Redcrosse.46 Yet Una has just inter-
rupted a suicide, the temptation to which Despair’s coup de grâce—oops, 
forget grâce—has been to excite the deranged knight’s imagination of 
damnation. Suicide is imminent, the dagger poised in the knight’s uplifted 
hand, and immediate intervention is needed. The terror of damnation is 
what the knight flinches from—not from divine forgiveness, as Berger 
suggests, but from its erasure by the insidious working of Despair, now 
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at its critical moment (1998:176). Nothing is heard from Una of “heau-
enly mercies” until the critical moment requiring her immediate action 
has passed (I.ix.53).47 Insofar as Una’s figure points to heavenly interven-
tion in this episode, she is grace—saving grace—but she is also love, and 
she is truth, trouthe. Her acting directly to save her knight also expresses 
an assurance and a strength of conviction not evident in her figure before. 
These will be evident again before the book is finished.
In another of the articles, Berger treats the “transmigration” of mean-
ing from one character in Book I to another in ways that intersect with my 
own and others’ arguments about Una in the present essay. The term “trans-
migration” is evidently more than a translation of the term “metaphor,” or 
continued metaphor (“allegory”), however.48 “Transmigration” substitutes 
here for psychoanalytical displacement, and it displaces metaphor’s main-
tenance of difference, or, indeed, of narrative distance. Thus the meanings 
of the names Abessa and Corceca “transmigrate to Redcross,” as instanced 
in “his blindheartedness” and in his fleeing from Una, thereby absenting 
himself (Berger, 2004:225). Yes, but also no. What’s in a name when each 
of these two figures of women is disembodied and returned to the status of 
a common word? Transmigratory reading subsequently turns Abessa and 
Corceca into additional displacements of the failings of Redcrosse, as cul-
tural representative and protagonist, onto woman. But other kinds of rela-
tionship between Abessa/Corceca and the fleeing knight are surely pos-
sible, a leading candidate being parody or, more blandly and locally, ironic 
commentary. Rather than being sucked into the vortex of Redcrosse’s 
psyche, through ironized parody this episode distances it, comments on it 
critically, and puts it into a much broader historical perspective.
We witness Redcrosse’s blindness to Una’s loyalty and his flight both 
from her (and figuratively from himself ) considerably before Abessa and 
Corceca appear in the narrative, and so Abessa/Corceca’s commenting 
on Redcrosse’s failures can only be retrospective—simultaneously a back-
wards connection of their meaning to his and an outward migration of 
his meaning to theirs. Yet transmigrating, or simply blending, their mean-
ing (and subsequently Kirkrapine’s) backwards into Redcrosse’s without 
their ever laying eyes on him reprioritizes and compromises their own 
figuration and function in the narrative, as it does Una’s. Abessa’s name, 
for example, has many meanings—notably, absence of being, abbess, and 
a meaning that usually gets forgotten, absenteeism, which applies both 
to former Catholic and current Protestant abusers of benefices.49 If the 
spelling and etymology of Abessa’s name also relate her to Duessa and 
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thence to the larger plot of Book I, the connection appears to be more 
strongly thetic and historical than psychic and internal in this instance 
(cf. Berger, 2004:225). Allegory, as a continued form of metaphor, is, once 
again, about differences, as well as similarities: Abessa is a withdrawal 
from being, Duessa a doubling and, implicitly, a fragmentation of it and 
therefore a more positive threat. Relatively simple, relatively outward, and 
relatively emblematic as are figures such as Abessa and Corceca, their figu-
ration in the narrative resists reduction to Redcrosse’s psyche, as, indeed, 
does Una’s. Again, yes, but also no: relationship is not identity: metaphor, 
including allegory, always combines similarity with difference.
Allegorical projections and momentary or partial identifications 
occur in Spenser’s Book I, as well as in other Renaissance writers, but they 
also respect figural differences and narrative distances and ask for specific, 
immediate textual support. These expectations apply even to the personi-
fied, hence tropic, figure of Despair, who looks like Redcrosse emerging 
from Orgoglio’s dungeon and knows all about the knight’s betrayals, but 
fails of full identity with Redcrosse, with whom he dialogues, interacts, 
and in speaking momentarily even merges, and whom he desperately 
wants simply to become. Yet Despair cannot become Redcrosse without 
the knight’s actual, bodily death as the fulfillment and finality of his des-
peration. Precisely labeled, this haunting tropic figure is the temptation to 
despair. Another representative instance of the textual support expected 
occurs in Archimago’s retrospective-proleptic parody of Redcrosse already 
discussed, by which this magician frightens himself with his own disguises 
and then dons the armor of the fleeing knight, thus impersonating him.50
Whereas Halpern and Berger prioritize Freud and Lacan, Walls’s 
book on Una reprioritizes Saint Augustine, the Bible, and religion more 
generally. It too features perceptive, localized readings,51 but I part funda-
mentally with her central thesis that Una, from the time that she is aban-
doned by Redcrosse, is consistently and primarily the invisible Church, 
also understood as Augustine’s City of god or the human community 
joined with Christ and thereby representing him. Consistency and pri-
macy are the major sticking points. In an episode such as Una’s sojourn 
with the satyrs, Walls’s thesis is plausible, but not exclusively so, in view of 
Pugh’s reading of the same episode, which to me is more compelling. It is 
thus not that Walls’s argument is simply wrong, but that it is too absolute. 
Her argument requires that, prior to Redcrosse’s abandonment, Una is, 
as she puts it, “chronically fallible” (20). Reading Una’s role in entering 
the Wandering Wood, in recognizing Error’s den, in her encouragement 
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to Redcrosse when he fights Error, and in advising Redcrosse to lodge with 
Archimago, Walls outdoes Halpern’s criticism of Una, which she cites for 
support. For instance, although neither Redcrosse nor Una enters the cave 
of Error, Una is nonetheless “in error” (32). This view denies Spenser’s nar-
rative: both may approach Error, but Una recognizes it, warns Redcrosse, 
and stops short of it. Subsequently, the knight peeks boldly into Error’s 
cave, his “glistring armor” exhibiting the parodic light of a votive candle—
“a litle glooming light, much like a shade” (I.i.14). Then, once Error has 
effectually paralyzed him by coiling her tail, python-like, around him, Una 
calls out to him, “Add faith vnto your force, and be not faint” (I.i.19). 
Walls criticizes Una at this moment for conceiving of faith as merely “a 
supplement to ‘force,’” and Redcrosse for responding, “not because his 
faith in god has been awakened but because his pride has been stung” 
(21–22). If she is right about Redcrosse’s response, this is his failing , 
not Una’s, and, as Walls notes, Una’s encouragement at least works to 
strengthen her knight.52 (A parallel but near-farcically parodic incident 
comes later, in Lucifera’s House, when Duessa encourages Sans Joy, and 
Redcrosse responds instead by mustering his strength.) Even aside from 
what Una intends in her cry of encouragement, its result is that Redcrosse 
responds “with more then manly force” and beheads the reptilian monster 
(i.24: my emphasis). In short, her encouragement works.
But is it fair to conclude that Una conceives of faith as merely a 
supplement? First, remember the narrative situation: Redcrosse is in dire 
physical straits, the serpent enveloping him; what role should his force 
play? And is Una’s outcry to add faith to force—belief to effort—really 
compromising in this moment? Consulting the OED, Walls finds that “‘to 
add faith to [something]’ was once an idiomatic expression for ‘to give cre-
dence to [it], to believe in [it].’” But she adds that, “Faith in the context of 
this definition is quite distinct from religious faith, faith (that is) in god” 
and bases her assertion on the historically relevant supporting citations 
in the OED that are secular—specifically prudential or erotic (23). There 
are two problems here: the first hardly counts against Walls’s scholarship, 
which precludes the endless rechecking of mutating electronic sources; 
nonetheless, the third edition of the OED (2010), contravening her claim, 
includes the following religious citation, dated 1560, for the expression 
“to add faith to”: “Iudas repented & confessed his sinne, . . but . . because 
he added not faith vnto his repentaunce, confession and satisfaction, all 
was in vaine.”53 The second problem is larger and more significant insofar 
as it bears on the use of negative evidence, that is, on an absence. Although 
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Spenser’s use of the phrase was apparently not instanced in the edition of 
the OED Walls consulted, negative evidence is weak in the face of textual 
use. For good reason, the OED invites readers to furnish any overlooked 
example of variant usage, which, in the instance of Redcrosse’s battle with 
Error, further shows that the expression in question occurs in the context 
of religious faith.
Walls also suggests that “force,” as Una uses it in her outcry, is “prob-
ably . . . no more than ‘strength,’” which is “tantamount to believing in 
‘himself ’” or in an “intensified egotism” and quite in contrast to Una’s 
admonishing him nine cantos later, when he faces Despair, to believe in 
god’s mercy (23–24). Yet consider that we are at the beginning of an evolv-
ing narrative and that one of the things we initially read about the nature 
of Redcrosse’s quest is how much his heart yearns to test his puissance 
“Vpon his foe, and his new force to learne” (I.i.3). Untried, overeager, and 
overconfident, the young knight has much to learn, but he is nonetheless 
on a righteous quest, not only to confront his dragon (or dragons) and by 
experience to learn the force of his foe, but also to learn the nature and 
source of his own force, which includes his having been chosen to wear the 
armor of Ephesians 6:11: the crucial phrase from Spenser’s alexandrine, 
“his new force to learne,” reads both these ways. Una’s urging, only sixteen 
stanzas later, “Add faith vnto your force,” taken whole as an independent 
clause, with its major stress on the immediate predicate “faith” rather than 
on “force,” the later object of a preposition, for all these reasons refers 
not exclusively to physical strength or to faith as merely a supplement 
but functions instead as the salvific intervention that Una’s words intend. 
Redcrosse’s true self, the one he is questing to realize, is, if as yet immature, 
not just egotistical, as both Una and gloriana presumably believed when 
they chose him and he took upon himself the full armor of god. In short, 
Una’s encouragement to Redcrosse is appropriate to the context of his first 
battle and to his present condition, rather than simplistically flawed or 
disconcertingly secular (Walls, 24).
Aside from the episodes prior to Una’s abandonment, Walls’s oppo-
site, idealizing assertion that Una is somehow transformed, or elected, into 
her role as the invisible Church during the night at Archimago’s hermitage 
is for me a hard saying. This transformation of Una is, in Walls’s words, 
“most important” yet also “secret” and “unspecified” (4; cf. 38, 178). It is 
as invisible, or hidden, as the true Church itself—that is, it happens out-
side our sight and, indeed, beyond Spenser’s text. Thereafter, Una’s adven-
tures mirror those of the Church in Augustine’s City of God: the satyrs, 
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for example, represent the Church’s mission to the gentiles, which is not 
invisible, although Una, in reality, is.54
Arthur, like Redcrosse, once he reforms, and like everyone else 
who helps Una, barring the lion (read as a Christ figure), is a constituent 
part or replica, indeed, an aspect, of Una’s unique singularity for Walls 
(178–79). From start to finish, Book I is really about Una, not Arthur or 
even Redcrosse, seemingly its equal or more focal protagonist; she, always 
already communal, is its only subject. In short, although Walls’s book is 
valuable in ways and at moments, not least in seeing something at once 
communal and larger than life in the figure of Una, its commitment to an 
all-consuming argument challenges credibility, a word some might hear 
with irony. Spenser’s epic is a narrative committed to temporal sequence 
and development. It resists totalizing, systemic impositions, be they psy-
choanalytical or religious, modern or late antique.
Parody in Eden
Parody persists in the final third of Book I, for example, in the figure 
of Despair as guide and counselor, quoting and skewing classical and 
Christian commonplaces, or in the initial behavior of the ungainly, 
overweight dragon, “Halfe flying , and halfe footing in his haste” and, 
in a pun, shadowing the land “vnder his huge waste” (I.xi.8). Initially, 
Una’s figure might seem free of parody at the end, but her homeland, 
Eden, and the events occurring there certainly are not, and the more clo-
sely we look, her figure is vitally touched by parody as well. It is so because 
she is a major player in these events, one finally, if momentarily, again 
crucial.
But what in the world might Eden be in the twelfth canto of Book 
I? What sort of place (topos)? Many readers, perhaps thinking of Milton’s 
“paradise within,” have assumed Eden’s innerness, a reasonable assump-
tion that I share and one that correlates with the inner dimension of other 
houses (topoi) in this book. Notably, however, these other houses, even 
the minor residences of Archimago or Aesculapius, the one a hermitage, 
the other a cave in the pit of hell, are not exclusively inner.55 The name 
Eden openly evokes, indeed insists on reference to, the Edenic garden of 
genesis, gone forever as an unfallen, earthly paradise, and so it evokes 
exile, together with return, loss along with triumph. This name further 
strengthens the necessity of Eden’s innerness, even while accentuating its 
lost outerness and consequent fictitiousness.
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If Spenser’s Eden were only inner, the lengthy, folksy scene-setting 
early in the canto would be odd and seem out of place: mirthful children, 
women with timbrels, a rabble gaping, gazing, and frightened by the idea 
of lingering life in the dragon. Memorably and typically realistic, a mother 
warns her child away from the dead dragon’s claws, while others boldly 
measure the beast, as if it were a beached whale. In this context, a reader 
might well recall the parodic tie of Saint george to the popular imagina-
tion when the first canto opened. Now, in canto xii, such domestic scene-
setting—also suggestive of genre painting—signals an outer, social dimen-
sion, as well. The realm of Eden is the conclusive counterbalance to that 
of Lucifera. Both places have inner and outer being in the poem, and their 
relationship is effectually parodic.
A. C. Hamilton notes in his edition that the line describing 
Redcrosse’s joy at his betrothal to Una—“His heart did seeme to melt in 
pleasures manifold”—“recalls the parody of his present state” during his 
erotic dream of her at Archimago’s hermitage in the first canto.56 A differ-
ent parodic reminiscence, also noticed by Hamilton, ties Spenser’s Eden to 
Lucifera’s House of Pride. During the betrothal ceremony in Eden,
 sweete Musicke did apply
Her curious skill, the warbling notes to play,
To driue away the dull Melancholy;
The whiles one sung a song of loue and iollity.
 (I.xii.38)
The OED offers the penultimate line of this inset as an example of melan-
choly meaning “sadness, dejection . . . gloominess; pensiveness or intro-
spection; an inclination or tendency to this.”57 The same line recalls the 
time that Redcrosse entered Lucifera’s hall to battle Sans Joy and found 
there that “many Minstrales maken melody, / To driue away the dull 
melancholy” (I.v.3). That dull melancholy needs to be driven away in the 
House of Pride, where Sans Joy is about to be battled, is not surprising, but 
that this need exists in the palace of Eden’s king is so, unless we remem-
ber that an earthly Eden is a memory of failure, exile, and loss, not just a 
triumphant return. This is a doubleness with which readers of Milton’s 
Eden, envisioned from a fallen world, will be familiar. In this world, the 
attainment of a Miltonic paradise within will also co-exist with another 
awareness, if only, in such ideal attainment, a memory of what has been 
lost. Duessa might be foiled but not eliminated—that is, not killed or de-
stroyed.
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Another revealing instance of parody that occurs when Arthur first 
enters the picture in Book I resonates with the present one. The phrase 
“exceeding shone” in Arthur’s introductory description recalls that of 
Lucifera, in which it occurs twice, and these two figures parodically share 
an additional, iconic affinity with a dragon, the one on his helmet, the 
other beneath her feet (iv.8–9, vii.34). The description of Arthur has 
other verbal memories of unsavory figures who appear earlier, including 
Orgoglio and Archimago. The broader bearing of parody on the figure of 
Arthur, whose elf queen originates in Chaucer’s comic Tale of Sir Thopas, 
which is itself a parody, is one I have told elsewhere.58 Again and again 
in Book I, the idealized figure of Arthur, best of knights and magnani-
mous epitome of all the virtues, is touched and humanized by parody, as 
are all its major figures, Una included. The ambivalence of parody, whose 
roots spread over Book I, might be seen to penetrate the entire epic, not 
to undermine or destroy its ideals, but at once to recognize and to ensure 
their ties to the human conditions of language, of storytelling , and of 
life.59 Again, parody can be gentle and forgiving.
It is with this broadly parodic perspective that I want to return to 
the problem of Una, insofar as it is also the problem of the whole twelfth 
canto, which has fully satisfied few modern readers, perhaps because we 
have had other expectations or desires. Noticeably, the twelfth is also a 
relatively short canto, in fact the shortest in Book I. Space and time are 
not features that Spenser, the poet who puts the garden of Adonis in the 
middle of Book III and its fertile mount “in the middest of that Paradise,” 
easily ignores (vi.43).60 A tongue-in-cheek, highly rhetorical, and, frankly, 
coy question about Archimago’s arrest near the end of the twelfth canto 
openly signals that this arrest will be temporary and brief, as readers dis-
cover early in Book II: “Who then would thinke, that by his subtile trains 
/ He could escape fowle death or deadly pains?” (I.xii.36). The tone of this 
parodic question by the narrator—a question generically reminiscent of 
one in a book for children—comes when the threat to the betrothal is over 
and right before its consummation proceeds.
For the purpose of discussion, canto xii can be broken into two 
halves: first, triumphant return and, second, betrothal, and so, in effect, 
past present and future present. At the beginning of the second half comes 
the spoiler, the guileful messenger of fragmentation and disunity, that is, 
of Duessa: double being, duplicity, dualism. This messenger, Archimago, 
destined for near farce recurrently in Book II, is akin to Ate, the messen-
ger with the apple of discord at another, earlier wedding in ancient myth, 
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destined to play a part in later books of the poem.61 Duessa’s emissary, 
Archimago, the old man of Ephesians 4:22–24, as well as an evil image-
maker and himself the arch (chief ) image, presents her claim to the per-
son of Redcrosse.62 The claim, “that writt,” is not just something written 
(xii.25). A writ is more exactly “a written command, order, or authority,” 
“a legal document or instrument,” “a written command precept, or formal 
order issued by a court in the name of the sovereign, state, or other compe-
tent legal authority, directing or enjoining the person or persons to whom 
it is addressed to do or refrain from doing some act specified therein.”63 
The legalese would have been familiar to Spenser, himself a litigant and 
the deputy clerk of the Council of Munster.64
The writ itself includes Duessa’s claim to Redcrosse “or liuing or else 
dead,” phrasing that strangely recalls a memorable, biblical ambiguity in 
the initial description of Redcrosse at the opening of Book I, where this 
knight is said ever to wear a bloody cross in “remembrance of his dying 
Lord . . . And dead as liuing euer him” adore (i.2). Despite a possible echo 
of Revelation 1:18, “I am he who liveth that was dead,” exactly what “dead 
as liuing” means is ambiguous and elusive at the outset of the opening 
canto. The emphasis on death that the phrase “dying Lord” contributes to 
this context two lines earlier only heightens its ambiguity. “Dead as liu-
ing” could mean “dead as if living” or “dead as when living” or “dead and 
living.” There is more than one touch of ambiguity in Redcrosse’s figure 
at the beginning of the first canto, but this particular ambiguity is spe-
cial, insofar as it concerns the young knight’s faith, the extent and degree 
to which he grasps—fully understands or fully embodies—the burden, at 
once the weight and the meaning, of the redemptive armor he wears. In 
each of the possible readings of the ambiguous phrase, death seems to vie 
with or even to preempt life, as it does in the tale Duessa tells Redcrosse 
after his defeat of Sans Foy. She portrays herself as the betrothed widow of 
a prince slain by foes, who travels far and wide to seek his “blessed body,” 
further emphasized and parodically degraded five lines later to a “woefull 
corse” (I.ii.24). Since Duessa’s father is the Emperor of the West with a 
throne by the Tiber, she is clearly a representative of the Roman Catholic 
Church here, and her single-minded search for the body of her slain 
prince glances at the enormous emphasis on the Corpus Christi in the late 
medieval history of Catholic ceremony and sacrament, which carried 
over to the sixteenth century, and it intimates that this emphasis might be 
considered a death cult.65 In the writ of canto xii, her claim to Redcrosse 
holds a threatening memory of these earlier necrotic passages. Little 
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wonder that “dull melancholy” has to be driven away after the intrusion of 
Archimago-Duessa and their reassertion of failure and loss at the end of 
Book I.
Archimago’s intrusion to deliver Duessa’s legal writ also evokes and 
parodies a scene common in both dramatic and nondramatic writing from 
the Middle Ages to the sixteenth century, namely the devil’s legalistic asser-
tion of his right to Adam and all his descendants. Together, the charge and 
the argument against it were a theological commonplace. Langland’s Piers 
Plowman, known to Spenser, affords a representative example of its poetic 
treatment.66 When Christ comes to harrow hell and free the pious pagans, 
Lucifer explains to his fellow demons that if Christ
 “reue [bereave] me my riȝt he robbeth me by  
  maistrie.
For by right and by reson the renkes [race (“men”)] 
  that ben here
Body and soule beth myne, bothe goode and ille.
For himself seide, that Sire is of heuene,
If Adam ete the Appul alle sholde deye
And dwelle with vs deueles.”
 (XVIII.277–82)
He then adds, “‘I leeue that lawe nul noȝt lete [allow] hym the leeste [the 
least of them]’” to escape (285).67 Lucifer’s argument belongs to the Old 
Law, which casts further light on the words and images in Archimago-
Duessa’s claim: “the burning Altars,” “bold periury,” and “polluted” 
pledges, for example (xii.27).
With further relevance to what happens next in Spenser’s twelfth 
canto, Langland’s Satan picks up the thread after Lucifer:
  “but I me soore drede,
For thow gete hem with gile and his gardyn breke,
And in semblaunce of a serpent sete vpon the  
 Appultree
And eggest hem to ete, Eue by hirselue,
And toldest hire a tale, of treson were the wordes;
And so thou haddest hem out and hider at the laste.”
 (XVIII.286–91)
Then goblin, another devil, chimes in: “‘For [because] god wol noȝt be 
bigiled . . . ne byiaped [tricked], / We haue no trewe title to hem, for thoruȝ 
treson were thei dampned’” (293–94). In Spenser’s Cave of Mammon in 
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Book II, Mammon will receive a common epithet for the devil, “guyler,” 
variously repeated throughout the debate among Langland’s devils and 
then in Christ’s answer to them. Its application to Mammon in Book II 
will only confirm what Archimago and Duessa share proleptically with 
him (vii.64). When, in Piers Plowman, Christ confronts the devils’ legal-
ism, he, too, first answers in terms of the Old Law, observing that beguil- 
ers deserve beguilement, that guile had deceived Adam and Eve, and that 
his own life has paid on the cross for theirs and redeemed their debt: in 
short, an eye for an eye and a fulfillment of the Law (XVIII.330–60). 
The further point that pertains to the writ of Archimago-Duessa, how- 
ever, is that their legalism has been superseded by a new covenant of grace, 
redemption, and mercy, which Langland’s Christ next asserts at length. 
In all these passages—the exchanges between the devils and then Christ’s 
declaration to them—lies the backgrounding gloss on Redcrosse’s re- 
sponse to the charges of Archimago-Duessa and Una’s intervention to 
support the truth of his claims. She is “trouthe,” after all, Truth, no longer 
veiled, and she is also love, the love of and for Redcrosse. It is fitting at this 
point that, as unveiled truth, she should penetrate Archimago’s disguise 
for the first time.
Redcrosse responds explicitly to the writ against him, which urges 
Duessa’s rights, not Una’s. This distinction should not be misleading, 
however: Duessa’s rights cannot exist without the cancelation of Una’s, 
nor can Duessa (re)appear without Redcrosse’s separation from Una, as 
happened in canto ii. Notably, Duessa does not come herself to Eden’s 
court. Likewise, now in reverse, Duessa’s rights must first be disabled 
before Una’s are fully restored. Redcrosse’s response blames Duessa 
for leading him astray “vnwares” (twice: xii.31–32), and it thus recalls ear-
lier characterizations of him, such as “since no’vntruth he knew” (about 
his response to the dream of a false Una: I.i.53) and “too simple and too 
trew,” the narrator’s ironic and ambiguous observation when Redcrosse 
embraces the guileful deception of Duessa-Fidessa by the tree of Fradubio; 
there the narrator’s obser vation referred at once to the swooning 
Duessa’s overdone deception and to the naïveté and vulnerability of 
the young knight, thus merging them at least syntactically and verbally 
(I.ii.45).
In the present canto, Redcrosse’s response to the writ and then 
Una’s support of his words now accord with what Langland’s devils fear-
fully anticipate and what Christ actually says to Satan: “‘For the dede that 
thei [Adam and Eve] dide, thi [thy] deceite it made; / With gile thow 
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hem gete ageyn alle reson” (XVIII.333–34). Based on deceit and guile, 
Duessa’s claim is without legal standing; it lacks truth. Christ’s argument 
in Langland next makes redemptive grace and the love of the creator for 
his creature still more crucial as its positive culmination. This ending too 
will be recalled in the conclusion to Spenser’s first book.
In light of Piers Plowman, Una, together with Redcrosse, is vitally 
touched by parody at the end of canto xii—explicitly by sacred parody, 
a cultural staple in medieval and Renaissance times. Importantly, it is 
together that they act to invalidate the writ, sharing the exposure of its 
origin in deceit. But Una’s role goes beyond this exposure. She embod-
ies not only personal loyalty (“trouthe,” or troth) and Truth (“trouthe”) 
but also love, at once human love in the narrative and godly love more 
broadly and symbolically. It is she who, at the crucial moment, acts to 
support Redcrosse and indeed to save him from the guile and dualism 
that Archimago and Duessa represent. Britomart will play a similar role 
simultaneously as Artegall’s love and the vehicle of redemptive love in 
Book V, where the fallen Artegall is imprisoned “Vntill his owne true 
loue his freedome gained” (v.57): Artegall’s “true loue” is at once Britomart, 
who loves him, and his true love (trouthe, troth) for her.68 Book V is a 
different context, and Britomart’s figure is different from, not simply 
related to, Una’s, however, a matter to which my third chapter will in time 
return.
After Redcrosse’s acknowledgment of his “mishaps” with Duessa 
(31–32), it is Una’s support for his story (33–34) by which her father, 
the King, is “greatly moued,” resulting in Archimago’s arrest and the con-
summation of her betrothal to Redcrosse (35). Una is not Christ, still less 
is Britomart much later, but both figures intimate an analogy between 
his redeeming love and the love of a woman for a man and a man for a 
woman—in canto xii of Book I, especially a woman’s for a man.69 Earlier 
in this canto, the narrator has described the “glorious light” of Una’s “sun-
shiny face,” which Hamilton glosses suggestively with Revelation 12:1, the 
woman clothed with the sun (23). In Spenser’s Epithalamion, not to be 
published or written until 1594–95, the poet will refer to the beauty of 
his own bride’s “sunshiny face,” a memory (at least for his readers) of Una’s 
human, as well as of her distinctively heavenly, aspect.70
Hamilton’s notes also gloss the last half dozen stanzas of canto 
xii of Book I with references to numerous marital contexts: the mar-
riage supper of the Lamb, the numerological symbolism of marriage in 
the Old Testament, pagan Roman rites, and Spenser’s Epithalamion. 
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Hamilton specifies the sweating of the walls and posts with sprinkled wine 
in Epithalamion, 253–54, with respect to their sprinkling and sweating 
in canto xii.38. For me, the most telling parallel between the culminat-
ing events in canto xii and Epithalamion comes in the central stanzas of 
ceremony in each when time touches eternity. In canto xii, there is heard 
the “heauenly noise . . . Like as it had bene many an Angels voice,” a song 
at once “heauenly” and “sweet,” otherworldly and sensuous; no creature 
knows whence it “Proceeded, yet eachone felt secretly / Himselfe thereby 
refte of his sences meet, / And rauished with rare impression in his sprite” 
(39). These lines describe the ravishing of sense into spirit, its sublation or 
simultaneously its raising, cancelation, and continuation—all three, but 
above all here, its elevation. In Epithalamion, the organ notes are louder 
(“Open the temple gates unto my love, / Open them wide that she may 
enter in”); the choristers praising the Lord are human, the angels “About 
the sacred Altare” erotically charged by earthly beauty, and the occasion 
more personal than the epic’s narrative, but resonance between the two 
occasions persists (stanzas 12–13).71
Subsequently, the liquid imagery at the very end of canto xii—“His 
heart did seeme to melt in pleasures manifold . . . Yet swimming in that 
sea of blisfull ioy” (40–41)—fulfills that earlier in the book, whether 
in Redcrosse’s wet dream in Archimago’s hermitage, his journey “in the 
wide deepe wandring,” the enervating stream from which he drinks before 
pouring out in looseness with Duessa, or his fall into a “liuing well” in the 
final dragon fight.72 An Elizabethan betrothal could extend to the rights 
of the marriage bed, although there was confusion regarding this rite, 
an issue that Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure explores in the coupled 
figures of Claudio/Juliet and Angelo/Mariana.73 Be that as it may, at the 
end of Spenser’s first book, the liquid imagery is simultaneously fleshly 
and sacred, erotic and redeemed. The same holds true for the final move-
ment of Epithalamion, whose penultimate stanza looks to a future perfect 
of children and lasting, heavenly happiness. The final truncated, imper-
fected stanza of Spenser’s own marriage hymn then returns time to the 
present and its cutting off of completion; at the end of Book I, Redcrosse 
returns to his unfinished questing, “and Vna left to mourne”—either left 
Una behind to mourn or Una left off mourning, having been reconciled 
to Redcrosse’s worldly task (41). Again, a self-citational, parodic compari-
son with Britomart is evident: when she and Artegall part in Book V, she 
“wisely moderated her own smart” and “tempred for the time her present 
heauinesse” before seeking new surroundings “her anguish to appease,” 
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again a comparison that will also come with much difference (vii.44–45). 
Spenser’s Eden is finally more than temporally double, lost and found. 
It is more precisely triple, a present in the poem that encompasses past 
and future. In this, it recalls Augustine’s threefold present, time past, time 
present, and time to come, and doing so, looks ahead to the similar con-
junction of times in Epithalamion.74
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Chapter 2
Belphoebe’s “mirrours more then one”: 
History’s Interlude
LIKE UNA, BELPHOEBE IS an idealized woman-figure in The Faerie Queene, but she is named for a classical moon goddess, a mythologized 
aspect of nature, and not, like Una, christened as a metaphysical concep-
tion. She is more relentlessly virginal than Una, however, who is betrothed 
at the end of her book and awaits perfected union with her human lover. 
In sharp contrast, Belphoebe repeatedly fails to comprehend human love, 
even while attesting to her own mortality. Accordingly, she is never recon-
ciled with her twin sister, Amoret, figuratively the side of her that is missing 
and part of her story in the poem. In further contrast to Una, Belphoebe 
appears in successive books of the poem and therefore in three variant con-
texts: temperance, chastity, and friendship, respectively, in Books II, III, 
and IV. Each of these books, as their titular virtues indicate, seeks some 
form of balanced relationship, progressively involving others. Their shift-
ing contexts challenge the initial intimation of Belphoebe’s wholeness and 
ultimately suggest that her figure is unbalanced, an extremity of virtue 
that is intemperate and, insofar as temperance is rooted in time (< Latin 
tempus), untimely. Her virtue finally belongs to some other world.
Belphoebe rushes into the third canto of Book II and promptly 
becomes a sustained series of perceptions—less an unfolding series, as in 
the instance of troutheful Una, than a shifting one, rather like a successive 
series of slides, or stills. Sped up, a successive series begins to look coherent 
and animated—moving. This initial series, a portrait that A. C. Hamilton 
identifies as the longest in Spenser’s entire epic, foreshadows for the ret-
rospective reader (or rereader) what will become of Belphoebe’s figure in 
the course of the books in which she appears.1 In this portrait, she succes-
sively takes shape in terms variously Petrarchan, courtly, mythic, biblical, 
classical, natural, legendary, and historical. She is both Venus and Virgo 
and, like the twin comparisons of her to Diana and to the Amazon Queen 
Penthesilea that cap her portrait, she is both mythic and human, ideal and 
mortal. Viewed as a portrait, like the many famous, iconic paintings of 
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Elizabeth, Spenser’s queen, the figure of Belphoebe has seemingly unlim-
ited potential; viewed historically, in terms of Elizabeth’s actual reign, 
Belphoebe’s initial depiction becomes an impossible contradiction, which 
the narrative she enters soon enough makes all too real.
Belphoebe’s namesake, the moonlike goddess Phoebe—Diana in 
the Roman pantheon—figures in myth as both unapproachable virgin 
and mammary mother goddess, the latter of these instanced by Diana of 
Ephesus or, indeed, by Spenser’s Charissa, with “A multitude of [nurs-
ing] babes” at her breasts (I.x.31). Belphoebe’s genealogy, of course, also 
includes Artemis, goddess of the hunt, who is another multiple-breasted 
figure, one of whose names is Phoebe.2 Spenser might have chosen the 
name Phoebe (greek phoibē, from the feminine form of phoibos, “shining”) 
in order to emphasize the lunar association of the goddess, which suits the 
official iconography of Elizabeth I. Phoebe also alludes to the name of the 
shining sun god, Phoebus Apollo, and in this way as well to Elizabeth as 
a queen.
The double nature of the moon goddess Phoebe is further embed-
ded in the etymological relation of moon  to Latin mensis/menses . 
Unsurprisingly, Belphoebe’s extensive, all-inclusive initial portrait is full 
of suspended, as-yet-unresolved tensions between mythic and mortal real-
ities, and is all the richer, more complex, and potentially more dynamic 
for their presence.3 From her first appearance, her mythic, iconographic, 
courtly, and explicitly queenly credentials also associate her with the 
reigning Queen Elizabeth, most ominously by comparison of Belphoebe 
to Penthesilea, “that famous Queene / Of Amazons, whom Pyrrhus did 
destroy” (II.iii.31).4 By the end of the proem to Book III, she explicitly 
becomes a figure of Elizabeth’s “rare chastitee,” and, in Spenser’s Letter 
to Ralegh, which was attached to the 1590 Faerie Queene, she is further 
identified with the queen’s person as “a most vertuous and beautifull Lady,” 
here a figure distinguished from her person as “a most royall Queene or 
Empresse.”5 When she reappears in the third book and the fourth one, she 
will also be less credibly mythic and less fully ideal, compromised by her 
increasing involvement in the narrative with human and historical reali-
ties.6
The first stage of Belphoebe’s portrait makes her appear more angelic 
than human and more conventionally rhetorical than real. Although 
there is cumulative movement in the poet’s opening , lyrical depic-
tion, Belphoebe herself, entering the narrative in canto iii, is stopped in 
her tracks. In narrative terms, her figure is now strikingly static, an 
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emblazoned countenance, an object for gazers. At the end of her portrait, 
where the comparison of her to Penthesilea appears, she becomes more 
natural and active; she is pictured in space and historical time, moving 
through landscape and legend. Petrarchan hyperboles characterize the first 
five stanzas (cheeks “Like roses in a bed of lillies shed,” fair eyes darting 
“fyrie beames,” an “yuorie forhead,” honeyed words, eyelids adorned with 
“many graces”). Then, descriptions of her raiment, weapons, and hair in 
stanzas 26, 29, and 30 associate her with the Amazons, but stanzas 29–30 
also associate her with Venus disguised as a follower of Diana, and her 
buskins and hunting in stanzas 27–28 further associate her with Diana.7 
These last two stanzas are mainly devoted to her legs, thus balancing those 
depicting her face at the beginning and following a gaze that proceeds 
from top to bottom. “Like two faire marble pillours,” her legs “doe the 
temple of the gods support / Whom all the people decke with girlands 
greene, / And honour in their festiuall resort.” Although essentially clas-
sical and pagan in reference, and perhaps also suggesting the English folk 
festivals of May, this comparison and the succeeding line that virtually 
extends it (“Whom . . . resort”) have further evoked associations as radi-
cally diverse as 1 Corinthians 6:19, Song of Solomon 5:15, and the climax 
of the Romance of the Rose. This Romance, known to Spenser, provides a 
sexual referent for Belphoebe’s “marble pillours” supporting a temple that 
is more explicit and credible, to my mind, than the much-discussed half 
line that stops with the hem of her skirt (reaching to her knee or mid-calf: 
26.9).8
The final lines of the penultimate stanza portraying Belphoebe 
may even imaginatively suggest such a rendering of myth as Botticelli’s 
Primavera (“Spring”), a painting in which Zephyrus, the west wind, touches 
the nymph Chloris with the result that “flowers issue from her breath, and 
she is transformed into Flora, the resplendent herald of spring.”9 Early in 
the poet’s depiction, Belphoebe has a heavenly, as well as a Petrarchan, 
aura (“heauenly birth,” “heauenly,” “Angels hew,” “ambrosiall odours”); 
she is even said to be “Hable to heale the sicke, and to reuiue the ded” 
(21–22). But now, near the portrait’s end, as she flees through the forest, 
and as flowers, leaves, and blossoms are said to enwrap themselves in her 
flying hair, her figure is seen instead to suggest a revival that is seasonal and 
thus a natural cycle of death and regeneration (30).
Incongruously, in this same canto, the poet’s tour de force in por-
traiture is framed by the low-life figures of Braggadocchio and Trompart. 
A greater contrast between elevated portrait and comic encounter would 
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be hard to imagine. A close contemporary analogy might come from the 
parodic juxtaposition of comic subplot with main plot in a contempo-
rary play, such as John Lyly’s Endymion or Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor 
Faustus.10 Belphoebe and Braggadocchio stage a debate between solitary 
purity and social degeneracy, ennobling desire and lustful appetite, honor 
and instinct that anticipates the thematic opposition in Shakespeare’s 1 
Henry IV of Hotspur’s extravagant idealism and Falstaff ’s earthy pragma-
tism—between Hotspur’s exclamatory declamation of an “easy leap, / To 
pluck bright honor from the pale-fac’d moon” and Falstaff ’s plain, if still 
rhetorical, questions: “Can honor set to a leg? . . . Or take away the grief 
of a wound?”11 The debate is summarily terminated when Braggadocchio 
offers to assault Belphoebe sexually, and, her javelin raised against him, 
she flees into the woods and out of Book II, leaving to others the effort to 
balance radical extremes in the search for temperance. At this point, she 
figures as a strange, sequential mixture of iconographic lyric and comic 
narrative, promissory inclusion and active rejection.
* * *
Before pursuing the figure of Belphoebe into Book III, I want to pause 
over the proem to this book, which explicitly addresses the relation of the 
living Queen Elizabeth to her two specified Faerie figurations, gloriana 
and Belphoebe. It also introduces the theme of “mirrours more then one” 
already met in my previous chapter and that of the relation of art to life, 
which is present but suspended in Book II’s long portrait of Belphoebe. 
But in this third proem, the poet begins to observe a distinction between 
truth and Faerie image that is absent from the proems to Books I and II. 
By comparison, these two earlier proems illuminate what is new in the 
third. In the first proem, the living queen, “great Ladie of the greatest 
Isle,” is a “Mirrour of grace and Maiestie diuine,” and the poem is a reflec-
tion of “that true glorious type” of her. In the proem to Book II, despite 
poetic play about the location of Faerie, the queen is the living reflection 
of the “antique ymage,” and so the Faerie image is a “fayre mirrhour” of 
her face and realms. Overall, the first two proems present one continuous, 
unbroken reflection: the queen reflects divinity; like her, the poem reflects 
the glorious origins, person, and reign of the living queen. The antique and 
Faerie images are also continuous, whereas they will increasingly diverge as 
the poem develops. In the first two proems, however, theirs is a continuity 
worthy of Una, yet another of the reigning queen’s cultic names.12
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Referring to the queen’s face, realms, and ancestry, the final stanza 
of Proem II offers an apology for the antique Faerie image that is actually 
a confident justification of it:
The which O pardon me thus to enfold
In couert vele, and wrap in shadowes light,
That feeble eyes your glory may behold,
Which ells could not endure those beames bright,
But would bee dazled with exceeding light
 (II.Pro.5)
The dazzling brightness of the living Queen is enfolded in shadow to 
enlighten feeble eyes, enabling them to behold true glory. This veil reveals 
a single truth instead of obscuring it, and these shadows, unlike those in 
the second three books, which are new in 1596, do not splinter truth or 
transform its character. Unlike the proem to Book VI, they do not make 
true glory truly fictive.13
In the proem to Book III, the poem continues to be the queen’s mir-
ror, and, although she is invited to view herself “In mirrours more then 
one”—specifically either in gloriana or in Belphoebe—both glasses are 
essentially virtuous, and conceivably, at least, they could be received as 
an unfolding of the good queen rather than as a dispersion of her unity. 
But, in this proem, the present embodiment also begins to vie with the 
antique image, living queen with antiquity, and to challenge it. Uneasy 
nuances (not quite tensions) cluster around the word “liuing.” In order to 
perceive the fairest virtue, chastity in this instance, one “Neede but behold 
the pourtraict of her [the queen’s] hart, / If pourtrayd it might bee by any 
liuing art.” The poet continues, “But liuing art may not least part expresse, 
/ Nor life-resembling pencill it can paynt . . . Ne Poets witt, that passeth 
Painter farre.” Then comes a plea for pardon that recalls the one in the 
second proem:
      But O dredd Souerayne
Thus far forth pardon, sith that choicest witt
Cannot your glorious pourtraict figure playne
That I in colourd showes may shadow it,
And antique praises vnto present persons fitt.
 (III.Pro.3)
These shadows are more opaque—and, as color, significantly more mate-
rial in contemporary philosophy—than the punning “shadowes light” 
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(light shadows, shadow’s or shadows’ light) of Proem II. They testify to 
the poet’s “want of words” and wit more than they serve the purpose of 
revelation.14 But the modesty topos is here a conventional mask for a more 
significant development. The poem is now becoming a somewhat compro-
mised “colourd show” that can merely shadow the queen’s “glorious pour-
traict” and tailor antique praises to present persons, a “fitt” that sounds 
neither so natural nor so close as the continuity of bright reflections in 
Proems I and II. The poem becomes the glass through which the living 
sovereign’s true portrait is more obscurely discerned. At this point, it is 
difficult not to think again of Elizabeth’s highly symbolic, elaborately cos-
tumed, V-waisted portraits and the conspicuous extent to which they are 
removed from a realistic, contemporary image of the aging queen. This 
sort of “fitt” exceeds any dressmaker’s talents.
The lines that directly follow the poet’s apolog y for “colourd 
showes” and “antique praises” refer to the depiction of Queen Elizabeth in 
Ralegh’s Cynthia: “But if in liuing colours, and right hew, / Thy selfe thou 
couet to see pictured, / Who can it doe more liuely, or more trew . . .?” 
than Sir Walter Ralegh (my emphasis). Although the OED offers innocent 
and even positive, religious instances of covet, this verb is also associated 
strongly with sin—with envy or greed—as it is most memorably in the 
Ten Commandments.15 But there is a larger point here: setting the “liu-
ing colours” and “right hew” of the reigning queen against the “colourd 
showes” and “antique praises” of The Faerie Queene, the poet introduces a 
far-reaching distinction between life and antiquity, historical present and 
mythic past, current truth and Faerie image. This distinction does not align 
nicely with that between the queen’s imperial and private affairs, which, in 
the Letter to Ralegh, are figured, respectively, in gloriana and Belphoebe. 
Instead, it applies to both figures. At the same time, the explicit division 
of the living queen into two figures arguably compromises her unity. For a 
reader of Book I, the specter of Duessa hovers in the distant background. 
Perversely, we might even recall the contradictory, yet overlapping, images 
of Elizabeth and the Babylonian whore to which Claire McEachern directs 
our attention, as noted in chapter 1.
In stanza 4 of the third proem, when the Spenserian poet refers 
a true and lively picture of the queen to Ralegh’s Cynthia, he is unlikely 
to have meant a picture that is merely realistic or unembellished by art. 
Ralegh’s fragmentary Ocean to Scinthia, much of which relates to his 
imprisonment in 1592, a disgrace subsequent to Spenser’s publication of 
Book III, is the best indication of Cynthia’s nature we have, and, although 
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Ralegh’s voice in it is distinct and passionate, such highly artificial modes 
as the Petrarchan (“Such heat in Ize, such fier in frost”) and the pasto-
ral (“Vnfolde thy flockes and leue them to the fields”) are also much in 
evidence.16 The bereaved, nostalgic employment of pastoral in Ocean to 
Scinthia suggests that the earlier versions of Cynthia by her “shepherd of 
the Ocean,” written in less desperate straits, might have been more con-
ventional rather than less so.17 When the poet of The Faerie Queene writes 
of the living colors and right hue of Cynthia, he implies a portrayal that 
is less hieratic, epic, and allegorical but more contemporary and personal 
than his own. Such a portrayal as Ralegh’s might be less universal and 
more ephemeral, but it belongs more immediately to time.
Although Spenser’s reference to Ralegh does not discredit the 
Faerie image, it does limit its authority unless this image can be expanded 
or otherwise modified to embrace life more closely. The third proem pro-
vides a particularly apt introduction to a book in which time and eter-
nity or present age and ideal, antique image are not so smoothly continu-
ous as indicated in the proems of Books I and II. Nothing reverberates 
through Book III quite like the “heauenly noise / Heard sound through 
all the Pallace pleasantly” at the betrothal of Redcrosse and Una—a noise 
like the voices of angels “Singing before th’eternall maiesty, / In their tri-
nall triplicities on hye” (I.xii.39)—and no figure quite like the brilliantly 
winged angel who succors guyon appears to rescue its knights and ladies. 
In fact, the closest we get to an angel in this book is Timias’s illusion that 
Belphoebe is one when he wakens from his swoon to find her bending over 
him and ministering to his wounds: “Mercy deare Lord . . . what grace is 
this,” he asks resonantly, “To send thine Angell from her bowre of blis, 
/ To comfort me in my distressed plight?” (v.35). Then he adds, on sec-
ond thought, “Angell, or goddesse do I call thee right?” thereby echo-
ing Vergil’s famous lines from Aeneas’s meeting with Venus in the guise 
of Diana’s maiden and avouching the young squire’s perception that this 
angelic illusion originates in a more worldly pantheon than Una’s “trinall 
triplicities on hye.” Parodically, it also recalls the same allusion to Vergil in 
the initial portrait of Belphoebe in Book II and, more openly and peril-
ously, by Belphoebe’s present posture—that of a pietà—the Bower of Bliss 
at the same book’s end (II.iii.33, xii).18
A blushing Belphoebe disclaims the angelic or godly status Timias 
attributes to her and declares herself simply a maid and “mortall wight” 
(36). Unfortunately, her declaration is exactly what Timias might have 
longed, but should never have been allowed, to hear her say, for he falls 
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irrevocably, irremediably, impossibly in love with her. Belphoebe not only 
denies him a reciprocal love but also fails to understand or even to rec-
ognize the erotic nature of Timias’s response to her. More than once, the 
poet criticizes her failure as a “Madnesse” that saves “a part, and lose[s] the 
whole” (43, cf. 42). Oddly, an echo of his criticism will occur two books 
later, when another of Queen Elizabeth’s avatars, Queen Mercilla, ambiva-
lently dispenses justice to the figure of a rival queen and where justice is 
seen “Oft [to] spill . . . the principall, to saue the part,” while trying “to 
preserue inuiolated right” (V.x.2). In both instances, one of the Queen’s 
bodies is not reconciled with the other. The tensions between disparate 
realities that were suspended in the initial portrait of Belphoebe are 
increasingly coming to light.
Back in Book III, while Timias languishes in love’s torments, 
Belphoebe spares no pains to ease him, but still not comprehending his 
malady, “that sweet Cordiall, which can restore / A loue-sick hart, she did 
to him enuy,” or refuse to give (v.50).19 Few readers or rereaders of these 
lines are fully prepared for those that follow, in which “that sweet Cordiall 
. . . that soueraine salue” is suddenly transformed to “That daintie Rose, 
the daughter of her Morne,” whose flower, lapped in “her silken leaues,” she 
shelters from midday sun and northern wind: “But soone as calmed was 
the christall ayre, / She did it fayre dispred, and let to florish fayre” (v.51). 
As Donald Cheney has suggested, precise equivalents for these lines do 
not exist. “For her,” he adds, “the rose is a rose, not a euphemism.”20
But surely not just a rose, either. Belphoebe’s dainty blossom soon 
opens into a flower strongly redolent of myth: “Eternall god,” we learn, 
“In Paradize whylome did plant this flowre” and thence fetched it to 
implant in “earthly flesh.” Soon we are asked to recognize the flower as 
the ur-rose that flourishes “In gentle Ladies breste, and bounteous race / 
Of woman kind” and “beareth fruit of honour and all chast desyre” (52). 
A truly marvelous hybrid, this is now the rosa moralis universalis. Not 
surprisingly, one of Spenser’s eighteenth-century editors compared it to 
Milton’s “Immortal Amarant” in the third book of Paradise Lost, “a flow’r 
which once / In Paradise, fast by the Tree of Life, / Began to bloom.”21 
Quite in contrast to this response to such mythologizing of the rose are 
medical associations between flowers and menses, specifically menstrual 
discharges, which Jessica Murphy has uncovered.22 In short, here are fur-
ther complications, notably involving opposite extremes—the realms of 
flesh and spirit.
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In Belphoebe’s transformation from uncomprehending nurse to vestal 
votaress of the rose, to antique origin and a fructifying virtue undifferenti-
ated by time, person, or place, Timias is quite forgotten. Her specific relation 
to him will not align with the general moral statement into which it is trans-
lated. To echo the third proem, it will not “fitt.” Honor and chaste desire, 
the fruit of the flower, are indeed virtuous, but Timias’s love is honorable 
in Book III, and his erotic desire, if not virginal, appears to be decent and 
pure and, in these senses, to be chaste, not unlike Britomart’s. Thus the gen-
eral moral statement not merely transcends the particular case but wholly 
misses it. Timias is one person these antique praises of the flower do not suit, 
and, since Belphoebe’s use of tobacco (v.32) to heal his wounds signals an 
obvious allusion to Ralegh, a reader might also think one “present person.”23
Having glorified the rose, the poet appears in no hurry to return 
from antique ideal to the person of Belphoebe. Instead, he directly 
addresses the “Fayre ympes of beautie” and urges them to emulate their 
origin by adorning their garlands with “this fayre flowre . . . Of Chastity 
and virtue virginall.” These “ympes” (shoots, scions) of beauty are preemi-
nently the “Ladies in the Court,” to judge both from the poet’s present 
address and its resemblance to the final dedicatory sonnet of The Faerie 
Queene.24 Timias aside, the poet opts for the general application of the 
antique ideal to this present world of readers. But, with the poet’s final 
promise that the flower will not only embellish the ladies’ beauty but will 
also crown them “with heauenly coronall, / Such as the Angels weare 
before gods tribunall,” the poem travels beyond even Timias’s first flush of 
erotic illusion to a simpler, purer, less earthly vision.
The poet’s address to the ladies continues in the next stanza, how-
ever, where he now commends to their attention not the beatifying rose, 
upon which he has spent the mythmaking of the previous stanzas, but 
Belphoebe herself as the true exemplar of its virtue. In effect he returns 
the rose, but now in its glorified form, to her person. Of particular note in 
this stanza are the initial recurrences of the word “faire” and the phrases 
“none liuing” and “ensample dead,” puzzling phrases whether taken alone, 
together, or with the “liuing colours, and right hew” of the third Proem:
To your faire selues a faire ensample frame,
Of this faire virgin, this Belphoebe faire,
To whom in perfect loue and spotlesse fame
Of chastitie, none liuing may compayre:
Ne poysnous Enuy iustly can empayre
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The prayse of her fresh flowring Maidenhead;
For thy she standeth on the highest stayre
Of th’honorable stage of womanhead,
That Ladies all may follow her ensample dead.
 (III.v.54)
The repetition of “faire” is insistent, even anxiously so, but it also enforces 
a link between present persons and Belphoebe. This link, if only a matter 
of rhetoric and fair appearance, suggests a series of steps from the court 
Ladies’ “faire selues,” surely many of whom in time were bound to marry; 
to a generalized “ensample” of purity, to its more exclusive, or higher, 
form, virginity; and finally to the individual fulfillment of virginity in fair 
Belphoebe herself, who is found on the “highest stayre . . . of womanhead.” 
This virginity is clearly not that of Britomart, the protagonist of Book III, 
whose quest is for erotic love in marriage. Notably, the stanza preceding 
the one just cited has slipped in the line “Of chastity and vertue virginall,” 
in which the paired phrases are not identical, as they are not in chaste mar-
ried love, the objective of Britomart’s quest.
The poet’s conception of a series of steps—that is, a “stayre”—
becomes additionally significant on examination of the other verbal oddi-
ties in the stanza cited.25 The first of these, the phrase “none liuing,” pre-
sumably means “none of you ladies” or “no one living,” since the poet here 
addresses his present audience, “youre faire selues,” and compares them 
with Belphoebe, the exemplar of ideal chastity, to which “none liuing” 
has yet attained. Alternatively, if we take the word “liuing” to be appli-
cable to Belphoebe, the phrase could mean “no other living lady” except 
Belphoebe herself. This is the meaning of a remarkably similar claim about 
chaste Florimell earlier in the same canto where her dwarf declares of her, 
“Liues none this day, that may with her compare / In stedfast chastitie” 
(v.8). But there are also significant differences between a claim made by 
a distraught dwarf within the narrative context of Faerie and one made 
by the Spenserian poet himself and addressed to an audience of courtly 
women outside the poem. We readily see that the loyal dwarf speaks 
loosely or hyperbolically. He really means no other living lady in all the 
realm of Faerie is chaster than Florimell or simply that she is the chastest 
lady imaginable. The word “liuing,” however, is not so readily defused in 
relation to Belphoebe, who mirrors the chastity of the living queen, espe-
cially when it occurs in a direct address to the poet’s living audience. If, in 
this context, we were to consider Belphoebe “liuing,” then her figure seems 
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at variance with the statements in the proem to Book III and downright 
embarrassing when we reach “her ensample dead” in the alexandrine of 
this same stanza. Such a radical dissolution of the fictional character of 
Belphoebe is entirely unexpected and would probably be wasted or, worse, 
misunderstood by Spenser’s audience.
The natural reading of the phrase “none liuing” is, then, as suggested, 
the obvious one, “no one liuing” or simply “no living lady.” Although this 
reading does not refer specifically or directly to the reigning queen, it 
increases the distance between Belphoebe as a mythic ideal and any liv-
ing referent, including the queen, and thus the distance between antiquity 
and the present age. The increased distance reflects the strains between 
ideal exemplar and human response in the story of Belphoebe and Timias 
and helps to bring both their story and canto v to an appropriate conclu-
sion in 1590, namely,
In so great prayse of stedfast chastity,
Nathlesse she was so courteous and kynde,
Tempred with grace, and goodly modesty,
That seemed those two vertues stroue to fynd
The higher place in her Heroick mynd
So striuing each did other more augment,
And both encreast the prayse of woman kynde,
And both encreast her beautie excellent;
So all did make in her a perfect complement.
 (III.v.55)
The poet’s depiction of Belphoebe has effectually reverted to his initial 
portrait of her by herself in Book II: a succession of opposites in sus-
pended tension, potentiality but no resolution.26 Like Timias’s reference 
to a “bowre of blis” earlier in this same canto, the present complement of 
virtues that strive (“stroue . . . striuing”) for supremacy glances again at 
Acrasia’s domain, whose opposites strive “each th’other to vndermine” (II.
xii.59). The strife of Belphoebe’s virtues may not be that of Acrasia’s, but 
neither is it the realized Concord of opposites figured in the emblematic 
figure of this name in Book IV’s Temple of Venus, which is that of an 
assimilation, however fragile, “above the differences, as in the concept,” 
to quote Paul Ricoeur. The assimilation that is Concord achieves a “level 
of conceptual peace and rest” and appropriately belongs to a stationary 
figure, who can withstand a threat to her equilibrium, precarious as the 
latter may be (IV.x.33, 36).27
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To return again to stanza 54, if the obvious reading of “none liuing” 
is also the right one in its fourth line, this reading is designed to cause 
another, longer pause for thought when we reread the last three lines of 
this penultimate stanza and especially its alexandrine, juxtaposed with (or 
against) the stanza that concludes the canto: Belphoebe “standeth on the 
highest stayre . . . of womanhead, / That Ladies all may follow her ensam-
ple dead” (54). If Belphoebe is a mythic ideal who has moved farther away 
from a living referent in the penultimate stanza, what has she to do with 
death? First she seems to be mythic in stanza 54 and now to belong to 
history. The obvious reading of “none liuing” and the alexandrine clearly 
do not as yet accord. We might recall that a similar opposition arose in 
the initial portrait of Belphoebe in Book II, when heavenly associations 
and the attributes of the mythic goddess Diana were juxtaposed with 
Penthesilea “that famous Queene / Of Amazons, whom Pyrrhus did 
destroy” (II.iii.31).
The phrase “ensample dead,” when glossed at all in the past, was 
long taken only to be an ellipsis of the clause “when she is dead,”28 and 
this phrase can be referred to the occurrence of a parallel construction in 
Merlin’s prophecy to Britomart of the child or “ymage” Artegall will leave 
with her when he is dead:
With thee yet shall he leaue for memory
Of his late puissaunce, his ymage dead,
That liuing him in all actiuity
To thee shall represent.
 (III.iii.29)
But the phrase “ensample dead” as readily means “her dead, or lifeless, 
example.” Before we are startled into reassessment, this is exactly what it 
seems to mean, and, if this were in fact all it meant, it would be a chilling 
comment on the ideal Belphoebe embodies and, if at a greater remove, on 
that of the reigning queen as well. This alternative meaning of “ensample 
dead” also finds a relevant parallel in a later alexandrine of Book III. It 
occurs when the witch creates False Florimell, that parody of coldly sterile, 
lifeless Petrarchism: “and in the stead / Of life, she put a Spright to rule 
the carcas dead” (viii.7). Death is this carcass’s present condition (dead 
carcass), not its future one (when dead).
The occurrence in a single stanza of two verbal cruxes as immediately 
and obviously related as life (“none liuing”) and death (“ensample dead”) 
is unlikely to have been adventitious. The meaning “dead example”—the 
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more obvious reading of “ensample dead”—accords better with the more 
obvious reading of “none liuing,” because it does not require, as does the 
alternative “when she is dead,” an abrupt and irrational shift from mythic 
to historical reference and, to put it bluntly, from an ageless Belphoebe to 
an aging Elizabeth. There is no way to cancel the more obvious reading 
of “ensample dead.” But perhaps we don’t have to stop with its dispiriting 
message. In the context of Timias’s highly Petrarchan adoration and ide-
alization of Belphoebe, the alternative reading, “ensample [when she is] 
dead,” need not refer to death as an exclusively physical event. It can also 
be taken in a way that makes sense of the mythic Belphoebe’s connection 
with death and offers the positive reflection on her ideal that balances, 
although it cannot simply cancel, the negative one.
In its Petrarchan context, the reading “when she is dead” points to 
the resolution of the conflict between body and spirit that comes with the 
lady’s physical death and spiritual transcendence. The phrase “ensample 
dead” therefore implies the ideal, the life-in-death, that the deadly carcass, 
the death-in-life, of False Florimell parodies. This reading of the phrase 
balances the cold reality of human loss—death, denial, lifeless exam-
ple—with high praise of Belphoebe and of the queen, whose chastity, if 
only dimly, she still mirrors. At the same time, it continues Belphoebe’s 
movement away from an earthly reality and suggests that the only possible 
solution of Timias’s dilemma—and seemingly the destined conclusion of 
Ralegh’s—is the symbolic or actual transfiguration of Belphoebe into pure 
spirit.29
Looking back at stanza 54 with the Petrarchan reading in mind, we 
might be struck anew by the phrase “perfect loue” and “spotlesse fame.” It 
suddenly makes more sense that “none liuing” should be perfect or spot-
less in Book III, where the possibility of a living Una has receded like a set-
ting sun, and that the “highest stayre . . . of womanhead” should be reached 
only with the lady’s transformation through death into spirit. Presumably 
this is also the “stayre” on which worthy emulators of the true rose are 
crowned “with heauenly coronall . . . before gods tribunall” (v.53).
It is further tempting to see a relation between the Petrarchan praise 
of fair Belphoebe in Book III and the first of Ralegh’s commendatory son-
nets to accompany The Faerie Queene:
ME thought I saw the graue, where Laura lay,
Within that Temple, where the vestal flame
Was wont to burne, and passing by that way,
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To see that buried dust of liuing fame,
Whose tumbe faire loue, and fairer vertue kept,
All suddeinly I saw the Faery Queene:
At whose approch the soule of Petrarke wept,
And from thenceforth those graces were not seene.
For they this Queene attended, in whose steed
Obliuion laid him downe on Lauras herse.30
But there is also a significant distance between this vision of Laura’s living 
successor and Spenser’s fully idealized Belphoebe, whose rose opens fully 
only in death. Perhaps Spenser could see more clearly the temporal, human 
cost—to Belphoebe and Timias both—of the fully realized Petrarchan 
vision because he was farther removed from it personally, or perhaps just 
farther away in epic romance than was Ralegh in lyric. By the writing of 
Book III, however, he certainly knew that in time Laura’s tomb could only 
be replaced by another’s “ensample dead.”31
The ill-fated encounter of Timias with Belphoebe occurs on the 
near side of the garden of Adonis, in the canto immediately preceding it. 
The first stage of the garden canto itself treats the twin birth of Amoret 
and Belphoebe and their adoption by Venus and Diana to be nurtured 
apart, Amoret in the garden and Belphoebe in the woods. No more is 
heard of the figure of Belphoebe in Book III beyond the garden canto. 
Yet one figure in the cantos on the far side of the garden suggests the 
lingering, parodic presence of the living queen. This figure is the lascivi-
ous giantess Argante, a nightmarish distortion of chastity, born locked 
in incest (<incestus, “unchastity”) with her twin brother and now roam-
ing the countryside to capture young men to be sex-slaves in her island 
kingdom.32 Besides being, like Amoret and Belphoebe, a twin, Argante’s 
incest with her brother embodies a denial of difference in pointed contrast 
to the equally distorting exaggeration of difference in the separation of 
the twin sisters by Venus and Diana. Argante’s name derives from greek 
homonyms, the one, argos, meaning “idle” (punningly, idyll, < Latin 
idyllium, greek eidullion), and the other, argos (cf. arges and argas), mean-
ing “bright,” “shining,” “white,” or “swift-footed,” meanings that resonate 
with the name of the moon-goddess and huntress Belphoebe, insofar as 
Phoebe derives from greek phoibē, or femininized phoibos, “shining.” Still 
more to the point, the likeliest origin of the proper name Argante is found 
in medieval British folklore and legend, exemplified in Laȝamon’s Brut, 
in which King Arthur, after the battle of Camelford, is taken to “Argante 
the queen, an elf most fair,” in Avalon.33 Herein lies the exemplar 
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connecting Prince Arthur to his Faerie Queene, now a woody elf, now 
great gloriana.
The figures of Lucifera and Philotime bear witness that such a dis-
torted image—such harsh parody—as that in the figure of Argante is not 
alien to the poet’s techniques, even in Spenser’s earliest two books. Yet 
Lucifera and Philotime, maiden queens both, are not missing sides of the 
living queen but a denial of what she could and should be. In the figure 
of Argante, parody occurs with a difference. Where the depiction specifi-
cally of Belphoebe in Book III manages in the end to transcend—indeed, 
to sublate—the conflict between Belphoebe’s ideal and earthly selves, 
the lusty Argante openly crosses the line between the royal concerns of 
a queen and the sexual concerns of a woman. Spenser apparently thought 
this to have been the case in the queen’s relation to Ralegh even before 
1590, when Book III was published.
Before leaving Book III for Book IV, I want briefly to connect 
Spenser’s figures of the Queen to the narratological technique of disnarra-
tion, a currently popular term coined by gerald Prince to describe a wide 
variety of deflective pauses, omissions, silences, absences, humility topoi 
(occupationes), cryptic allusions, lyric sublations (supersessions), allegories 
or dark conceits, and more (primarily post-Enlightment).34 Prince’s defi-
nitions and multiple descriptions of this technique could be stretched to 
encompass most of Spenser’s poem, but his term is more usefully reserved 
to distinguish clearly disnarrative, or otherwise nameless, phenomena such 
as the half-line that stops with the hem of Belphoebe’s skirt, the uneasy 
nuances of Proem III, Belphoebe’s sublated rose, or anxious repetitions 
of “faire.” Otherwise, as a general practice, more exact terms, where possi-
ble, and specific textual evidence offer fuller, more discriminating results. 
Even the unspoken or half-spoken phenomena for which disnarrative is 
particularly suggestive are often ambiguously or not exclusively narrative. 
Typically, The Faerie Queene eludes categorical restraints, as it does with 
respect to parody and epic itself.
* * *
In Book IV, Belphoebe’s next and last appearance, her estrangement from 
Timias intersects with his relation to Amoret, Belphoebe’s missing twin 
sister, and Belphoebe’s reconciliation with Timias clashes sharply with 
the abandonment and slander of Amoret. With Timias’s reconciliation 
and Amoret’s revilement, duality of judgment and truth can no longer be 
contained in a single phrase or image, in consecutive stanzas, or even in 
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a single character or event. Belphoebe herself—or what her figure was in 
Book II and perhaps even in the fifth canto of Book III, an ideal main-
taining some relation to worldly reality—is fractured, a mirror now splin-
tered. The alternatives of love and loss, of timeless and temporal truth, 
are no longer grasped together, no longer simultaneous and complemen-
tary dimensions of awareness, as tenuously they could still be even in the 
phrase “ensample dead,” as well as in the juxtaposition of the last two stan-
zas of Belphoebe’s canto in Book III (v.54–55). They have become still 
more sharply distinct and are in danger of becoming mutually exclusive. 
The distance between ideal image and present age, antique praises and 
living colors, is widening rapidly as history presses on the poem. Whereas 
antiquity was earlier continuous with the Faerie realm, it is increasingly 
set apart from it. At the same time, more is happening : the distance 
between gloriana and Belphoebe, the imperial and personal figurations of 
the reigning queen, is increasingly and more openly a problem. All this is 
doubleness compounded.
The story of Belphoebe and Timias in Book IV is now inseparable 
from the last stages of Amoret’s story there. Wounded and then tended 
by Timias, Amoret becomes the unwitting cause of Belphoebe’s estrange-
ment from him. She has become part of their story and, when she is simply 
abandoned by them in the middle of it, she becomes, both narratively and 
morally, a loose end waiting to be rewoven into some larger design. Her 
ties with the story of Belphoebe and Timias are symbolic and thematic as 
well as figural. The ruby that helps to bring Belphoebe back to Timias is 
“Shap’d like a heart, yet bleeding of the wound, / And with a little golden 
chaine about it bound” (IV.viii.6). A jeweler’s replica of Amoret’s heart 
in the Masque of Cupid, this lapidarian heart that Belphoebe once gave 
Timias alludes to Amoret’s real one, simultaneously suggesting contrast 
and resemblance to it. The heart-shaped jewel also evokes the use of jewels, 
lockets, and limned miniatures with intimate significance in courtly cul-
ture and notably its use by Queen Elizabeth herself.35
The twin birth of Belphoebe and Amoret, the complementary maids 
of Diana and Venus, provides a richly figural backdrop to their aborted 
reunion, and, although Amoret arguably is, or rather becomes, a more fully 
human figure than merely an abstract conception of Love, or Amor, the 
latter is one kind of meaning she carries when she is wounded, then aban-
doned, and later reviled. Her abandonment resonates with Belphoebe’s 
inability to comprehend erotic love in Book III, insofar as the wrathful 
Belphoebe, her trust betrayed by Timias, sees no distinction between the 
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predations of the fantastically beastly figure of Lust and Timias’s inad-
vertent wounding of Amoret, thinking to kill all three of them with the 
same arrow (IV.vii.36). But the most provocative imitation, or parody, 
of Amoret’s thematic congruence with Belphoebe comes when the poet 
subsequently interrupts his narrative during Slander’s revilement of the 
wounded Amoret to recall an Edenic age when the “glorious flowre” of 
beauty flourished, a time when “antique age yet in the infancie / Of time, 
did liue then like an innocent, / In simple truth and blamelesse chas-
tity” (IV.viii.30). Antiquity, ideal image, mythic flower, even chastity, all 
previously associated with Belphoebe’s rose—the poet associates them 
all now with Amoret. Effectually, Amoret is transported from Slander’s 
reviling to an antique age of truth and purity, carried back, it would seem, 
to an “antique world” of the sort that Eden is found to be at the end of 
Book I, the first instance of the antique image, so specified, in the poem 
(xii.14). Like Belphoebe and her rose in Book III, she is translated to 
another place. This is a mythic place that is very “like an innocent” one (IV.
viii.30). The qualification “like” is notable. Whereas the rose is finally stel-
lified, Amoret’s translation to purity remains in an antique age on earth—
Edenic but also human. The intrusive timing of the poet’s lyric assertion of 
his presence, moreover, guarantees that we notice it for itself, as well as for 
its content, even more than was the case with Belphoebe’s rose. Little stays 
just the same in the still moving Faerie Queene.
In addition to the connections between the stories of Amoret and 
of Belphoebe and Timias sketched earlier, there are pointed contrasts. 
The reconciliation of Belphoebe and Timias is conspicuously artificial, 
effected through the agency of a sympathetic turtle dove and a lapidary’s 
heart and totally removed from temporal reality. When Timias is recon-
ciled, his condition actually anticipates Melibee’s self-enclosed vulnerabil-
ity in Book VI: he is “Fearlesse of fortunes chaunge or enuies dread, / And 
eke all mindlesse of his own deare Lord” (IV.viii.18). His Lord is Arthur, 
but I have never quite shaken off the intimation of a higher Lord, perhaps 
a memory of Arthur’s role as savior in the two earliest books. Timias’s con-
dition is not made whole by his reconciliation with Belphoebe. Its divi-
sive nature is instead reinforced by separation from Arthur and the higher 
calling, whatever its precise nature, that this prince represents. Timias is 
fixed again, frozen so to speak, in the situation he occupied with respect to 
Belphoebe when last seen in the preceding book.36
Still more noticeably, even while the estrangement of Belphoebe 
from Timias alludes unmistakably to Ralegh’s fall from queenly favor, 
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their reconciliation in Book IV conflicts with the real state of Ralegh’s 
affairs in 1596, when Book IV was published.37 After Ralegh’s secret mar-
riage to Elizabeth Throckmorton, one of the Virgin Queen’s maids of 
honor, whom he had evidently impregnated and plausibly by marriage 
sought to rescue, and the consequent imprisonment of them both in 1592, 
he was, although released fairly quickly from prison, not in fact recon-
ciled with the queen until 1597. His wife, left to languish in prison longer 
than he, never returned to favor with the queen. In the reconciliation of 
Timias and Belphoebe in Book IV, artificial thus means twice unreal—
unreal at once in manner and in historical reference.38 What the subtitle of 
this chapter, “History’s Interlude,” suggests now threatens the more comic, 
constructive stories of Una in Book I and Britomart in Books III and IV. 
History openly compromises the Faerie vision, as it will again in the last 
two books.
The plight of the abandoned Amoret contrasts sharply with the 
conspicuous artifice of reconciliation. When Arthur finds her in the for-
est, she is “almost dead and desperate,” ingloriously wounded and unro-
mantically in need (IV.viii.19). In an effort to shelter her (and her less ide-
alized companion, Aemylia), Arthur unwittingly takes her to the House 
of Slander, a foul old woman “stuft with rancour and despight / Vp to the 
throat” (24), a description that continues the allusions to queenly attire—
this time a starched ruff—begun in the proem to Book III. Once they are 
within Slander’s house, the indignant and somewhat bitter voice of the 
poet, earlier noted, intrudes at length in the narrative to connect Slander 
to the present age (“Sith now of dayes”) and to oppose this age to the 
ideal, antique image “in the infancie / Of time” (29–30). Slander’s railings 
therefore have a general historicity or timeliness pointedly attributed to 
them for which Amoret’s own adventures, apart from the topicality of her 
relation to Timias’s estrangement from Belphoebe, would fail to account. 
She was captured by Lust while walking “vnwares” in the woods “for pleas-
ure, or for need”—the latter hardly unnecessary—and by her own effort 
she has escaped from Lust’s cave without further defilement, at least until 
Timias intervenes (vii.4). In short, what befalls Amoret in the two cantos 
she shares with Belphoebe and Timias looks very much like the other half 
of their story, the half muted in Belphoebe’s withdrawal from Timias and 
suppressed in his return to her. What befalls Amoret unfolds the “inburn-
ing wrath” of Belphoebe (viii.17) and gives tongue to the revilement and 
infamy Ralegh’s secret marriage incurred. This marriage incurred “the 
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displeasure of the mighty . . . Then death it selfe more dread and desper-
ate,” to which the eroticized triangle of Belphoebe, Timias, and Amoret 
refers with startling directness (viii.1).
Writing presumably in 1592 from imprisonment in the Tower of 
London, Ralegh contrasted the queen’s formerly gracious favor to him 
with his present state:
Thos streames seeme standing puddells which, before,
Wee saw our bewties in, so weare they cleere.
Bellphebes course is now obserude no more,
That faire resemblance weareth out of date.
Our Ocean seas are but tempestius waves
And all things base that blessed wear of late.
 (269–74)
If we remember Spenser’s final vision of Belphoebe in 1590, with its series 
of “fayre” steps from living audience to the highest ideal, these words from 
Ocean to Scinthia have an added edge. But, even without this refinement, 
they afford a commentary on the distance that has opened between living 
queen and either of her Faerie images: as the imprisoned Ralegh again 
observes of this distance, “A Queen shee was to mee, no more Belphebe, 
/ A Lion then, no more a milke white Dove” (327–28). As the distance 
widens, as an ideal Belphoebe becomes further detached from living ref- 
erence, other kinds of reference to the present age build up and push 
intrusively into Faerie. Their violence and their ugliness, unparalleled by 
the more controlled images of evil in Books I, II, and even III, do not just 
threaten the Faerie vision but actually violate it.
The old hag who reviles Amoret, her companion Aemylia, and 
Arthur, their would-be rescuer, is nothing short of hideous, as extreme in 
her violent ugliness as conciliatory dove and ruby-heart are in their arti-
ficiality. The poet seems almost unable to put a stop to his description of 
her, his incursion qualifying as another instance of disnarration, refractive 
despite its length and violence: “A foule and loathly creature” with “filthy 
lockes,” she sits in her house “gnawing her nayles for felnesse and for yre, 
/ And there out sucking venime to her parts entire” (IV.viii.23–24). The 
description continues for another two stanzas with a reiterative empha-
sis and expansiveness that partial quotation hardly conveys. She abuses 
all goodness, frames causeless crimes, steals away good names. Nothing 
can be done so well “aliue”—that is, in life—without her depriving it of 
“due praise” (25). As the poet continues, castigating the verbal poison 
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Slander spues out of her hellish inner parts, she becomes an unmistakable 
precursor, first of Detraction and then of that poet’s nightmare, the 
Blatant Beast, both in Book V: “For like the stings of Aspes, that kill with 
smart, / Her spightfull words did pricke and wound the inner part” (26).39
“Such was that Hag,” the poet concludes, “vnmeet to host such 
guests, / Whom greatest Princes court would welcome fayne” (viii.27). 
Then, just before the poet in his own voice breaks into the narrative for 
five stanzas to decry the distance between antique age and present corrup-
tion, he praises the patience of Slander’s “guests,” who endure every insult 
she can offer, “And vnto rest themselues all onely lent, / Regardlesse of 
that queane so base and vilde, / To be vniustly blamd, and bitterly reuilde” 
(viii.28: my emphasis). Quean, meaning “harlot,” “hussy,” or, in Spenser’s 
instance, “hag,” is not the same word as queen, and it might be supposed 
from the poet’s virulent description that she is an unlikely image of the 
Virgin Queen Elizabeth.40 But the word “queane” in this context is not 
disposed of so easily, nor is the possibility that this image of the bitter, old 
woman glances at the living queen.
Philologists have been reluctant to recognize the likelihood of 
the homonymic pun on quean/queen in Renaissance English that exists 
in modern English. Helge Kökeritz notes that contemporary philologi-
cal evidence proves the possibility of such a pun in colloquial speech but 
doubts that polite speakers would have found the pun readily accessible. 
E. J. Dobson likewise notes the distinction in pronunciation of the two 
vowels in educated southern speech but allows for vulgar or dialectical 
variations in which the pun would exist.41 The pun is therefore possible 
but unlikely or inappropriate in a polite context, an argument that actu-
ally might recommend it on grounds of aesthetic decorum—not to say 
political prudence—for the impassioned description of a discourteous 
hag. The historical imagination is hard pressed to picture a courtier who 
would be likely to explain such a pun to the queen or even willing to admit 
recognition of its presence.
Admitting the pun in Spenser’s use of quean, we might regard it as 
one of the many signs in Book IV that in some sense the poem is becom-
ing more private and personal, even as its topical concerns—friendship, 
justice, courtesy—are becoming more social. We can admit the pun, how-
ever, without having to argue that it would not have been recognized 
by a number of Spenser’s readers. Wordplay on the combination quean/
queen has a long history, in part because of its alliterative potential, as, 
for example, in these lines from Langland’s Piers Plowman: “At churche 
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in the charnel cheorles aren vuel to knowe, / Other a knight fro a knaue, 
other a queyne fro a queene.”42 In an age of printing like the Renaissance, 
the spelling of quean—“queen” and “queyn” in Thynne’s Chaucer—was 
also a visual invitation to wordplay, analogous to an eye rhyme, an analogy 
that philology might be inclined to discount.43 The same pun occurs as 
well in Middleton’s A Trick to Catch the Old One when Witt-good dis-
claims youth’s follies, including “sinfull Riotts, / Queanes Evills, Doctors 
diets” (V.ii.185–86). The evils of queans are venereal, but highly qualified 
readers agree that the pun on quean/queen and the consequent play on 
king’s evil (scrofula) are present here.44 Contemporary, dramatic use of a 
pun argues its accessibility to auditors, and a play on diseases dependent 
on the pun urges this fact.
To my mind, the most illuminating information about Spenser’s 
calling Slander a “queane” is that this is his sole use of the word. Occasion, 
Duessa, Impatience, Impotence, the witch who creates False Florimell—
not a one of these hags wears this common Renaissance label, and we 
might almost suppose that Spenser was deliberately avoiding it. That he 
should suddenly have used the word “queane” accidentally or innocently 
in a context inseparable from Belphoebe, Timias, and the relation of Faerie 
ideal to present age defies credibility, and does so much more, in view of 
Spenser’s verbal sensitivity, than does the possibility that he alludes to the 
reigning queen.
As with Belphoebe’s rose in Book III, there are now no precise or 
steady equivalents for the figures gathered in Slander’s House: Amoret, 
who has a considerable history in the poem, does not simply equal 
Elizabeth Throckmorton, Arthur does not equal Ralegh, Aemylia does 
not equal anybody, and Slander does not simply equal the queen.45 In the 
moments and ways I have suggested, however, what happens to Amoret 
reflects the scandal, wrath, and disgrace that Ralegh’s marriage unleashed, 
and briefly the poet again holds up to his sovereign the kind of reflec-
tion found in a hideous cartoon, as he did less realistically in the figure of 
Argante. Where Lucifera, Philotime, and even the much larger-than-life 
Argante were threats, Slander is a present reality.46 There is nothing ludic 
about Slander, as there is even in the fantastic, hyperbolized lust of the 
giantess Argante, who bursts onto the scene with the fabliau figure of the 
Squire of Dames and then, snatching the mighty warrior Satyrane by his 
collar, plumps him athwart her horse.
* * *
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Over the course of The Faerie Queene, Belphoebe appears in three Books, 
II to IV, and Amoret in two, III and IV. Belphoebe never leaves the woods 
during her time in the poem. Despite the promissory fullness when she 
is first introduced in that long, complex portrait in Book II, her persis-
tent woodiness suggests something primitive, unsocial, and finally unfin- 
ished about her, as Braggadocchio, churlish fool though he be, alleges. 
In contrast, Amoret is found in Houses—more broadly in rhetorical 
residences, or cultural topoi, such as the garden of Adonis, the House 
of Busirane, and the Temple of Venus, extending even to the House of 
Slander as another sociocultural site. The cave of Lust, insofar as it is a 
perverse reflection of the bisexed cave with the boar under the mount in 
the garden of Adonis, is arguably yet another, although it might also be 
the exception proving the rule.47 Although the woods—in extreme form 
the Wandering Wood—can be considered a topos as well, in their wilder 
form, indeed forms, they can also be meaningfully distinguished from the 
more cultivated, enclosed places of the poem.
Mainly, Amoret resides in situations set apart from the narrative of 
quest, if also in some sense part of it. The exception comes when she trav-
els with Britomart (treated in the next chapter), a liberating experience 
that affects her figuration, and then in the sequel to these travels in Book 
IV: namely, her capture by Lust and escape, her inadvertent wounding by 
Timias, her rescue by Arthur, and her merely presumptive arrival with him 
to hear Scudamour recount his raptus of her from the Temple of Venus. 
Without a word from her from the time she escapes from Lust’s Cave to 
her arrival with Arthur, and without any other closure of her story, her fig-
ure disappears from the poem, lingering only as a memory in Scudamour’s 
narration of his Temple exploit in the tenth canto of Book IV. In Book III, 
Amoret’s early nurture among the happy, mythic personae in the garden 
of Adonis receives two stanzas of narrative in which she plays no active 
role. At the end of her story, she is back in the Temple of Venus, where, we 
now learn, her story outside the garden began. Even in outline, it looks 
as though something has failed in Amoret’s story and that an entrapping, 
unhealthy circularity has replaced narrative progress. It also looks as if the 
Spenserian poet explored and improvised as he went along. Certainly, with 
respect to the story of Amoret, by the beginning of Book IV, he professes 
“oftentimes” to have wished “it neuer had bene writ,” although he notably 
continues with its further writing nonetheless (i.1). What is written, espe-
cially if then published, like what is otherwise done, belongs to history.
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Does Amoret change in the course of her appearances? Does 
Belphoebe? Surely our perceptions of them both develop, doing so as their 
figures appear in different contexts and situations. Our sense of Belphoebe 
as the figure who fails to comprehend human love differs from our sense 
of her in the portrait of Book II, which includes the complexities that her 
figure cannot contain in subsequent narrative, and our sense of her rejec-
tion of her twin sister and Timias in Book IV differs from our sense of her 
earlier generosity to him in Book III. But there is no sense of her devel-
oping interiorly or consistently from one of these figurations to another. 
She is simply in different situations at different times, always consistently 
virginal—like Diana or Minerva, not Venus, even though she is perceived 
as Venus by Timias and her initial portrait similarly includes Venerean 
allusions. Her generosity to Timias, which is both qualified and incon-
stant, does not extend to Amoret. There is no other consistency than vir-
ginity about her. This looks like allegorical fixation rather than simply an 
Aristotelian subordination of character to plot.48 At the same time, how-
ever, it is the developing narrative, or plot, that is influenced by events 
outside the poem and affects, or is made to affect, the situations in which 
the figure of Belphoebe finds herself and must function.49 From this point 
of view, she is not a static figure but one who changes over time, even while 
she remains both virginal and in the wild woods, in an elemental and prim-
itive environment rather than in one more fully developed. Whereas Una, 
another allegorical figure, learns from experience, however, Belphoebe 
apparently does not, and this is finally the major difference between their 
figurations. Whereas Una’s figural being is continuous, Belphoebe’s is at 
best paradoxical, ever imperiled by contradiction, division, and disconti-
nuity—by shades of Duessa.
I doubt that Amoret changes much either, except in a situated, 
rather than an interiorized, sense. In terms of the narrative, she might have, 
and indeed begins to, but then she wanders away from Britomart’s protec-
tion (if, ambiguously, for pleasure or for need) and discovers misery in 
the cave of Lust, conversing there with another pitiable woman, Aemylia, 
before escaping this cave to become hopelessly entangled in the affairs of 
Belphoebe and Timias.50 Although Amoret is said to call out to Britomart 
in the House of Busirane and later, in Book IV, is said to converse inti-
mately with her lady knight, she never speaks directly, aside from a feeble 
shriek, until she finds herself in Lust’s cave with Aemylia, a sorry situation 
if ever there was one. The sad fact is that Amoret’s figure, like Belphoebe’s, 
becomes subject to the entangled narrative that is driven by its relation to 
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contemporary history in Book IV. As a figure, she is subjected to it, and, if 
she is different in different situations, she too is finally discontinuously so. 
Adequate links and sufficient development are recurrently missing, as they 
are in the argument—endless for lack of enough evidence—as to whether 
she lands in Busirane’s clutches because Scudamour is too aggressive or 
because she is either too fearful or, conversely, too Venereal.51 Notably, all 
these too simple possibilities—even the first—would finally pin her plight 
on her, Busirane’s object and victim.
Yet I also doubt that a dismissal of Amoret as a changing figure 
is sufficient in itself for several reasons. The first is that her travel with 
Britomart has been deferred to the next chapter, and it is her best chance 
for development as a figure, to which, arguably, her subsequent flight from 
Lust attests, even if it ends with cruel irony in the arms of Timias. This 
is a deferral warranted, to my mind, both because of the greater interest 
and importance of Britomart in the poem and because its inclusion in this 
chapter would require too much repetition in the next one. The second 
reason for deferral is that Scudamour’s narrative of the Temple of Venus is 
a present reassertion of a bold, too bold beginning, at once a failed possi-
bility within this narrative—or disnarrative—in Book IV and a testament 
of unfinished business. Effectually, as the latter, it is also an invitation to 
start the story anew or at the very least to reflect on its origin and to pon-
der its deep cultural roots, “yfounded stronge.”52 That this retelling comes 
throughout in Scudamour’s voice only makes it harder to assess, however. 
Does the irony that punctuates it signal the possibility of an expanded 
awareness on his part or the same old blindnesses? Analogously, in their 
final appearances, the figures of Amoret and Belphoebe, not unlike 
Shakespeare’s famously inconsistent, if more fully developed, heroines, 
such as Desdemona, Olivia, and Lady Macbeth, who change with their 
situations in the plot rather than consistently, speak to us at once of lost 
possibilities and of still imaginable ones.53
Yet the best reason of all for not dismissing Amoret’s change per-
tains to the reappearance of her dilemma in the story of Serena that occu-
pies much of Book VI, as well as the final chapter of this book. It is in 
Serena’s story, coupled with Mirabella’s, that the misery first voiced briefly 
by Amoret and at greater length by Aemylia in Lust’s cave—along with 
the nameless old woman—is fully realized. Is that old woman a recon-
textualized and feminized version of the biblical Old Man, or perhaps 
another queanly figure, a hag, whose kindness (in both senses) grimly and 
ironically reflects on women’s plight? Be that as it may, Serena’s story is 
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where the Spenserian narrator returns to the unfinished business to which 
Scudamour’s tale of the Temple of Venus attests. From this vantage point, 
the twinned stories of Amoret and Belphoebe change profoundly, involv-
ing a substantial refiguration for each that approaches and bids fair to 
become a new identity, as the difference in their names in Book VI clearly 
signals within this poem. The identity of each becomes at once more affec-
tive and more personal, and, to my eyes, the Spenserian poet-narrator is 
greatly and personally in sympathy with it. Deferring these refigurations 
until chapter 4 respects the unfolding of Spenser’s narrative, while grant-
ing to Britomart’s story in Books III to V the prominence it deserves and 
actualizes in The Faerie Queene.
“This page intentionally left blank”
Chapter 3
Britomart: Inside and Outside the Armor
THE COMPLEXITY OF THIS chapter asks for an introductory road map: its first section explores ways in which the depiction of 
Britomart answers to traits modern readers, notably Alan Sinfield, have 
found in Shakespeare’s characters. The chapter next proceeds to Britomart’s 
culminating experience in Book III, namely her adventure in the House 
of Busirane. Then it examines her figure through the lens of her defin-
ing armor throughout the three books in which she appears, III, IV, and 
V, the books of chastity, friendship, and justice. This doubled approach, 
occasionally looking back or forward, reflects my own interpretive history 
regarding Britomart and further suggests the differences that approaches 
themselves—critical lenses—at once reveal and create. Approaching the 
House of Busirane, my focus becomes increasingly rhetorical, narrower, 
and more detailed—largely responsive to the fact that this place, this cul-
tural topos, is a house in the rhetorical sense—whereas, right afterward, 
the focus on Britomart’s armor is mythic, iconological, and wider, travers-
ing more of the narrative. My method also attempts to reflect the actual 
experience of reading The Faerie Queene for someone like me, that is, a 
rereader with an overview that allows for retrospection, yet one who tries 
to respect the forward progression of the narrative, not substituting a later 
stage of it for an earlier one.
Britomart is the most fully developed figure of a woman in The Faerie 
Queene and, although she could be called a character, she is also appropri-
ately called a figure, both in order to preserve the continuum in Spenser’s 
poem from more to less complexity of figuration and to acknowledge her 
symbolic dimensions. Her name most simply signifies “martial Briton”; 
discussion of other symbolic dimensions of her figure will occur as they 
become relevant to this chapter.1 Like Britomart, the dramatis personae, 
or characters, in stage plays can also be considered figures, of course, and 
symbolic dimensions are easily enough found at once in them and in the 
plots in which they operate: Shakespeare’s pairing of Hotspur and Falstaff, 
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Ariel and Caliban, Egypt and Rome afford familiar examples.2 The proper 
names of Shakespeare’s characters can also be suggestively symbolic, for 
example, those in the preceding sentence or Cordelia (Latin cor/cordis, 
“heart,” and “delia” as an anagram of “ideal”).3
Britomart and Character Effects
From Britomart’s first appearance in the poem at the beginning of Book 
III, the narrator attributes to her an inside that differs from her outside, 
and he makes a point of doing so, interrupting the action in the first canto 
to identify her as the knight inside the armor who topples guyon and to 
indicate the nature of her Faerie quest (i.8). To suggest that she has “that 
within which passes show” is not to claim that she has an interiority (or 
a lack of it) the same as Hamlet’s or other representative Shakespearean 
characters; instead, it is only to note a certain similarity.4 A significant 
difference between Hamlet and Britomart is that her interiority is subse-
quently exhibited at length, whereas his remains more of a mystery.
One similarity between the two is that some readers would deny 
interiority to them both, either not noticing it for what it is in Britomart’s 
case, or in Hamlet’s by refusing or dissolving it, whether rationalizing or 
materializing it, or both, into the closed terms of modern systems. Systems 
shed light, but they can also destroy the shadows actually present in human 
texts. If I had to identify one feature of Renaissance literary texts, dramatic 
and nondramatic, that most separates them from modern systems and, for 
this very reason, offers to illuminate these systems in turn, it would be 
their persistent, insistent resistance of such closure. Modern scientism has 
its virtues, but, with rare exceptions, the tendency to closure and certainty 
of its typical forms is deceptive when applied to creative writings, espe-
cially older ones. Hamlet’s objection that his treacherous friends would 
“pluck out the heart of his mystery” is also his awareness that they aim to 
do so, his resistance of their efforts, and his determination actively and 
antically to frustrate these (III.ii.365–66). Centuries of criticism suggest 
that to a significant extent he has succeeded. He is certainly one character, 
moreover, for whom the designation “most Shakespearean” is also most 
fitting. Older writings were subject to older systems, to be sure, but typi-
cally, these were more aware of mystery and more tolerant of it. Perhaps 
they had to be; perhaps they chose to be; perhaps neither.
In a couple of ways, the Spenserian narrator’s opening aside to read-
ers in Book III regarding Britomart’s identity and quest differs from the 
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extensive presentation of the Renaissance inside/outside topos early in 
Book I, specifically in Archimago’s manipulation of Redcrosse’s imagina-
tion and his subsequent impersonation of his victim. First, Archimago is 
himself an actor in the relevant episode of Book I, rather than the third-
person narrator of it as in the opening of Book III, and second, in Book 
III, the aside in question is the narrator’s straightforward presentation of 
background, not his sly insinuation of his protagonist’s insufficiency, an 
insinuation effected in Book I, for example, by his making Archimago’s 
impersonation of Redcrosse comment on this knight. Such differences 
render Britomart a more autonomous figure in Book III. The narrator, so 
to speak, respects her difference.
Britomart’s armor in the third book also differs from Una’s veil in 
Book I by being primarily a deliberate, strategic disguise, not just protec-
tive covering or a necessary disguise for a woman in a world of woods, 
caves, and wild creatures, whether human or beastly. By definition, 
Britomart’s armor, including sword and spear, is aggressive, not merely 
defensive. Further, insofar as Una represents Truth in this fallen world, her 
veil is an unavoidable reality, whereas Britomart’s armor is voluntary and 
represents a choice. Britomart is hiding a secret; Una is not. The wimpled 
Una’s black stole cast “ouer all” expressly suggests that she mourns “inly” 
(I.i.4).
As noted in chapter 1, Britomart declines to join the chase of 
Florimell and the forester in the first canto of Book III because she is con-
stant to her own “mind,” not to some other dictate.5 At the outset, she 
declines the traditional role of a knight, whether to rescue or to pursue 
a maiden and thus typically to make love or war, as knights have done 
from time immemorial. Her constant quest for a specific lover is further 
distinguished early in canto i even from Arthur’s quest, since, in chasing 
Florimell, Arthur moves away from his initial motivation to find his elf 
queen and instead seems ready to accept a substitute: later losing sight of 
the fleeing Florimell when night falls, “Oft did he wish, that Lady faire 
mote bee / His faery Queene . . . Or that his Faery Queene were such, 
as shee” (III.iv.54). Although his elf queen is still the gold standard, he 
drifts into likeness as an alternative, acceptable possibility (“such, as”). 
Britomart, in contrast, is steadfast. While focusing on Shakespeare, Helen 
Cooper describes as an inheritance of medieval romance, “the portrayal of 
a young woman in love from inside her own mind” and cites Britomart as 
a case in point; “typically feisty,” the romance heroine of the Middle Ages 
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is self-aware, passionate about “the man she chooses to love” and ready to 
go to great lengths to find (or “get”) him.6
Also notable as Book III gets under way is the fact that Britomart 
is named almost immediately within the text as well as after first acting, 
rather than, for example, after a long description or first only within the 
argument heading a canto, as are Una and Belphoebe.7 Her agency is 
foregrounded. Britomart also has a father rather than a myth of origin, 
a nurse, not a Palmer, and a history both inherited and destined that is 
set firmly on earth. In short, she looks and is more human than her most 
memorable predecessors in the poem, as is the potentially virtuous love 
for which she quests. But it is even more important that the identification 
of Britomart’s quest at the very outset begins to be defined by her differ-
ences from and relationships to numerous other actors in the poem. Her 
figure has a distinctly social as well as an individualized existence. She is 
neither Everywoman, let alone Everyman (humankind, or in premodern 
usage, mankind), nor is she wholly unique. Once again such a description 
of her looks human.
In a perceptive discussion of character and a defense of its validity 
as a current critical topic, Alan Sinfield offers a “redefinition of character 
as continuous consciousness,” while barring “establishment of the indi-
vidual as a single, unified presence,” as distinct from his or her enhanced 
subjectivity.8 While thus rejecting the bourgeois individual of “essentialist 
humanism,” which is post-Enlightenment anyway, Sinfield opts for more 
than “an intermittent, gestural, and problematic subjectivity,” namely, “a 
continuous or developing interiority or consciousness” (62). His subse-
quent discussions of Shakespeare’s characters make clear that such a con-
tinuous consciousness doesn’t have to continue throughout a whole play: 
it can come and go or, once established, can afterwards simply go, leav-
ing a resistant or unresolvable problem. From this perspective, he looks at 
Desdemona, Olivia, and Lady Macbeth. His list could have been extended 
to other problematic figures among Shakespeare’s fictive women: Cressida 
and Isabella, for a start.9
My intention is not to make Britomart into a cross-dressed 
Shakespearean heroine, although I am not the only one long since to have 
remarked general similarities between her and Shakespeare’s Rosalind or 
Viola. At the same time, however, I am struck by the number of charac-
teristics Britomart’s figure exhibits that correspond to the methods play-
wrights use to produce “character effects” in dramatis personae, as Sinfield 
enumerates them. These include self-reference and self-questioning, which 
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might include soliloquy, and also lying, which creates distance between 
statement and intention, the latter indicating inwardness. I would add 
that intention is a word-concept derived etymologically from Latin in, “in, 
within,” and tendere, “to extend, proceed, aim, direct one’s self or one’s 
course.” Further included in Sinfield’s enumeration are indecision, more 
generally the representation of decision-making, and informative conver-
sations overheard by the audience, which raise questions about intention-
ality—that among gloucester, Kent, and Edmund at the opening of King 
Lear comes to mind, for instance.10
Britomart lies to Redcrosse when she rides away from Malecasta’s 
castle with him, telling him that Artegall has done “Late foule dishonour 
and reprochfull spight” to her, but then she waxes “inly wondrous glad” 
when Redcrosse tells her he is greatly surprised that Artegall should ever 
have done such injury to her (III.ii.8–11). Britomart’s direct conversa-
tion with Redcrosse, which continues for nearly ten stanzas, including 
narrative framing and commentary, soon after leads in a narrative flash-
back to the story of her falling in love with the image of Artegall that is 
facilitated through a magic globe—an objectification of her waking, and 
awaking , pubescent imagination. The flashback then proceeds to her 
back-and-forth conversation about her erotic predicament with glauce, 
her comic old nurse, for more than another fifteen stanzas. Not only 
does this conversation deliver background information and dramatize a 
process of decision-making, it also focuses on Britomart’s inner state and 
reveals, in glauce’s words, that Britomart is making a “Monster of . . . [her] 
minde”—imagining horrors and perversions, whereas she should more 
simply be recognizing that she is in love (40).11 Their conversation could 
readily have been adapted for the Renaissance stage. It has comic features, 
as do the visit to Merlin and other aspects of Britomart’s characterization. 
Notably, both women converse in terms of mythic figures, Myrrha, Biblis, 
Pasiphaë, Narcissus. Like the Elizabethan schoolboys Lynn Enterline has 
studied, they use Ovidian mirrors, types or examples, “to understand and 
to express” their own perceptions, which are influenced by these types, 
even if also reshaped and repurposed by the schoolboys (and girls) as they 
mature. Enterline’s proof-texts are Shakespeare’s Lucrece and Hamlet.12
Two other examples of Sinfield’s character effects that produce the 
impression of consciousness occur in the first third of Book III. One is 
Britomart’s much-discussed soliloquy by the seaside in canto iv, in which, 
now imitating a sonnet from Petrarch, she expresses the tempestuous 
“sea of sorrow” within her and nearly despairs of a happy outcome until 
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glauce reminds her of Merlin’s dynastic prophecy and a hostile knight 
conveniently appears to offer an immediate object on which to vent her 
passion (11–16). Significantly, although the ur-text here is mainly (not 
exclusively) Petrarchan, it is Britomart herself, not the narrator, who 
voices it and, within the poem, thus recreates it.13 My other example is 
not the modern word “consciousness,” which is just becoming available in 
the first half of the seventeenth century, but “awareness,” or, in the form 
in which it recurrently occurs with respect to Britomart, a condition of 
being “vnwares.” Her “vnwareness” is obviously based on the presumption 
of its opposite as the possibility to which experience leads.14 Britomart 
is “vnwares” when she looks into the magic globe to see the vision of 
Artegall but later acutely aware of her earlier unawareness when, she tells 
glauce, she swallowed this bait (III.ii.26, 38). Earlier in this book, she was 
also “vnwares” when Malecasta slipped into her bed, the climax in Castle 
Joyous of the initial stage of her initiation as an active quester into the 
bodily and sociocultural context of sexual awareness. At a later stage, she 
will be “vnwares” again when Busirane wounds her, a situation to which 
I will return (i.61, xii.33). Each of these occurrences of Britomart’s lack 
of awareness instances an increasing development of her figure, and the 
correction of each leaves her more aware both of herself and of the nature 
of her quest. Each is a learning experience that results in growth. At the 
same time, there is a perceptible continuity among these experiences. This 
is a continuity, however, which, unlike that of the more metaphysically 
oriented Una—again, more oriented, not exclusively conceived—will be 
disrupted before the poem is finished with Britomart’s figure. With this 
change, her figuration will be at once more problematic and more sadly, 
historically realistic. Still further Shakespearean?
Britomart’s Awareness in the House of Busirane
When Britomart accepts a knight’s plea to free Amoret from the House 
of Busirane, she becomes a radical challenge to the erotic culture in which 
she, too, has operated to this point, with the exception of her declining to 
rescue Florimell, the anticipatory, threshold image of Book III. Amoret, 
if not exactly a prop or just another exhibit in Busirane’s House, has been 
imprisoned by the sadistic enchanter and in this way has unwillingly 
become his creature, another of his creations, or so his production stages 
her. Busirane’s capture of Amoret is what we witness until Britomart ends 
it. We last saw Amoret only briefly in the garden of Adonis, her former 
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residence in Book III. Encountering Busirane’s House at the end of this 
book, we have only the knight Scudamour’s name (Shield of Love), his 
heraldic device (Cupid) and behavior, and his account of why Amoret is 
under Busirane’s control, and, for six more years, from the 1590 install-
ment of the poem until the 1596 one, Spenser’s original audience lacked 
access to anything more.
In contrast to Amoret, Britomart reaches Busirane by actively 
questing and most immediately by chasing the evil Ollyphant (“destruc-
tive fantasy”), Argante’s twin brother, to the sight of Scudamour “all wal-
lowed / Vpon the grassy ground” (III.xi.7). This sequence suggests both 
Britomart’s opposition to such fantasy and Scudamour’s implication in it. 
Simply put, Scudamour replaces Ollyphant. Scudamour tells her that the 
enchanter has “pend,” or through his art confined, Amoret, in effect arrest-
ing the very possibility of their love (xi.11)—at once imprisoning and par-
alyzing it. More allegorically, Scudamour, Cupid’s man, has been separated 
by Busirane from the object of his love, Amoret, who is “Venus mayd,” or 
punningly, Venus-made, ever since Venus discovered and adopted her in 
Cupid’s “stead”—in his “place”—earlier in Book III (vi.28).15 The possibil-
ity of the love of Scudamour and Amoret is therefore the very possibility 
of realizing love, not simply the love of these two figures, but, in terms of 
their simple allegorical natures, here Love itself.
Imprisoned in Busirane’s House of perverse, rhetorical art forms, 
however, Amoret has become the Ovidian-Petrarchan love object. Her 
capture has shaped her figure, indeed, has transfigured it from what it was 
in the garden. For Britomart, confrontation of Busirane is another ini-
tiation and a further education, this time with respect to Ovidian myths 
and Petrarchan conceits that have informed the erotic culture in which 
she functions and, as we have seen, have informed her own awareness. Her 
task is to free Amoret from Busirane’s malign control and to enable the 
possibility of Amoret’s reunion with Scudamour. Developments in Book 
IV subsequently make clear that both Amoret and Scudamour have to 
change for this possibility to be truly realized. To glance back to the last 
chapter and forward in the present one, in 1596 this realization fails to 
happen. In 1590, the lovers’ reunion is greatly compromised, even dubi-
ous, a claim to which this chapter will later return.
In recent times, the House of Busirane has variously been seen as 
Busirane’s projection, as Amoret’s, as Scudamour’s, as Britomart’s, and, 
without regard for these mediating characters, as the Spenserian narrator’s. 
This House, like the House of Holiness, the Bower of Bliss, the garden of 
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Adonis, the Temple of Venus, or any other such place in The Faerie Queene, 
is a cultural site, a topos or “place.” Its representation is finally the poet’s, 
as are all the figures residing in or traveling into it, although the poet’s 
control of it, his agency with respect to it, is mediated, limited, and com-
promised by his own position in language and history. He is nonethe-
less responsible for it insofar as he is in control of it—again, insofar as. 
Although the Temple of Venus in Book IV is a special case whose narra-
tion belongs to Scudamour, it, too, is finally the poet’s, as he acknowledges 
at its very end. Like other cultural sites in The Faerie Queene, which have 
some special pertinence to the figures within them, the House of Busirane 
also has special pertinence to Britomart, as well as more immediately to 
Amoret and Scudamour, without being solely attributable to any one of 
them or even to them all together apart from culture and history. The 
nature of this pertinence—moral, theological, psychological, historical, or 
a combination of such—is variable, not simply formulaic, and it is subject 
to context when it occurs.
In Britomart’s instance, aside from the general, formalized eroti-
cism of Busirane’s House, which has obvious relevance to a love quest, her 
progress in Book III more specifically explains why she is there: in canto i, 
her vulnerability to Malecasta, realized in her wounding, foreshadows her 
vulnerability to Busirane, and, in canto ii, the smoky, sulphurous Etna in 
her breast anticipates the Busiranic fire, shaking, and “stench of smoke and 
sulphure” (ii.32, xi.21, xii.2). Likewise, in canto ii, the perverted, mythic 
forms her explanation takes when she confides in glauce foreshadow those 
in Busirane’s tapestries. In canto iv, the “selfe-pleasing thoughts” that feed 
her pain, her guidance by blind Cupid, and her pendulum swing between 
“Love and despight,” anticipations of Busirane’s paired masquers, prepare 
for Busirane’s pageant, as does her sympathetic recognition of kinship 
with Paridell’s pain in canto ix, ominously within the perverted House of 
Malbecco and Hellenore.16 Amoret, Ovidian-Petrarchan love object par 
excellence, is part of Busirane’s pageant the first time Britomart sets eyes 
on her.
Once Britomart enters Busirane’s enchanted House, the first room 
of three that she views specifically signals the inevitability of her arrival 
there. The tapestries on its walls share both their Ovidian source in the 
Metamorphoses and their sense of erotic compulsion with her beholding—
taking in—the tapestry in the House of Malecasta that depicts the fixated, 
hyper-sensuous love of Venus for the boy Adonis (a foretaste of Argante’s 
preferences) and leads in the narrative to the flashback with glauce in 
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which Britomart expresses her own passion as an erotic perversion in clas-
sical myth.17 The specific Ovidian passage on which Busirane’s tapestries 
draw is the ecphrasis of Arachne’s art in her ill-fated weaving contest with 
Pallas Athena, the greek Minerva. Immediately, there are ironies and 
crossings of gender in this situation, whose many complications must be 
unlayered gradually.
When Britomart initially encounters Busirane’s enchanted fire, she 
asks Scudamour in dismay, “‘What monstrous enmity prouoke we heare, 
/ Foolhardy as th’Earthes children, which made / Batteill against the 
gods? So we a god inuade’” (III.xi.22). Once again, Britomart expresses 
herself, and thinks, in the mythic terms studied in the grammar school 
texts of the period, which were read by well-educated girls, as well as by 
boys. Traditionally, the fire-god is Vulcan, the smith and forger of chains, 
as well as the figure of the jealous, overly possessive husband also evoked 
allusively by the netting of Acrasia and Verdant, a Venus and a Mars, in 
the Bower of Bliss. It is as if Britomart were again upending and improv-
ing on guyon and his Palmer, as she was at the very outset of Book III. 
Her ability in her armor to pass unharmed through the fiery entrance of 
Busirane’s House contrasts both with the disabling jealousy of Scudamour 
and the possessive hoarding of Busirane, throwbacks alike to Malbecco, 
the essence of “gelosy” itself.18
Boldly invading this jealous fire-god and forger of chains, Britomart 
next gazes at the tapestries that recreate the one woven by Ovid’s Arachne, 
a woman bold—perhaps too bold?—in protesting the violent excesses of 
the gods’ passions but also one whose protest is depicted sympathetically in 
the eyes of the Roman poet of the Metamorphoses.19 The tapestries Britomart 
views similarly show more than one sign of parodic protest: for example, 
in Mars’s undignified “shreek” (comically rhyming with “eek”) of passion, 
along “With womanish teares, and with vnwarlike smarts,” or in the 
sequence of Neptune’s undying love only for Bisaltis in the alexandrine of 
one stanza—“Ne ought but deare Bisaltis ay could make him glad”—fol-
lowed immediately in the next stanza by the laconic statement “He loued eke 
Iphimedia deare, / And Aeolus faire daughter Arne hight” (III.xi.41–42, 44).
Yet the cross-dressed knight Britomart finds her tapestry of wom-
anly protest within the chambers of a male enchanter, who, like herself, 
is also the creation of a male poet. At this point, we might well stop to 
ask, with Susanne Wofford, whose tapestry this is and through whose eyes 
we see and, more properly, “rede,” or interpret it.20 Arachne’s, Ovid’s, his 
narrator’s, Britomart’s, Busirane’s, Spenser’s as poet or narrator, the inter-
84  CHAPTER 3
pretive tradition’s, or our own? going beyond the possibilities Wofford 
endorses, I would not exclude any of these, and the ecphrasis of the tap-
estry itself invites them in describing Jove’s rape of Leda, breaking into 
apostrophe in the manner of Ovid to do so:
O wondrous skill, and sweet wit of the man,
That her in daffadillies sleeping made,
From scorching heat her daintie limbes to shade:
Whiles the proud Bird ruffing his fethers wyde,
And brushing his faire brest, did her inuade:
She slept, yet twixt her eielids closely spyde,
How towards her he rusht, and smiled at his pryde.
 (III.xi.32)
Considerable ambiguity of reference marks this much-discussed stanza. 
Is the skilled and sweet-witted man in the first line Busirane or the cha-
meleon-like, negatively capable Spenserian narrator, or the Spenserian 
poet in his own voice?21 This time, the lines cited have no direct paral-
lel in Ovid, hence no parallel in Arachne’s tapestry, and they therefore 
belong to the three possibilities enumerated. But are we to forget that 
Britomart is our gazer and that these lines could also belong to her vision 
or response to Arachne’s?22 In whose opinion is the man “sweet-witted”? 
And what do the last two lines of the stanza mean: “She slept, yet twixt 
her eyelids closely spyde, / How towards her he rusht, and smiled at his 
pryde”? Leda sleeps, like Verdant in the Bower of Bliss, and yet, also to an 
extent like him, between her eyelids she seems to see—to spy—the swan 
rushing toward her. Is she awake or in a trance or in a daydream? Each 
of these possibilities would imply a different kind and degree of agency. 
The simple adverb “closely” could indicate that her eyes are indeed shut 
(“closely twixt”) or that she spies with close attention an object close to 
her (“closely spyde”). The word “spy” itself carries an insistent association 
with stealth or closeness—intense, secretive observation. The final clause 
of the line, as Katherine Eggert has noted, is also ambiguous: does Leda 
smile in anticipation of rapture or does the swan, as the assumed form of 
Jove, smile in anticipation of ravishment?23 And is the smile one of Jovian 
arrogance, of pure pleasure—his, hers, or theirs—or is it an ironic smile, 
a self-reflexive, deflating, Ovidian possibility that the availability of the 
womanly perspectives of Arachne and Britomart, not to mention some 
other readers, enforces? The narrator’s own awareness, often amazing, is 
not to be slighted, either.
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Another passage, even more frequently remarked, expresses ambi-
guity of reference as well. The walls of the enchanter’s House are clothed 
with arras,
Wouen with gold and silke so close and nere,
That the rich metall lurked priuily,
As faining to be hidd from enuious eye;
Yet here, and there, and euery where vnwares
It shewd it selfe, and shone vnwillingly:
Like to a discolourd Snake, whose hidden snares
Through the greene gras his long bright burnisht backe  
                    declares.
 (III.xi.28)
This time, the inwoven threads of metal have an explicit precedent in 
Ovid, although it proves as striking in its difference as in its similarity: 
“There, too, they [Athena and Arachne] weave in pliant threads of gold, 
and trace in the weft some ancient tale (illic et lentum filis inmittitur 
aurum / et vetus in tela deducitur argumentum).”24 In Ovid’s version, the 
gold thread, belonging to Arachne and Athena alike, lacks the last six 
lines of Spenserian description, which call attention—heightened atten-
tion—to the serpentine filaments. Rather than betraying the presence of 
art, they shout it by comparison with Ovid’s text, unwilling as they may 
be, or rather feign to be so. The participial pun “faining”—“As faining 
to be hidd”—as easily supports an exhibitionist impulse as it denies one, 
since the homonymic pun means either pretending (feigning) or desiring 
(faining). The alternative of merely pretending to hide from but actually 
enticing the “enuious eye” would relate the serpentine threads to the gold 
grapes in Acrasia’s Bower, which enfold themselves among the leaves “As 
lurking from the vew of couetous guest”—as if lurking but actually sedu-
cing (II.xii.55).
But art in the House of Busirane is not finally the same as in the 
Bower, where “The art, which all that wrought, appeared in no place” 
(II.xii.58). Here, not unlike the sonneteer’s topos of inarticulateness or 
an elaborate declamation uttered in full erotic chase by Ovid’s Apollo, 
art may want or pretend to hide but instead displays itself, unwillingly or 
not. Like the pun faining/feigning, the word “unwillingly,” which specifi-
cally refers to shining or conspicuousness—“It shewed it selfe, and shone 
vnwillingly”—again evokes the oscillating play of visual and interpretive 
perspectives, along with that of inadvertency and agency. Moreover, it 
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does so “vnwares,” which is precisely the ambiguous way Malecasta ear-
lier sneaks up on Britomart and the way Busirane’s knife wounds her and 
the knowing and not knowing way that Leda, in all her ambiguity, awaits 
the rush of the swan. This is an acute, extraordinarily telling way of real-
izing the combination of cultural exposure and ignorance, knowing and 
not knowing, that characterizes Britomart’s condition and observation, as 
indeed her youthful reading of Ovid. Britomart does not cause this cul-
tural site, whose meaning at once precedes and exceeds her role in it, but 
this place of rhetorical culture bears special pertinence to her condition 
and quest. Again, as with Leda, she is mirrored to an extent in the object 
or site.
Britomart passes from the tapestries next to a Mammonic room 
overlaid with pure gold, in which the “monstrous formes” of false love are 
depicted and on whose glittering walls hang the trophies of love’s wars and 
conquests (xi.51–52). Again, Busirane is a hoarder, a self-gratifying one 
like Spenser’s Mammon, who autoerotically fingers the gold coins in his 
lap “to feede his eye” (II.vii.4–5). In Busirane’s golden room, Britomart 
witnesses the procession of Cupid’s masquers, figures that stage the very 
process of a false love which is hardly distinguishable at moments from 
a true one. Antiquity of origin characterizes the creations of this room, 
as before of the tapestries depicted. As A. C. Hamilton’s gloss conven-
iently summarizes, the masquers draw directly on the conventions of the 
medieval courts of love and of Renaissance triumphs, not least Petrarch’s 
own, as well as on those of the Renaissance masque.25 Again, these fig-
ures are hardly Britomart’s creation, although they have special relevance 
to her condition and quest, as they do to Amoret’s and Scudamour’s, and 
to those of other characters in Book III. The very fact, long recognized, 
that they can be read from either a male or female point of view indicates 
their basically cultural rather than exclusively personal status. Their formal 
artificiality also proclaims their radical—indeed, their catachrestic—con-
structedness. Unlike the insidious art forms in Acrasia’s Bower, they make 
no claims on nature. On reflection, who would want such mirrors of pas-
sion as these?
Their relation to Busirane and ultimately to Britomart is worth pur-
suing, however. Cupid’s masquers resemble the kind of form Malbecco 
becomes at the end of canto x, one that “Is woxen so deform’d, that he has 
quight / Forgot he was a man, and Gelosy is hight” (60). Malbecco’s meta-
morphosis into a “passion . . . in the mind” introduces the first canto, the 
eleventh, in which the House of Busirane figures centrally, and, in effect, 
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it prepares for the masquers, whose humanity, like Malbecco’s, has either 
vanished or failed of realization.26 Like the fixed and fixated emblem 
“gelosy” that Malbecco has become, the masquers are impostors of the 
living and every bit as artificial, as “personified,” hence metaphorized, as 
the “carcas dead” of the False Florimell (III.viii.7, xi.1). Malbecco makes 
explicit in Book III the connection between sexual and monetary hoard-
ing that was glimpsed earlier in the figure of Mammon. Even though the 
masquers are in a procession—a kind of dead march—each pair in itself is 
a frozen stage of courtship, removed from the necessarily narrative process 
of allegory and quest.27 The masquers are another product of Busirane’s 
art, and they issue from an “inner rowme” that is his as well (xii.26).
Years since, Thomas P. Roche, Jr., glossed Busirane as abuse in the 
sixteenth-century senses of “imposture, ill-usage, delusion,” or as the 
archaic abusion, meaning a “perversion of the truth, deceit, deception, 
imposture,” and in the words of Book II, implying “fond . . . illusions” 
(xi.11).28 To these meanings, I would add abusio, the familiar Renaissance 
word for catachresis, here understood as a wrenching of metaphor or an 
extravagant use of it, in the case at hand, a violent (mis)use of language, 
of which the masquers’ dead likenesses are a prime exhibit. In Busirane’s 
House of rhetorical art and illusion, abusio reigns, or “ranes,” supreme. The 
traditional classification of poetry as a branch of rhetoric was still com-
mon in the Renaissance, and Busirane is clearly an abuser of poetry, as 
well as of rhetoric.29 By now, I imagine, it is also clear that Busirane’s name 
puns on abuse/abusio—that is, A-busirane.
Another persistent association of abusio in the rhetorical tradition is 
with audacia, or boldness, and it offers a gloss on the strange, forward and 
backward, summoning and forbidding, aggressive and maidenly impera-
tives Britomart reads over the doors in Busirane’s Mammonic second 
chamber: “Be bolde, be bolde . . . Be not too bold” (xi.54).30 In a discussion of 
metaphor, including catachresis/abusio, in De Oratore, Cicero’s spokesman 
praises “paulo audaciores [translationes],” or, “somewhat bolder meta-
phors” that bring brilliance to a speech but do not violate “ratio”—reason, 
purpose, or indeed, the nature of things (rerum natura). Such figures are 
bold but not too bold.31 Read through the lens of Ciceronian rhetoric, 
the writing Britomart confronts above the doors in Busirane’s House of 
rhetoric has the Ciceronian quality of an invitation to use audacia and 
a caution against excess in doing so, as it does in De Oratore. The choice 
Britomart faces as reader of Busirane’s art is edged with anxiety and 
danger, not unlike that faced by an orator in Cicero’s Rome, as the forced 
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deaths of so many of the speakers in De Oratore, as well as of Cicero him-
self, dramatize. Rhetoric is consequential; it is a social, legal, and political 
shaper, not merely a neutral ornament or tool of pedagogues. Britomart, 
or any other reader, would do well carefully and cautiously to heed these 
warnings about the boldness of rhetorical art, warnings now appearing 
elusive and treacherous, yet also beguiling, in the message they send “to 
any vnwares” in Busirane’s House. They invite a decision, while undermin-
ing assurance, and the only escape from Busirane’s hegemonic cultural trap 
here or elsewhere, then or now, starts with awareness.
Britomart’s evident acceptance of the challenge to be bold, but not 
too bold, leads to the third chamber of the House of Busirane, where its 
patron, the figure or at least the first figure behind the curtains, Busirane 
himself, primarily represents the constructedness of the entire place. 
Again, this art-full place simply doesn’t make the same claims as Acrasia’s 
Bower about its nearness to or indistinguishability from nature. This is art 
in capital letters, and alarmingly, Amoret’s life in some sense now depends 
on Busirane. Thus “the Lady [Amoret], which by him stood bound, / 
Dernly vnto her [Britomart] called to abstaine, / From doing him to dy” 
(xii.3: my emphasis). Once in Busirane’s clutches, Amoret recognizes 
herself and is recognized as his creation, pleading for his life in order to 
preserve her own. Her identity as love, which is presently her whole life, 
depends on loving. She is, after all, “Venus mayd” and the complement of 
“Cupids man,” as she will be described by Scudamour in Book IV (x.54). 
Busirane has arrested her development, both imprisoned her figure and 
obstructed the realization of what she could and should be.
The adverb “dernly,” which conveys the tone and manner in which 
Amoret calls on Britomart to spare Busirane’s life, means “secretly” or 
“privately, confidentially”; it also carries the sense “inwardly.” Dernly 
is a strange but suggestive word in this context, one that in the past has 
often been glossed too casually in the derived senses “dismally” or “direly.” 
More significantly, it intimates a special appeal or relationship, something 
understood or otherwise shared between the two women. Yet dern(e) also 
means “dark” and “secret” in the sense “done in the dark” and often has 
associations with craft, deceit, or evil.32 Conceivably, if disturbingly, it 
could further connect Amoret with her captor, at least while in his power. 
Associatively, the “dark secret life” that destroys Blake’s rose comes to 
mind.
Clearly, however, Britomart cannot destroy Busirane without 
destroying what Amoret now is, the cultural love object par excellence. 
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This Busiranic figuration underlies Amoret’s development in the com-
pany of Britomart after Book III and prior to the intractable, historical 
entanglement of Amoret’s figure with the story of Timias and Belphoebe 
in Book IV (vii–viii). Amoret’s figuration as love object is also the reason 
that, although Busirane’s artworks vanish, he still survives, bound by the 
very chain or, in further terms of traditional iconography, by the rhetori-
cal art that he has abused.33 Without him, there is only a vacuum, and this 
vacuum might also have something to do with the fact that Spenser’s own 
Amoretti, written and published between Book III and the 1596 sequel, 
cannot wholly escape the available conventions of erotic discourse but 
indeed must use and try to reshape them.34 The furnishings of Busirane’s 
rooms may vanish at the end of canto xii, but this is hardly the last we see 
of their kind in Spenser’s poetry.
The alternative definition of catachresis/abusio, namely a necessary 
extension of the signification of a word to something that lacks a word, 
rather than merely a willful wrenching of language, bears both on the emp-
tiness apparent with the vanishing of the artworks in Busirane’s House and 
on the persistence of Ovidian, Petrarchan, or otherwise Busiranic forms in 
Spenser’s poetry. Abusive as these might have been and still might be, they 
are currently and culturally inescapable for a practicing poet who wants his 
poems read, even aside from the extent to which he is able, or is not, to get 
outside and to critique them. Poetry has never been written in a cultural 
vacuum. This is another suggestion conveyed by Spenser’s ending Amoret’s 
story with a return to the Temple of Venus in Book IV, right where her 
life beyond the garden of Adonis began, as discussed in chapter 2.
Busirane represents a fantasy and, additionally, a culture of rape, 
as others have argued without qualification, but it should be observed as 
well that he is not successful. His fantasy remains exactly that, and Amoret 
remains a virgin under his roof: “Die had she leuer with Enchanters knife, / 
Then to be false in loue, profest a virgine wife”—pledged to Scudamour 
but not fully one with him (IV.i.6, III.xii.31). If it were otherwise, 
Busirane’s significance as a peculiarly rhetorical form of abuse, an art with 
the power in actuality to arrest love, would be lost, and with it the real 
cultural critique of Book III. Busirane abuses figuration and the percep-
tion based on it to feign that metaphor is the same as reality, that it is abso-
lutely rather than is and is not, as Paul Ricoeur would gloss this figure of 
perverse predication—“perverse” (from pervertere), “turned away, around, 
about” or “athwart,” hence “tropic.”35 It is Busirane who feigns (and fains) 
rape. And his ideological legacy is the reading that believes him.
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Britomart herself is wounded, although not deeply, by Busirane and 
therefore proves vulnerable to him. Her heart is also said to be pierced and 
her hair stood on end by his bloody verses, even while, her threatening 
sword raised above him, she controls him.36 To my mind, this is the one 
moment in the scene, rather than any other one, at which Britomart expe-
riences, or truly realizes, Amoret’s condition. For a modern reader invested 
in psychoanalytic connections, this could be a moment when Britomart 
traverses, enters into, the Busiranic fantasy, even as it is the same moment 
in which Busirane “reuerse[s]” his spell, turning it back as when one looks 
at the backside of a collar, and his artworks crumble, then vanish, because 
there is nothing real there (III.xii.36).37
At one point in the immediate context of Busirane’s disenchanting 
verses—a rhetorical spell, which like all spells, must be unbound—a truly 
ambiguous pronoun occurs, (con)fusing Britomart with Amoret. With 
“threatfull hand” unslackened, Britomart waits “[un]dismaied” (and un-
dis-maided) by the quaking of this House and undeterred by “daungers 
dout,” a phrase offering to reassume the familiar form of an actual pair of 
the masquers earlier seen (cf. xii.10–11, 37); thus she “Abode,” occupying 
and inhabiting this “place,”
 to weet, what end would come of all.
At last that mightie chaine, which round about
Her tender waste was wound, adowne gan fall,
And that great brasen pillour broke in peeces small.
 (III.xii.37)
The ambiguous referent of the pronoun “her” signals Britomart’s involve-
ment—literally her enwrapping, winding (Latin involvere)—in Busirane’s 
“mightie chaine,” in the toils (and coils) of his rhetoric, thus evoking the 
familiar iconographic identification of rhetoric with spellbound enchain-
ment that I earlier referenced. Arguably, the first seven lines in the next 
stanza also encompass Britomart and Amoret, although my own awareness 
of the situation in the narrative just described makes me think such a rea-
ding unlikely. Be that as it may, what is significant about the one momen-
tary identification of Britomart with Amoret in the penultimate line of 
the last inset is that it comes only with Amoret’s freeing at Britomart’s 
hand. It implicates Britomart in Amoret’s predicament, and she could 
hardly not be implicated in view of the experiences that brought her to 
Busirane’s House in the first place, but again, like Britomart’s superficial 
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wounding, in doing so it more tellingly exhibits the superiority and inti-
macy of her derne, or dark, secret power.
Let us briefly suppose nonetheless that the next stanza, of whose 
identification with Britomart I am skeptical, does continue the identifica-
tion of her with Amoret, since this stanza offers the best evidence for the 
actual raping of Amoret and, in Susan Frye’s argument, of Britomart as 
well:
The cruell steele, which thrild her dying hart,
Fell softly forth, as of his owne accord,
And the wyde wound, which lately did dispart
Her bleeding brest, and riuen bowels gor’d,
Was closed vp, as it had not beene sor’d [1596,  
   1609: “bor’d”],
And euery part to safety full sownd,
As she were neuer hurt, was soone restor’d:
Tho when she felt her selfe to be vnbownd,
And perfect hole, prostrate she fell vnto the grownd.
 (III.xii.38)
The crucial words occur in the lines describing the wound in “Her bleed- 
ing brest, and riuen bowels” that “Was closed vp, as it [the wound] had 
not beene sor’d.” Although these lines are about as transgressively sug-
gestive as The Faerie Queene gets, I would reject a reading that swallows 
catachresis whole, actualizing the radical metaphors present here. The 
meaning of the lines depends heavily on that of the words “bowels” and 
“as” in them. Contrary to the popular modern understanding of bowels 
exclusively as “guts,” in the sixteenth century this word commonly referred 
to ”the seat of the tender and sympathetic emotions” or the “heart, centre,” 
and in Spenser’s writing it frequently, although not always, carries the 
latter meaning, as is also true of English translations of the Bible in this 
period.38 Doublets, such as “bleeding brest” and “riuen bowels” in the first 
of the crucial lines, are rife in Spenser, and the prominence in canto xii of 
Amoret’s transfixed heart also favors the meanings, now archaic, that I 
have cited. Use of a singular verb (“was”) and singular pronoun (“it”) with 
reference to the single wound in “brest” and “bowels” further enforces 
identification of this alliterating doublet as a single unit.
The other word, as, in the phrase “as it had not been sor’d,” could be 
read “as if,” but it need not be. This word can also mean “inasmuch as” or 
“since,” and this is what I take it to mean here: “inasmuch as it had not been 
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sor’d.”39 I would not reject the other possible reading out of hand either, 
although in context I find it a stretch—“far-fet,” indeed an abusio, and 
notably Busiranic in viewpoint. But metaphor, even abusive, catachrestic 
metaphor, is, as well as is not. Ricoeur, for one, insists on such “split refer-
ence,” a meaning that is there and not there, and Pierre Bourdieu similarly 
speaks of the ambivalence of sublation, of a lifting or raising that “simulta-
neously denies and maintains both the repression and the repressed” and 
thus “allows for a doubling of profits: the profit of saying and the profit of 
denying what is said by the way of saying it.”40
In the Spenserian passage in question, however, the possibility of the 
counterfactual reading “as if,” like the former possibility of reading “bow-
els” as “guts,” hence “belly” or reproductive organs, would only return us 
to the multiple perspectives of the participants in this canto—here spe-
cifically those of Amoret, Britomart, Busirane, the sometimes unreliable 
narrator, and the Spenserian poet himself. The pun on “whole” in the final 
line of the stanza is equally undisturbed by the reading I have advanced or 
by the one that chooses Busirane’s perspective on it: Amoret, representative 
love object, is rendered “whole and wanting,” at once perfected, or com-
pleted, for the passion of Cupid’s man and both lacking and desiring him. 
Freely now, her responses, like Britomart’s, are holistic in every sense of 
the hopeful or disheartening pun, as the reader will have it.
We hear or half hear submerged, or (im)possible, puns of the sort 
just addressed even when prolonged attention to syntax and context 
indicates that they are far-fetched or grammatically irrational. They are 
plentiful in the literature of the period, in Shakespeare and Donne, for 
obvious instances, and notably in Spenser as well. Studying the mental 
processes by which we select and comprehend words, the psycho-linguist 
Jean Aitchison has found evidence that I see supporting the viability of 
such puns: readers or listeners “briefly activate both meanings of a homo-
nym, even in cases where one of them is inappropriate”; in fact, according 
to one model, “A whole army of words, it seems, marches up for consid-
eration each time a word begins.”41 Aitchison’s explanation of homonymic 
punning is readily extended to a syntactical construction or to any alterna-
tive signification of a single word.
Whatever the precise workings of our mental circuitry, a third 
Spenserian example of (im)possible punning is ready to hand slightly 
earlier in Britomart’s confrontation with Busirane, and it raises similar 
issues of reading, thus contributing to this significant interpretive pattern 
in Busirane’s third chamber. When Busirane’s knife wounds Britomart, 
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“Exceeding wroth therewith the virgin grew, / Albe the wound were noth-
ing deepe imprest” (xii.33). In an examination of Spenser’s puns on the 
word “nothing,” Eggert has suggested that nothing here might be a noun 
and therefore a sexual pun, the familiar Shakespearean equivalent of “hole,” 
or “vagina, genitalia”: in this reading “nothing [is] deepe imprest.”42 Once 
again, though surely prematurely, the “virgin” Britomart is presumed to 
have been raped. But, as Eggert has agreed, the concessive “Albe” (mean-
ing “albeit, although”) preceding “nothing” syntactically negates such a 
pun and indicates instead that “nothing” is an adverb—that is, “nothing 
[or not at all] deepe imprest”—with the result that Britomart is far from 
having been violated except in a superficial sense. Once the grammatical 
reading dominates, the (im)possible pun spectrally present serves to insin-
uate a more threatening potential in the situation—one submerged and 
unrealized—and it may intimate as well the precariousness of Britomart’s 
control at this moment, a control, by drawing her sword, that she quickly 
asserts and maintains (33–34). Once again, the abusive reading is finally 
meaningful only as an expression of the threat and indeed of the projected 
fantasy of Busirane. The (im)possible pun would nominalize the word 
“nothing,” insisting on its literal sense “no thing”; this is the sense that 
negates the male member, or “thing,” in a common Elizabethan sense of 
the word thing, while also evoking it, and thus motivates the sexual pun. In 
this way, the “abusive,” Busiranic reader deconstructs the more abstractive 
(supersessive) adverb to find the material root that makes it a noun and a 
metaphor. At the heart of this practice is debate about the viability of dead 
metaphors, appropriately mentioned in passing here.43
In both the 1590 and 1596 editions of The Faerie Queene, Busirane’s 
artworks disappear once he is captured, and in the 1596 edition Britomart 
and Amoret leave his House, only to find that Scudamour and glauce 
have departed, fearing the worst. In the 1590 edition, however, Amoret is 
reunited with Scudamour outside Busirane’s House. Hamilton’s gloss on 
their embrace is hardly alone in suggesting that the embrace is orgasmic, 
and I suppose it might be, but Britomart’s presence as an observer gives me 
pause. Certainly their embrace is passionate: Amoret melts in pleasure and 
pours out her spirit in “sweete ravishment”; the embracing lovers are “like 
two senceless stocks,” and, as if grown together, they resemble the marble 
statue of a hermaphrodite (xi.45–46). The fact that Spenser cancelled this 
ending in 1596 is the strongest sign that something is wrong with it, how-
ever, and the “senceless stocks” and marble hermaphrodite are two others. 
A stock is a tree stub or a block of wood, both lifeless, as is the marble 
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statue, fixed in its place.44 The image of the hermaphrodite in this con-
text is at best ambivalent—grotesquely double-limbed, motionless, and 
dubiously human. That Britomart is said to half-envy the lovers’ embrace 
half-suggests that she does not embrace it herself without reservation and 
half-suggests that she does and therefore that she has more learning to do.
Understood sequentially as resulting from Britomart’s victory, the 
conclusive image of the hermaphroditic statue reflects ironically on her 
triumph. Amoret has been freed, but she remains to an extent Busirane’s 
creature, a figure bound to his erotics, even as she is bound to Cupid’s man 
Scudamour, whose identifying shield, which is emblazoned with the fig-
ure of Cupid, results from his conquest of unwilling womanhood in the 
Temple of Venus (see III.7, IV.x.55, 57). Even in Book III, his name and 
blazon identify him as Cupid’s surrogate. Aside from the Temple of Venus, 
which only appears in the tenth canto of Book IV, Amoret’s sociocultural 
shaping preeminently has been at Busirane’s cruel hands. The hermaph-
rodite is what survives Busirane’s cultural site when all his other erotic 
forms have vanished, and its survival will be further apparent when, after 
a hiatus of six years, the second installment of The Faerie Queene is pub-
lished—Books IV to VI. Of course Busirane, like Archimago and Acrasia 
before him, survives, too, although we see no more of his figure. The poet 
of Faerie may be an idealist, but he is hardly unaware of the real world, as 
we call it and as these survivals testify.
As if to observe the hiatus between the first installment of The 
Faerie Queene and the poet’s reflections on it in the proem to Book IV, I 
want first to review Britomart’s role to this point and then in the next sec-
tion to begin anew with another, different approach to it, through some-
thing at first glance purely external, her armor. This approach will thus use 
a new lens, which the 1596 installment does not inaugurate but makes fur-
ther significant. Republishing Spenser’s first installment together with his 
second, with heightened emphasis on Britomart’s armor, the 1596 Faerie 
Queene itself invites a review of Book III.
Although Britomart is repeatedly developed at length in relation 
to others in the first four cantos of Book III, she still remains focal. Her 
quest provides the main story line: Malecasta, the flashback with glauce, 
the visit to Merlin, her complaint by the seaside, which is mirrored by 
Cymoent’s and Arthur’s in the same canto (iv). Admittedly, Merlin’s his-
tory lesson over twenty-plus stanzas stretches this point, yet his history is 
centered on Britomart’s progeny. In the second four cantos—Belphoebe 
and Timias, the garden of Adonis, Florimell, the witch and old fisherman, 
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Argante, Satyrane, the Squire of Dames—Britomart is absent as a figure 
in the action. Then, in canto ix, she shares a role at and in the castle of 
Malbecco, there discovering her genealogical connection with Paridell. 
The metamorphosis of Malbecco into the emblem of jealous fixation in 
canto x, a story from which Britomart is again absent, introduces the first 
of the cantos of Busirane. That Britomart’s absence from nearly half the 
cantos in Book III conforms to the structure of romance is important, but, 
in a poem that everywhere makes form and structure meaningful, it means 
more.
When Britomart reappears for the last two cantos, which are situ-
ated in Busirane’s House of Rhetoric, she looks once more like the major 
representative of the story line, yet her primary function for stanza after 
stanza is to tour the artworks that dominate the scene, and to partici-
pate in the multiple points of view explored through them. When she 
acts to save Amoret, the heightened, layered ambiguity of what actually 
transpires, albeit comprehendible, conspicuously leaves the final decision 
to others—viewers and readers as participants. In short, the dominant 
subject now looks cultural, and the primary focus thematic rather than 
characterological. Whereas the characterological features of the first four 
cantos might have invited the view that Britomart is in herself the sub-
ject, the final eight cantos, including the adventure of Busirane, have read-
justed it. The Faerie Queene is never static, let alone formulaic. In Book IV, 
Britomart’s figure will become less conventionally cross-dressed, and, in 
accordance with the more generally experimental nature of this book, her 
figure will also become more experimentally so. This is the development 
that I intend to trace next by considering Britomart’s armor, from Book 
III through Book V, where her story shifts again before ending.
Britomart’s Armor
Throughout Book III, Britomart has been vested in armor that forms and 
masks, expresses and veils, defends and contains her. She has been further 
invested in finding Artegall, whose identity is known to her by his own 
vesting in the conquered arms of Achilles. By the opening of Book IV, 
Britomart, the armed but nubile virgin, not only Venus-Virgo but more 
radically Venus within Mars, has become a complicated cultural signi-
fier implicated in cultural conceptions of gender. Riding into Book IV, 
Britomart and Amoret share a single horse, a traditional symbol of passion, 
as well as a single saddle, unless Amoret perches on the horse’s rump—a 
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passing, parodic thought. Since Britomart wears a full suit of armor, their 
combined silhouette on the horse recalls the hermaphrodite in the original 
ending of Book III. This transposed, catachrestic, hermaphroditic form at 
the outset of Book IV, which replaces the one in the original ending, is in 
effect a continuation of unfinished business. Their silhouette also antici-
pates the statue of Venus with “both kinds in one, / Both male and female, 
both vnder one name” that presides over the Temple of Venus in the tenth 
canto of this fourth book (41).
A fixed, emblematic statue is not a figure developing in figured nar-
rative, however, and sex need not be equated with gender. Nonetheless, by 
Book IV it is clear that a binaristic conception of gender is inadequate.45 
Clearly now, there are four terms in play, and, with the benefit of retro-
spection, at least two in each of the major amatory players of the books 
featuring Britomart. The play of these terms with respect to Britomart 
is my major focus in what follows, but, with respect to Artegall, it bears 
mention, precisely because four terms, not just Britomart’s two, are vital 
to it. When Artegall appears at a tournament in Book IV of the poem, his 
first appearance as an actor rather than merely as an image, he is “the salu-
age knight” with “Saluagesse sans finesse”—artless, uncivilized savagery—
emblazoned on his shield (IV.39, 42). Encountering Britomart’s spear after 
toppling all other knightly contestants, he is summarily knocked from his 
horse. A poor loser who harbors a grudge, he still sports his savage iden-
tity when he next meets Britomart and engages in hand-to-hand combat 
with her, an episode that I will subsequently examine in detail. Its result is 
Artegall’s assumption of his true identity as he yields to Britomart.
Both armed encounters of Artegall with Britomart dramatize that 
his savagery needs softening, refining, civilizing. As the loaded term sof-
tening signals in a context of gender and sexuality, softening suggests his 
need of the Venerean principle, ranging from love to courtesy, gentleness, 
generosity, and compassion, a principle that has been hidden, indeed 
absent, from his actions as the savage knight. In mythological terms, this 
principle might be dubbed his inner Venus. It will moderate and civilize 
his hyper-masculinity, his exclusive maleness. Much more happens in 
Artegall’s own book, the fifth, although its complexities exceed my present 
focus. Yet briefly, in a parody of Artegall’s yielding to Britomart in Book 
IV, he yields again to a woman, the wrong one, in Book V, and his doing 
so results in his punitive cross-dressing as a woman. He is humiliated and 
effeminized but simultaneously humanized—once again civilized—by 
this fall, and with it, for the first time in Book V, he recalls his betrothal to 
Chapter 3
Britomart: Inside and Outside the Armor
THE COMPLEXITY OF THIS chapter asks for an introductory road map: its first section explores ways in which the depiction of 
Britomart answers to traits modern readers, notably Alan Sinfield, have 
found in Shakespeare’s characters. The chapter next proceeds to Britomart’s 
culminating experience in Book III, namely her adventure in the House 
of Busirane. Then it examines her figure through the lens of her defin-
ing armor throughout the three books in which she appears, III, IV, and 
V, the books of chastity, friendship, and justice. This doubled approach, 
occasionally looking back or forward, reflects my own interpretive history 
regarding Britomart and further suggests the differences that approaches 
themselves—critical lenses—at once reveal and create. Approaching the 
House of Busirane, my focus becomes increasingly rhetorical, narrower, 
and more detailed—largely responsive to the fact that this place, this cul-
tural topos, is a house in the rhetorical sense—whereas, right afterward, 
the focus on Britomart’s armor is mythic, iconological, and wider, travers-
ing more of the narrative. My method also attempts to reflect the actual 
experience of reading The Faerie Queene for someone like me, that is, a 
rereader with an overview that allows for retrospection, yet one who tries 
to respect the forward progression of the narrative, not substituting a later 
stage of it for an earlier one.
Britomart is the most fully developed figure of a woman in The Faerie 
Queene and, although she could be called a character, she is also appropri-
ately called a figure, both in order to preserve the continuum in Spenser’s 
poem from more to less complexity of figuration and to acknowledge her 
symbolic dimensions. Her name most simply signifies “martial Briton”; 
discussion of other symbolic dimensions of her figure will occur as they 
become relevant to this chapter.1 Like Britomart, the dramatis personae, 
or characters, in stage plays can also be considered figures, of course, and 
symbolic dimensions are easily enough found at once in them and in the 
plots in which they operate: Shakespeare’s pairing of Hotspur and Falstaff, 
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Ariel and Caliban, Egypt and Rome afford familiar examples.2 The proper 
names of Shakespeare’s characters can also be suggestively symbolic, for 
example, those in the preceding sentence or Cordelia (Latin cor/cordis, 
“heart,” and “delia” as an anagram of “ideal”).3
Britomart and Character Effects
From Britomart’s first appearance in the poem at the beginning of Book 
III, the narrator attributes to her an inside that differs from her outside, 
and he makes a point of doing so, interrupting the action in the first canto 
to identify her as the knight inside the armor who topples guyon and to 
indicate the nature of her Faerie quest (i.8). To suggest that she has “that 
within which passes show” is not to claim that she has an interiority (or 
a lack of it) the same as Hamlet’s or other representative Shakespearean 
characters; instead, it is only to note a certain similarity.4 A significant 
difference between Hamlet and Britomart is that her interiority is subse-
quently exhibited at length, whereas his remains more of a mystery.
One similarity between the two is that some readers would deny 
interiority to them both, either not noticing it for what it is in Britomart’s 
case, or in Hamlet’s by refusing or dissolving it, whether rationalizing or 
materializing it, or both, into the closed terms of modern systems. Systems 
shed light, but they can also destroy the shadows actually present in human 
texts. If I had to identify one feature of Renaissance literary texts, dramatic 
and nondramatic, that most separates them from modern systems and, for 
this very reason, offers to illuminate these systems in turn, it would be 
their persistent, insistent resistance of such closure. Modern scientism has 
its virtues, but, with rare exceptions, the tendency to closure and certainty 
of its typical forms is deceptive when applied to creative writings, espe-
cially older ones. Hamlet’s objection that his treacherous friends would 
“pluck out the heart of his mystery” is also his awareness that they aim to 
do so, his resistance of their efforts, and his determination actively and 
antically to frustrate these (III.ii.365–66). Centuries of criticism suggest 
that to a significant extent he has succeeded. He is certainly one character, 
moreover, for whom the designation “most Shakespearean” is also most 
fitting. Older writings were subject to older systems, to be sure, but typi-
cally, these were more aware of mystery and more tolerant of it. Perhaps 
they had to be; perhaps they chose to be; perhaps neither.
In a couple of ways, the Spenserian narrator’s opening aside to read-
ers in Book III regarding Britomart’s identity and quest differs from the 
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extensive presentation of the Renaissance inside/outside topos early in 
Book I, specifically in Archimago’s manipulation of Redcrosse’s imagina-
tion and his subsequent impersonation of his victim. First, Archimago is 
himself an actor in the relevant episode of Book I, rather than the third-
person narrator of it as in the opening of Book III, and second, in Book 
III, the aside in question is the narrator’s straightforward presentation of 
background, not his sly insinuation of his protagonist’s insufficiency, an 
insinuation effected in Book I, for example, by his making Archimago’s 
impersonation of Redcrosse comment on this knight. Such differences 
render Britomart a more autonomous figure in Book III. The narrator, so 
to speak, respects her difference.
Britomart’s armor in the third book also differs from Una’s veil in 
Book I by being primarily a deliberate, strategic disguise, not just protec-
tive covering or a necessary disguise for a woman in a world of woods, 
caves, and wild creatures, whether human or beastly. By definition, 
Britomart’s armor, including sword and spear, is aggressive, not merely 
defensive. Further, insofar as Una represents Truth in this fallen world, her 
veil is an unavoidable reality, whereas Britomart’s armor is voluntary and 
represents a choice. Britomart is hiding a secret; Una is not. The wimpled 
Una’s black stole cast “ouer all” expressly suggests that she mourns “inly” 
(I.i.4).
As noted in chapter 1, Britomart declines to join the chase of 
Florimell and the forester in the first canto of Book III because she is con-
stant to her own “mind,” not to some other dictate.5 At the outset, she 
declines the traditional role of a knight, whether to rescue or to pursue 
a maiden and thus typically to make love or war, as knights have done 
from time immemorial. Her constant quest for a specific lover is further 
distinguished early in canto i even from Arthur’s quest, since, in chasing 
Florimell, Arthur moves away from his initial motivation to find his elf 
queen and instead seems ready to accept a substitute: later losing sight of 
the fleeing Florimell when night falls, “Oft did he wish, that Lady faire 
mote bee / His faery Queene . . . Or that his Faery Queene were such, 
as shee” (III.iv.54). Although his elf queen is still the gold standard, he 
drifts into likeness as an alternative, acceptable possibility (“such, as”). 
Britomart, in contrast, is steadfast. While focusing on Shakespeare, Helen 
Cooper describes as an inheritance of medieval romance, “the portrayal of 
a young woman in love from inside her own mind” and cites Britomart as 
a case in point; “typically feisty,” the romance heroine of the Middle Ages 
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is self-aware, passionate about “the man she chooses to love” and ready to 
go to great lengths to find (or “get”) him.6
Also notable as Book III gets under way is the fact that Britomart 
is named almost immediately within the text as well as after first acting, 
rather than, for example, after a long description or first only within the 
argument heading a canto, as are Una and Belphoebe.7 Her agency is 
foregrounded. Britomart also has a father rather than a myth of origin, 
a nurse, not a Palmer, and a history both inherited and destined that is 
set firmly on earth. In short, she looks and is more human than her most 
memorable predecessors in the poem, as is the potentially virtuous love 
for which she quests. But it is even more important that the identification 
of Britomart’s quest at the very outset begins to be defined by her differ-
ences from and relationships to numerous other actors in the poem. Her 
figure has a distinctly social as well as an individualized existence. She is 
neither Everywoman, let alone Everyman (humankind, or in premodern 
usage, mankind), nor is she wholly unique. Once again such a description 
of her looks human.
In a perceptive discussion of character and a defense of its validity 
as a current critical topic, Alan Sinfield offers a “redefinition of character 
as continuous consciousness,” while barring “establishment of the indi-
vidual as a single, unified presence,” as distinct from his or her enhanced 
subjectivity.8 While thus rejecting the bourgeois individual of “essentialist 
humanism,” which is post-Enlightenment anyway, Sinfield opts for more 
than “an intermittent, gestural, and problematic subjectivity,” namely, “a 
continuous or developing interiority or consciousness” (62). His subse-
quent discussions of Shakespeare’s characters make clear that such a con-
tinuous consciousness doesn’t have to continue throughout a whole play: 
it can come and go or, once established, can afterwards simply go, leav-
ing a resistant or unresolvable problem. From this perspective, he looks at 
Desdemona, Olivia, and Lady Macbeth. His list could have been extended 
to other problematic figures among Shakespeare’s fictive women: Cressida 
and Isabella, for a start.9
My intention is not to make Britomart into a cross-dressed 
Shakespearean heroine, although I am not the only one long since to have 
remarked general similarities between her and Shakespeare’s Rosalind or 
Viola. At the same time, however, I am struck by the number of charac-
teristics Britomart’s figure exhibits that correspond to the methods play-
wrights use to produce “character effects” in dramatis personae, as Sinfield 
enumerates them. These include self-reference and self-questioning, which 
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might include soliloquy, and also lying, which creates distance between 
statement and intention, the latter indicating inwardness. I would add 
that intention is a word-concept derived etymologically from Latin in, “in, 
within,” and tendere, “to extend, proceed, aim, direct one’s self or one’s 
course.” Further included in Sinfield’s enumeration are indecision, more 
generally the representation of decision-making, and informative conver-
sations overheard by the audience, which raise questions about intention-
ality—that among gloucester, Kent, and Edmund at the opening of King 
Lear comes to mind, for instance.10
Britomart lies to Redcrosse when she rides away from Malecasta’s 
castle with him, telling him that Artegall has done “Late foule dishonour 
and reprochfull spight” to her, but then she waxes “inly wondrous glad” 
when Redcrosse tells her he is greatly surprised that Artegall should ever 
have done such injury to her (III.ii.8–11). Britomart’s direct conversa-
tion with Redcrosse, which continues for nearly ten stanzas, including 
narrative framing and commentary, soon after leads in a narrative flash-
back to the story of her falling in love with the image of Artegall that is 
facilitated through a magic globe—an objectification of her waking, and 
awaking , pubescent imagination. The flashback then proceeds to her 
back-and-forth conversation about her erotic predicament with glauce, 
her comic old nurse, for more than another fifteen stanzas. Not only 
does this conversation deliver background information and dramatize a 
process of decision-making, it also focuses on Britomart’s inner state and 
reveals, in glauce’s words, that Britomart is making a “Monster of . . . [her] 
minde”—imagining horrors and perversions, whereas she should more 
simply be recognizing that she is in love (40).11 Their conversation could 
readily have been adapted for the Renaissance stage. It has comic features, 
as do the visit to Merlin and other aspects of Britomart’s characterization. 
Notably, both women converse in terms of mythic figures, Myrrha, Biblis, 
Pasiphaë, Narcissus. Like the Elizabethan schoolboys Lynn Enterline has 
studied, they use Ovidian mirrors, types or examples, “to understand and 
to express” their own perceptions, which are influenced by these types, 
even if also reshaped and repurposed by the schoolboys (and girls) as they 
mature. Enterline’s proof-texts are Shakespeare’s Lucrece and Hamlet.12
Two other examples of Sinfield’s character effects that produce the 
impression of consciousness occur in the first third of Book III. One is 
Britomart’s much-discussed soliloquy by the seaside in canto iv, in which, 
now imitating a sonnet from Petrarch, she expresses the tempestuous 
“sea of sorrow” within her and nearly despairs of a happy outcome until 
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glauce reminds her of Merlin’s dynastic prophecy and a hostile knight 
conveniently appears to offer an immediate object on which to vent her 
passion (11–16). Significantly, although the ur-text here is mainly (not 
exclusively) Petrarchan, it is Britomart herself, not the narrator, who 
voices it and, within the poem, thus recreates it.13 My other example is 
not the modern word “consciousness,” which is just becoming available in 
the first half of the seventeenth century, but “awareness,” or, in the form 
in which it recurrently occurs with respect to Britomart, a condition of 
being “vnwares.” Her “vnwareness” is obviously based on the presumption 
of its opposite as the possibility to which experience leads.14 Britomart 
is “vnwares” when she looks into the magic globe to see the vision of 
Artegall but later acutely aware of her earlier unawareness when, she tells 
glauce, she swallowed this bait (III.ii.26, 38). Earlier in this book, she was 
also “vnwares” when Malecasta slipped into her bed, the climax in Castle 
Joyous of the initial stage of her initiation as an active quester into the 
bodily and sociocultural context of sexual awareness. At a later stage, she 
will be “vnwares” again when Busirane wounds her, a situation to which 
I will return (i.61, xii.33). Each of these occurrences of Britomart’s lack 
of awareness instances an increasing development of her figure, and the 
correction of each leaves her more aware both of herself and of the nature 
of her quest. Each is a learning experience that results in growth. At the 
same time, there is a perceptible continuity among these experiences. This 
is a continuity, however, which, unlike that of the more metaphysically 
oriented Una—again, more oriented, not exclusively conceived—will be 
disrupted before the poem is finished with Britomart’s figure. With this 
change, her figuration will be at once more problematic and more sadly, 
historically realistic. Still further Shakespearean?
Britomart’s Awareness in the House of Busirane
When Britomart accepts a knight’s plea to free Amoret from the House 
of Busirane, she becomes a radical challenge to the erotic culture in which 
she, too, has operated to this point, with the exception of her declining to 
rescue Florimell, the anticipatory, threshold image of Book III. Amoret, 
if not exactly a prop or just another exhibit in Busirane’s House, has been 
imprisoned by the sadistic enchanter and in this way has unwillingly 
become his creature, another of his creations, or so his production stages 
her. Busirane’s capture of Amoret is what we witness until Britomart ends 
it. We last saw Amoret only briefly in the garden of Adonis, her former 
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residence in Book III. Encountering Busirane’s House at the end of this 
book, we have only the knight Scudamour’s name (Shield of Love), his 
heraldic device (Cupid) and behavior, and his account of why Amoret is 
under Busirane’s control, and, for six more years, from the 1590 install-
ment of the poem until the 1596 one, Spenser’s original audience lacked 
access to anything more.
In contrast to Amoret, Britomart reaches Busirane by actively 
questing and most immediately by chasing the evil Ollyphant (“destruc-
tive fantasy”), Argante’s twin brother, to the sight of Scudamour “all wal-
lowed / Vpon the grassy ground” (III.xi.7). This sequence suggests both 
Britomart’s opposition to such fantasy and Scudamour’s implication in it. 
Simply put, Scudamour replaces Ollyphant. Scudamour tells her that the 
enchanter has “pend,” or through his art confined, Amoret, in effect arrest-
ing the very possibility of their love (xi.11)—at once imprisoning and par-
alyzing it. More allegorically, Scudamour, Cupid’s man, has been separated 
by Busirane from the object of his love, Amoret, who is “Venus mayd,” or 
punningly, Venus-made, ever since Venus discovered and adopted her in 
Cupid’s “stead”—in his “place”—earlier in Book III (vi.28).15 The possibil-
ity of the love of Scudamour and Amoret is therefore the very possibility 
of realizing love, not simply the love of these two figures, but, in terms of 
their simple allegorical natures, here Love itself.
Imprisoned in Busirane’s House of perverse, rhetorical art forms, 
however, Amoret has become the Ovidian-Petrarchan love object. Her 
capture has shaped her figure, indeed, has transfigured it from what it was 
in the garden. For Britomart, confrontation of Busirane is another ini-
tiation and a further education, this time with respect to Ovidian myths 
and Petrarchan conceits that have informed the erotic culture in which 
she functions and, as we have seen, have informed her own awareness. Her 
task is to free Amoret from Busirane’s malign control and to enable the 
possibility of Amoret’s reunion with Scudamour. Developments in Book 
IV subsequently make clear that both Amoret and Scudamour have to 
change for this possibility to be truly realized. To glance back to the last 
chapter and forward in the present one, in 1596 this realization fails to 
happen. In 1590, the lovers’ reunion is greatly compromised, even dubi-
ous, a claim to which this chapter will later return.
In recent times, the House of Busirane has variously been seen as 
Busirane’s projection, as Amoret’s, as Scudamour’s, as Britomart’s, and, 
without regard for these mediating characters, as the Spenserian narrator’s. 
This House, like the House of Holiness, the Bower of Bliss, the garden of 
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Adonis, the Temple of Venus, or any other such place in The Faerie Queene, 
is a cultural site, a topos or “place.” Its representation is finally the poet’s, 
as are all the figures residing in or traveling into it, although the poet’s 
control of it, his agency with respect to it, is mediated, limited, and com-
promised by his own position in language and history. He is nonethe-
less responsible for it insofar as he is in control of it—again, insofar as. 
Although the Temple of Venus in Book IV is a special case whose narra-
tion belongs to Scudamour, it, too, is finally the poet’s, as he acknowledges 
at its very end. Like other cultural sites in The Faerie Queene, which have 
some special pertinence to the figures within them, the House of Busirane 
also has special pertinence to Britomart, as well as more immediately to 
Amoret and Scudamour, without being solely attributable to any one of 
them or even to them all together apart from culture and history. The 
nature of this pertinence—moral, theological, psychological, historical, or 
a combination of such—is variable, not simply formulaic, and it is subject 
to context when it occurs.
In Britomart’s instance, aside from the general, formalized eroti-
cism of Busirane’s House, which has obvious relevance to a love quest, her 
progress in Book III more specifically explains why she is there: in canto i, 
her vulnerability to Malecasta, realized in her wounding, foreshadows her 
vulnerability to Busirane, and, in canto ii, the smoky, sulphurous Etna in 
her breast anticipates the Busiranic fire, shaking, and “stench of smoke and 
sulphure” (ii.32, xi.21, xii.2). Likewise, in canto ii, the perverted, mythic 
forms her explanation takes when she confides in glauce foreshadow those 
in Busirane’s tapestries. In canto iv, the “selfe-pleasing thoughts” that feed 
her pain, her guidance by blind Cupid, and her pendulum swing between 
“Love and despight,” anticipations of Busirane’s paired masquers, prepare 
for Busirane’s pageant, as does her sympathetic recognition of kinship 
with Paridell’s pain in canto ix, ominously within the perverted House of 
Malbecco and Hellenore.16 Amoret, Ovidian-Petrarchan love object par 
excellence, is part of Busirane’s pageant the first time Britomart sets eyes 
on her.
Once Britomart enters Busirane’s enchanted House, the first room 
of three that she views specifically signals the inevitability of her arrival 
there. The tapestries on its walls share both their Ovidian source in the 
Metamorphoses and their sense of erotic compulsion with her beholding—
taking in—the tapestry in the House of Malecasta that depicts the fixated, 
hyper-sensuous love of Venus for the boy Adonis (a foretaste of Argante’s 
preferences) and leads in the narrative to the flashback with glauce in 
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which Britomart expresses her own passion as an erotic perversion in clas-
sical myth.17 The specific Ovidian passage on which Busirane’s tapestries 
draw is the ecphrasis of Arachne’s art in her ill-fated weaving contest with 
Pallas Athena, the greek Minerva. Immediately, there are ironies and 
crossings of gender in this situation, whose many complications must be 
unlayered gradually.
When Britomart initially encounters Busirane’s enchanted fire, she 
asks Scudamour in dismay, “‘What monstrous enmity prouoke we heare, 
/ Foolhardy as th’Earthes children, which made / Batteill against the 
gods? So we a god inuade’” (III.xi.22). Once again, Britomart expresses 
herself, and thinks, in the mythic terms studied in the grammar school 
texts of the period, which were read by well-educated girls, as well as by 
boys. Traditionally, the fire-god is Vulcan, the smith and forger of chains, 
as well as the figure of the jealous, overly possessive husband also evoked 
allusively by the netting of Acrasia and Verdant, a Venus and a Mars, in 
the Bower of Bliss. It is as if Britomart were again upending and improv-
ing on guyon and his Palmer, as she was at the very outset of Book III. 
Her ability in her armor to pass unharmed through the fiery entrance of 
Busirane’s House contrasts both with the disabling jealousy of Scudamour 
and the possessive hoarding of Busirane, throwbacks alike to Malbecco, 
the essence of “gelosy” itself.18
Boldly invading this jealous fire-god and forger of chains, Britomart 
next gazes at the tapestries that recreate the one woven by Ovid’s Arachne, 
a woman bold—perhaps too bold?—in protesting the violent excesses of 
the gods’ passions but also one whose protest is depicted sympathetically in 
the eyes of the Roman poet of the Metamorphoses.19 The tapestries Britomart 
views similarly show more than one sign of parodic protest: for example, 
in Mars’s undignified “shreek” (comically rhyming with “eek”) of passion, 
along “With womanish teares, and with vnwarlike smarts,” or in the 
sequence of Neptune’s undying love only for Bisaltis in the alexandrine of 
one stanza—“Ne ought but deare Bisaltis ay could make him glad”—fol-
lowed immediately in the next stanza by the laconic statement “He loued eke 
Iphimedia deare, / And Aeolus faire daughter Arne hight” (III.xi.41–42, 44).
Yet the cross-dressed knight Britomart finds her tapestry of wom-
anly protest within the chambers of a male enchanter, who, like herself, 
is also the creation of a male poet. At this point, we might well stop to 
ask, with Susanne Wofford, whose tapestry this is and through whose eyes 
we see and, more properly, “rede,” or interpret it.20 Arachne’s, Ovid’s, his 
narrator’s, Britomart’s, Busirane’s, Spenser’s as poet or narrator, the inter-
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pretive tradition’s, or our own? going beyond the possibilities Wofford 
endorses, I would not exclude any of these, and the ecphrasis of the tap-
estry itself invites them in describing Jove’s rape of Leda, breaking into 
apostrophe in the manner of Ovid to do so:
O wondrous skill, and sweet wit of the man,
That her in daffadillies sleeping made,
From scorching heat her daintie limbes to shade:
Whiles the proud Bird ruffing his fethers wyde,
And brushing his faire brest, did her inuade:
She slept, yet twixt her eielids closely spyde,
How towards her he rusht, and smiled at his pryde.
 (III.xi.32)
Considerable ambiguity of reference marks this much-discussed stanza. 
Is the skilled and sweet-witted man in the first line Busirane or the cha-
meleon-like, negatively capable Spenserian narrator, or the Spenserian 
poet in his own voice?21 This time, the lines cited have no direct paral-
lel in Ovid, hence no parallel in Arachne’s tapestry, and they therefore 
belong to the three possibilities enumerated. But are we to forget that 
Britomart is our gazer and that these lines could also belong to her vision 
or response to Arachne’s?22 In whose opinion is the man “sweet-witted”? 
And what do the last two lines of the stanza mean: “She slept, yet twixt 
her eyelids closely spyde, / How towards her he rusht, and smiled at his 
pryde”? Leda sleeps, like Verdant in the Bower of Bliss, and yet, also to an 
extent like him, between her eyelids she seems to see—to spy—the swan 
rushing toward her. Is she awake or in a trance or in a daydream? Each 
of these possibilities would imply a different kind and degree of agency. 
The simple adverb “closely” could indicate that her eyes are indeed shut 
(“closely twixt”) or that she spies with close attention an object close to 
her (“closely spyde”). The word “spy” itself carries an insistent association 
with stealth or closeness—intense, secretive observation. The final clause 
of the line, as Katherine Eggert has noted, is also ambiguous: does Leda 
smile in anticipation of rapture or does the swan, as the assumed form of 
Jove, smile in anticipation of ravishment?23 And is the smile one of Jovian 
arrogance, of pure pleasure—his, hers, or theirs—or is it an ironic smile, 
a self-reflexive, deflating, Ovidian possibility that the availability of the 
womanly perspectives of Arachne and Britomart, not to mention some 
other readers, enforces? The narrator’s own awareness, often amazing, is 
not to be slighted, either.
BRITOMART  85
Another passage, even more frequently remarked, expresses ambi-
guity of reference as well. The walls of the enchanter’s House are clothed 
with arras,
Wouen with gold and silke so close and nere,
That the rich metall lurked priuily,
As faining to be hidd from enuious eye;
Yet here, and there, and euery where vnwares
It shewd it selfe, and shone vnwillingly:
Like to a discolourd Snake, whose hidden snares
Through the greene gras his long bright burnisht backe  
                    declares.
 (III.xi.28)
This time, the inwoven threads of metal have an explicit precedent in 
Ovid, although it proves as striking in its difference as in its similarity: 
“There, too, they [Athena and Arachne] weave in pliant threads of gold, 
and trace in the weft some ancient tale (illic et lentum filis inmittitur 
aurum / et vetus in tela deducitur argumentum).”24 In Ovid’s version, the 
gold thread, belonging to Arachne and Athena alike, lacks the last six 
lines of Spenserian description, which call attention—heightened atten-
tion—to the serpentine filaments. Rather than betraying the presence of 
art, they shout it by comparison with Ovid’s text, unwilling as they may 
be, or rather feign to be so. The participial pun “faining”—“As faining 
to be hidd”—as easily supports an exhibitionist impulse as it denies one, 
since the homonymic pun means either pretending (feigning) or desiring 
(faining). The alternative of merely pretending to hide from but actually 
enticing the “enuious eye” would relate the serpentine threads to the gold 
grapes in Acrasia’s Bower, which enfold themselves among the leaves “As 
lurking from the vew of couetous guest”—as if lurking but actually sedu-
cing (II.xii.55).
But art in the House of Busirane is not finally the same as in the 
Bower, where “The art, which all that wrought, appeared in no place” 
(II.xii.58). Here, not unlike the sonneteer’s topos of inarticulateness or 
an elaborate declamation uttered in full erotic chase by Ovid’s Apollo, 
art may want or pretend to hide but instead displays itself, unwillingly or 
not. Like the pun faining/feigning, the word “unwillingly,” which specifi-
cally refers to shining or conspicuousness—“It shewed it selfe, and shone 
vnwillingly”—again evokes the oscillating play of visual and interpretive 
perspectives, along with that of inadvertency and agency. Moreover, it 
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does so “vnwares,” which is precisely the ambiguous way Malecasta ear-
lier sneaks up on Britomart and the way Busirane’s knife wounds her and 
the knowing and not knowing way that Leda, in all her ambiguity, awaits 
the rush of the swan. This is an acute, extraordinarily telling way of real-
izing the combination of cultural exposure and ignorance, knowing and 
not knowing, that characterizes Britomart’s condition and observation, as 
indeed her youthful reading of Ovid. Britomart does not cause this cul-
tural site, whose meaning at once precedes and exceeds her role in it, but 
this place of rhetorical culture bears special pertinence to her condition 
and quest. Again, as with Leda, she is mirrored to an extent in the object 
or site.
Britomart passes from the tapestries next to a Mammonic room 
overlaid with pure gold, in which the “monstrous formes” of false love are 
depicted and on whose glittering walls hang the trophies of love’s wars and 
conquests (xi.51–52). Again, Busirane is a hoarder, a self-gratifying one 
like Spenser’s Mammon, who autoerotically fingers the gold coins in his 
lap “to feede his eye” (II.vii.4–5). In Busirane’s golden room, Britomart 
witnesses the procession of Cupid’s masquers, figures that stage the very 
process of a false love which is hardly distinguishable at moments from 
a true one. Antiquity of origin characterizes the creations of this room, 
as before of the tapestries depicted. As A. C. Hamilton’s gloss conven-
iently summarizes, the masquers draw directly on the conventions of the 
medieval courts of love and of Renaissance triumphs, not least Petrarch’s 
own, as well as on those of the Renaissance masque.25 Again, these fig-
ures are hardly Britomart’s creation, although they have special relevance 
to her condition and quest, as they do to Amoret’s and Scudamour’s, and 
to those of other characters in Book III. The very fact, long recognized, 
that they can be read from either a male or female point of view indicates 
their basically cultural rather than exclusively personal status. Their formal 
artificiality also proclaims their radical—indeed, their catachrestic—con-
structedness. Unlike the insidious art forms in Acrasia’s Bower, they make 
no claims on nature. On reflection, who would want such mirrors of pas-
sion as these?
Their relation to Busirane and ultimately to Britomart is worth pur-
suing, however. Cupid’s masquers resemble the kind of form Malbecco 
becomes at the end of canto x, one that “Is woxen so deform’d, that he has 
quight / Forgot he was a man, and Gelosy is hight” (60). Malbecco’s meta-
morphosis into a “passion . . . in the mind” introduces the first canto, the 
eleventh, in which the House of Busirane figures centrally, and, in effect, 
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it prepares for the masquers, whose humanity, like Malbecco’s, has either 
vanished or failed of realization.26 Like the fixed and fixated emblem 
“gelosy” that Malbecco has become, the masquers are impostors of the 
living and every bit as artificial, as “personified,” hence metaphorized, as 
the “carcas dead” of the False Florimell (III.viii.7, xi.1). Malbecco makes 
explicit in Book III the connection between sexual and monetary hoard-
ing that was glimpsed earlier in the figure of Mammon. Even though the 
masquers are in a procession—a kind of dead march—each pair in itself is 
a frozen stage of courtship, removed from the necessarily narrative process 
of allegory and quest.27 The masquers are another product of Busirane’s 
art, and they issue from an “inner rowme” that is his as well (xii.26).
Years since, Thomas P. Roche, Jr., glossed Busirane as abuse in the 
sixteenth-century senses of “imposture, ill-usage, delusion,” or as the 
archaic abusion, meaning a “perversion of the truth, deceit, deception, 
imposture,” and in the words of Book II, implying “fond . . . illusions” 
(xi.11).28 To these meanings, I would add abusio, the familiar Renaissance 
word for catachresis, here understood as a wrenching of metaphor or an 
extravagant use of it, in the case at hand, a violent (mis)use of language, 
of which the masquers’ dead likenesses are a prime exhibit. In Busirane’s 
House of rhetorical art and illusion, abusio reigns, or “ranes,” supreme. The 
traditional classification of poetry as a branch of rhetoric was still com-
mon in the Renaissance, and Busirane is clearly an abuser of poetry, as 
well as of rhetoric.29 By now, I imagine, it is also clear that Busirane’s name 
puns on abuse/abusio—that is, A-busirane.
Another persistent association of abusio in the rhetorical tradition is 
with audacia, or boldness, and it offers a gloss on the strange, forward and 
backward, summoning and forbidding, aggressive and maidenly impera-
tives Britomart reads over the doors in Busirane’s Mammonic second 
chamber: “Be bolde, be bolde . . . Be not too bold” (xi.54).30 In a discussion of 
metaphor, including catachresis/abusio, in De Oratore, Cicero’s spokesman 
praises “paulo audaciores [translationes],” or, “somewhat bolder meta-
phors” that bring brilliance to a speech but do not violate “ratio”—reason, 
purpose, or indeed, the nature of things (rerum natura). Such figures are 
bold but not too bold.31 Read through the lens of Ciceronian rhetoric, 
the writing Britomart confronts above the doors in Busirane’s House of 
rhetoric has the Ciceronian quality of an invitation to use audacia and 
a caution against excess in doing so, as it does in De Oratore. The choice 
Britomart faces as reader of Busirane’s art is edged with anxiety and 
danger, not unlike that faced by an orator in Cicero’s Rome, as the forced 
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deaths of so many of the speakers in De Oratore, as well as of Cicero him-
self, dramatize. Rhetoric is consequential; it is a social, legal, and political 
shaper, not merely a neutral ornament or tool of pedagogues. Britomart, 
or any other reader, would do well carefully and cautiously to heed these 
warnings about the boldness of rhetorical art, warnings now appearing 
elusive and treacherous, yet also beguiling, in the message they send “to 
any vnwares” in Busirane’s House. They invite a decision, while undermin-
ing assurance, and the only escape from Busirane’s hegemonic cultural trap 
here or elsewhere, then or now, starts with awareness.
Britomart’s evident acceptance of the challenge to be bold, but not 
too bold, leads to the third chamber of the House of Busirane, where its 
patron, the figure or at least the first figure behind the curtains, Busirane 
himself, primarily represents the constructedness of the entire place. 
Again, this art-full place simply doesn’t make the same claims as Acrasia’s 
Bower about its nearness to or indistinguishability from nature. This is art 
in capital letters, and alarmingly, Amoret’s life in some sense now depends 
on Busirane. Thus “the Lady [Amoret], which by him stood bound, / 
Dernly vnto her [Britomart] called to abstaine, / From doing him to dy” 
(xii.3: my emphasis). Once in Busirane’s clutches, Amoret recognizes 
herself and is recognized as his creation, pleading for his life in order to 
preserve her own. Her identity as love, which is presently her whole life, 
depends on loving. She is, after all, “Venus mayd” and the complement of 
“Cupids man,” as she will be described by Scudamour in Book IV (x.54). 
Busirane has arrested her development, both imprisoned her figure and 
obstructed the realization of what she could and should be.
The adverb “dernly,” which conveys the tone and manner in which 
Amoret calls on Britomart to spare Busirane’s life, means “secretly” or 
“privately, confidentially”; it also carries the sense “inwardly.” Dernly 
is a strange but suggestive word in this context, one that in the past has 
often been glossed too casually in the derived senses “dismally” or “direly.” 
More significantly, it intimates a special appeal or relationship, something 
understood or otherwise shared between the two women. Yet dern(e) also 
means “dark” and “secret” in the sense “done in the dark” and often has 
associations with craft, deceit, or evil.32 Conceivably, if disturbingly, it 
could further connect Amoret with her captor, at least while in his power. 
Associatively, the “dark secret life” that destroys Blake’s rose comes to 
mind.
Clearly, however, Britomart cannot destroy Busirane without 
destroying what Amoret now is, the cultural love object par excellence. 
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This Busiranic figuration underlies Amoret’s development in the com-
pany of Britomart after Book III and prior to the intractable, historical 
entanglement of Amoret’s figure with the story of Timias and Belphoebe 
in Book IV (vii–viii). Amoret’s figuration as love object is also the reason 
that, although Busirane’s artworks vanish, he still survives, bound by the 
very chain or, in further terms of traditional iconography, by the rhetori-
cal art that he has abused.33 Without him, there is only a vacuum, and this 
vacuum might also have something to do with the fact that Spenser’s own 
Amoretti, written and published between Book III and the 1596 sequel, 
cannot wholly escape the available conventions of erotic discourse but 
indeed must use and try to reshape them.34 The furnishings of Busirane’s 
rooms may vanish at the end of canto xii, but this is hardly the last we see 
of their kind in Spenser’s poetry.
The alternative definition of catachresis/abusio, namely a necessary 
extension of the signification of a word to something that lacks a word, 
rather than merely a willful wrenching of language, bears both on the emp-
tiness apparent with the vanishing of the artworks in Busirane’s House and 
on the persistence of Ovidian, Petrarchan, or otherwise Busiranic forms in 
Spenser’s poetry. Abusive as these might have been and still might be, they 
are currently and culturally inescapable for a practicing poet who wants his 
poems read, even aside from the extent to which he is able, or is not, to get 
outside and to critique them. Poetry has never been written in a cultural 
vacuum. This is another suggestion conveyed by Spenser’s ending Amoret’s 
story with a return to the Temple of Venus in Book IV, right where her 
life beyond the garden of Adonis began, as discussed in chapter 2.
Busirane represents a fantasy and, additionally, a culture of rape, 
as others have argued without qualification, but it should be observed as 
well that he is not successful. His fantasy remains exactly that, and Amoret 
remains a virgin under his roof: “Die had she leuer with Enchanters knife, / 
Then to be false in loue, profest a virgine wife”—pledged to Scudamour 
but not fully one with him (IV.i.6, III.xii.31). If it were otherwise, 
Busirane’s significance as a peculiarly rhetorical form of abuse, an art with 
the power in actuality to arrest love, would be lost, and with it the real 
cultural critique of Book III. Busirane abuses figuration and the percep-
tion based on it to feign that metaphor is the same as reality, that it is abso-
lutely rather than is and is not, as Paul Ricoeur would gloss this figure of 
perverse predication—“perverse” (from pervertere), “turned away, around, 
about” or “athwart,” hence “tropic.”35 It is Busirane who feigns (and fains) 
rape. And his ideological legacy is the reading that believes him.
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Britomart herself is wounded, although not deeply, by Busirane and 
therefore proves vulnerable to him. Her heart is also said to be pierced and 
her hair stood on end by his bloody verses, even while, her threatening 
sword raised above him, she controls him.36 To my mind, this is the one 
moment in the scene, rather than any other one, at which Britomart expe-
riences, or truly realizes, Amoret’s condition. For a modern reader invested 
in psychoanalytic connections, this could be a moment when Britomart 
traverses, enters into, the Busiranic fantasy, even as it is the same moment 
in which Busirane “reuerse[s]” his spell, turning it back as when one looks 
at the backside of a collar, and his artworks crumble, then vanish, because 
there is nothing real there (III.xii.36).37
At one point in the immediate context of Busirane’s disenchanting 
verses—a rhetorical spell, which like all spells, must be unbound—a truly 
ambiguous pronoun occurs, (con)fusing Britomart with Amoret. With 
“threatfull hand” unslackened, Britomart waits “[un]dismaied” (and un-
dis-maided) by the quaking of this House and undeterred by “daungers 
dout,” a phrase offering to reassume the familiar form of an actual pair of 
the masquers earlier seen (cf. xii.10–11, 37); thus she “Abode,” occupying 
and inhabiting this “place,”
 to weet, what end would come of all.
At last that mightie chaine, which round about
Her tender waste was wound, adowne gan fall,
And that great brasen pillour broke in peeces small.
 (III.xii.37)
The ambiguous referent of the pronoun “her” signals Britomart’s involve-
ment—literally her enwrapping, winding (Latin involvere)—in Busirane’s 
“mightie chaine,” in the toils (and coils) of his rhetoric, thus evoking the 
familiar iconographic identification of rhetoric with spellbound enchain-
ment that I earlier referenced. Arguably, the first seven lines in the next 
stanza also encompass Britomart and Amoret, although my own awareness 
of the situation in the narrative just described makes me think such a rea-
ding unlikely. Be that as it may, what is significant about the one momen-
tary identification of Britomart with Amoret in the penultimate line of 
the last inset is that it comes only with Amoret’s freeing at Britomart’s 
hand. It implicates Britomart in Amoret’s predicament, and she could 
hardly not be implicated in view of the experiences that brought her to 
Busirane’s House in the first place, but again, like Britomart’s superficial 
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wounding, in doing so it more tellingly exhibits the superiority and inti-
macy of her derne, or dark, secret power.
Let us briefly suppose nonetheless that the next stanza, of whose 
identification with Britomart I am skeptical, does continue the identifica-
tion of her with Amoret, since this stanza offers the best evidence for the 
actual raping of Amoret and, in Susan Frye’s argument, of Britomart as 
well:
The cruell steele, which thrild her dying hart,
Fell softly forth, as of his owne accord,
And the wyde wound, which lately did dispart
Her bleeding brest, and riuen bowels gor’d,
Was closed vp, as it had not beene sor’d [1596,  
   1609: “bor’d”],
And euery part to safety full sownd,
As she were neuer hurt, was soone restor’d:
Tho when she felt her selfe to be vnbownd,
And perfect hole, prostrate she fell vnto the grownd.
 (III.xii.38)
The crucial words occur in the lines describing the wound in “Her bleed- 
ing brest, and riuen bowels” that “Was closed vp, as it [the wound] had 
not beene sor’d.” Although these lines are about as transgressively sug-
gestive as The Faerie Queene gets, I would reject a reading that swallows 
catachresis whole, actualizing the radical metaphors present here. The 
meaning of the lines depends heavily on that of the words “bowels” and 
“as” in them. Contrary to the popular modern understanding of bowels 
exclusively as “guts,” in the sixteenth century this word commonly referred 
to ”the seat of the tender and sympathetic emotions” or the “heart, centre,” 
and in Spenser’s writing it frequently, although not always, carries the 
latter meaning, as is also true of English translations of the Bible in this 
period.38 Doublets, such as “bleeding brest” and “riuen bowels” in the first 
of the crucial lines, are rife in Spenser, and the prominence in canto xii of 
Amoret’s transfixed heart also favors the meanings, now archaic, that I 
have cited. Use of a singular verb (“was”) and singular pronoun (“it”) with 
reference to the single wound in “brest” and “bowels” further enforces 
identification of this alliterating doublet as a single unit.
The other word, as, in the phrase “as it had not been sor’d,” could be 
read “as if,” but it need not be. This word can also mean “inasmuch as” or 
“since,” and this is what I take it to mean here: “inasmuch as it had not been 
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sor’d.”39 I would not reject the other possible reading out of hand either, 
although in context I find it a stretch—“far-fet,” indeed an abusio, and 
notably Busiranic in viewpoint. But metaphor, even abusive, catachrestic 
metaphor, is, as well as is not. Ricoeur, for one, insists on such “split refer-
ence,” a meaning that is there and not there, and Pierre Bourdieu similarly 
speaks of the ambivalence of sublation, of a lifting or raising that “simulta-
neously denies and maintains both the repression and the repressed” and 
thus “allows for a doubling of profits: the profit of saying and the profit of 
denying what is said by the way of saying it.”40
In the Spenserian passage in question, however, the possibility of the 
counterfactual reading “as if,” like the former possibility of reading “bow-
els” as “guts,” hence “belly” or reproductive organs, would only return us 
to the multiple perspectives of the participants in this canto—here spe-
cifically those of Amoret, Britomart, Busirane, the sometimes unreliable 
narrator, and the Spenserian poet himself. The pun on “whole” in the final 
line of the stanza is equally undisturbed by the reading I have advanced or 
by the one that chooses Busirane’s perspective on it: Amoret, representative 
love object, is rendered “whole and wanting,” at once perfected, or com-
pleted, for the passion of Cupid’s man and both lacking and desiring him. 
Freely now, her responses, like Britomart’s, are holistic in every sense of 
the hopeful or disheartening pun, as the reader will have it.
We hear or half hear submerged, or (im)possible, puns of the sort 
just addressed even when prolonged attention to syntax and context 
indicates that they are far-fetched or grammatically irrational. They are 
plentiful in the literature of the period, in Shakespeare and Donne, for 
obvious instances, and notably in Spenser as well. Studying the mental 
processes by which we select and comprehend words, the psycho-linguist 
Jean Aitchison has found evidence that I see supporting the viability of 
such puns: readers or listeners “briefly activate both meanings of a homo-
nym, even in cases where one of them is inappropriate”; in fact, according 
to one model, “A whole army of words, it seems, marches up for consid-
eration each time a word begins.”41 Aitchison’s explanation of homonymic 
punning is readily extended to a syntactical construction or to any alterna-
tive signification of a single word.
Whatever the precise workings of our mental circuitry, a third 
Spenserian example of (im)possible punning is ready to hand slightly 
earlier in Britomart’s confrontation with Busirane, and it raises similar 
issues of reading, thus contributing to this significant interpretive pattern 
in Busirane’s third chamber. When Busirane’s knife wounds Britomart, 
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“Exceeding wroth therewith the virgin grew, / Albe the wound were noth-
ing deepe imprest” (xii.33). In an examination of Spenser’s puns on the 
word “nothing,” Eggert has suggested that nothing here might be a noun 
and therefore a sexual pun, the familiar Shakespearean equivalent of “hole,” 
or “vagina, genitalia”: in this reading “nothing [is] deepe imprest.”42 Once 
again, though surely prematurely, the “virgin” Britomart is presumed to 
have been raped. But, as Eggert has agreed, the concessive “Albe” (mean-
ing “albeit, although”) preceding “nothing” syntactically negates such a 
pun and indicates instead that “nothing” is an adverb—that is, “nothing 
[or not at all] deepe imprest”—with the result that Britomart is far from 
having been violated except in a superficial sense. Once the grammatical 
reading dominates, the (im)possible pun spectrally present serves to insin-
uate a more threatening potential in the situation—one submerged and 
unrealized—and it may intimate as well the precariousness of Britomart’s 
control at this moment, a control, by drawing her sword, that she quickly 
asserts and maintains (33–34). Once again, the abusive reading is finally 
meaningful only as an expression of the threat and indeed of the projected 
fantasy of Busirane. The (im)possible pun would nominalize the word 
“nothing,” insisting on its literal sense “no thing”; this is the sense that 
negates the male member, or “thing,” in a common Elizabethan sense of 
the word thing, while also evoking it, and thus motivates the sexual pun. In 
this way, the “abusive,” Busiranic reader deconstructs the more abstractive 
(supersessive) adverb to find the material root that makes it a noun and a 
metaphor. At the heart of this practice is debate about the viability of dead 
metaphors, appropriately mentioned in passing here.43
In both the 1590 and 1596 editions of The Faerie Queene, Busirane’s 
artworks disappear once he is captured, and in the 1596 edition Britomart 
and Amoret leave his House, only to find that Scudamour and glauce 
have departed, fearing the worst. In the 1590 edition, however, Amoret is 
reunited with Scudamour outside Busirane’s House. Hamilton’s gloss on 
their embrace is hardly alone in suggesting that the embrace is orgasmic, 
and I suppose it might be, but Britomart’s presence as an observer gives me 
pause. Certainly their embrace is passionate: Amoret melts in pleasure and 
pours out her spirit in “sweete ravishment”; the embracing lovers are “like 
two senceless stocks,” and, as if grown together, they resemble the marble 
statue of a hermaphrodite (xi.45–46). The fact that Spenser cancelled this 
ending in 1596 is the strongest sign that something is wrong with it, how-
ever, and the “senceless stocks” and marble hermaphrodite are two others. 
A stock is a tree stub or a block of wood, both lifeless, as is the marble 
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statue, fixed in its place.44 The image of the hermaphrodite in this con-
text is at best ambivalent—grotesquely double-limbed, motionless, and 
dubiously human. That Britomart is said to half-envy the lovers’ embrace 
half-suggests that she does not embrace it herself without reservation and 
half-suggests that she does and therefore that she has more learning to do.
Understood sequentially as resulting from Britomart’s victory, the 
conclusive image of the hermaphroditic statue reflects ironically on her 
triumph. Amoret has been freed, but she remains to an extent Busirane’s 
creature, a figure bound to his erotics, even as she is bound to Cupid’s man 
Scudamour, whose identifying shield, which is emblazoned with the fig-
ure of Cupid, results from his conquest of unwilling womanhood in the 
Temple of Venus (see III.7, IV.x.55, 57). Even in Book III, his name and 
blazon identify him as Cupid’s surrogate. Aside from the Temple of Venus, 
which only appears in the tenth canto of Book IV, Amoret’s sociocultural 
shaping preeminently has been at Busirane’s cruel hands. The hermaph-
rodite is what survives Busirane’s cultural site when all his other erotic 
forms have vanished, and its survival will be further apparent when, after 
a hiatus of six years, the second installment of The Faerie Queene is pub-
lished—Books IV to VI. Of course Busirane, like Archimago and Acrasia 
before him, survives, too, although we see no more of his figure. The poet 
of Faerie may be an idealist, but he is hardly unaware of the real world, as 
we call it and as these survivals testify.
As if to observe the hiatus between the first installment of The 
Faerie Queene and the poet’s reflections on it in the proem to Book IV, I 
want first to review Britomart’s role to this point and then in the next sec-
tion to begin anew with another, different approach to it, through some-
thing at first glance purely external, her armor. This approach will thus use 
a new lens, which the 1596 installment does not inaugurate but makes fur-
ther significant. Republishing Spenser’s first installment together with his 
second, with heightened emphasis on Britomart’s armor, the 1596 Faerie 
Queene itself invites a review of Book III.
Although Britomart is repeatedly developed at length in relation 
to others in the first four cantos of Book III, she still remains focal. Her 
quest provides the main story line: Malecasta, the flashback with glauce, 
the visit to Merlin, her complaint by the seaside, which is mirrored by 
Cymoent’s and Arthur’s in the same canto (iv). Admittedly, Merlin’s his-
tory lesson over twenty-plus stanzas stretches this point, yet his history is 
centered on Britomart’s progeny. In the second four cantos—Belphoebe 
and Timias, the garden of Adonis, Florimell, the witch and old fisherman, 
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Argante, Satyrane, the Squire of Dames—Britomart is absent as a figure 
in the action. Then, in canto ix, she shares a role at and in the castle of 
Malbecco, there discovering her genealogical connection with Paridell. 
The metamorphosis of Malbecco into the emblem of jealous fixation in 
canto x, a story from which Britomart is again absent, introduces the first 
of the cantos of Busirane. That Britomart’s absence from nearly half the 
cantos in Book III conforms to the structure of romance is important, but, 
in a poem that everywhere makes form and structure meaningful, it means 
more.
When Britomart reappears for the last two cantos, which are situ-
ated in Busirane’s House of Rhetoric, she looks once more like the major 
representative of the story line, yet her primary function for stanza after 
stanza is to tour the artworks that dominate the scene, and to partici-
pate in the multiple points of view explored through them. When she 
acts to save Amoret, the heightened, layered ambiguity of what actually 
transpires, albeit comprehendible, conspicuously leaves the final decision 
to others—viewers and readers as participants. In short, the dominant 
subject now looks cultural, and the primary focus thematic rather than 
characterological. Whereas the characterological features of the first four 
cantos might have invited the view that Britomart is in herself the sub-
ject, the final eight cantos, including the adventure of Busirane, have read-
justed it. The Faerie Queene is never static, let alone formulaic. In Book IV, 
Britomart’s figure will become less conventionally cross-dressed, and, in 
accordance with the more generally experimental nature of this book, her 
figure will also become more experimentally so. This is the development 
that I intend to trace next by considering Britomart’s armor, from Book 
III through Book V, where her story shifts again before ending.
Britomart’s Armor
Throughout Book III, Britomart has been vested in armor that forms and 
masks, expresses and veils, defends and contains her. She has been further 
invested in finding Artegall, whose identity is known to her by his own 
vesting in the conquered arms of Achilles. By the opening of Book IV, 
Britomart, the armed but nubile virgin, not only Venus-Virgo but more 
radically Venus within Mars, has become a complicated cultural signi-
fier implicated in cultural conceptions of gender. Riding into Book IV, 
Britomart and Amoret share a single horse, a traditional symbol of passion, 
as well as a single saddle, unless Amoret perches on the horse’s rump—a 
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passing, parodic thought. Since Britomart wears a full suit of armor, their 
combined silhouette on the horse recalls the hermaphrodite in the original 
ending of Book III. This transposed, catachrestic, hermaphroditic form at 
the outset of Book IV, which replaces the one in the original ending, is in 
effect a continuation of unfinished business. Their silhouette also antici-
pates the statue of Venus with “both kinds in one, / Both male and female, 
both vnder one name” that presides over the Temple of Venus in the tenth 
canto of this fourth book (41).
A fixed, emblematic statue is not a figure developing in figured nar-
rative, however, and sex need not be equated with gender. Nonetheless, by 
Book IV it is clear that a binaristic conception of gender is inadequate.45 
Clearly now, there are four terms in play, and, with the benefit of retro-
spection, at least two in each of the major amatory players of the books 
featuring Britomart. The play of these terms with respect to Britomart 
is my major focus in what follows, but, with respect to Artegall, it bears 
mention, precisely because four terms, not just Britomart’s two, are vital 
to it. When Artegall appears at a tournament in Book IV of the poem, his 
first appearance as an actor rather than merely as an image, he is “the salu-
age knight” with “Saluagesse sans finesse”—artless, uncivilized savagery—
emblazoned on his shield (IV.39, 42). Encountering Britomart’s spear after 
toppling all other knightly contestants, he is summarily knocked from his 
horse. A poor loser who harbors a grudge, he still sports his savage iden-
tity when he next meets Britomart and engages in hand-to-hand combat 
with her, an episode that I will subsequently examine in detail. Its result is 
Artegall’s assumption of his true identity as he yields to Britomart.
Both armed encounters of Artegall with Britomart dramatize that 
his savagery needs softening, refining, civilizing. As the loaded term sof-
tening signals in a context of gender and sexuality, softening suggests his 
need of the Venerean principle, ranging from love to courtesy, gentleness, 
generosity, and compassion, a principle that has been hidden, indeed 
absent, from his actions as the savage knight. In mythological terms, this 
principle might be dubbed his inner Venus. It will moderate and civilize 
his hyper-masculinity, his exclusive maleness. Much more happens in 
Artegall’s own book, the fifth, although its complexities exceed my present 
focus. Yet briefly, in a parody of Artegall’s yielding to Britomart in Book 
IV, he yields again to a woman, the wrong one, in Book V, and his doing 
so results in his punitive cross-dressing as a woman. He is humiliated and 
effeminized but simultaneously humanized—once again civilized—by 
this fall, and with it, for the first time in Book V, he recalls his betrothal to 
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Britomart in Book IV. His regressive, brutal figuration as Justice earlier in 
Book V effectually enters a Venerean world of romance in which love can 
redeem him.46 His quest as both knight and justicer thereafter is beyond 
my present concern with Britomart, since she, having saved Artegall, dis-
appears from the poem.
A major problem with the fusing of Scudamour with Amoret, 
Cupid’s man with Venus’s maid, at the end of Book III in 1590 is pre-
cisely that only two terms, opposite ones, male and female, are involved. 
Venus-Virgo does not sufficiently represent the doubled perception that 
four terms require either, no matter whether Virgo is perceived as Diana 
or Minerva/Athena. Unless seen as a cultural inflection of the compos-
ite Venus-Mars, Venus-Virgo masks the truly Martian, martial, masculine 
nature of Britomart’s figure—her “manly terror,” as the poem puts it early 
in Book III (i.46). Venus-Virgo elides the hard questions that her armor 
presents, those involving combinations of nubility and firm resistance, 
incorporation and active, assertive agency, the kinds of questions involv-
ing degrees, kinds, and causes of what the early modern period perceived 
as masculinity, whose relation to maleness per se was not well defined 
or neatly separated from other spheres and aspects of life. Edgar Wind’s 
familiar reflections on Venus as Mars, Mars as Venus, are informative for 
their stress on the compounding of the nature of each of them: “Dressed 
in armour . . . the Venus victrix or Venus armata signifies the warfare of 
love; she is a compound of attraction and rejection, fostering her gracious 
aims by cruel methods. . . . Even Virgil’s Diana-like Venus . . . is but a vari-
ant of the Venus armata: a bellicose Venus who has donned the weapons 
that normally belong to her opponent—either Diana, Minerva, or Mars.” 
Wind’s conception might be analogized to a compound sentence, which 
connects two independent clauses. Pertinent to “Venus as a Mars,” James 
Nohrnberg further observes that “All Amazons are . . . ‘daughters of Mars,’” 
to which I would add emphatically with respect to Britomart, even Venus 
manifested as Jove’s daughter Minerva and vice versa.47
In what follows, my intention is to work with Spenser’s poem with-
out imposing on it a clarity it does not have or, perhaps, want. Although 
acknowledging the relation of Venus-Virgo to Britomart, I find that its 
exclusive use figures a woman apart from a man without pressing specifi-
cally enough the nature of this a-partness—this compounding—or press-
ing it to the extent that the poem does.48 Accordingly, I plan to highlight 
the Venus armata composite as Venus-Mars and to trace how a doubled 
perception of Britomart’s gender develops. As before, my approach will 
98  CHAPTER 3
continue to engage the process of figuration in Britomart’s story. Britomart 
is an evolving figure, and her armor conspicuously participates in—indeed 
figures—both the development of her integrity and its loss.
My method reflects what happens to mythological sources in their 
creative revision within the movement of metaphorical narrative and, in 
the focal instance at hand, to Britomart. In this respect it differs, while 
benefitting, from the central concerns of an art historian such as Wind, 
whose work is primarily grounded in paintings, medals, sculptures, and 
other more stationary forms. Instead, it seeks to approach a process of fig-
ural thinking that overlaps with allegory but also loosens it.49 This proc-
ess produces figures that are considerably fuller and less simply abstract, 
perhaps closer to the figuration of the gods and goddesses of ancient myth 
themselves, who have sometimes been classed with allegory or subjected to 
reductive allegoresis and sometimes have not been. Basically, however, this 
process of thinking is yet another, further extension of continued or mov-
ing metaphor, as classical and early modern rhetoricians have described 
allegory itself. In Cicero’s immensely influential De Oratore, for example, 
Crassus, one of two major spokesmen, considers allegory an extension of 
metaphor in “a chain of words linked together: ex pluribus [verbis] con-
tinuatis connectitur” and thus, in modern terms, in the contiguous rela-
tionship that characterizes narrative (II:130: Bk III.xli.166). On this note, 
furnished with immediately relevant principles of gendering and reflec-
tions on method, I would return to Britomart herself in the early cantos 
of Book III.
The Briton Princess Britomart wears the armor of the Saxon Queen 
Angela, but armor itself is coded male in Spenser’s culture, as is evident 
whenever Britomart encounters a knight with her visor down and, in the 
Castle of Malecasta, even with her visor up.50 Britomart’s vesting herself 
in this armor narratively follows on, and causally results from, her visit 
to Merlin, who has been Arthur’s armorer and therefore in some sense 
his maker, and Britomart’s use of her armor not surprisingly remakes her 
as well.51 Her arming is also a process that her motherly nurse glauce 
first suggests and then facilitates following their crucial visit to Merlin, 
which is itself glauce’s womanly conception. So vested, Britomart is 
no longer the merely frustrated and enclosed pubescent child, the shel-
tered girl, of the second canto, but suddenly refigured as a knight “trained 
vp in warlike stowre, / To tossen speare and shield, and to affrap / The 
warlike ryder to his most mishap.” These lines, spoken by Britomart to 
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Redcrosse (erroneously printed guyon) would have sufficed to explain her 
quest, but gratuitously she adds,
Sithence I loathed haue my life to lead,
As Ladies wont, in pleasures wanton lap,
To finger the fine needle and nyce thread;
Me leuer were with point of foemans speare be dead.
 (III.ii.6)
Ostensibly, Britomart here rejects the weaving, spinning, and other crafts 
of “needle and nyce thread” especially associated with Minerva (not to 
mention Arachne). She is not simply dressed but is vested in her armor and 
the knightly role it represents. Although she feigns in the lines just cited, 
she is also describing the way she actually behaves once she is in Faerie 
Land, where all figures are feigned and defined by what they do. Like all 
the young men in The Faerie Queene who seem to have some future—
Arthur, Redcrosse, Artegall, and Tristram, for example—Britomart is here 
separated from her family, significantly armed, and thereby reinvented. In 
order to survive or to find the possibility of a future—purpose, being, or 
justice—escape to Faerie appears as necessary in this epic romance as to 
Arden in Shakespeare’s As You Like It.52 Aside from this constructive read-
ing of Britomart’s enabling armor, the last line cited in the inset could be 
taken with comic irony as Britomart’s inadvertent expression of a desire 
to find her “foeman” Artegall’s spear and thereby to consummate her love 
quest. More than once, the representation of Britomart in Books III and 
IV is touched by parody or comic wit. This is another humanizing touch 
in her figuration, as it recurrently is in that of Spenser’s Arthur and Una.53
Like Artegall’s armor, a sign of his Trojan and British lineage, 
Britomart’s Saxon armor also has a dynastic function.54 Since Britomart is 
a Briton princess, it figures the eventual joining of Briton with Saxon, as 
predicted by Merlin, who, as maker of the magic globe belonging to King 
Ryence, Britomart’s father, is not surprisingly the expositor of Britomart’s 
“heuenly destiny,” which her deliberate, conscious speculation, as distin-
guished from her initially empty, passive viewing in the self-reflective 
globe, first intimates (III.iii.22–24). King Ryence never appears in the 
poem, and his shadowy presence serves mainly to validate Britomart’s 
dynastic role, which is more directly scripted by Merlin, the wizard with 
a sense of humor whose comic ancestry includes a “Lady Nonne” (lady 
none, or nun), Matilda (Teutonic: battle-maid, or battle-made), and 
Pubidius, a historical nonentity with a name glancing at Latin pubes/pubis, 
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“puberty” (iii.13).55 Such ancestors could hardly better befit Britomart’s 
condition: they are made for her, and the same is true of Merlin’s dynas-
tic prophecy, which at once reflects and guides her wishes. Although the 
male/female cooperation here has been read as compromising her agency, 
I see it as potentially further empowering her—again, potentially. On the 
one hand, in “this man’s world,” as too common a saying of the twentieth 
century went, she has to start somewhere if she is to have a viable quest. 
On the other hand, if she really is, or is to become, a composite of Mars 
and Venus, the male/female cooperation expresses rather than compro-
mises her integrity.
Britomart’s Saxon armor was acquired by a band of Britons on a 
“forray”—a raiding party bent on pillage—a “Few dayes before” when they 
“had gotten a great pray / Of Saxon goods, emongst the which was seene 
/ A goodly Armour” belonging to Queen Angela (iii.58). This account 
highlights the fortuitous, even casual, quality of the armor’s acquisi-
tion. Angela was not defeated by the Briton king in battle; in fact, the 
account suggests that the pillagers might have broken into one of Angela’s 
storehouses or, perhaps more ingloriously, into her country house in her 
absence.
Angela herself and Britomart’s father, King Ryence, do not even 
seem directly involved, and the fact that Ryence’s acquisition of the 
armor is subsequently termed a “gladfull victory” renders it about as glori-
ous as Artegall’s winning the arms of Achilles is actual (59). As Ryence’s 
“onely daughter and his hayre” from whom “nothing he . . . reseru’d 
apart,” Britomart might actually be thought to have a right to the cap-
tured armor—in legal terminology a vested right (III.ii.22): in English 
law, women had full rights to inheritance when sons were lacking. In this 
connection, two attributes of Minerva, as identified with Athena, come 
to mind, namely her unique possession of her father Jove’s thunderbolt 
and aegis with the gorgon’s head.56 In sum, Britomart’s robbery of her 
armor from a church is on the transgressive scale of her later white lies to 
Redcrosse, who is himself Saxon-born. In Faerie, Saxons and Britons such 
as Redcrosse and Arthur mingle readily.
Britomart’s martial accoutrements actually combine Saxon with 
Briton. Although her Saxon armor is not magical, her ebony spear, made 
by Bladud, a Briton king, has been produced by magic and has magical 
powers that an opposing rider cannot withstand.57 Although Britomart 
also has a sword, the spear is her ultimate weapon, and it is alike an 
attribute of Mars and Minerva. The spear has been stored in King Ryence’s 
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church, which begins to sound like an armory or virtual history museum. 
Even glauce finds her nondescript suit of armor there. Since Britomart’s 
shield, emblazoned with Brutus’s lion passant, is simply said to be beside 
the spear, it too could be associated with Bladud or with her dynastic 
genealogy. When Britomart sets off for Faerie immediately after her arm-
ing, the hunched figure of old glauce trails her: the lady knight brings 
with her, so to speak, her own gently comic visual parody.
Variously glossing Glauce, the name of Britomart’s nurse, A. C. 
Hamilton suggests greek “owl,” a bird traditionally associated with 
Minerva, as well as greek “grey” (that is, old glauce), and the mother of 
Diana in Cicero’s De natura deorum.58 As a combination of Venus and 
Mars, the amorously motivated Britomart is as much a parody of the 
fiercely, eternally virginal Minerva herself as is glauce of Minerva’s owl. 
Notably, glauce as a visual form of parody trailing Britomart disappears 
by the end of Book III, although then she ludicrously trails Scudamour 
instead. given Hamilton’s glosses of glauce’s name, a more appropriate 
verb for her presence with respect to him might be “shadows” or, better 
still, “haunts.” When Britomart finds Artegall in Book IV, glauce briefly 
reappears in the conventional role of complicit nursely matchmaker, a ver-
sion of Fair Welcome (Bialacoyle, in Chaucer’s rendering of Le Roman 
de la Rose), after which point she vanishes from the poem (IV.vi.25: 
“belaccoyle”).59 With significant figural difference, in Book V an armed 
Britomart will resume her Faerie quest accompanied by the iron man 
Talus.
Momentarily excepting the sojourn with Malecasta, Britomart 
removes either her helmet or all her armor twice in Book III: first at the 
seashore and then in the castle of Malbecco. In both instances, the danger 
of containment by the protective armor in the negative sense of suppres-
sion and self-enclosure becomes evident. Both witness an outpouring of 
what is inside this armored and self-contained figure—frustrated desire, 
patriotic affection, a kind of figural voice, since she, not the narrator, is 
the speaker. In Philip Sidney’s term, at these moments she is literally and 
memorably a speaking picture.60 Sitting unhelmeted beside the seashore, 
she utters her passionate love-longing in a notably Petrarchan form, but 
then she suits up again in the enabling armor to get on with the quest and 
to topple “loues enimy,” the aggressor Marinell, who has rashly advised her 
to retreat (III.iv.26).61 Later, within the Castle of Malbecco, and now fully 
divested of her armor, she discovers and reveals her kinship to Paridell, not 
only as a Trojan descendant but also, in a phrase that refuses containment, 
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as “another partner of . . . [his] payne” and of his “pitifull complaint” of 
his lost homeland (III.ix.40). The inner Britomart, so to speak, takes sur-
prising cultural forms, not merely borrowing those of males but truly vest-
ing herself in them. The cultural alternative for her in the poem would 
appear to be silence, and the cultural challenge to modify or to exceed 
these inherited forms in some way.
In the Castle of Malecasta, Britomart remains fully suited, although, 
to her mischance, she has her visor up, thus projecting “amiable grace,” 
along with her “manly terror” (III.i.46). She later unsuits in private; her 
bed is invaded by the deluded and delusional Malecasta; and, as a result, 
she is slightly wounded by gardante (Looking ), who leers at her when 
she is clad only in a smock. Punningly, she is further vulnerable as well for 
having let her guard down, whether by having a look around Malecasta’s 
domain or by “dissembl[ing ]” her disapproval of the temptress’s out-
rageously open advances “with ignoraunce” (i.e., playing dumb) and by 
“entertayn[ing]” her instead with “faire countenaunce” (i.50, 55). Delude, 
incidentally, is another word deriving from ludere, “play,” and surely there 
is something parodic about this incident in Castle Joyous. (Intertextually, 
the plight of Sir gawain comes to mind.)62 Britomart, as we know, will 
also be wounded, although again not deeply, in the House of Busirane, but 
this later time, with significant difference, through her full suit of armor. 
Here the wound will signify her vulnerability to Busirane despite the 
armor, but this is not all. The armor, including shield and sword, its phallic 
“point direct[ed] . . . forward right,” has helped her through the flames of 
Busirane’s porch, which divide themselves, allowing her to pass through, 
“as a thonder bolt / Perceth the yielding ayre” (III.xi.25).63 The image is 
distinctively Jovian; that Jove’s cerebral offspring Minerva can also be rep-
resented hurling the thunderbolt makes it no less so. Like father, like son; 
is it really like daughter, too? Britomart will be wearing the same armor 
when she meets and crucially engages Artegall in Book IV, where the 
thunderbolt will be his.
When Britomart is wounded through the armor by Busirane and 
yet is victorious, it is as if the armor had become more fully a part of her 
in some way, at least while she is in the condition of possibility and crea-
tive figuration that Faerie affords. An analogy to the shifting relation of 
Christian armor to what is inside it at various points in Book I is available, 
as is the implication of such shifts for the broader relation of surface to 
substance in the poem.64 This developing relation may be a constructive 
reason, in addition to the deceptive and abusive ones, the throwbacks to 
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Busirane, why Britomart stays safely within her armor at the beginning of 
Book IV where, rather than reveal herself to Amoret, she “fain[s]”—ambig-
uously pretends, desires, or both—her sex male and thereby “maske[s] her 
wounded mind” (i.7). She has, after all, been thrice wounded by love—
first by her vision of Artegall in the magic globe and twice by love’s perver-
sion at the hands of Malecasta/gardante and Busirane. All these wounds 
were painful.
Along with the narrator’s word “abusion” characterizing Britomart’s 
deception of Amoret, the other words I have just quoted from the first 
appearance of the two women together in Book IV, namely “fain” and 
“maske,” enforce the specter of Busirane. Britomart’s masking her female 
sex from the anxious, defenseless Amoret, while feigning and faining to be 
a man, both reflects Busirane’s abusive masking and ironically suggests that 
Britomart is at once the heir of his art and of Amoret, its ultimate object.65 
Surely cruel, not merely comic, Britomart’s abusive playing with and upon 
Amoret’s responses suggests both curiosity and resentment—an openness 
to experience and a resistance to the stock-in-trade of conventional wom-
anhood, to something of what Shakespeare’s Angelo calls the “destin’d 
livery” of woman.66 Yet it also enables her exploratory performance of 
manhood, an alternative and possibly liberating identity. This is another 
point at which her figuration as Mars clashes more noticeably with her fig-
uration as Minerva, both figural possibilities present in the Venus armata 
composite. For a modern reader, it is also a point at which the Renaissance 
figure of Britomart strongly suggests Judith Butler’s emphasis on the per-
formativity of a gendered identity.67
Like Britomart’s momentary identification with Amoret in the 
House of Busirane, her “abusion” of her charge at the beginning of Book 
IV might again suggest a Lacanian traversal of the fantasy, a completing 
or an experiencing of both (or all) sides of it—earlier of victimhood, this 
time of Busiranic abuse.68 Accordingly, Britomart might turn from a pro-
jected identification of herself as the object of desire, that is, an identifica-
tion with Amoret in the House of Busirane, to an introjected identifica-
tion of herself as the agent of desire, or Busirane himself, at the beginning 
of Book IV. As signaled by the similarity of the word traverse (“turn across, 
athwart”) to translate (“carry across”), the latter a term specifically for met-
aphor and alternatively for tropicality in general, this notion is allegorical, 
whether metonymic and substitutive or more properly metaphorical, the 
latter being at once constructive and differential, never just the same.69 
Such traversal offers a useful connection and insight, since it further 
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highlights Britomart’s characterological features, as long as it does not 
produce sameness at the expense of difference—the difference between 
identification and Britomart’s sustained control over Busirane in his 
House, despite her momentary vulnerability, and the difference between 
mere abusion of Amoret and Britomart’s constructive, experimental per-
formance of manhood.70 This is also the difference between armor that is 
merely alienating and armor that is constructively enabling.
In sum, at the outset of Book IV, the true Britomart is no longer 
simply within the armor, if, once armed, she could ever have been charac-
terized this way. Her figure continues to exhibit characteristics of interior-
ity and awareness—Sinfield’s “consciousness”—but even so, as this book 
begins, she is more fully invested in armored form and expression than 
ever before. The potential of her figure as at once Mars and Venus, aggres-
sive boar and sensuous flower, male and female, hard-edged form and melt-
ing passion has increasingly been realized in Book III, yet, when her own 
book ends and Book IV opens, her armored form and her performance of 
manhood are further definitive.71 In view of her final adventure in Book 
III in which the armor is already so much a part of her, this is less a deep-
ening revelation, a word I used with respect to Una, than a further devel-
opment, a broadening of her figure—a greater comprehension. Subjected 
to friendship, the form of love thematic in Book IV, Britomart’s figure will 
be at once different and still continuous by Book IV’s end. Both Una and 
Britomart learn from experience in their own Books (I and III), but the 
shaping of Britomart in the course of Books III to V is more extensive, 
prolonged, and remarkable with respect to her awareness and, be it added 
in a glance forward to Book V, with respect to her unawareness, as well.
* * *
Further discussing composite forms in Renaissance art, Edgar Wind offers 
the images of a closed fist and an unfolded palm to illustrate how a com-
posite image, such as Venus and Mars or amiable Concordia and martial 
Constantia, might be represented: “Normally, Constantia would hold 
a lance or lean on a column. . . . But the lance is replaced by an arrow 
of love which she swings in a defiant bellicose manner, and the column 
on which she leans is formed by a bundle of arrows, the traditional sym-
bol of Concordia. The visibly fierce, unassailable Constantia is therefore 
a concealed Concordia; like a closed fist withholding an open palm. . . . 
[Thus] Constantia is represented as an ‘infolded’ Concordia—Concordia 
as an ‘unfolded’ Constantia” (76). In a variation on Wind’s image, at the 
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beginning of Book IV, mounted on that single horse with Britomart, 
the Venerean Amoret is this knight’s love outfolded, the best outward, 
unfolded expression presently available, while Britomart herself remains 
the outfolded form of Mars, whom the enabling armor expresses. Ideally, 
the Venerean Amoret, as a generative symbol of Britomart’s love, will be 
incorporated—perhaps more accurately reincorporated—into Britomart, 
and Amoret herself, as a separate figure, will somehow find a viable exter-
nal form and reformed cultural expression.72 The alternative to such 
constructive, figural reformation will be Amoret’s discarding, not entirely 
unlike the disappearing Fool in King Lear, whose role Lear subsumes in 
the storm and whose figure he replaces with Poor Tom’s. Realism of plot 
and character in the modern quotidian sense is foreign to the construc-
tive, bold process that Spenser’s fourth book undertakes, as well as more 
broadly to his culture.73 Form, too, has a cultural history that remains 
conspicuously significant in The Faerie Queene, where Amoret as a figure 
differs formally from the relatively greater complexity and awareness of 
Britomart. Both the conventions of narrative and of symbolism in the 
Renaissance bear on Book IV, and the conflict between them becomes 
focal as the book develops.
More than once, Book IV refers suggestively to Amoret as 
Britomart’s love. A telling example occurs in Satyrane’s tournament in 
canto v, when the lady knight will not forgo “her owne Amoret” for False 
Florimell (20). The possessive adjective “owne” accentuates Amoret’s 
figural signification as Love: Britomart’s own Amoret is both her friend 
and the love she possesses and continues to nurture. Earlier in this book, 
Britomart’s abusive deception of Amoret ceases once she meets and over-
comes the nameless, faceless knight outside the nameless castle in canto i, 
subsequently unhelmeting herself to reveal her womanhood and thus ena-
bling all three of them (Britomart, Amoret, and the young male knight) to 
enter the castle, each as a pair (IV.i.10–13). The young knight’s nameless-
ness has particular significance in an allegory, one of whose characteris-
tics is significant naming. His anonymity facilitates his interchangeabil-
ity with Britomart, and hers with Amoret as well—a triangulation of the 
three, with the lady knight performing as Venus and Mars, simultaneously 
man and woman, and thus conceived as at once a mean point and a mov-
ing one. The mathematical diction seems appropriate. There is an abstract 
logic to the plot at this moment.
This new Britomart behaves differently from the one in Book III; 
she reveals her erotic beauty voluntarily and for a socially constructive 
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purpose, not simply in response to discomfort within her armor, whether 
from a surge of emotion at the sight of the surging sea or a downpour out-
side the Castle of Malbecco, as happened in the third book. Britomart’s 
self-revelation now comes while she still wears the rest of her armor, and 
it is actually more wondrous for combining the armor with her cascad-
ing golden hair. The narrator celebrates the occasion with rhetoric that at 
once recalls Acrasia’s Venerean veil in the Bower of Bliss and the comet-
like appearance of Florimell at the outset of Book III.74 The imagery of fire 
and light rather than of showers or cloudbursts predominates:
With that her glistring helmet she vnlaced:
Which doft, her golden lockes, that were vp bound
Still in a knot, vnto her heeles downe traced,
And like a silken veile in compasse round
About her backe and all her bodie wound:
Like as the shining skie in summers night,
What time the dayes with scorching heat abound,
Is creasted all with lines of firie light,
That it prodigious seemes in common peoples sight.
 (IV.i.13)75
All glistening, golden, fiery, and bright, there is nothing abstract about 
the cascading hair. With this unfolding of Venus from within Mars, the 
Venerean figure of Amoret draws “freely” and naturally to Britomart’s bed 
in another memory of Book III, where Malecasta, free in the licentious 
sense, has earlier done so. This all makes figural sense. Amoret’s attraction 
necessarily derives from her figural nature as “Venus mayd” (IV.x.54).
“All that night” the two women, inside the castle and together in 
bed, as old glauce and Britomart were in Book III, “of their loues did 
treat” (1.16). In Spenser’s time beds were valuable commodities, and it was 
common to share one. Notable are the plural “loues,” the information in 
the immediately following lines that the two women “priuately bemone” 
one another’s plight with “griefull pittie,” and especially the conspicuous 
figural dimension of both women from the outset of Book IV, which here 
is singularly affected by Britomart’s being divested of the armor that has 
increasingly become a part of her. These considerations noted, the phrase 
“their loues” remains susceptible to a homoerotic reading, which history 
justifies and others have observed. That this, and more, is Ate’s reading 
later in the same canto ensures rather than erases its textual existence.76 
Without her armor, Britomart is more simply female, like Amoret.
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The women’s treating of their loves lasts all of four lines. At dawn, 
Britomart is revested (and reinvested) in armor, and she and Amoret ride 
again on a single horse, together a hermaphroditic silhouette atop that 
traditional symbol of passion. Again in an exteriorized, exposed, and less 
private landscape, they are not long on the horse before the fickle knight 
Blandamour challenges Britomart for possession of Amoret. Now occurs 
the strange but crucial stanza in which perspectives repeatedly oscillate 
between Britomart’s and Blandamour’s points of view and simultaneously 
between chivalric and erotic, outer and inner, and narrative and symbolic 
values. (All these pairs, especially the last pair, are not simply and synony-
mously exchangeable with each other, though all are in play.) Although 
familiar to Spenserians, the stanza bears citing:
The warlike Britonesse her soone addrest,
And with such vncouth welcome did receaue
Her fayned Paramour, her forced guest,
That being forst his saddle soone to leaue,
Him selfe he did of his new loue deceaue
And made him selfe thensample of his follie.
Which done, she passed forth not taking leaue,
And left him now as sad, as whilome iollie,
Well warned to beware with whom he dar’d to dallie.
 (IV.i.36)
The combination of Britomart’s armed form with the outward posses-
sion and expression of her own Amoret—Amor, her love—causes still 
further confusion between merely fleshed and more inclusively figural 
meanings—again, genuine confusion, not the simple fusion of both terms 
of a single binary. The combination is problematical: whether Blandamour 
is Britomart’s or Amoret’s “fayned Paramour” is uncertain, as are the 
location and identity of “his new loue”—inner or outer, Britomart 
or her Amoret. The motivations, erotic or chivalric, of Britomart and 
Blandamour are similarly uncertain, as are narrative and symbolic dimen-
sions more broadly. A reader might even wonder whether the assault of 
the fickle Blandamour, the object of whose loves is ever shifting, is a fur-
ther comment on the night Britomart and Amoret have spent together, 
an accusation of infidelity like Ate’s, only eleven stanzas later (47–49). 
The result of the encounter of Blandamour with Britomart and Amoret 
is a blur, but a meaning ful blur, analogous to—that is, like and unlike—
the endless, undefined (formless), regressive, and chaotic fighting of the 
108  CHAPTER 3
false friends in Book IV’s first and ninth cantos. It is also a situation in 
a single stanza that is momentary; it cannot be lasting without signaling 
poetic negligence rather than poetic significance. Clearly significant, it 
participates in a recurrent pattern in the experimentally figured narrative 
of Book IV.
Amoret accompanies armed Britomart in the rest of Book IV only 
until Amoret walks off “for pleasure, or for need” while Britomart is sleep-
ing, as Britomart recounts much later (vii.4). Said to be “vnwares” and, 
though in a forest, “of nought affeard,” Amoret may suppose herself free of 
courtly danger, the only sort she knows, when she wanders off, or she may 
even fancy herself back with Pleasure, her youthful companion amid the 
myrtle trees in the garden of Adonis. Then the figure of beastly Lust seizes 
her. Thereafter, abandoned by Belphoebe and Timias and found in the 
woods by Arthur, she returns to her former status as a separate figure with 
her own story line, such as it now is. She is now a desperately wounded 
figure who seems to have nowhere to go and no story to fit into. Arthur 
feels only pity for her, and she is a fifth wheel in the story of the look-alike 
squires and their morally compromised ladies, which comes next.77
It makes a kind of figural sense that Amoret should have to with-
draw from Britomart’s company before Britomart can achieve loving 
“accord”—heartfelt harmony—with Artegall (IV.vi.41). Yet even in this 
“accord,” Amoret’s presence lingers punningly: the word with which 
Spenser thus characterizes it plays etymologically on Latin ad, “to, 
toward,” and cor/cordis, “heart,” and phonologically on English chord and 
cord. English chord enriches the harmony signaled by the word accord 
itself, but resonant in the homonymous cord there is also a memory of the 
chain Busirane used to bind Amoret. Is the tie that binds creatively revised 
in the accord of Britomart and Artegall, or is this transformation merely 
apparent? Could the tie that binds still be enchainment? Submerged in a 
pun in Book IV, this question emerges openly in Book V, whose time, to 
paraphrase Merlin’s prophetic words, is not yet. Puns can work this way in 
The Faerie Queene, as memorably in other writers of the period.
Earlier in Book IV, Britomart, fully suited and still with Amoret, 
fights Artegall in Satyrane’s tournament and again later on foot, when her 
armor is breached as Artegall shears off her ventail, the first step toward a 
truce between them. When she and Artegall subsequently retire to solace 
and feasting, reach their “accord,” consent to marriage, and are privately 
betrothed, Britomart is presumably unarmored, but this is a point the 
poem passes over in silence, perhaps signaling its lack of significance now 
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(IV.vi.39, 41).78 When she and Artegall separate again—specifically and 
importantly with her assent (vi.43: “wonne her will”)—and, promisingly, 
she now accompanies Scudamour in his search for Amoret, she is again 
armored and committed to “vertues onely sake, which doth beget / True 
loue and faithfull friendship” rather than to the marital love quest that 
initially led to her arming (vi.46). Clearly, Amoret no longer belongs to 
Britomart in the same sense as when Amoret was “her owne” in Satyrane’s 
tournament (IV.v.20). Although in Book IV we never see Britomart with-
out her armor after her accord with Artegall, the armor now appears more 
practical than significant. This situation will change again in Book V.
* * *
Before moving on to Book V, however, I want to look again at develop-
ments in the fourth book over which I have just skimmed—briefly to 
recapitulate Amoret’s capture by Lust, along with her subsequent history 
in Book IV, and then more closely to examine the combat that leads to 
Britomart’s and Artegall’s accord, insofar as Britomart’s armor plays a 
notably figural role in the latter and, doing so, provokes a nagging ques-
tion: why does Spenser, the poet of the Amoretti and Epithalamion, deny 
the principal couple of the poem a conciliation less steely (and likely off-
putting) than clashing and clanging armor? The mix of genres in Book IV 
hardly accounts for this denial. To my mind, the significance of Britomart’s 
armor to this point is again the major reason for it, the inescapable specter 
of Busiranic art forms continuing to be another, as was evidenced in the 
hermaphroditic figure concluding the 1590 edition and as it will be again 
by Scudamour’s raptus in the Temple of Venus.79 A third reason is the per-
sistent, recurrent, significantly thematized disjunction and confusion of 
the merely fleshly and the more inclusive figural, of the inner and outer, 
and of the narrative and the symbolic in Book IV that is at once exempli-
fied and crystalized in the early encounter of Blandamour with Britomart 
and Amoret that I recently examined.
Achieving accord, Britomart’s battle with Artegall surmounts these 
thematized problems, at least as much as is possible in Book IV. Seen ret-
rospectively through the same problematized, thematic lenses, the poem 
then cedes Amoret to genital Lust, a bisexual, hence hermaphroditic, fig-
ure that could hardly be depicted in more explicitly physical, fleshy terms 
and one whose cave alludes parodically in its bisexuality to that beneath 
the garden of Adonis.80 Although Amoret escapes from Lust, as my last 
chapter indicated, she continues to be compromised in the narrative, 
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which answers to events outside it, even while her figure is once and for-
ever idealized by the sublating lyric voice of the Spenserian poet, who, for 
this purpose, abruptly and impulsively interrupts his bleak narrative of a 
night with Slander during the eighth canto, as also treated in chapter 2 
(65, 67–69). In other words, in Amoret’s story, apart from Britomart’s, 
disjunction merely increases. Her reappearance in the Temple of Venus 
then becomes at once a discouraging memory of the forms that led to 
the House of Busirane in the first place and, perhaps, as I tentatively sug-
gested, the defiant intimation of a rebeginning. Understandably, the fig-
ure of Amoret nonetheless disappears from the poem, evidently having 
become a property too hot for the poet to handle.
In contrast, for better or worse, the accord of Britomart and 
Artegall, the latter masking as the Salvage Knight, represents in armed 
combat the principle of erotic coupling in The Faerie Queene. Their com-
bat, which simultaneously climaxes both their relationship and the first 
half of Book IV, is both focal and distinctive. Its position in a central canto 
of this book corresponds to that of the garden of Adonis in Book III. In 
terms that I variously derive from Jean-François Lyotard on the figurality 
of the dream-work and from Ricoeur on iconic metaphor, their combat 
is highly figural—embodied but not simply fleshly—and, in the main, 
its contours are cognitive, imaginative, and affective, rather than directly 
emotional or passionate.81 As a battle, the ur-conflict of epic romance, it 
is also a narrative moment in the poem that belongs to the quest, rather 
than to a statue, an extended emblem, or a lyric. It is full of mutual, devel-
opmental action.
In Ricoeur’s theory, the iconic dimension of metaphor, which, like 
other figures of speech, has a “quasi-bodily externalization,” also carries 
feeling (as distinguished from raw emotion). Ricoeur describes this feel-
ing as a complex form of affection, intentionality, “interiorized thoughts,” 
“felt participation,” and the like (142, 154–55). Lyotard, opposing the 
Lacanian view that dream-work is a form of discourse, argues instead for 
its less abstract, more Freudian figurality; for Lyotard, “An imaged text 
is a discourse that is very close to the figure.” Its proximity inheres in 
“the figurative power of a word, of course, but also the rhythmic power 
of syntax, and at an even deeper level, the matrix of narrative rhythm.”82 
Addressing this matrix, Lyotard explains that, “The great linguistic figures, 
of discourse, of style, are the expression, right in the heart of language, of 
a general disposition of experience, and the phantasm is the matrix of that 
ordering, that rhythm, which will henceforth be imposed on everything 
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that happens on the levels of ‘reality’ and expression” (245: my emphasis). 
As form, matrix, and rhythm, the figure “jam[s]” the communicative con-
straints inscribed in “any language. . . . By virtue of the fact that it sets up a 
closed circuit intercom system of the work with itself.” Lyotard concludes 
that, “language, at least in its poetic usage, is possessed, haunted by the 
figure” (246).
Characterized by elemental and animal imagery, by reference to 
religious forms, by wounds, sweat, and blood, the combat of Britomart 
with Artegall is violent and erotic as well as figurative. It is sexually sug-
gestive, for example, when Artegall “Thrust[s]” at Britomart from below 
as if “an eger hound” were thrusting “to an Hynd within some couert 
glade”; Artegall has a couchant hound on the crest of his helmet (pres-
ently masked by “woody mosse”), and a hind is a female deer.83 Similarly 
suggestive, he next deeply wounds the “hinder parts” of Britomart’s horse, 
that conventional symbol of bodily passion earlier shared by Britomart 
with Amoret (vi.13). But the combat of Britomart and the (still) Salvage 
Knight is not directly and immediately genital the way Lust’s fleshy figure 
is, instead being relatively and significantly more masked, sublimated, and, 
in a word, civilized. Their combat is not merely chaotic and endless as is 
the initial and later battling of Blandamour, Paridell, and the like (e.g., 
ix.20–33). Rather, it has a kind of form and pattern, a rhythm and, cru-
cially, a progression. It is at once Typhonic-Chthonic and dance-like—
both explosive and generative, both Hate and Love, in terms I take from 
the Temple of Venus. This is the sort of figuration that Lyotard intends 
when he refers to the matrix of narrative rhythm.
In the heat of their encounter the knights exchange the roles of 
hunter and hunted recurrently—either of them “Sometimes pursewing, 
and sometimes pursewed” (vi.18).84 Britomart wounds Artegall directly 
despite his armor: his “mayle [punningly male] yriv’d, and plates yrent,” 
his blood pours to the ground (vi.15). In contrast, Britomart’s armor twice 
deflects the force of Artegall’s blows, his first consequential stroke glanc-
ing down her back to light on her horse:
Like as the lightning brond from riuen skie,
Throwne out by angry Ioue in his vengeance,
With dreadfull force falles on some steeple hie,
Which battring, downe it on the church doth  
   glance,
And teares it all with terrible mischance.
 (IV.vi.14)
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With this imagery Scudamour’s less violently graphic church-robbery 
later in the Temple of Venus comes to a rereader’s mind, as does the ear-
lier, bizarre containment of chaotic urge and violent desire in the religious 
idolatry and ritual battle of Satyrane’s tournament, which, with all its pri-
mitive and parodic limitations, is a relatively civilizing form, greatly supe-
rior to the still more formless, endless fighting at the outset of this book 
(Blandamour, Paridell, etc.). The limitations termed primitive and paro-
dic in the preceding sentence include Florimell’s girdle enshrined within 
an ark, insistent images of animality and elemental force, and knightly 
figures named Bruncheval, Sangliere, Brianor, and Ferramont (Brown 
Horse, Wild Boar, Bear, and, ludically, Iron Mount). Similarly in the pre-
sent combat, Artegall’s lightning is significantly Jovian, formed into myth, 
as well as elemental. The steeple on which it falls is as pointedly phallic, 
moreover, as is Britomart’s magic spear, which Artegall’s Jovian blow to 
her horse renders ineffectual.85
Artegall’s second crucial stroke lights on Britomart’s helmet and 
glances harmlessly down the front of her body armor, yet it shears away 
her ventail en route and exposes her face, framed by wisps of golden hair, 
which is culturally coded female. This partial breach of her armor is an 
unmasking rather than a total divesting, however. The difference is vital for 
a poem in which masking, with its Busiranic potential for abuse, has been 
thematically recurrent and specifically vital for the figure of Britomart, 
whose armor is integral to her quest and whose outfolded figural integrity 
is armored. Now without her spear, Britomart crucially retains her raised 
sword, exactly as she did in her vulnerability both within Malecasta’s bed-
room and the House of Busirane. Yet no more than Artegall is simply 
lightning, hail, hound, Jove, or an idolator is Britomart simply her horse’s 
animality, a church, an angel, an artwork, a goddess, priestess, or even her 
own armor. The armor itself, moreover, cannot be translated simply as her 
chastity, as Hamilton’s second edition might suggest (e.g., 453n13.4). The 
armor is at once multivalent and responsive to specific context. By this 
point in the poem, it signals her agency and specifically her will to resist 
and act freely.86 It further represents the force of her virtue, not merely its 
moral form but also its Machiavellian virtù, control and ability to effect, 
and Latin virtus, “power, strength, value.”87 Virtus, of course, derives from 
vir, “man.” Most striking of all, Britomart’s armor signifies her hardness 
and even her hate, again, as this concept appears in the Temple of Venus, as 
a cosmic force harmoniously, concordantly balanced by love, and finally, 
her armor signifies her masculinity, if not her maleness per se.88
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Tellingly, Britomart’s armor, though culturally coded male, has 
been a queen’s from the start—a good “fitt,” in the punning, physical sense 
of this word in the third proem.89 Although her figure wears a habergeon, 
or coat of mail, it has never explicitly received the descriptor “mayle” (or 
male), a recurrent Spenserian pun applied to other knights. This is merely 
a negative piece of evidence about her, minuscule yet still notable. By the 
end of her battle with Artegall, her integrity has been figured not as ana-
tomically doubled like the hermaphroditic statue imaged in 1590 but as 
truly, integrally both Martian and Venerean in effectual, psychological, 
and agential terms. In these telling respects, her figure is androgenous. 
The distinction between an adjectival and a nominal form, here between 
androgenous and androgyne, is relevantly significant, comparable to that 
between allegorical and allegory, distinctive property and defining liter-
ary form, for example. Distinguishing such verbal forms in terms of their 
grammatical and semantic functions, as in traditional logics and rhetorics, 
simultaneously enables preservation of relation and acknowledgment of 
difference: an allegorical figure, like one on a shield or in a tableau, is not 
just by virtue of the adjective a literary allegory if an allegory is a mov-
ing metaphor, that is, a narrative or dramatic one.90 The adjectival form 
also sits more comfortably with mythic forms creatively revised within 
a moving, metaphorical narrative of the sort that is found in The Faerie 
Queene and most complexly exemplified by the story of Britomart. When 
Britomart finds Artegall, the difference between her evolving role as an 
actor and the function of an emblematic statue such as the bisexual Venus 
of canto x, not to mention the one that survives the capture of Busirane, 
becomes quite definite.
In a useful discussion of intellectual sources for Spenser’s garden 
of Adonis, Jon Quitslund highlights some aspects of Leone Ebreo’s influ-
ential Dialoghi d’Amore of 1535, which bears on imaginative writing in 
England from Spenser through Donne and Milton.91 Leone reverses the 
amorous roles our own age still considers conventional, not to say hegem-
onic or “normal.” His male lover is maternal, and his engendering female 
beloved is paternal—the true father of love. Here, the woman’s fatherhood 
occurs within a culture and context that still attribute originary potency 
to men, yet it is nonetheless striking that for Leone this fathering resides in 
the woman. As Quitslund summarizes Leone, “each sex or gender is not an 
autonomous entity but an aspect of mankind (‘l’ homme’ in Tyard’s trans-
lation). . . . ‘Each of them has a masculine part, perfect and active, which is 
the intellect, and a feminine part, imperfect and passive, which is the body 
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and matter’” (235). Clearly these parts are not reducible to genital dif-
ferences, and they both underwrite human eros.92 Suggestively in Leone’s 
statement, sex and gender are also not differentiated from one another as 
fully or neatly as our age still tends to think of them.93 The potential for 
their confusion is evident and often occurs in The Faerie Queene, whether 
in comic, threatening, or constructive modes, or in varied combinations 
of them.
In the combat of Britomart and Artegall, he is overcome by her 
beauty, available to him only in her flushed and sweating face, framed by 
wisps of hair. Once his phallic sword has fallen from his correspondingly 
“slacke” fingers, Britomart’s long-lost nurse glauce intervenes to per-
suade Britomart to offer Artegall a truce, which eventually turns out to 
be a mutual recognition of love or overwhelming attraction (vi.21). This 
enabling truce extends to Scudamour, still the totally conventional bearer 
of Cupid’s shield. glauce salutes Britomart with “seemely belaccoyle” and 
here, in effect, is transformed to a figure straight from The Romance of 
the Rose who helps the Lover gain access to the Rose, or nubile Woman 
(vi.25). This Romance (and its tradition) is another source at once under-
lying the Temple of Venus and Busirane’s masquers. Not long after these 
pronounced inclusions of convention, Britomart accepts the unmasked 
Artegall as her future “Lord,” or husband, another glance at conventional, 
sociocultural assumptions (vi.41).94 Recognizing all these as shadows of 
the ever present Busiranic forms, I look again to Britomart’s armor, still 
encasing her, as the sign of her strength—her virtue—even while her 
experience incorporates these reminders of contemporary erotic culture, 
including and subordinating them in what could be or become a better 
possibility. In this way, the accord of Britomart and Artegall is not simply 
a fiction opposed to contemporary culture and denying it. Instead, like 
metaphor and allegory, as a form of metaphor, whose “as if ” is and is not, 
it doubles what we know and reaches beyond it.95
Any inclusion in the poem of the unreformed sociocultural past, 
which remains alive and well in Elizabethan England, brings subversive 
ironies and huge future risks, however. Relevantly and realistically, the 
concluding stanza of Book IV will reaffirm these, remarking ambiva-
lently of Florimell’s affection for Marinell: “Ne lesse was she in secret hart 
affected, / But that she masked it with modestie, / For feare she should 




As earlier indicated, Britomart’s amor, having made its point, has little 
import in the rest of Book IV, but Book V is another matter. In this book, 
the armor is so undistinctive that Britomart’s pairing with Talus leads 
to misrecognition of her armed figure as a substitute—merely a meto-
nym—for Artegall. This new effort to transform her figure and willfully 
to unmake its complex wholeness is the more significant insofar as she 
does not participate voluntarily in it. To invoke my earlier pun, she does 
not per-form it. Instead, her figure is passively subjected to this change. 
Still more importantly, this process openly occurs despite her feelings and 
intentions. In other words, the poem makes sure that we notice it. It is 
as if figure and fated plot, figure and ongoing narrative—for Britomart, 
developed character and prophesied marriage—were somehow separate 
or separating, as memorably happens at times in Shakespearean drama, 
notably in Hamlet, wherein the prince resists his narrative fate, the fami-
liar revenge plot. As William Morse has suggested, one word for such 
Shakespearean separation is irony, which might more broadly be glossed 
for my purpose as double vision.96
For Britomart, the first stage of this ironic process comes in the 
episode of misrecognition by Dolon and his sons, who mistake her for 
Artegall mainly because she has the iron man Talus with her. In the sec-
ond stage, the authoritative priestly interpretation of her experience in Isis 
Church (i.e., the Temple of Isis), it comes in an emphatically ideological 
simplification of her figural integrity to this point.97 Whereas in Book 
III, Merlin, together with glauce, could offer the pubescent Britomart a 
future beyond herself that purposed her feelings without denying them, 
Isis’s chief priest simply displaces them. Britomart, at this stage, is not the 
same uninitiated, “vnwares” girl she was early in Book III, and the distance 
between her experience in Isis Church and what the priest would make 
of it is glaring. A character’s growth has consequences for her author, a 
developing creature for her creator, as any reader of Paradise Lost comes to 
see with respect to Eve, as well as to Adam and Satan. The more developed 
a character is, the harder it is to repurpose or reverse our awareness of her 
being.
The first and second stages, Dolon and Isis Church, are further 
comparable with respect to Britomart’s armor. In Dolon’s chamber, 
Britomart utters an impassioned complaint while fully armored, and, her 
helmet only unlaced, in Isis Church nonetheless experiences “troublous 
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passion,” “fearfull fright,” and doubtful “dismay,” all of which are justified 
by what is happening to her figural integrity, indeed, to her very being.98 
In the Temple, the flames that grow outrageously “vnwares,” along with 
the rest of her visionary experience, recapitulate the course of her fearful 
fall into love, then her finding and fighting Artegall, his surrender, their 
accord, and Merlin’s earlier prophecy of their future progeny, in short her 
history through Books III and IV (vii.14–16). Venus and Mars, infolded 
and unfolded opposites, her own inside and outside, are not at variance in 
the Dolon and Temple episodes, but her mature, composite figure is now 
quite at odds with the readings conspicuously imposed on it by others in 
the poem. The Merlin ploy, so to speak, is no longer enough. Britomart’s 
being is no longer so simple.
The first of these misreaders is the deceitful Dolon, named for a 
Trojan spy who betrays his own side, ironically a side from whom the fig-
ure of Britomart is descended. The crow of a cock, “The Bird, that warned 
Peter of his fall,” right before Dolon activates the would-be entrapping 
bed, suggests that Britomart’s figure is experiencing some form, or forms, 
of self-betrayal—her jealousy, yes, but much more (vi.27, cf. 25). Who 
besides Dolon is betraying her self—Britomart, Artegall, the Spenserian 
narrator? Who is unclear, but Dolon is not alone. When Dolon misrec-
ognizes Britomart, the narrator intervenes to let us know what is going 
on, but makes a point of telling us that Britomart does not know—“Now 
mote ye know (that which to Britomart / Vnknowen was)” (vi.31)—and 
that she will never know. He now treats Britomart the way he treated 
guyon at the outset of Book III (i.8), whereas, at that earlier point, in con-
trast to this one, he respected her figural integrity. Now he seems to want 
us to notice that he no longer does. The next day Britomart meets two of 
Dolon’s sons, who misrecognize her again and accuse her of killing the 
third son, but “Strange were the words in Britomartis eare,” the narrator 
tells us, before she summarily dispatches the brothers (38).
Britomart’s next misreader, her third, is Isis’s chief priest, a celibate 
ascetic, and his interpretation smothers her richly mythopoeic vision of 
sexuality, birth, and death into wooden exegesis and legal-dynastic ano-
dyne. Her fourth reinterpreter will again be the narrator himself, whose 
rendering of her final acts in canto vii, the battle with Radigund and its 
sequel, produces comparable reduction, then stasis.99 This development 
is the final stage of her transformation. If we were to take the effectual 
disabling of Britomart’s armor only to signal that her passionate response 
to Artegall’s capture is excessive, that she must sacrifice herself to save 
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Artegall, or that the figure of Artegall has simply replaced hers through 
legal coverture, which could suspend a woman’s “very being”—all readings 
to which her figure has been subjected by critics—we would have to over-
look the fact that the poet appears to have written her journey precisely to 
make us notice this process of denial and suppression and to heighten our 
awareness of its ugly cost.100 We might also notice in passing that cover-
ture is absent actual marriage in Britomart’s instance unless it is off stage, 
or page—that is, simply not there. We even assume her earlier betrothal, 
rather than witnessing it as we do Una’s. given opposition in Spenser’s 
Shepheardes Calender and Mother Hubberds Tale to a marriage by the 
queen, the compromising of Britomart’s identity as she travels toward 
Artegall adds a political dimension to our awareness of its personal cost. 
The poet has had further opportunity over time to reflect on these costs, 
and doing so has apparently affected his own awareness.101 The recurrent 
confusion of the queen’s two bodies in the poem has also made the danger 
to a woman’s agency, indeed to her “very being,” more threatening.
Britomart’s climactic fight with Radigund reopens the issue of the 
armor’s signification with a vengeance. Strikingly, the two women do 
not first fight with spears on horseback but on foot with curved swords, 
whose semicircularity qualifies their phallic potency. Like “a Tygre and 
a Lionesse” fighting to possess the carcass of some prey, they “hack” and 
“hew” each other, not sparing their breasts or other “dainty parts,” the 
latter a coy phrase even without the whiff of Victorian priggery sensed 
by a modern reader (vii.29–30): “so dainty they say maketh derth,” as the 
Spenserian sage once wryly forewarned us (I.ii.27). Furious, both women 
forget their martial skill and fight to maim and spoil as much as to win. 
There is a chaotic, disturbing excess to this battle that is wasteful spe-
cifically in sexual and generative terms: blood flows from their sides and 
gushes through their armor; they tread “in gore . . . and on the ground 
their liues did strow, / Like fruitles seede, of which vntimely death should 
grow” (V.vii.31). As the whole encounter suggests, their battle is the 
undoing of Mars and Venus, tiger and lionesse, both.102 Like the misrecog-
nitions and misreadings of Britomart’s figure earlier in Book V, battle and 
battlers participate in her figure’s undoing. This narrator is now more than 
Dolon. He is Busirane, abusing and reversing his own forms.
The blood gushing from multiple wounds blazons Britomart’s vul-
nerability to Radigund, but it is the blow glancing from Britomart’s shoul-
der-plate to bite deeply to the bone instead of glancing harmlessly down 
her armor that signals most sharply the difference between the present 
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encounter and her earlier combat with Artegall. Clearly the armor is now 
mere armor, finally and fully drained of its potency and multivalence. Of 
all the violations Britomart’s figure receives in The Faerie Queene, this is the 
one that seals her figural fate, despite her summary dispatch of Radigund 
right after. Redcrosse’s Pyrrhic victories over Error, Sans Foy, and Sans Joy 
come analogously and worrisomely to mind.
As the destructive wastefulness of the battle with Radigund has cer-
tainly suggested, killing Radigund, Britomart has lost too much of her-
self. Radegone, the city Radigund has named after herself, is the state of 
a selfish woman, enclosed upon itself, a mirror of self-regard. Yet if the 
only alternative to it is Britomart’s repeal of the “liberty of women,” this is 
also blatantly the repeal of her own figure as we have seen it developing in 
earlier books (vii.42).103 In these books, she is self-centered in productive 
senses, and she has to be so. Otherwise she is a suit of armor with nothing 
at all within it, and certainly not a version of Venus. Like but also unlike 
Jove’s brain child Athena, born after the god has swallowed the nymph 
Metis, Venus is born from the foamy sea-sperm outside and beyond a male 
god: gaea (Earth) has brought this sea forth of herself; the sperm is that 
of castrated Uranus, son and husband of gaea. “Male and female through 
commixture joynd” in this way, Venus quickly becomes a various, multiple, 
material other and a distinct form, who will only join Mars as an equal.104
* * *
When Book IV makes an issue of interpretive readings, it chiefly does so 
obliquely through modes and cumulative patterns of meaning. In com-
parison, Book V makes an outright and eventually blatant issue of such 
readings, to be followed in this kind of questioning still more blatantly 
and thematically in Book VI. The arch-villain of Book VI, the Blatant 
Beast, like his predecessors Ate, Slander, Envy, and Detraction, is osten-
sibly, at least, a vicious misreader. Put simply, in the interpretive context 
of Book V and of the books on either side of it, and especially in that of 
the conspicuously imposed misreadings that have accompanied Britomart 
to Radegone, I do not trust the narrative voice that tells me Britomart’s 
replacement of women’s liberty with their subjection to men is true 
justice, “That all they [the women?] as a goddesse her adoring, / Her 
wisedome did admire, and hearkned to her loring” (vii.42). This voice is 
similar to, if still more excessive than, that of the priestly interpreter in 
the Temple of Isis. It does not belong to the poet of Book IV or Book III. 
From the beginning, Book V has more openly than ever before advertised 
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its narrator as a persona, himself a mask, now to be trusted, now not, now 
within the fiction, now apart from it, as even a casual reading of the fifth 
proem makes clear.105 The chaff of this persona’s misreading comes home 
in Britomart’s last appearance. Almost nothing is left of her figure, Venus 
within Mars, the richly valent figure of Books III and IV.
Although in Book III Merlin prophesied a son for Britomart and 
Artegall, the fulfillment of his prophecy defies belief in Book V. Now 
alone, Britomart leaves the poem in sorrow and anguish, seeking some 
other place, and Artegall, who earlier won the legendary armor of Achilles 
and whose name once intimated equality with the legendary Prince Arthur, 
rides off at last to become the equal of Arthur, Lord grey de Wilton, chased 
out of Ireland by the Blatant Beast of Envy and Detraction.106 Effectually, 
Artegall’s figure enters present time, from which there will be no credible 
return to Faerie for him. Protesting his innocence of the charges against 
him, he appears just long enough in the restorative Faerie context of Book 
VI to pass the baton to Calidore and then, like Britomart, to vanish.
Whether the unnamed “goddesse” to whom Britomart is assimi-
lated at the end of her mission to subdue the liberty of women should 
be imagined as equitable Isis or as wise Minerva hardly matters. In either 
case, her divinity offers a substitute for Britomart’s former figural integ-
rity. As earlier in Britomart’s progress through Book V, this assimilative 
process is basically metonymic and therefore substitutive, but with a final 
difference: the figure of Britomart now cooperates in it.107 Her integrity 
bled out of her, so to speak, in the battle with Radigund, the process of her 
incremental figuration is finished by being undone. She is immobilized 
and effectually outside further narrative process. Now, she is properly stat-
uesque. As a modern film-goer, I am reminded of the startling, disturbing 
transformation of a once lively face, that of Cate Blanchett’s Elizabeth I, 
into the white grease-paint mask of Elizabeth’s court portraits, the frozen 
mask-face on which the camera fixes at the end of Shekhar Kapur’s 1998 
depiction of this queen.108
* * *
Honoring the fact that an epic romance is by virtue of its structure poten-
tially endless, I have two more observations about Britomart’s figure in 
The Faerie Queene. I would stress again that the process by which her 
figure is reduced is made obvious to us in Book V. It is something that the 
Spenserian poet-narrator wants us to see. The only escape from an other- 
wise enveloping ideology is awareness of it and the agency this awareness 
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makes possible. Awareness crucially comes first. This is what Britomart’s 
progress through Books III and IV most importantly shows a reader, and 
in a different, more disturbing way, Book V does as well. But what is done 
to her figure in Book V, the Book of Justice, which by definition has no 
respect of persons, subjects her awareness to her function as a vehicle of 
merciful redemption for Artegall, after which she is effectually discarded, 
like Amoret. In both characterological and allegorical terms, her figure 
becomes subject to a changed context, a different surround, another lens, 
that of justice. But is this justice? This is the question Book V repeatedly 
asks about all its episodes. Again those inconsistent, problematical women 
in Shakespeare’s plays also come back into view. In Britomart’s instance, 
however, a narrator is openly involved at the end, in addition to a the-
matized change of context. We might ask what happens to the narrator 
or replaces a narrator’s role when shifted to drama, as in the related ins-
tances of Shakespeare’s figures of women, and conversely, what happens to 
dramatized silence (or silencing) when shifted to narrative. With respect 
to The Faerie Queene’s narrative in the books added in 1596, the role of 
the narrator, or poet-narrator, which has recurrently been self-reflexive, 
becomes outspokenly so regarding the ethics of his own culture. This fact 
makes the very end of Britomart’s story, like the silencing of women at the 
end of Shakespeare plays, even more troubling. This could be precisely its 
point.
Chapter 4
Phantasies, Pains, and Punishments:  
A Still-Moving Coda
THE MAIN TITLE OF this chapter comes from the end of Busirane’s pageant, where the narrator describes the “many moe like maladies” 
that he can neither count nor name, “So many moe, as there be phantasies 
/ In wauering wemens witt, that none can tell, / Or paines in loue, or pun-
ishments in hell.”1 All these march in symbolic attire and accoutrements—
“in masking wise”—as did the pairs that the narrator earlier named. They 
include mind-made and emotional disorders and their consequences. 
Moving from Spenser’s major figures of women in The Faerie Queene, namely 
Una, Belphoebe, Britomart, and, to a related extent, Amoret and Florimell, 
to the rest, I newly appreciate the narrator’s sense of inadequacy. The rest 
at this point seem endless. Writing in the early 1960s, Anne Paolucci com-
pared Dante’s women in The Divine Comedy to Spenser’s in The Faerie 
Queene; her work was not published until 2005.2 It includes brief chapters 
on the “Spectrum of Female Types,” “Dress and Physical Features,” “general 
Properties,” “Techniques of Characterization” (figurative language, paral-
lels, and the like), and, finally, “Allegorical Significance.” Paolucci’s book is 
relatively short and, in the main, her approach is general and taxonomic. 
Other, more recently conceived approaches, many included in my text and 
notes to this point, have valuably and more narrowly focused on a single 
topic or on one or more aspects of the women in Spenser’s poem, such 
as Amazons or erotic politics, as well as on selected episodes, such as the 
initial portrait of Belphoebe or the Marriage of Rivers.3 For the purpose 
of this final chapter, an approach between the all-inclusive and the highly 
selective looks like the best option. I derive it from my preceding chapters.
In them, a recurrent drumbeat has been the opposition or the par-
adoxical conjuncture of stillness and movement, constancy and change. 
Negatively, in further expansion of these terms, stillness suggests fixation 
and death; positively, it suggests inclusion, for example as conceptualiza-
tion and lyric sublation (cancelation, continuity, and transcendence, each 
of which is partial). Movement positively suggests life, temporal develop-
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ment, and narrative; negatively, it suggests instability, shapelessness, incon-
stancy: in the Mutabilitie Cantos, “all that moueth, doth mutation loue,” 
a resonant line that plays on the Renaissance commonplace that what-
ever lives moves and therefore changes (VII.vii.55). Stillness and move-
ment hardly constitute the only binary relevant to figuration in The Faerie 
Queene, but they are a recurrent one, as noted, for example, in the descrip-
tion of Florimell “Still as she fledd,” which anticipates the focal punning 
on still movement, “still moouing,” in the Mutabilitie Cantos, as well as 
elsewhere in Spenser and other poets of the period, such as Jonson and 
Shakespeare (VII.vii.13).4 Cosmic love and hate, attraction and repulsion, 
centripetal and centrifugal forces, for instance, are variations of another 
relevant binary, one that bears on the decisive battle between Britomart 
and Artegall in Book IV, yet this binary has proved less useful to my spe-
cific concern with the figurations of women that remain to be considered 
than has the relation of stillness and movement.
Among these are Duessa, Hellenore, Aemylia and Poeana, and 
Mirabella and Serena, most importantly this last pair in Book VI. As ear-
lier suggested, it is in Serena’s story, intersecting with Mirabella’s, that the 
twinned stories of Amoret and Belphoebe both recognizably reappear and 
change profoundly. This recurrence involves a substantial refiguration—
stillness and movement for each—that entails a new identity, as their new 
names in Book VI unmistakably indicate within this poem. The identity 
of each figure becomes at once more affective and more personal, sig- 
naling as well the Spenserian poet-narrator’s sympathy for each. Deferring 
these refigurations until the present chapter, rather than trying to treat 
them in Belphoebe’s, has respected the unfolding of Spenser’s narrative 
and the crucial temporality of its movement, indeed, its still movement, in 
The Faerie Queene. This is a movement that includes sameness and differ-
ence, still points and changes, a memorable past and a present newness. It 
realizes a developing process of creative thought and exploration. Before 
turning to Serena and Mirabella, however, I want to account in a general 
way for the numerous figures of women I do not treat in detail and thereby 
at least to gesture toward the taxonomy that Paolucci offers. Stillness and 
movement are my organizing principles in what follows, or, more exactly, 
still movement is.
* * *
Figures of women found in a single location and condition in The Faerie 
Queene are situated—placed—in both these senses. They may move 
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within their site but not beyond it: Alma moves within the body, for 
example, and Lucifera moves from her throne to a coach for a drive around 
her estate. Coelia’s movement within the House of Holiness is implicit 
in the other figures dwelling there. This situated sort of figure is the 
good or evil genius presiding over a place: Lucifera, Coelia, Medina, 
Alma, Acrasia, Malecasta, Isis, Radigund, Mercilla, and, together, 
Nature and Mutability, who share Arlo Hill.5 That the presiding figure 
in these rhetorical places, or cultural topoi, is a womanly figure is largely 
conventional, although the figures of Acrasia and Malecasta also have 
a specifically sexual and gendered charge, as do the figures of Radigund 
and Isis. given that a queen reigned from the English throne for nearly 
the entirety of Spenser’s lifetime, we generally recognize that many of 
the presiding figures glance at her in some way: for example, the maiden 
Queen Lucifera as a warning, and Queen Mercilla, her throne embos-
sed with the royal arms of England, as a more direct representation. 
Radig und, Acrasia , and others have also been thought to allude 
to her.6
Acrasia, whose seductive figure occurs at the end of Book II, which, 
excepting only Amavia, otherwise features strumpets and virgins, has 
proved the most engaging and challenging of these figures of women for 
contemporary readers. Her figure is central to questions of sex and gender 
in The Faerie Queene. Accordingly, although I have treated her and her 
Bower of Bliss elsewhere in detail, I want to pause over her image at least 
in a truncated version here, before returning to further enumerations and 
distinctions.7 My pause starts with the second view of Acrasia that readers 
get. This view begins where the first left off, with the captivated Verdant’s 
“sleepie head” softly positioned in her lap, following sexual intercourse. 
(II.xii.76). The stanzas describing her, this time without intrusive moral-
izing, speak affectively and effectively for themselues:
Vpon a bed of Roses she was layd,
As faint through heat, or dight to pleasant sin,
And was arayd, or rather disarayd,
All in a vele of silke and siluer thin,
That hid no whit her alabaster skin,
But rather shewd more white, if more might bee:
More subtile web Arachne cannot spin,
Nor the fine nets, which oft we wouen see,
Of scorched deaw, do not in th’ayre more lightly flee.
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Her snowy brest was bare to ready spoyle
Of hungry eies, which n’ote therewith be fild,
And yet through languour of her late sweet toyle,
Few drops, more cleare then Nectar, forth distild,
That like pure Orient perles adowne it trild,
And her faire eyes sweet smyling in delight,
Moystened their fierie beames, with which she thrild
Fraile harts, yet quenched not; like starry light
Which sparckling on the silent waues, does seeme more  
                    bright.
 (II.xii.77–78)
The audible attraction of the words and rhythm in these lines, reinforced 
by visual, tactile, and other sensuous and associative suggestions, is ama-
zing. Like the word “crime” at the end of the Song of the Rose in Acrasia’s 
Bower, the word “sin,” rhyming with “thin,” “skin,” and “spin,” is barely 
distinguished in this context.8 By the outset of the second stanza, it has 
effectually been forgotten, and, if we actually read and listen without 
presuming misogyny, the narrator sounds as eager to enjoy this “snowy 
brest” as either to scorn “hungry eies” that greedily seek “spoyle” or to 
decry Acrasia’s readiness. The appeal of the stanzas exceeds sharply de-
fined barriers of gender and other rational determinants. At moments, 
the landscapes and soundscapes of Acrasia’s Bower, which further express 
her, evoke a sense of wondrous pleasure that together with her own image 
has often been likened to the description of Shakespeare’s Cleopatra at 
Cydnus (and elsewhere), who, where “Other women cloy / The appetites 
they feed, . . . makes hungry / Where most she satisfies.9
Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophy of the image, primarily the painted 
image but also the literary one, is here suggestive for its use of such terms 
as reflection, or mere mirroring; of form as essential surface and force, and 
of affective participation and contagion. Nancy observes that, “Even when 
the image is mimetic, it must fundamentally by itself and for itself, count 
for more than an image; otherwise, it will tend toward being nothing but 
a shadow or a reflection [a mirroring ].” For Nancy, who addresses both 
Renaissance and modern images, the “mimesis [of the image] encompasses 
methexis, a participation or a contagion through which the image seizes 
us.” The surface of the image is “Not an ‘idea’ (idea or eidolon), which is an 
intelligible form, but a force that forces form to touch itself.”10 Similarly, 
an image in allegory Acrasia may be, but, as image, she, like her garden, 
nonetheless exceeds and surpasses rationality, or even intelligibility, alone. 
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That an image in an allegory of temperance should do so is in some way a 
greater expression of artistic power than that one less morally contextual-
ized should. Acrasia’s image compels participation—perhaps contagion—
and serves to suggest the power Spenser’s situated figures of women can 
project.
Acrasia’s veil, spun as subtly as, or even more subtly than, a web by 
Arachne, suggests arachnidan entrapment, of course, but as a woven fabric, 
or text (Latin textum: “web, fabric, text”), it also associates Acrasia with 
Book II’s Palmer, since he, like her—or is it she like him?—is a fabricator, 
a maker of nets, and, elsewhere in Book II, a spinner of landscapes and 
stories. In short, Acrasia, like the Palmer and also like the Spenserian poet, 
is an artist.11 Ovid’s Arachne, last discussed as a presence in Busirane’s tap-
estry and here implicit in Acrasia’s art, is a woman bold (too bold as her 
tale eventuates) in protesting the violent excesses of the gods’ passions and 
one whose protest is depicted with positive sympathy and possible ambiv-
alence by the male Roman poet.12 As Ovid depicts Arachne’s weaving, it 
is deeply subversive, and reference to it in describing Acrasia conveys this 
suggestion as well. Arachne’s eyes gaze defiantly, intertextually back from 
her image, and, whether they are beside or within Acrasia’s, they are osten-
sibly, disturbingly those of a woman for viewers with eyes to see them. 
Like the figures in Busirane’s pageant, including his figuration of Amoret, 
and like Leda in his tapestry, Acrasia can be read from both a man’s and 
a woman’s point of view, and appropriately so, insofar as she inhabits a 
cultural site.
Listing the major, situated figures of women, and illustrating the 
potency of their roles by its most powerful example, Acrasia, I have set 
aside the figure of Venus in the garden and Temple of Books III and IV, 
respectively, first because Venus is a mythic goddess and second because, 
in Book III, her avatar is seen outside as well as inside the garden, of 
which Adonis, not she, is the eponymous figure.13 In the Temple, Venus 
is a statue, albeit one to whom Scudamour attributes sexes, gender, assent, 
and thus animation; her spirit certainly animates the place. Isis is a god-
dess and a statue, too, and perhaps I should have set her aside with Venus, 
but the historical origin (among others) that Plutarch attributes to her 
was well known in Spenser’s time, and her relation to Britomart leads 
me to keep her within my present list. A sea nymph, such as Cymoent, 
and Chrysogonee, daughter of a faerie, belong to another order of figural 
being—earthly and natural, yet nonetheless mythic. My concern in this 
chapter is primarily with more distinctly human figures.
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Reviewing my list of the major, situated figures of women to this 
point, and excepting traditional figures of myth, I note that the romance 
Books, III, IV, and VI, do not have as pronounced a centering figure of 
this type or as many of these as to be found in Books I, II, and V. In the 
romance books, the womanly figure (or figures) is less centripetal and con-
tained (in both senses), another suggestive change reflecting the romance 
form. In these books, the extremes of woman on a pedestal or in the 
brothel, woman as either virgin or strumpet, are likewise loosened. In the 
Renaissance, romance was traditionally and not surprisingly associated 
with women as readers. Of course, there are additional, minor Spenserian 
instances of womanly figures who remain in a single location and con-
dition, such as Corceca (and her daughter) and the witch and her son 
(another incidental alignment of Una’s experiences with Florimell’s). Also 
memorably situated are Amavia, Phaedria, Slander, Poeana, Lady Munera, 
and Briana, the last together with a number of other figures of women in 
Book VI. As here, my examples are exemplary rather than exhaustive, and 
my groupings include localized figures in other respects quite disparate.14 
A poem as massive and various as Spenser’s invites provisional groupings 
that attend to differences and exceptions, while resisting tight categoriza-
tion.
Most often, the quest of a protagonist leads into the houses, or situ-
ations, of centering woman-figures such as Lucifera, Coelia, Alma, and 
Acrasia, and the condition encountered there bears in some way on the 
quest itself. That is, the landscape of quest effectually includes these places, 
even while they are set apart from it, and the resident woman-figure who 
presides over each place is for a time (or time-out) its focal expression. 
But it is the visitor who is changed, informed, tempted, initiated, imper-
iled, or otherwise affected, not the tutelary denizen of the place or topos. 
Even the capture of Acrasia or the death of Radigund effects no change 
in what either figurally is, although it violently arrests the former’s spell 
and it claims, at great cost, to eliminate the latter’s injustice. The presid-
ing figure is basically fixed and isomorphic with her location, whether 
she is good or evil, whether she is depicted with psychic depth like the 
glittering, discontented, joyless Lucifera, beneath whose House is a hell, 
or whether she is depicted more simply like the bead-bidding, physically 
aged yet spiritually joyful Coelia.15 She might be fascinating for imagistic, 
historical, theological, or other sociocultural reasons, but not primarily 
in herself, so to speak. That is, not primarily as a person with her own 
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story, or narrative. This difference strikes me again as important, and it is a 
narrative difference, as the preceding chapters have shown.
* * *
Other Spenserian figures of women besides the major ones move into dif-
ferent places and contexts, and at least one, Duessa, has a role in four differ- 
ent books: I, II, IV, and V. She is Arthur’s nearest competitor in this res-
pect. Like Acrasia’s, her womanly figure, the radical enemy of Una’s figure, 
as treated in chapter 1, asks for additional attention. Duessa’s thematic 
and historical manifestations change in the course of the poem, but she 
remains at bottom the same—fundamentally wicked and duplicitous, in 
this regard a constant that is minimally affected by her changing situations. 
(Compare Belphoebe’s more virtuous fixation?) If Duessa’s condition is 
still moving, it is so in a perverse sense. Movement and stillness are for her 
little more than illusions, as they are for her sidekick in Book IV, namely 
Ate, or hellish discord, “raised,” presumably by Duessa, “from below / Out 
of the dwellings of the damned sprights” (IV.i.19). Like the walking dead 
in Busirane’s pageant and the “carcas dead” of False Florimell, neither 
Duessa nor Ate is capable of changing. Theirs is a negative life that feeds 
on the living like a necrotic disease, thus realizing the traditional sense of 
evil as negation. This is why Duessa pleads for Redcrosse’s life in Book I 
when Orgoglio threatens to destroy him (vii.14): she needs him to live. 
Like Archimago, Duessa assumes various guises in the poem, some comic, 
others debatably so, but none leads to good. Evil lacks dignity—human 
worth, as defined in chapter 1. It is fissiparous, seeking incoherence, form- 
lessness, disorder, cosmic hatred, dis-creation as its end and, in personified 
form, doing so on purpose. (As Milton discovered in Paradise Lost, the 
sense in which Evil, literally the personified abstraction Satan slips into, is 
free remains at best a knotty conundrum.) Unmasked in Book I, Duessa is 
monstrous, and her escape into the wilderness recalls her earlier passage in 
Night’s chariot to Hell, via a parodic allusion to the wooded entrance into 
the Aeneid’s underworld—in the traditional interpretation, thus entering 
the nether world through matter (hyle, silva).16 Although she returns to 
the poem in various guises thereafter, she remains fundamentally wicked 
and duplicitous, Duo-esse.
The last of Duessa’s appearances, which occurs in Mercilla’s court 
in Book V, might appear to challenge her figuration in the first two and 
fourth books, though I doubt it.17 Her figure participates in the vexed 
problem of justice that Book V explores. In the episode at issue, the figure 
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of Mercilla barely, only nominally, masks reference to the living Queen 
Elizabeth, as do Duessa to Mary Stuart and Duessa’s trial to Mary’s. To say 
that this episode has been much discussed would be an understatement; 
the poem makes the issues involved in the trial unavoidable.18 The prob-
lem is that Duessa’s figuration comes too close to history, bringing with it 
the complexities of human life and justice in a real-life world. At the same 
time, her figure, nominally a fictional one, has become oddly attenuated—
again hardly more than a name—and effectually abstracted from move-
ment, as well as subjected to one near-bodiless abstraction after another: 
Zeal, Kingdom’s Care, Authority, Religion, Pity, Regard of Womanhead, 
Danger, Nobility, grief. Even Ate is now said to testify against Duessa/
Mary, her brief testimony suggesting that of a co-conspirator turned wit-
ness for the prosecution and furthering the discord on which she thrives. 
Ate, like Duessa, has a body to match her intent, a “lying tongue . . . in two 
parts diuided” and feet that simultaneously move in opposite directions, 
one going backwards, one forwards (IV.i.27). Reminding us of Duessa’s 
misdeeds in earlier books, the narrator makes specific mention of Ate’s 
mischief in Book IV, where this hag was introduced into the action by 
Duessa, raised from hell as we heard.19 Ate’s testimony adds another flurry 
of charges, this time including several more personal ones—Incontinence, 
Adultery, and Impiety, along with Murder and Sedition. Seemingly a col-
lective noun for all social, political, and personal ills and thus a common 
name, Duessa has little other figural substance in Book V. She remains 
wicked and duplicitous, nominally figured still as a woman, even while 
her figuration signals, not to say screams, that something is wrong here, 
perhaps in this way also figuring the voice of the poet whose tongue is 
nailed to a post at the very entrance to Mercilla’s court. If so, the poet has 
effectually, startlingly become another cross-gendered figure in this same 
episode, as well as a self-reflexive one.
Joan Copjec offers a Lacanian description of Vergil’s Fama (rumor 
or report) as a paranoid image of the dismembered body that casts a sug-
gestive light on Spenser’s silenced and immobilized poet and its self-reflex-
ive cross-gendering. This paranoid image of dismemberment “appears at 
a point where the narration has reason to doubt its own omniscience, its 
own position as source of knowledge”; it is at this point that “a cry [in 
the form of Fama] is torn from the throat of the narrative which [force-
fully] reattaches it to the events of the world.”20 Like Fama, Spenser’s poet, 
tongue nailed to a post, can be seen as “a “hypostasized image of speech, 
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an intrusion that is simultaneously the very substance of the narrative”—
indeed, in my terms, its own self-reflexive commentary (44).
This silenced, immobilized poet, dubbed Malfont, inescapably 
recalls the figure of another womanly figure in Book V, Lady Munera, 
whose hands and feet are nailed to a post to become an emblem of the bru-
tal miscarriage of true justice. Munera is duplicitous in more than a moral 
sense, her figure being double-sided and having, with utter equivocation, 
hands and feet of precious metal or else of human flesh, that is, figura-
tive or real ones.21 In Book V, Duessa, the very agent of division, similarly 
lacks figural integrity in a way she earlier did not. Earlier, she was herself 
single-mindedly wicked and divisive, with a monstrously misshapen body, 
once she is unmasked in Book I, to match her evil intent. Nominally, in 
her final appearance in Mercilla’s court, she has a past in the poem that 
her name signals, but her attenuated, nigh-bodiless, abstracted presence 
explicitly, overwhelmingly also signals her dubiously just transfiguration 
into a woman once actually living—Mary Stuart. As in the episode involv-
ing Artegall and Burbon, which soon follows the trial of Duessa/Mary, 
here Faerie fiction temporarily collapses into history.22 (A Spenserian pun 
on the derivation of temporarily from tempus, “time,” is welcome.)
Aside from Duessa, the more interesting figures in the mobile 
grouping of relatively minor figures of women are those with some degree 
of movement within a canto or between cantos within a single book. 
Although lacking the prominence of the mobile figures of women treated 
in my first three chapters, who either play a central role in one book or 
play significant roles in several books or do both, such figures are more 
than features of the landscape and often are problematical or puzzling 
with respect to it. They appear after the tightly structured Books I and 
II and especially in the books with romance structures. Among them are 
Pastorella, Aemylia, Mirabella, and Serena, on the four of whom I will 
spend the rest of this chapter. Each of them has narrative life—a story. I 
shall consider Hellenore here as well, in part for lack of somewhere else 
to put her and also in part because her husband Malbecco usually gets all 
the coverage, despite the fact that she, too, has a notable story.23 She is also 
thematically relevant.
Malbecco becomes a fixated form, Hellenore a form of natural 
mutability. Curiously, only Una and Hellenore get to spend time in the 
woods with satyrs. Both episodes are comic, one high, the other low, and 
both also celebrate nature. In Una’s experience, this is mainly kindness 
conceived as generosity, in Hellenore’s as hyperbolized sexuality—merely 
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animal as portrayed, but also vital, alive by contrast with Malbecco’s fix-
ated fate as Jealousy, and, indeed, a kind of energeia. Instead of expressing 
surprise at the relatively sympathetic, if also ironic, tone of the narrator’s 
treatment of Hellenore, we might look at Spenser’s fabliaux elements in 
Book III through a Chaucerian rather than a Victorian lens and see this 
tone for what it is. As his narrator comically remarks of Hellenore, “not 
for nought” she “loued [the satyrs] so well / When one so oft a night did 
ring his matins bell” (III.x.48). The punning, bawdy, double negative is 
tonally telling, as is that irreverent moment of sacred parody in the mat-
ins bell. Hellenore’s mobility and mutability enable her escape from what 
Malbecco is: an unnatural, frozen, deathly being, comparable to the figure 
of Despair in Book I, as well as to Busirane’s masquers. When Hellenore 
chooses (“chose”) “emongst the iolly Satyres still to wonne,” she freely and 
parodically embraces a form of still movement—always (still) moving—
but a vital, living one in this instance (x.51).
In chapter two, in connection with Amoret, I described Aemylia 
and Poeana, both found in Book IV, as morally compromised figures inso-
far as they have been marked by lust. The look-alike squires they are to 
marry are similarly marked, although one of them is lustful, gigolowise; he 
is so on behalf of friendship in order to free his look-alike from the dun-
geon of Corflambo, another figure of lust, who has separately seized the 
imprisoned look-alike, namely, Aemylia’s lover. But this is multi-figured 
romance, and I get ahead of the complicated story. Aemylia, daughter of a 
“Lord of high degree,” encounters Amoret in the cave of Lust and tells her 
how she was seized by this cave-creature when she attempted, against her 
father’s and “all her friends” wishes, to meet her lover Amyas, a squire of 
low degree, and “away to flit” with him (IV.vii.16–17). Hardly by coinci-
dence, this failed tryst happened the same night Corflambo seized Amyas, 
before the actualization of the lovers’ tryst and apparently as a substitute 
for it. The rest of Aemylia’s story includes her rescue, in sequential order, 
as a result of Amoret’s flight from Lust, Belphoebe’s killing this cave-crea-
ture, Arthur’s aiding the abandoned Aemylia and Amoret in the forest 
and his night with these two women and Slander, then Arthur’s killing 
Corflambo, and finally Aemylia’s happy reunion with her lover Amyas. 
This reunion apparently countenances Aemylia’s violation of her father’s 
and friends’ wishes, although only after hardships and the death of mutual 
lust (the figures Lust and Corflambo).24 Viewed in this light, so far the 
story of Aemylia and Amyas bears witness at once to suffering and to 
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reform, that is, to change for the better. In this respect, it looks ahead to 
Book VI.
Yet the imprisoned Amyas, whom Poeana wants as her lover, has 
already granted her wishes, though coldly, we hear, in the hope of win-
ning his freedom. He is only freed, however, when Placydas, his look-
alike friend, intervenes, an effort that unexpectedly leads to the death 
of Corflambo at Arthur’s hands and then to the liberation of his castle. 
Again, I am ahead of the story and need to fill in the parts of Poeana 
and Placydas, as I shall after pausing to offer a mnemonic assist with the 
confusion of names and roles in this foursome. That it is needed (as I 
hope by now to have demonstrated) strategically underscores the extent 
to which they are relatively attenuated figures, simple in striking contrast 
to Una, Belphoebe, and especially Britomart. The foursome’s tangled 
story is a bare exemplum, so much so as to enable a reader to recognize 
that it actually parodies the interlaced complications of the romance 
form, even as it accentuates sociable interlinkages in this, the Book of 
Friendship.
Conveniently, the alliterating A-names, the coupled Aemylia 
and Amyas, both phonically suggest love and friendship, Latin amo and 
French ami, and the P-names, Poeana and Placydas, also go together. The 
latter two suggest Latin poeana, “punishment, satisfaction” on the one 
hand and, on the other, Latin placeo, “to please, satisfy.” In short, together 
the P-names signal pain and pleasure. A. C. Hamilton notices that, twice 
in the 1596 edition, Poeana’s name is later spelled “Paeana,” from paean, 
“a shout of joy,” and he takes the new spelling to reflect her changed con-
dition—in my terms, formerly pain but now pleasure for both lovers 
(473n49.4–7). Hamilton also takes Poeana’s punishment as the pain and 
grief of her rejection, that is, as the coldness of the love, or rather lust, that 
Amyas nonetheless grants her.25 But it might better refer to the death of 
her father and her surrender of control to Placydas in the end, and I take it 
to do so. She pays for her pleasure.
Placydas, having learned of his friend Amyas’s imprisonment by 
Corflambo and his daughter, manages to insert himself into the prison and 
to pose as his look-alike friend. Coming to Poeana without the restraint 
of a former erotic commitment to another woman, he satisfies her lust 
and eventually abducts the keeper of the keys to her prison, absconding 
with both keeper and keys. This is the point at which Corflambo, Poeana’s 
father, follows in wrathful pursuit, meets Arthur, and is duly beheaded. 
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Poeana’s castle is then liberated through a ruse, the requisite scene of rec-
ognition occurs, and Placydas accepts Poeana “to his wedded wife,” along 
with “all her land and lordship during life” (ix.15). The happy foursome, 
Amyas, Aemylia, Placydas, and Poeana, all formerly lustful and all now 
reformed, look like a parodic, more imperfect, and arguably more human 
version of the idealized foursome Canacee, Triamond, Campbell, and 
Cambina met earlier in the same book (IV).
Substitution, extending even to the old woman’s substituting for 
Aemylia in the cave of Lust, is so conspicuous in the story of the present 
foursome as to become itself an issue, as Jonathan goldberg noticed long 
since.26 Perhaps through substitution with Aemylia, Poeana, whose two 
names (Poeana, Paeana) fit Aemylia’s story along with her own, might 
also be considered a mobile figure: even though Poeana remains in her 
castle, her father extends their range outside it, and, far more significant, 
she reforms, even getting a new name or at least a meaningful new spell-
ing of her old name, as if she had actually changed her location together 
with her condition.27 This would be yet another strange variant of still 
movement, one that complements Aemylia’s and Amyas’s constancy in the 
course of changed locations.
Yet, with all this substituting, it is remarkable that Aemylia does 
not for a moment take Placydas for Amyas when she first sees him. She 
recognizes Placydas as Amyas’s friend: embracing him, she inquires, “And 
liues yet Amyas?” to which Placydas immediately responds in the third 
person as well, “He liues . . . and his Aemylia loues” (viii.63). Continuing 
the same stanza, she replies, after reference to her own trials, in the present 
tense, “what mishap thus long him fro my selfe remoues?” and Placydas 
again recounts the tale of his effort to free Amyas that he has already told 
Arthur. (That he has already done so further enforces our awareness that 
he is Placydas.) Only Poeana, her perception weakened by lust, is wholly 
fooled by the look-alike squires, as is Lust in the dark cave by the old 
woman. Evidently, likeness is not identity, and difference still matters, 
except to Lust. But the more significant takeaway in the present story is 
the possibility of reform among the compromised and fallen, apparently 
after or through suffering of some sort. Amoret alone seems excluded (by 
Belphoebe) from this ethic of forgiveness in Book IV. She escapes Lust’s 
cave only to be actually wounded by Lust.
In Book VI, Serena’s story, which resonates variously and recurrently 
with Amoret’s, spans six cantos (iii–viii) and overlaps with Mirabella’s 
in two of these (vii–viii, although Mirabella is briefly mentioned in vi). 
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Mirabella’s story resonates at first distantly and then more closely with 
that of Belphoebe, as it alludes unmistakably to the reigning queen. 
Notably, Belphoebe and Mirabella even share part of their names, Bel/
bella (beautiful, beauty). Both Serena’s and Mirabella’s stories also concern 
choice, fortune, and responsibility, which are interlocked thematically 
throughout Book VI, and thereby they serve to introduce the more local-
ized stories of Melibee and Pastorella in cantos ix–x (and with a difference 
in cantos xi–xii).28 Agency is a major theme in Book VI, and Serena’s and 
Mirabella’s participation in it goes a long way emotionally to deepen and 
personalize their figures, especially Serena’s.
Synoptically, Serena moves from dalliance with Calepine, to the 
venomous bite of the Blatant Beast, to rescue by the Salvage Man, to a 
second rescue by Arthur and then, together only with Timias, to minis-
tration by the old hermit. Later, she flees the prospect of Mirabella, her 
torturers, and their captives, now including Timias, and finally, she is cap-
tured by cannibals, from whom Calepine saves her, if anyone really can. 
This overview makes a point: no other character in The Faerie Queene has 
a story that less fits her name than does Serena (from Latin serenus/-a, 
“fair, serene,” usually in reference to the weather, but tropologically, “glad, 
joyous, tranquil”). Serena keeps moving from one location to another, 
apparently constant to Calepine, although her stillness in this respect is 
not emphasized to the extent that his is. Whereas he searches actively for 
her, she seems only to move from place to place. What comes to the fore 
is her constant misery and finally her total lack of serenity, which looks 
as much like self-cancellation as does Turpine’s total ignominy—his ulti-
mate namelessness (< Latin in, “not,” and nomen/-inis, “name”)—his fate 
of inverted, degraded, dis-figured knighthood in this same book. Further 
pertinent to self-cancellation is Timias’s shaming, or loss of honor (greek 
timē, “honor,” “dignity,” “worth”), the source of his name, at the hands of 
Mirabella’s tormentors.29 His having caused, if accidentally, the wounding 
of Amoret by Lust in Book IV might be seen in this loss to catch up with 
him.
Defeat of the Blatant Beast is the objective of the nominal protago-
nist of Book VI, Calidore, knight of Courtesy. This Beast serves Envy and 
Detraction; he specifically wounds human names, that is, human identity 
and dignity, thus specifically human being : no other kind of wound “so 
sore doth light, / As doth the poysnous sting, which infamy / Infixeth 
in the name of noble wight” (VI.vi.i). Names, though not always in the 
same way, have been highly significant throughout the poem. Serena’s 
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story, which meaningfully intersects with those of multiple others in 
Book VI—Calidore, Turpine, the Salvage Man, Arthur, the hermit, Timias, 
Mirabella, the cannibals, and, of course, her lover Calepine and the 
Blatant Beast30—also presses and probes hard questions about the rela-
tion of responsibility to fortune and of agency to suffering and in doing 
so bears some relation, not only to Amoret’s story, but also to Florimell’s, 
as remarked on several occasions in chapter 1. Serena’s story presses this 
relation to a degree and an extent that Florimell’s does not in Books III 
and IV, however.
Spanning six cantos in Book VI, Serena’s story indicates a the-
matic importance at once continuous and developing that is not usually 
attributed to her figure. Converting it into economic, colonial, politi-
cal, religious, and other ideological dimensions in selected incidents can 
be illuminating (and has been), but tropicality, especially discontinuous 
tropicality, cannot replace or displace her figural basis, which is distinctly 
that of a woman and which I mean to reaffirm.31 At its most pronounced, 
such tropic conversion itself becomes the cancelation of her own identity 
as a womanly figure. Ironically, with the destruction of her serenity, this 
has proved, not surprisingly, indeed her fate. In her figure, the violence of 
tropic extremity finally takes over. Although I do not share the view that 
allegory is ipso facto violent, its abuse can be.32 The Faerie Queene exam-
ines and brutally exposes this fact—this catachrestic, Busiranic allegory—
in the story of Serena, as it does less affectively and complexly in the trial 
of Duessa/Mary Stuart. Significantly, this fuller exposure occurs in Book 
VI, not in earlier books and certainly not in Book I, in which the domi-
nant figure of a woman is Una, or even in the relatively more symbolic 
and sublated—artistic and civilized—horrors of Busirane in Book III, in 
which the dominant figure is Britomart. Book VI, whose arch-villain is a 
blatant and beastly misuser of language, is still more fundamentally and 
insistently about words, names, interpretations, and poetic forms, and 
Serena is its major figure of a woman.
If Serena’s trials are not treated in detail, as they regularly are not, 
what matters in her story, which is also the story of her figuration, gets 
lost. What follows will accordingly be detailed. Serena’s trials begin when 
Calidore happens upon her together with Calepine, enjoying “their quiet 
loues delight” in the shade of a covert (VI.iii.21). Mutual abashment over-
come, the two knights pleasure themselves with knight-talk, and Serena, 
both shut out of the conversation and
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Allur’d with myldnesse of the gentle wether
And pleasaunce of the place, the which was dight
With diuers flowres distinct with rare delight,
Wandred about the fields, as liking led
Her wauering lust after her wandering sight,
To make a garland to adorne her hed,
Without suspect of ill or daungers hidden dred.
 (VI.iii.23)
This is the point at which the Blatant Beast catches her “vnaware . . . thus 
loosely wandring here and there” (24). Even without the last five words of 
narrative commentary, which feature the third use of wander within seven 
lines, now modified by the adverb “loosely,” Serena’s aimless movement, 
led only by her fluctuating, wavelike pleasure, is clearly narrated as too 
heedless for so pleasurable a place, a locus amoenus and implicitly an idyl-
lically pastoral one to boot. Her occupying herself with her own adorn-
ment, a garland of flowers for her head, mindless of danger the while, is 
as ominous a note as the distance beat of approaching danger heard in a 
melodrama. The culling of flowers is a common figure of “proper choice.”33 
Yet the “myldnesse of the gentle wether” is naturally alluring to her preci-
sely because she is Serena, “fair, serene,” usually in reference to mild and 
gentle weather and, tropically, to a condition of gladness, joy, tranquil-
ity. She is where she naturally belongs, allured by nature herself, here the 
springlike weather. Her “lust,” which ranges in meaning from “pleasure, 
to delight, to desire,” is hardly unnatural or wicked, and (pace Hamilton), 
she is not seized and wounded simply by monstrous Lust, as Amoret was, 
but by the vicious mouth of the Blatant Beast, a venomous attack from 
without. The Beast’s venom soon spreads within, however, going beyond 
the vicious social offense of gossip or slander that first wounds Serena, to 
eat away at her self-respect—her self-worth, as we took to calling it in the 
twentieth century, according to the OED.
Later in this same book, Melibee will spend “all the night in siluer 
sleepe” and attend all day to whatever he pleases, to what he “listes,” that 
is, “lustes” in a variant spelling ; carelessly, he will also lay his “limbes in 
euery shade . . . And drinke of euery brooke” (ix.22–23). The vulnerability 
of either figure, Serena or Melibee, a woman or a man, results from self-
indulgent imprudence, once we accept an invitation to read allegorically 
and, more exactly here, morally: prudence is a cardinal virtue. In Serena’s 
instance, however, the failing is far less deliberated and less willful than 
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in Melibee’s.34 She appears to be young and is certainly “vnaware” and 
inexperienced, as we have been told. Moreover, Serena’s plight implicates 
Calepine’s inattentive thoughtlessness as much as her own. Calepine and 
Calidore are discourteous in their self-centered knight-talk, and the result, 
exceeding any offense, is the serious wounding of the vulnerable Serena,
Crying aloud in vaine, to shew her sad misfare
Vnto the Knights, and calling oft for ayde,
Who with the horrour of her haplesse care
Hastily starting vp, like men dismayd,
Ran after fast to reskue the distressed mayde.
 (VI.iii.24)
The rhyming play on “mayde” in the last two of these lines mocks the 
knights’ manhood, their humiliating failure to protect a vulnerable 
woman, and the rhyme word “misfare” virtually becomes Serena’s motto 
from this time forward. From a prefix meaning “badly, mistakenly, amiss” 
and a noun (or verb) meaning “journey,” misfare is “The action or pro-
cess of going wrong or astray; a mishap, misfortune, ill-fate.”35 Hamilton 
glosses the phrase “haplesse care” in the same passage simply as “trouble,” 
but “haplesse” more likely means “unfortunate,” a meaning that evokes the 
word “fortune,” which, as we know, together with responsibility, is the-
matic in this book; besides “trouble,” “care” indicates “mental suffering, 
sorrow, grief.”36 In passing, I note again that Serena is here a “mayde,” her 
dalliance with Calepine notwithstanding. Indeed, the Beast’s intention is 
to drag her into the woods and to “spoyl” her, that is, “to destroy, injure 
bodily, ravish,” or otherwise “violate” her.37 The instability of figurative 
and physical dimensions in her plight is conspicuous. They are coexten-
sive. The Beast’s malice endangers her whole being.
Having forced the Beast to drop his victim, Calidore pursues 
him, disappearing from sight until canto ix, and the story of Calepine 
and Serena, now together, now apart, becomes the Book’s major thread. 
Calepine, on foot, with the badly wounded Serena on his horse—imag-
ined in silhouette, the three an emblem of passion’s wound—seeks assist-
ance and shelter from Turpine, who first denies these and then assaults 
and seriously wounds the unmounted, disadvantaged knightly protector 
of the wounded Serena.38 At this point, the Salvage Man, another figure of 
natural compassion, appears, chases Turpine off, and takes the wounded 
knight and lady to his forest dwelling in a “gloomy shade” (iv.13). Under 
the kindly Salvage Man’s care, Calepine recovers, but the Salvage finds no 
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herb able to heal Serena’s wound, “for it was inwardly vnsound” (iv.16). 
The Beast’s bite is venomous, but again, as with Serena’s wandering and 
wavering through the flowery fields, a persistent intimation of immoral-
ity, this time present in that single word “inwardly,” is becoming harder 
to escape. Or is it just easier to hear a second time? Has the process of 
reading itself been affected? Could the Beast’s poison be spreading? In the 
opening episode of The Faerie Queene, it was the maple tree that was “sel-
dom inward sound,” phrasing whose signal of corruption few readers miss 
(I.i.9). In poetry that is incredibly self-conscious, the Beast’s bite is affect-
ing the figuration of Serena and simultaneously our reading of it. This 
development exceeds the impact of history on the triangle of Belphoebe, 
Amoret, and Timias in Book IV because it comes from within the poem 
itself. It now does so noticeably, moreover.
At this juncture, Calepine, wending “abrode . . . To take the ayre, 
and heare the thrushes song”—whispers of pastoral again—encounters 
a bear with a baby in his jaws, gives chase, and rescues the baby, but in 
the course of doing so loses himself in the forest (iv.17).39 Unable to find 
the knight, the Salvage conveys his loss to Serena, who for the first time 
loses control, tearing her hair, rending her garments, beating her breast, 
tormenting herself (v.4):
Vpon the ground her selfe she fiercely threw,
Regardlesse of her wounds, yet bleeding rife,
That with their bloud did all the flore imbrew,
As if her breast new launcht with murdrous knife,
Would streight dislodge the wretched wearie life.
There she long groueling, and deepe groning lay,
As if her vitall powers were at strife
With stronger death, and feared their decay,
Such were this Ladies pangs and dolorous assay.
 (VI.v.5)40
Another, similar stanza follows as the Salvage tries to help her, “But day 
and night did [she] vexe her carefull thought, / And euer more and more 
her owne affliction wrought” (6). She is feeding on her own misery, much 
as did Scudamour in Books III and IV, not to mention Redcrosse in Book 
I. When any hope of Calepine’s return has faded, however, she arises (like 
Una) and sets out for help, mounted on Calepine’s horse and accompa-
nied by the Salvage, now in Calepine’s armor and on foot. They encounter 
Arthur and Timias, who has also been bitten by the Blatant Beast. By now, 
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we read, Serena’s “wounds corruption gan to breed; / And eke this Squire, 
who likewise wounded was / Of that same Monster late, for lacke of heed, 
/ Now gan to faint” (v.31). “Corruption” is now out in the open, not just 
intimated by wandering or inward unsoundness, and it is directly Serena’s 
but only Timias’s in “like” manner: a hair’s breadth of difference, but 
nonetheless evident. Timias’s wound, moreover, is specifically the result 
of a “lacke of heed,” together with entrapment, whereas Serena’s, which 
heedlessness also occasions, is intimated to be more culpable. What is 
progressively exposed to view in Serena’s story is the way meaning and its 
consequences get attached to an event and indeed to a figure—the figure 
of a woman, as it happens, and not without the narrator’s awareness, 
arguably both sympathetic and realistic—truthful.
Serena, who has not spoken since her cry for help when the Beast 
seized her and then her futile plea to Turpine to spare Calepine, inter-
venes when Arthur and Timias first find her with the kindly Salvage, 
whom Timias tries to subdue. She calls on Arthur to separate the com-
batants, and he, significantly having first asked whether she is freely with 
the Salvage, or not, for nearly three stanzas hears her sad story. That she is 
herself the teller bears emphasis, as does her awareness of what has hap-
pened to her. Discerningly, she characterizes herself as a dame “Who both 
in minde, the which most grieueth me, / And body haue receiu’d a mortall 
wound,” and she characterizes her companion as “a saluage wight, of brut-
ish kind” who has been bred among forest beasts, yet one in whom “It is 
most straunge and wonderfull to fynd / So milde humanity, and perfect 
mynd” (v.28–29).41 From this point forward, we recognize that Serena, no 
merely passive object, appreciates what is going on. She seems more fully 
human, particularly in her awareness of her mental suffering and in her 
grateful wonder at the Salvage’s “straunge,” or unaccustomed, kindness. 
Notably, however, she has been wounded in body as well as in mind.
Arthur commits Serena and Timias to the care of the holy old her-
mit, who treats their wounds, now festering “pruily,” “rankling inward” 
with bouts of pain, and putrifying the “inner parts”—in short, quite 
desperate (vi.5). The hermit’s “counsell to the minde” by means of art-
ful words is well known: “For in your selfe, your onely helpe doth lie, / 
To heale your selues, and must proceed alone / From your owne will, to 
cure your maladie” (5–7). It would be hard to imagine a more emphatic 
emphasis on the word self, which in this period is acquiring its modern 
meaning as “that which in a person is really and intrinsically [s]he (in 
contradistinction to what is adventitious).”42 Selfhood is associated with 
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self-awareness and vice versa, as well as with responsibility and agency—
with “your owne will,” as the hermit puts it. He also counsels self-restraint 
and avoidance of “things, that stirre vp fraile affection” (7). His discipline 
is stern; “affection” indicates not simply passion (in the popular modern 
sense) but anything that affects the sensible soul. Whether “fraile” applies 
to all passion or only to its corrupting forms is open to interpretation. 
The hermit is an elderly ascetic who would be at home in the House of 
Holiness, were it not for its formal features, which are not merely formal. 
This hermit, in contrast, has also had a long and active life of worldly expe-
riences. What seems quite clear is that the sickened plight of Timias and 
Serena has reached a need for desperate measures.
The hermit further explains that the Blatant Beast bites “both good 
and bad, both most and least,” thereby injecting doubt back into the ques-
tion of his patients’ responsibility for the extremity of their conditions 
(12). Serena, like many a modern patient, comically wishes for a salve that 
might magically cure her malady, instead of the harsh, therapeutic disci-
pline the hermit prescribes, but then she joins Timias in accepting the her-
mit’s more detailed remedy:
Abstaine from pleasure, and restraine your will,
Subdue desire, and bridle loose delight,
Vse scanted diet, and forbeare your fill,
Shun secresie, and talke in open sight.
 (VI.vi.14)
Thus fortified, Timias and Serena again set forth and promptly 
see Mirabella and her two tormentors, whose story I defer until done 
with Serena’s, treating only Serena’s response to Timias’s capture. Seeing 
Timias clubbed to earth by Mirabella’s giant Disdain, Serena flees “away 
with all the speede she mought [might],” just as Una fled from the bat-
tle of Satyrane and Sans Loy in Book I (VI.vii.50, I.vi.90). Both women 
flee anticipated capture with good reason, but, whereas Una next finds the 
dwarf traveling toward her with Redcrosse’s abandoned armor, to which 
she transfers her attention, Serena is not so fortunate. Serena flees at once 
into and away from herself, “afeard”
Of villany to be to her inferd:
So fresh the image of her former dread,
Yet dwelling in her eye, to her appeard,
That euery foote did tremble, which did tread,
And euery body two, and two she foure did read.
 (VI.viii.31)
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In the first line of the inset, the word “inferd” signals Serena’s fear of being 
judged vicious, or depraved in character, a fear that results from the vivid 
memory—indeed the image “Yet dwelling in her eye”—of her seizure 
and near-spoliation by the Blatant Beast.43 She is haunted, traumatized 
in modern terms, by a flashback to that experience and by the inference 
drawn from it, the inference of culpability and inner corruption that I 
have traced. The hermit’s counsel, supposedly her cure, has only increased 
her terror of regression or the mere inference of it by others. The sight of 
Mirabella and the capture of Timias by Disdain and Scorn have triggered 
the terrifying flashback.
Flying “Through hils and dales, through bushes and through breres 
. . . till that at last she thought / Her selfe now past the perill of her feares,” 
Serena dismounts and utters a complaint about Calepine’s disloyalty in 
abandoning her in the forest, unaware that he has spent the intervening 
cantos trying to find her (32).44 (Even Una, on the basis of abandonment, 
entertained a passing contrast between the kind lion that protects her and 
her unfaithful knight: I.iii.7.) Serena, now thinking herself safe and worn 
out by travel and sorrow, falls asleep. This is when the savage cannibals, 
who are not only sexual predators but conspicuously also Petrarchan son-
neteers, hence eroticized makers of cultural meaning, discover her. Unlike 
the artist Busirane, however, they are first and foremost—literally, as we 
say—eaters of human flesh. By further translation, of course, the cannibals 
turn out also to be Catholic idolators, exploitative colonizers, mercantil-
ists, natives of the New World or of Ireland, and more.45 Such extraor-
dinarily pronounced tropic conversion, I would reemphasize, has a cost. 
It becomes itself the cancelation of Serena’s identity as a womanly figure, 
together, ironically, with the destruction of her serenity and, in short, of 
Serena herself. By such tropic interpretation, her figure becomes as mul-
tiple as that of Duessa, the other figure of a woman in the poem who is 
stripped (I.viii.45–50). But surely with a difference. Beneath her clothing, 
Duessa is a monstrous cartoon of misshapen matter. Serena is undeniably 
a woman. And a beautiful one, at that. In further contrast to Duessa, this 
time as Mary Stuart in Book V, Serena is not essentially reduced just to her 
name as a common noun in the poem. She has, instead, quite a story.
With the cannibals’ voyeuristic, wishful dismemberment of Serena’s 
nakedness and their plan for her ritual sacrifice, to be followed by a 
feast on her flesh, we are well beyond Busirane’s feigning. This time the 
performance is more than a little too real. given what Serena has been 
through—especially “the image of her former dread / Yet dwelling in her 
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eye” that has been so recently renewed, together with “the villany . . . to 
her inferd”—it is surely tempting to suppose that the cannibals are her 
fantasy, fueled by fear and guilt.46 They are this, but by no means only or 
simply so. The text is clear on this matter: Serena wakes to a real night-
mare, not simply from one:
The damsel wakes, then all attonce vpstart,
And round about her flocke, like many flies,
Whooping, and hallowing on euery part,
As if they would have rent the brazen skies.
Which when she sees with ghastly griefful eies,
Her heart does quake, and deadly pallid hew
Benumbes her cheekes: Then out aloud she cries,
Where none is nigh to heare, that will her rew.
 (VI.viii.40)
This looks like, and is, isolation, desperation, and sheer terror. Evidently 
there really are “paines in loue” and “punishments in hell,” together with 
the “phantasies / In wauering wemens witt.” They can superimpose them-
selves on each other inextricably.47
Even as the savage priest lowers his sacrificial knife toward Serena’s 
“brest,”—notably not, like Busirane’s Amoret, her breast and bowels—
Calepine arrives on the scene “by chaunce, more then by choyce” and 
saves her (viii.46, 48: my emphases). Because it is night and she does not 
speak—“So inward shame of her vncomely case / She did conceiue”—he 
fails to recognize her (51). Three of the most elusive lines in the entire 
poem then follow: “So all that night to him vnknowen she past. / But day, 
that doth discouer bad and good, / Ensewing, made her knowen to him at 
last” (51).48 The poet promises a continuation at another time, but never 
gets to it. This is the last we see of Serena. Whether what is discovered 
is good, bad, or both and what “knowen” means in the last line are left 
hanging, apparently left up to readers in another strong instance of what 
I termed disnarration in chapter 2.49 What we do know, however, is that 
Serena can never again be serene—cheerful, tranquil, carefree as a day in 
June.
Unlike Amoret near the end of Book III, moreover, Serena indubi-
tably does not feel “her selfe . . . perfect hole” when she is finally rescued 
(III.xii.38). A modern comment about forgiveness, which in Spenser’s 
Book VI is a version of courtesy that is evident from its earliest cantos, 
seems more appropriate at this moment than a sexual pun on “knowen,” 
not to mention another on “case” in the same stanza. This comment 
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resonates with what we know of Serena’s story to this point.50 It encom-
passes both fortune and agency: “Without being forgiven, released from 
the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it 
were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover; 
we would remain the victims of its consequences forever, not unlike the 
sorcerer’s apprentice who lacked the magic formula to break [or, like 
Busirane, to reverse?] the spell. . . . no one can forgive herself.”51 This chal-
lenge to interpretation, also resonating with challenges in Florimell’s flight 
in Book III and more loudly with Amoret’s plight in Book IV, is an appro-
priate note on which to turn next to the story of Mirabella, whose sight 
precipitates Serena’s headlong flight, unwittingly, as it turns out, into tor-
ment by the savages.
Mirabella’s story interlinks with Serena’s, as earlier noticed, and, like 
hers, recurrently recalls the story of Amoret and the history of Ralegh’s 
wife that informs it. Ralegh referred to his wife as Serena.52 Another rea-
son that the story of Mirabella occurs between Serena’s cure by the hermit 
and her headlong flight from the sight of Timias’s capture by Mirabella’s 
tormentors is that the figure of Mirabella, a representation of the conven-
tional Cruel Beauty of the Middle Ages and the Tudor sonnet tradition, 
also glances unmistakably at England’s Virgin Queen, who long refused 
parliamentary requests that she marry and about whose love life cultural 
fantasies proliferated.53 The opening stanzas of the eighth canto of Book 
VI, which intervene between the initial report of Serena’s terrified flight 
and Mirabella’s full tale, issue a warning to the queen. The first of these 
starts by addressing “gentle Ladies, in whose soueraine powre / Loue hath 
the glory of his kingdome left” and then cautions them,
Be well aware, how ye the same doe vse,
That pride doe not to tyranny you lift;
Least if men you of cruelty accuse,
He from you take that chiefedome, which ye doe abuse.”
 (VI.viii.1)
Critical analyses of Elizabethan sonnet sequences have long accustomed 
us to the subtleties of their political nuances, but there is little sub- 
tlety about the language of royalty in the present context: “soueraine 
powere,” “tyranny,” and “chiefedome” require little effort of the readerly 
imagination.54
Somewhat gentler, the next stanza recalls the advice in the proem 
to Book IV that Cupid “chase imperious feare” from the queen’s “high 
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spirit . . . And vse of awful Maiestie remoue,” sprinkling her heart with 
drops of love and softening her “haughtie courage . . . That she may hearke 
to loue, and reade this lesson often” (5). This stanza directly introduces 
the full story of Mirabella by suggesting the fall from high to low estate 
that Fortune’s wheel produces. It continues the address to court ladies, 
urging the practice of kindness (natural goodness, generosity) that is 
further thematic in Book VI and then the banishing of “cruelty and 
hardnesse”
That all your other praises will deface,
And from you turne the loue of men to hate.
Ensample take of Mirabellaes case,
Who from the high degree of happy state,
Fell into wretched woes, which she repented late.
 (VI.viii.2)
Aside from reference to the queen, Mirabella is another, profoundly 
psychological study of womanly misery, as well as a kind of emblematic 
road show—a “Ladie free,” who rides “an Asse / Led by a Carle and foole, 
which by her side did passe” (VI.vii.27). guided, or led, as is Mirabella, by 
her giant Disdain and with her Fool Scorn beside her, the sense in which 
she is “free” is in question from the very start. The word “free,” reinforced 
by the word “libertie,” occurs twice in the four stanzas depicting her here. 
As Hamilton notes in his edition, “free” is a stock epithet for a lady of 
noble birth, and he further suggests that the initial use of the word at this 
point carries “the sense of being wilful,” a quality, I would add, that, if 
pertinent, is hardly evident this soon (648n27.7). A beauty, “deckt with 
wondrous giftes of natures grace,” Mirabella scorns and disdains scores of 
languishing lovers, until eventually she is haled before Cupid as judge, and 
this love god imposes a penance on her (vii.28). Until she saves as many 
lovers as she has destroyed, she is to wander with the Fool and the giant, 
who also happens to be the sib of Orgoglio (Book I’s giant Pride). As 
this threesome travels, the giant cruelly demeans Mirabella, and the Fool 
occasionally whips her, along with her horse. She is also furnished with 
a backpack for her repentance that has a torn bottom and with a leaky 
bottle for her contrite tears. The figure of Mirabella, embodying futility 
as well as misery, looks like yet another expression of despair. She is a far 
cry from the earlier cartoons implicating the queen, such as Argante and 
Slander, insofar as her story includes some appreciation of her unhappy 
plight.
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When Timias, traveling with Serena, tries to rescue Mirabella from 
the giant and Fool, he is instead captured by them, as is the knight who 
next tries to intervene. Mirabella’s tormentors lead Timias, bound like a 
dog, and then threaten to yoke the two captured knights together as if they 
were oxen. They degrade and dehumanize the men they control. Mirabella 
herself, whose aggressive behavior they embody, is their prisoner, too, and, 
seen this way, she is to be pitied. Everything about her signals hopeless 
self-enclosure. Her name suggests not only beauty (bella) to be admired 
but also, in view of her life-long behavior, a mirror: like Latin mira 
and miror/-ari, which derive from miro, “to wonder,” these Latin roots 
underlie the English word mirror, which sound alone would suggest as a 
play on Mirabella’s name. If Mirabella’s giant Pride is Orgoglio’s brother, 
her sister is Lucifera, the joyless Queen of Pride’s House, who holds in 
her hand “a mirrhour bright” and “in her selfe-lou’d semblance” takes 
delight (I.iv.10).55 The difference between these two queenly figures, 
however, is Mirabella’s awareness of her guilt as well as her misery, evi-
dent in her confessing to Prince Arthur the damage to others her self- 
loving denial of true love has done and its painful consequences for herself 
(viii.19–22).
Like Amoret in Book III,  however,  Mirabella pleads self- 
destructively for the life of her own oppressors, her giant Disdain and 
Fool Scorn. Yet, having heard Mirabella’s pleas to spare her tormentors 
and then having “wisely” attended to her own account of her plight, 
Arthur suddenly and surprisingly offers her redemption:
Now Lady sith your fortunes thus dispose,
That if ye list haue liberty, ye may,
Vnto your selfe I freely leaue to chose,
Whether I shall you leaue, or from these villaines lose.
 (VI.viii.25, 29)
Arthur clearly puts no stock in Mirabella’s hopeless understanding of 
her present plight. But her reply to his offer is simply that “it may not 
be” because she has to fulfill the penance enjoined by Cupid, which she 
cannot fulfill, not least because of the bottomless bag of repentance and 
the leaking bottle of contrition, which mock a religious doctrine of meri-
torious works—that is, self-help. This is the point, not earlier, at which 
Mirabella’s freedom ironically becomes, by her own choice, its lack. The 
repeated word “free” in her initial portrait only now becomes clearly iro-
nic by virtue of retrospection, at once with respect to her will and to her 
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Chaucerian “fredom and curtesye,” generosity and its social expression in 
courtesy, forms of love and forgiveness.56
Mirabella has been self-loving , and Cupid has sentenced her to 
herself. The disdain and scorn with which she hurt others have turned in 
guilt and penance back upon herself. They lash out at any, such as Timias, 
who would rescue her. They are still her masters and, indeed, have become 
her gods. Led by them, she finally refuses her own right to redemption 
when Arthur offers it to her. From one point of view, she is willful but, 
from another, quite will-less and lacking not only in kindness but also in 
faith. Mirabella and her tormentors keep moving, but they get nowhere. 
Effectually, she is stuck in one place and condition, an effect that sheds 
light on her initial depiction in so strikingly emblematic a form. Her 
refusal of Arthur’s offer, his “good will,” as with unwitting irony she calls 
it, immediately gives way in the same canto to the episode of Serena and 
the cannibals (30). Whereas Serena is depicted essentially as a victim of 
fortune, however, Mirabella is depicted as a victim at once by choice and 
its lack. In this, she bears an odd resemblance to Acrasia, as Harry Berger 
has glossed this witch’s name, which alludes at once to power and to pow-
erlessness.57
Discussing the stories of Belphoebe and Amoret in chapter 2, I sug-
gested that Spenser explored and improvised as he went along; at this point, 
I would add that, as time passed, he re-envisioned his massive project with 
respect to its figuration of women. The figuration of Serena and Mirabella, 
an extensive transformation of Amoret and Belphoebe, extends not only 
to their names but even to the prioritizing of their respective stories 
within the poem, and it does so conclusively. Whereas poor Amoret just 
keeps falling into lustful hands—Busirane’s, Lust’s, then Lust’s again (with 
Timias’s help), then seemingly once more Scudamour’s—Serena’s story is 
not primarily about lust but more complexly about pleasure, detraction, 
agency, trauma, and the poetic and readerly generation of socio- 
cultural and personal meaning. As for Belphoebe and Mirabella, whereas 
Belphoebe’s figure suggests fixation, Mirabella’s more sympathetically and 
starkly explores its sociocultural and personal sources, or mechanisms—
including choice and fortune, virtù and fortuna.
Yet simply to make contrasting exempla of the linked stories of 
Serena and Mirabella, the one too free with her favors, the other too 
stingy, would be, although not wrong, morally reductive. It would violate 
the human contours, the emotional insight and complexity, of their fig-
ures and stories, that is, of their narrativized figuration. Like Una, Serena 
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and Mirabella are offered real, salvific help by Arthur, not just the pity he 
feels for Amoret in Book IV. Serena, in fact, gets the same help as Timias, 
although their plights diverge once they leave the hermit, and the help 
both women get in Book VI involves the human dignity of responsible 
choice. In short, this book brings not only a return to romance after the 
epic form that dominates Book V but also a profound conceptual shift in 
the figuration of its major woman, Serena, with whom Mirabella is still 
meaningfully twinned.
The interlinked episodes of Serena and Mirabella lead into the 
pastoral cantos of Melibee and Pastorella, the old shepherd’s foster child 
and a foundling, with whom Calidore, the nominal protagonist of Book 
VI, falls in love. He first sees her “placed” on a hillock, “Environ’d with 
a girland, goodly graced, / Of louely lasses,” a sight that anticipates his 
later vision of the graces (ix.8). Charmed both by Melibee’s way of life 
and Pastorella’s beauty, Calidore dons the garb of a shepherd, and a pas-
toral courtship ensues. Little distinguishes Pastorella from many another 
pastoral queen, and here she exists only in the narrator’s brief accounts 
of Calidore’s courtship and her response to it. Essentially, she belongs to 
Melibee’s idyllic situation, his place and condition, as her name signals. 
When, in Calidore’s absence, brigands capture Melibee and “all his peo-
ple,” including Pastorella, they effectually destroy the place of pastoral 
(x.40). Pastorella’s situation becomes the brigands’ cave, where “darke-
nesse dred and daily night did houer / Through all the inner parts” and 
where “continuall candlelight . . . delt / A doubtfull sense of things, not 
so well seene, as felt” (x.42). In this situation, Pastorella exercises some 
ingenuity, pretending to favor the brigand’s captain, who is attracted to 
her, and feigning sickness to escape his attentions. In short, she lies, one 
of the character effects discussed in chapter 3. The narrator also reports 
that she suffers in mind and body but is constant in virtue and troth. By 
and large, however, she remains a stock figure of romance. When Calidore 
rescues her from the brigands and restores her to “joyous light,” he takes 
her to a castle, which turns out to belong to the parents who lost her as 
an infant (xi.50). He thus takes her home, her third and final situation. 
Here, Pastorella’s mother recognizes her long-lost daughter by a birth-
mark in the shape of a rose on Pastorella’s breast (VI.xii.7). This birthmark 
recalls and reembodies Belphoebe’s rose, which was formerly recalled in 
the poet’s lyric sublation of Amoret’s “flowre” (IV.viii. 32–33). Yet, in all 
Pastorella’s differing locations—pastoral fields, hellish cave, true origin—
she never speaks directly or otherwise exhibits much awareness or depth. 
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If our sense of who she is changes, it does so mainly because her situa-
tion does. She remains largely a function of the plot and, for this reason, 
usefully sets off the figures of Serena and Mirabella in this book, both of 
whom are effectually psychological studies with multiple historical and 
cultural dimensions.
To end a discussion of Spenser’s figures of women with Pastorella 
is in one sense to end with a whimper. Yet Pastorella on the pastoral hill-
ock prefigures the “countrey lasse” at the center of the vision on Mount 
Acidale, and her joyous redemption from what is termed the “hell” of her 
capture by the diabolical brigands also participates in the reaffirmation 
of trouthe, fidelity and truth—her own, Colin’s, and Calidore’s—close 
to the end of Book VI (x.25, 43). The language of this redemption, espe-
cially Calidore’s breaking open the “dores” and “locks” of the brigands’ 
cave, is laden with distant memories of the harrowing of hell, more insist-
ently recalled in the debate between Duessa’s emissary Archimago with 
Redcrosse and Una at the end of Book I, which I examined in chapter 1 
(VI.xi.43, 50).58 Of course, in the final stanzas of canto xii, on the other 
side of the Acidalian vision and this further reaffirmation of redemptive 
trouthe, the Blatant Beast continues to rage and spread poison, a process 
studied so acutely in the story of Serena’s figuration and, like it, never end-
ing. At the end of Book I, we similarly realized that Archimago would 
escape his prison. The difference involves tone and emphasis: a hopeful 
promise at the close of the opening book but, at the close of the final book, 
a bitter complaint. If Books IV to VI witness a massive refiguration, bar-
ring the Mutabilitie Cantos, which reflect on time and change, they also 
witness the end of The Faerie Queene.
* * *
The major figures of women examined in this study—especially Una, 
Belphoebe, and Britomart, but also Amoret, Florimell, Mirabella, and 
Serena—depict the status of women with a greater sensitivity to their pro-
blems and experiences than is the sociocultural norm in the Elizabethan 
period, even while staying largely within it. They push meaningfully 
against it, although only so far. Una’s truth, her “trouthe,” finds fulfillment 
only in Eden; Belphoebe’s early promise turns into haggish cartoons; 
Britomart’s approach to selfhood is suppressed in the end; Amoret is 
abandoned; Mirabella is arrested in misery; and Serena seems damaged 
for good. Only Florimell enters wedlock, yet the culturally normative 
happiness of her wedding day with her long-sought Marinell, which has 
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been taken to symbolize the coming of spring, the return of Persephone 
to earth, the fruitful conjunction of heaven and earth, and more, turns 
out at best to be nostalgic, “taking vsurie of time forepast,” as the narra-
tor remarks of it (V.iii.40: my emphasis). The term usury suggests a self-
indulgent and dubiously ethical exploitation of what belongs to the past. 
Nostalgia is what Pastorella’s happy ending offers as well, in this instance 
for the homecoming that concludes Book I, yet there remains in her res- 
toration a present memory of Una’s achievement and, with it, a still linger- 
ing reaffirmation of renewal as well. Spenser’s figuration of the women of 
Faerie does not end in ways to content most modern readers, but the explo-
rations of possibility in his figured narratives are still complex, impressive, 
and promising. As one of my former graduate students, a committed femi-
nist, memorably asked a harsher reader of Spenser’s poem, “Don’t you get 
credit for trying?” Awareness is where still movement starts.
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readings want “a sense of the materiality that grounds poetry”: The Pain of Refor-
mation: Spenser, Vulnerability, and the Ethics of Modernity (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2012), 69, 102–3, and all of chapter 2.
39 Syrithe Pugh, Spenser and Ovid (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005), 50–57, 
66–68. Rust, 143–51, treats Una among the satyrs extensively, reading the epi-
sode as a parody of the Queen’s iconotropic body.
40 Paradise Lost, V.117–19: the lines are spoken by unfallen Adam after 
intuiting that Eve’s dream is evil (96–98). Milton told Dryden that Spenser was 
“his Original”: Barbara K. Lewalski, The Life of John Milton (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2000), 508.
41 Logically, this would make Una an accident. See Judith H. Anderson, 
Words That Matter: Linguistic Perception in Renaissance English (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1996), 88.
42 For example, my “July Eclogue and the House of Holiness: Perspective in 
Spenser,” Studies in English Literature 10.1 (1970): 17–32, and, in compressed 
form, my Growth of a Personal Voice, 44–49, esp. 46 (unity and continuity).
43 On this maxim in Book V, see my “‘Nor man it is’: The Knight of Jus-
tice in Book V of Spenser’s Faerie Queene,” PMLA 85 (1970): 65–77 at 66–67; 
cf. Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 50–51.
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44 Lancelot Andrewes, Works, 11 vols. (Oxford, UK: John Henry Parker, 
1841–54; repr. 1967), 5:265. Andrewes refers to Augustine’s De Civitate Dei 
(City of God) and to Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. Andrewes’s words are later than 
Spenser’s Book I but consistent with the bishop’s earlier views. The subject is com-
plicated; see, for example, Susan E. Schreiner, Are You Alone Wise?: The Search 
for Certainty in the Early Modern Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
chap. 4, also 108: Calvin was “Suspicious of all appeals to the Spirit alone, to the 
Spirit-guided church or an invisible church.”
45 As mentioned, these articles have some overlap with McEachern, whose 
book comes earlier, and with Halpern, whose article comes later. Halpern cites 
two of Berger’s articles, one treating Una in canto xii and the other treating the 
lion, and the trio of Abessa, Corceca, and Kirkrapine. Walls cites Halpern for sup-
port, as well as Berger 2003, and so it goes.
46 In Berger’s view, Redcrosse “responds to her recrimination like a little boy 
who has been scolded and told to be good. . . . She has become his savior, govern-
ess, and guide, and she shares these offices with the strong women who dominate 
the House of Holiness. Should this be expected to close up the secret breach of 
the self-loathing sinner who wants the punishment he knows he deserves? Who 
has just defied or flinched from the power of the terrible gift of divine forgive-
ness? That this power of donation is vested in Una, the almighty humble loving 
virgin, engenders the threatening effects of the secret breach: the threat of infan-
tilization; the threat of emasculation; the threat, one hesitates to say, of castra-
tion” (1998:176).
47 I take it that Berger’s Una is being scapegoated here, though I’m not sure 
by whom. Berger ventriloquizes the reigning view of Spenser’s religious culture 
when he refers in greatly heightened rhetoric (1998:176) to Una’s intervention as 
emasculating Redcrosse. He wants to expose this culture’s ideological exploitation 
of woman, together with its manipulation of its own believers, to wit, Redcrosse. 
What bothers me are discrepancies between the narrative and this reading of it. 
The narrative seems to get in the way, as does the figural being of Una.
48 Metaphor differs from metonymy, or substitution—that is, from coding or 
recoding. Simultaneously, metaphor respects both similarity and difference: my 
love is a rose, but my love is not (really) a rose.
49 On non-residency or absenteeism, see Mary Robert Falls, “Spenser’s 
Kirkrapine and the Elizabethans,” Studies in Philology 50 (1953): 457–75.
50 Berger’s Kirkrapine is more complicated. His meaning transmigrates to 
Archimago, “whose investment in and as St. george illustrates Kirkrapine’s theft,” 
and comments on Redcrosse’s effectual theft of Christian armor when he aban-
dons Una (Berger, 2004:226). This perceptive insight makes way for the claim 
that Redcrosse becomes or embodies Archimago by acquiescing in the tempter’s 
imagination and bad agency. Again, I wonder whether psychic displacement is 
warping the text. Archimago penetrates, manipulates, and poisons Redcrosse’s 
imagination during the knight’s time in the hermitage, but he does so without 
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replacing or simply becoming it. Redcrosse, who has been given the armor of the 
Christian and still possesses some of its potency after leaving Archimago’s hermit-
age, next defeats the pagan Sans Foy. If this victory turns out to be Pyrrhic, it is 
still a victory, not a defeat. The meaning of Redcrosse’s betrayal of Una fans out 
to the Abessa, Corceca, Kirkrapine trio, rather than their meaning funneling back 
into his; it extends out, not narrows in, with significant historical and philosophi-
cal ramifications.
51 Examples include Abessa’s pot as an allusion to the Old Testament’s Hagar; 
Una’s animals, the trio of lamb, ass, and lion, as (associatively) Trinitarian; identi-
fication of her dwarf with the notion of religious adiaphora, although the consis-
tency of this meaning throughout Book I is questionable for me. Another is Walls’s 
suggestion of the relevance of the “palmesel” to the satyrs’ worship of Una’s ass. 
The palmesel, part of the celebration of Palm Sunday in germany, was a “life-sized 
wooden carving of Christ on a donkey, which ran on wheels,” Eamon Duffy, The 
Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England. 1400–1580 (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 26; Walls, 119n38. Reference to this custom 
was available in an anti-papist tract translated in 1570 by Barnaby googe, briefly 
Spenser’s contemporary in Ireland twelve years later (Walls, 119–22). On googe 
in Ireland, see The Spenser Encyclopedia, ed. A. C. Hamilton, Donald Cheney, W. 
F. Blissett, David A. Richardson, and William W. Barker (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1990) s.v., Googe Barnabe (sic); also Hadfield, 124–25, 229.
52 Hamilton, ed. (2007), 36n19, suggests that Una’s outcry “breaks the 
encoiling rhythm” of Error. He also glosses Redcrosse’s “griefe” (19) as “anger.” 
That “gall” in stanza 19 is the source of anger is not the only conclusion the 
Online OED suggests, s.v. gall n.1: see not only 3.a. “Bitterness of spirit . . . ran-
cour,” whence Hamilton’s anger; but also 3.b. “Spirit to resent injury or insult” 
(accessed January 10, 2016). Be that as it may, the reason for Redcrosse’s “griefe” 
at this point is not unambiguous: shame, frustration, disappointment, and anger 
with himself at his vulnerability are possibilities. The object of his “high disdaine,” 
which, Hamilton implies, is elevated or ennobling, is ambiguous as well: is this 
object himself or the serpent strangling him—or both? Una’s intervention seems 
the right moment to redouble his force in god’s fight, not to stop fighting and 
start praying.
53 Online OED, s.v., add, v., 1.b (accessed March 15, 2014).
54 Another pressure point comes with Walls’s identification of the Lion as 
Christ—historically and visibly with Christ’s Incarnation (1)—and the lion’s 
dismembering of Kirkrapine as Christ’s expulsion of the money lenders from the 
Temple (101). The far more open, insistent association of Arthur with Christ in 
canto viii and of the Crucifixion, not with Sans Loy’s slaying the lion, but with 
Arthur’s battling and defeating Orgoglio, the sinful flesh, is unacknowledged or 
explained away by Walls: e.g., Arthur’s breaking open the iron door of Orgoglio’s 
hellish dungeon, which Walls admits is “reminiscent of Christ’s Descent into 
Hell,” indicates that the Prince wants to preach to him (186–89).
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55 Even Redcrosse’s hell is not exclusively inner, but is strikingly related to 
cultural history, which, as history, has external, objective existence, for example, 
as the cult of Aescupalius, greek drama, ancient myth, The Aeneid, and so on; it is 
not a question of inner or outer, but of inner and outer. Hell, moreover, is usually 
considered a real place in Tudor religion. Spenser’s hell in Book I parodically mir-
rors unity and wholeness, distorting them.
56 Hamilton, ed. (2007), 155n40.9; Faerie Queene, I.i.47, ll.4–6.
57 Online OED, s.v. melancholy (accessed December 7, 2015).
58 For more on the initial description of Arthur, see Anderson, Reading the 
Allegorical Intertext, 130–34, and 54–60 on Spenser’s use of Sir Thopas in charac-
terizing Redcrosse and Arthur.
59 To find such parody merely corrosive or destructive is to succumb to the 
attitude of Jonathan Swift’s satiric poem about Celia, whose idealizing admirer, 
Strephon (a pastoral name), realizes with disillusioned horror that she experiences 
the basic functions of the human body and even that, “Oh! Celia, Celia, Celia 
shits”: “The Lady’s Dressing Room,” www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/180934 
(accessed September 11, 2017). Swift’s poem suggests that the opposite of naïve 
idealization is naïve disgust or world-weary cynicism.
60 The phrase “in the middest” comes precisely at the middle of Book III: 
Hamilton, ed. (2007), 348n43. Other examples of Spenser’s regard for space and 
time are numerous: for example, their meaningful disjunction in the opening pic-
ture of Redcrosse, Una, and the dwarf (I.i.1–6) and their observance throughout 
Epithalamion (e.g., the falling of night and the truncated stanza at the end).
61 At the wedding of Peleus and Thetis, Ate throws in the golden apple that 
eventually led to the Trojan War: see Hamilton, ed. (2007), 222n55.4–9; cf. 671n22.
62 On Archimago’s name and epithet “old man,” see Hamilton, ed. (2007), 
41n43.6; Anderson, Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 58, 66, 284–85.
63 Online OED, s.v. writ, 2.c, 3.a, b. (accessed December 7, 2015).
64 See Andrew Zurcher, Spenser’s Legal Language: Law and Poetry in Early 
Modern England (Woodbridge, UK: D. S. Brewer, 2007), 65: Zurcher finds 
Duessa’s accusation of prior contract loaded with legal diction. On Spenser as 
deputy clerk, see Hadfield, 187, 192, and on Spenser as litigant, 202–6, 291–92. 
See also see Anderson, Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 168–79, esp. 176–77.
65 Eamon Duffy’s sympathetic treatment of Roman Catholic ceremonies in 
Tudor England refers to its “cult of the dead” (466); on the popular celebration 
of Corpus Christi in England, see Duffy, 43–44, 566, 580. For fuller treatment, 
see Rubin’s Corpus Christi. Broaddus makes a similar observation about Duessa’s 
seeking the “corse” of her lord, but he finds Una Roman Catholic as well, the 
Truth that lingered in Catholicism: “Spenser’s Redcrosse Knight,” 575, 577–78. 
Compare James Kearney, “Enshrining Idolatry in The Faerie Queene,” English Lit-
erary Renaissance 32.1 (2002): 3–30: Kearney considers the presence of Catho-
lic objects and practices in Spenser’s first book a futile effort to appropriate or 
redeem them.
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66 Another parallel occurs in Paradise Lost, where Milton’s god, in discus-
sion with his Son, voices much the same justification for saving fallen humanity 
and paying Adam’s debt: III.129–31, 285–301. Milton, too, was acquainted with 
Piers Plowman.
67 William Langland, Will’s Visions of Piers Plowman, Do-Well, Do-Better and 
Do-Best, ed. george Kane and E. Talbot Donaldson (London: Athlone, 1975). 
I have silently changed thorns to th and removed editorial brackets in the text; 
those remaining are glosses borrowed from Donaldson’s translation: Piers Plow-
man: An Alliterative Verse Translation by E. Talbot Donaldson, ed. Elizabeth D. 
Kirk and Judith H. Anderson (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990). The apparatus of 
the Kane–Donaldson edition includes variants from Robert Crowley’s two edi-
tions and subsequent reprint of 1550, which I have checked and found insignifi-
cant for my purposes in the lines that I cite. Crowley’s last edition was reprinted 
by Owen Rogers in 1561.
68 Briefly, see my “Artegall” in The Spenser Encyclopedia, 62–64, esp. 63 bot. 
to 64 top; my Growth of a Personal Voice, 164–70, further develops the redemp-
tive role of love in Book V.
69 I would not identify Una as directly and immediately with Christ, the 
invisible Church, and additional equivalents at the end as do Walls’s medieval-
izing methods of biblical exegesis, e.g., 176–205. For Berger’s interpretation of 
the final canto of Book I, see 2003:49–55; it extends his earlier, psychoanalytical 
remarks about Una and Redcrosse. Broaddus, “Spenser’s Redcrosse Knight,” 601, 
follows Berger in thinking Redcrosse’s response to Archimago/Duessa’s writ “dis-
honest,” but he also considers Una “the embodiment of Christian Charity,” who 
shadows forth “‘glorifying righteousness’” (602, 604, but cf. 601).
70 Epithalamion, 119, in The Yale Edition of the Shorter Poems of Edmund 
Spenser. Hamilton does not note the use of “sunshyny face” in Epithalamion, 
likely because, although the two phrases make a connection, the contexts other-
wise indicate a difference. Falk (18) rightly emphasizes the invisibility of the bibli-
cal woman in the (blinding) sun, but underemphasizes Una’s human dimension at 
the end. The difference between what prophetic vision actually sees and ordinary 
physical sight is pertinent.
71 On Spenserian eros, including Epithalamion and the rest of Spenser’s 
poetry (but not Book I), see William A. Oram, “Spenser’s Crowd of Cupids and 
the Language of Pleasure,” in Rhetorics of Bodily Disease and Health in Medieval 
and Early Modern England, ed. Jennifer C. Vaught (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 
2010), 87–104. On the “discourses of joy” in Epithalamion, including “psalmic 
praises, hymnody, spiritual comfort, heavenly foretaste, matrimony, and finally 
sex,” see James S. Lambert, “Spenser’s Epithalamion and the Protestant Expression 
of Joy,” Studies in English Literature 54.1 (2014): 81–103 at 83.
72 Faerie Queene, I.ii.1, vii.6–7, xi.31. On Redcrosse’s wet dream, see Ander-
son, “Redcrosse and the Descent into Hell,” 473–76, and Growth of a Personal 
Voice, 29–32. On his looseness, see James W. Broaddus, “A galenic Reading of the 
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Redcrosse Knight’s ‘goodly court’ of Fidessa/Duessa,” Studies in Philology 109.3 
(2012): 192–98.
73 Measure for Measure, in The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. g. Blakemore Evans 
et al., second ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), I.ii.147 (and note); also 
Anne Barton’s introduction, 582. Compare Debra Kuller Shuger, Political Theolo-
gies in Shakespeare’s England: The Sacred and the State in “Measure for Measure” 
(Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2001), 25–29, 98, 146n37. Zurcher, 90–94, summa-
rizes the forms of “legal” marriage in sixteenth to seventeenth-century England; 
cf. 94 regarding “the legally valid custom of the spousal.”
74 On Augustine’s threefold present, see Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 
trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984), 1:5–30.
2 Belphoebe’s “mirrours more then one”: History’s Interlude
1 Reference is to Edmund Spenser: The Faerie Queene, ed. A. C. Hamilton, 
text edited by Hiroshi Yamashita, Toshiyuki Suzuki, and Shohachi Fukuda, rev. 
second ed. (Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2007), II.iii.21–31, and 183n21–31: notes 
cited as Hamilton, ed. (2007). Hamilton calls these stanzas a blazon, as they are 
in part, but they are also, inclusively, a portrait that draws heavily on a variety of 
imagistic and pictorial modes.
2 For Diana of Ephesus in the Bible, see Acts 19:28. (google affords abun-
dant images of Ephesian Diana.).
3 Here I reflect my article on Belphoebe in The Spenser Encyclopedia, ed. A. 
C. Hamilton, Donald Cheney, W. F. Blissett, David A. Richardson, and William 
W. Barker (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 85–87 at 85. I remain 
indebted to Harry Berger Jr.’s ground-breaking chapters on the portrait of Bel-
phoebe in The Allegorical Temper: Vision and Reality in Book 2 of Spenser’s “Faerie 
Queene” (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957), 120–49.
4 See esp. Berger, 125–28.
5 Edmund Spenser: The Faerie Queene, 716.
6 On the Queen’s two bodies, see David Lee Miller’s study of The Poem’s Two 
Bodies: The Poetics of the 1590 “Faerie Queene” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1988).
7 See Essays by Rosemond Tuve: Spenser, Herbert, Milton, ed. Thomas P. 
Roche, Jr. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 124–27.
8 Hamilton, ed. (2007), 185n28.1–2, offers the biblical references. guillaume 
de Lorris and Jean de Meun, The Romance of the Rose, trans. Harry W. Robbins, ed. 
Charles W. Dunn (New York: Dutton, 1962), 440–41 (20785–20816); cf. 451–
52 (21225–27); see Hamilton, ed. (2007), 184nn26.9–27.1. Anxious critical 
efforts to distance the pillars and temple from Belphoebe’s legs and torso ironi-
cally attest to its suggestiveness: e.g., Anne Ferry, The Art of Naming (Chicago: 
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University of Chicago Press, 1988), 161–62. See the comparison of Serena’s 
thighs to a “triumphal Arch” in the cannibal episode of Book VI.viii.42—with a 
difference, too, of course.
9 Hamilton, ed. (2007), 185n30.7–9. Quotation from Edgar Wind, Pagan 
Mysteries in the Renaissance, rev. ed. (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1967), 115. 
Spenser probably never saw Botticelli’s painting, but the painting participates in a 
widespread cultural context.
10 Lyly’s Endymion, including characters named Cynthia and Sir Thopas, was 
played before the Queen’s court in 1588: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(DNB; accessed online January 5, 2016). Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus belongs to the 
late 1580s, too (exact date uncertain): Oxford DNB (accessed online January 5, 
2016).
11 1 Henry IV, I.iii.201–2, V.1.131–32 (dated 1596–97), in The Riverside 
Shakespeare, ed. g. Blakemore Evans et al., second ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1997).
12 See Frances A. Yates, Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 29–74, esp. 65–66, 72–73.
13 On the sixth proem, see my Reading the Allegorical Intertext: Chaucer, 
Spenser, Shakespeare, Milton (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 
42–53; the following paragraph extends 335n6.
14 For Aristotle, color constitutes the subject of vision and the cause of the 
visible. For a Neoplatonizing scientist such as Johannes Kepler, light, rather than 
color, is the cause of the visible, but color is still material, “light entombed in a 
pellucid material”: Judith H. Anderson, Light and Death: Figuration in Spenser, 
Kepler, Donne, Milton (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017), 123–25.
15 Online OED, s.v. covet, 1.b, c; 2.a, 3.a–c (accessed January 2, 2016). The rel-
evant commandment is the tenth, although one might also think of a jealous god 
in the first. (The queen is a far cry from Spenser’s god, however.)
16 “The 11th: and last booke of the Ocean to Scinthia,” ll. 69, 497 ff., cf. ll. 
29–30, in The Poems of Sir Water Ralegh, ed. Agnes M. C. Latham (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951); reference is to this edition. On the dating of Cyn-
thia, see Latham’s introduction, xxxvi–xl; and Stephen J. greenblatt, Sir Walter 
Ralegh: The Renaissance Man and His Roles (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1973), 12–13.
17 Spenser calls Ralegh “shepheard of the Ocean” in Colin Clouts Come Home 
Againe, The Yale Edition of the Shorter Poems of Edmund Spenser, ed. William 
A. Oram, Einar Bjorvand, Ronald Bond, Thomas H. Cain, Alexander Dunlop, 
and Richard Schell (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), l. 66, cf. ll. 
164–67, 173–75. On possible earlier versions of Ralegh’s Cynthia, see Agnes M. 
C. Latham, ed., Sir Walter Raleigh: Selected Prose and Poetry (London: Athlone, 
1965), 25; on the style of Cynthia, 210–11. Also greenblatt, 77–98, esp. on pas-
toral, 80, 84–85.
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18 Hamilton, ed. (2007), 337n35.5–6. These allusions are widely recognized. 
In Book III, Belphoebe’s posture, her bending over Timias, also recalls the tapes-
try of Malecasta and looks ahead to such figures as Venus in the garden of Adonis 
and Britomart with the prostrate Scudamour in canto xi.
19 Mary Villeponteaux, “Semper Eadem: Belphoebe’s Denial of Desire,” in 
Renaissance Discourses of Desire, ed. Claude J. Summers and Ted-Larry Pebworth 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1993), 29–45, takes “enuy” as greed—
jealousy or covetousness (42–43); but see Online OED, s.v. envy, v.1: 3.a: “to refuse 
to give (a thing) to (a person),” which is the meaning that best fits both context 
and syntax here (accessed April 15, 2016). On the difference between envy and 
jealousy, see Anderson, Light and Death, 54–58.
20 Donald Cheney, Spenser’s Image of Nature: Wild Man and Shepherd in 
“The Faerie Queene” (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 102.
21 The reference is to Ralph Church’s edition, 1758: Spenser’s Works: A Vario-
rum Edition, ed. Edwin greenlaw, Charles Osgood, and Frederick Morgan Padel-
ford, 11 vols. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1932–57), 3:248 (lii).
22 Jessica C. Murphy, “‘Of the sicke virgin’: Britomart, greensickness, and the 
Man in the Mirror,” Spenser Studies 25 (2010): 109–27 at 114.
23 On the Spenser–Ralegh connection, see James P. Bednarz, “Ralegh in 
Spenser’s Historical Allegory,” Spenser Studies IV (1984): 49–70; also Andrew 
Hadfield, Edmund Spenser: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
231–35.
24 Edmund Spenser: The Faerie Queene, 735 (DS 17).
25 Online OED, s.v. stair, 1.a: “An ascending series . . . of steps”; 2.a: “One of 
a succession of steps”; 2.d. fig.: “A step of degree in a (metaphorical) ascent or in a 
scale of dignity”; 2.e: “A high position” (accessed January 2, 2016).
26 Suggestive in this regard is the enumeration of chastity’s possibilities as 
“a weapon, a tool, a mystification, an evasion, a sovereign prerogative, or a com-
munal covenant”: Kathryn Schwarz, “Whose Body?” in Rethinking Feminism in 
Early Modern Studies: Gender, Race, and Sexuality, ed. Ania Loomba and Melissa 
E. Sanchez (London: Taylor & Francis, 2016), 213–28 at 215–16.
27 Paul Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and 
Feeling,” in On Metaphor, ed. Sheldon Sacks (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1978, 1979), 141–57 at 146. Hate, standing on one side of Spenser’s Con-
cord, ineffectually and unavailingly bites his lip, gnashes his teeth, and threatens 
with his club. But he remains where he is and gets nowhere. On stationary or 
immobile figures, see also my fourth chapter.
28 For example, A. C. Hamilton, ed., The Faerie Queene (London: Longman, 
1977), 354n54.9. As of Hamilton’s 2001 and 2007 editions, his note cites my 
argument as a gloss. His original edition was unusual in recognizing that the alex-
andrine needed glossing.
29 Compare Louis Adrian Montrose’s analysis of Petrarchan sublimation in 
“‘The perfecte paterne of a Poete’: The Poetics of Courtship in The Shepheardes 
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Calender,” Texas Studies in Literature & Language 21 (1979): 34–67, esp. 54 
(November Eclogue).
30 Edmund Spenser: The Faerie Queene, 721 (CV1).
31 In Mirror and Veil: The Historical Dimension of Spenser’s “Faerie Queene” (Chap-
el Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977), 113–14, Michael O’Connell 
rightly locates a “sense of paradox” in the final stanzas of Book III.v, the result espe-
cially of the word “Nathlesse.” This sense also follows from my own reading of the 
penultimate stanza (“ensample dead”) and fittingly concludes the canto. For a harsher 
take on Belphoebe’s response to Timias, see Villeponteaux, “Semper Eadem,” 42–43.
32 See my Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 126–34, esp. 126–29. My earlier 
argument, which offers further evidence, is greatly curtailed in the present para-
graph, which, conversely, also adds and expands some details.
33 “Layamon’s Brut,” in Arthurian Chronicles Represented by Wace and Lay-
amon, intro. Lucy Allen Paton (London: J. M. Dent, 1912), 264; Laȝamon, Brut, 
ed. g. L. Brook and R. F. Leslie, EETS 227 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1963–78), II:750.
34 gerald Prince, “The Disnarrated,” Style 22.1 (1988): 1–8.
35 See Patricia Fumerton, “‘Secret’ Arts: Elizabethan Miniatures and 
Sonnets,” in Representing the English Renaissance, ed. Stephen greenblatt (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1988), 93–133, esp. 93–106. Specifically on 
Timias’s ruby heart, see Allan H. gilbert, “Belphoebe’s Misdeeming of Timias,” 
PMLA 62 (1947): 622–43.
36 For Melissa E. Sanchez, Timias and Amoret are versions of the same self-
destructive excess of devotion: Erotic Subjects: The Sexuality of Politics in Early 
Modern English Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 70–71.
37 O’Connell, 116; and A. L. Rowse, Ralegh and the Throckmortons (Lon-
don: Macmillan, 1962), 164, 204–6. Also Ralegh, Sir Walter, in the Oxford DNB 
(accessed online January 7, 2016).
38 For a more positive reading of the jewel and dove episode, see Patrick 
Cheney’s construction of an elaborate roman à clef: Spenser’s Famous Flight: 
A Renaissance Idea of a Literary Career (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1993), 142–48. Cheney’s reading and mine could co-exist, appropriately testify-
ing to yet another doubleness in the poem. Spenser’s episode does not overlook 
the plight of Amoret to concentrate only on Ralegh, however.
39 Compare Faerie Queene, V.xii.36, VI.vi.1.
40 Online OED, s.v. quean, 1; s.v. queen (etymology): these words have an 
ablaut relationship (accessed January 3, 2016). Thomas P. Roche, Jr., ed., The 
Faerie Queene (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1978), 1176, glosses quean as hag, 
as does Hamilton, ed. (2007). This meaning seems obvious from several examples 
in the OED and is the most appropriate one for Spenser’s context.
41 Helge Kökeritz, Shakespeare’s Pronunciation (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1960), 88; E. J. Dobson, English Pronunciation 1500–1700, second 
ed., 2 vols. (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1968), 2:640, 612n2.
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42 The Vision of William concerning Piers the Plowman in Three Parallel Texts, 
ed. Walter W. Skeat (London: Oxford University Press, 1886), C.IX.45–46 (my 
punctuation). For a concise discussion of Langland’s punning on quean/queen and 
its basis in Old English, see Mary Carruthers, The Search for St. Truth: A Study 
of Meaning in “Piers Plowman” (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
1973), 60–61n19. Carruthers discusses wordplay in Langland’s line “here nis no 
quen queyntere that quyk is o lyue” (A.II.14: george Kane, ed.: I have replaced a 
thorn with th).
43 geoffrey Chaucer, Works 1532, supplemented by material from the edi-
tions of 1542, 1561, 1568, and 1602 (London: Scolar, 1969), f. 104 v., Manciple’s 
Prologue, l. 34; f. 165 v., The Romaunt of the Rose, column a, l. 19.
44 Quotation from Middleton is from Charles Barber’s edition (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1968); Barber considers the play on king’s evil 
“doubtless.” For the same view, see James T. Henke, Renaissance Dramatic Bawdry 
(Exclusive of Shakespeare): An Annotated Glossary and Critical Essays, Jacobean 
Drama Studies, 39 (Salzburg: Institut für Englische und Literatur, Universität 
Salzburg, 1974), 2:249.
45 On the presence of Aemylia and other dimensions of meaning in IV.viii, 
see my essay “Whatever Happened to Amoret? The Poet’s Role in Book IV of The 
Faerie Queene,” Criticism 13 (1971): 180–200, esp. 181–85; also chapter 4 in the 
present volume.
46 Near the end of the poet’s praise of antiquity and denunciation of the pres-
ent in canto viii, he only appears to compliment the queen. Instead, he speaks 
with an evasive, disnarrative ambiguity that is to become increasingly character-
istic of his compliments to her and, apparently, of his disillusionment with her. 
In viii.32.8, “her glorious flowre” is beauty’s (l. 1). In viii.33.5, the word “her,” 
although ambiguous, logically refers to beauty’s glorious flower in l. 6 (chastity, 
to judge from Book III); from this flower proceed the “drops” or dew or nectar 
of virtue. The near but failed reference of pronouns in these stanzas to the living 
queen is further testimony of the distance between her and the ideal image.
47 On the bisexuality of the cave beneath the mount in the garden of Adonis, 
see my Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 221–23; and Lauren Silberman, Trans-
forming Desire: Erotic Knowledge in Books III and IV of “The Faerie Queene” 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 47–48. On Lust’s bisexuality, see 
chapter 3 in the present volume, including note 80.
48 Compare James E. Berg’s contrast between the modern term character and 
a Theophrastan character, explained in note 6 of my introduction to this volume.
49 Compare Marvin Hunt’s suggestive analogy of the placement of Sidneian 
characters within a plot to Saussure’s linguistic chessmen operating according to 
rules of play: “Characteronymic Structures in Sidney’s Arcadias,” Studies in Eng-
lish Literature 33.1 (1993): 1–19.
50 For a constructive reading of Amoret, see Dorothy Stephens, The Limits 
of Eroticism in Post-Petrarchan Narrative: Conditional Pleasure from Spenser to 
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Marvell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 25–46. See also my 
discussion of Serena in chapter 4, including notes.
51 On the adulterous temptation to Amoret of her “Venereal disposition,” 
see Anne Paolucci, The Women in Dante’s “Divine Comedy” and Spenser’s “Faerie 
Queene” (Dover, DE: griffon House, 2005), 122–23.
52 On Scudamour’s seizure of Amoret in the Temple of Venus and its cul-
tural origins, see my Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 149–53, esp. 144 (present 
quotation), 148, 152–53. Sanchez, reading the Temple for its erotic politics, sug-
gests that it shows “a masochistic enjoyment of powerlessness” (Erotic Subjects, 64, 
71–75). See also Cynthia E. garrett, “Sexual Consent and the Art of Love in the 
Early Modern English Lyric,” Studies in English Literature 44.1 (2004): 37–58, for 
further light on Scudamour’s raptus of Amoret, including reference to Ralegh (43).
53 See Alan Sinfield’s discussion of Shakespeare’s characters in Faultlines: Cul-
tural Materialism and the Politics of Dissident Reading (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992), 52–79; but also Elisa Oh’s exploration of female strat-
egy in “The Silences of Elizabeth I and Shakespeare’s Isabella,” English Literary 
Renaissance 45.3 (2015): 351–76.
3 Britomart: Inside and Outside the Armor
1 For a sketch of these dimensions, see my “Britomart” in The Spenser Encyclo-
pedia, ed. A. C. Hamilton, Donald Cheney, W. F. Blissett, David, A. Richardson, 
and William W. Barker (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 113–15 at 
113. I now put greater emphasis on Britomart as a combination of Mars and Venus.
2 On the origin and range of the term figure, see the editors’ introduction to 
Judith H. Anderson and Joan Pong Linton, ed., Go Figure: Energies, Forms, and 
Institutions in the Early Modern World (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2011), 1–18.
3 On the anagram, see Arthur F. Kinney, “Lear,” Massachusetts Review 17 
(1976): 677–712 at 684.
4 Hamlet, I.ii.85, The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. g. Blakemore Evans et al., 
second ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1997); reference is to this edition. 
See Katharine Eisaman Maus, Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995), 1–34 (including, 1–3, a critique of 
other arguments, and, on the line I cite from Hamlet, 1–2). For a strong denial 
in Hamlet’s instance, see Francis Barker, The Tremulous Private Body: Essays on 
Subjection (London: Methuen, 1984), 35–38: Barker is likely right that Hamlet’s 
interiority remains a mystery but mistaken that it is therefore nonexistent.
5 Quotations are from Edmund Spenser: The Faerie Queene, ed. A. C. Hamil-
ton, text edited by Hiroshi Yamashita, Toshiyuki Suzuki, and Shohachi Fukuda, 
rev. second ed. (Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2007), here III.i.9 (my emphasis); Hamil-
ton, ed. (2007) refers to his glosses.
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6 Helen Cooper, Shakespeare and the Medieval World (London: Bloomsbury, 
2010), 180–83. Cooper also traces Ariosto’s Bradamante, another of Britomart’s 
models, to a medieval source.
7 Una is first named in Faerie Queene, I.i.45, as Truth in I.ii.arg., as actor in 
I.ii.9. Belphoebe’s name first appears in II.iii.arg., then in III.Pro.5, and, within a 
canto, in III.v.27. Britomart, named in III.i.arg., acts in III.i.8.
8 Alan Sinfield, Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics of Dissident 
Reading (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 61, 65. See also Yu Jin 
Ko’s introduction to Yu Jin Ko and Michael W. Shurgot, ed., Shakespeare’s Sense 
of Character: On the Page and From the Stage,  (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2012), 
1–16: “at the heart of Shakespearean character” is a “web of relationship” with 
others (9). Compare the ethical dimension of “intersubjectivity” in Bruce W. 
Young, “Shakespearean Character and Early Modern Subjectivity: The Case of 
King Lear,” in Shakespeare’s Sense of Character, 35–51, e.g., 36–37, 50–51; and 
William Flesch, “What Makes Someone a Character in Shakespeare?” to which 
he answers, “interaction”: ibid., 53–64 at 60. Compare Paul Yachnin’s and Jes-
sica Slights’s introduction to their Shakespeare and Character: Theory, History, 
and Theatrical Persons (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1–18; also 
Sharon O’Dair’s, “On the Value of Being a Cartoon, in Literature and in Life,” 
in Harold Bloom’s Shakespeare, ed. Christy Desmet and Robert Sawyer (Hound-
mills, UK: Palgrave, 2001), 81–96: O’Dair chides “essentialist humanism” and 
modern critical practice for “insufficient appreciation of the extent to which self 
and structure are interrelated” (89–90, cf. 95). R. A. Foakes argues that Sinfield’s 
“continuous or developing interiority of consciousness” (Faultlines, 62) is “an act 
of interpretation,” rather than “in the text or action of the play”: “Reviving Shake-
spearean Character Criticism,” In the Footsteps of William Shakespeare, ed. Christa 
Jansohn (Münster: LIT, 2005), 191–204 at 203–4. See also note 9 below in this 
chapter.
9 Elisa Oh, “The Silences of Elizabeth I and Shakespeare’s Isabella,” English 
Literary Renaissance 45.3 (2015): 351–76, interprets womanly silence as a stra-
tegic, open-ended eluding of patriarchal power and thereby an alternative to Sin-
field’s reading. Oh’s alternative does not disqualify Sinfield’s positive criteria of 
consciousness, as distinguished from its eventual lack.
10 I extend and modify Sinfield, Faultlines, 59. For another take on “charac-
ter effects,” see William Dodd, “Character as Dynamic Identity: From Fictional 
Interaction Script to Performance,” 62–79, in Shakespeare and Character: we 
should take “character as an effect and not as an origin of speech”; such a “dis-
course biography” results in a social, moral, cultural identity (62–63). Such biog-
raphy may be compatible with Dodd’s “mimesis,” but dubiously with agency. In 
a written forum on character in Shakespeare Studies 34 (2006), Alan Sinfield 
(“From Bradley to Cultural Materialism,” 25–34) aligns the opposition of “old 
historicism” to formalist imagism with the newer opposition of historicism to 
“postmodern principles and deconstructive mechanisms” (25, 27–28), and then 
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reaffirms his own Althusserian (and implicitly Jamesonian) cultural materialism 
(30, 33). In the same forum, Jonathan Crewe (“Reclaiming Character?” 35–40) 
refers suggestively to “virtual persons” in drama (35); Tom Bishop (“Personal 
Fowl: ‘The Phoenix and the Turtle’ and the Question of Character,” 65–74) 
relates the term “person” in religious discourse to the mix of secular and religious 
in Shakespeare. In “Character Criticism, the Cognitive Turn, and the Problem of 
Shakespeare Studies,” Shakespeare Studies 42 (2014): 196–228, Edward Pechter 
offers a useful history of character, from Samuel Johnson to current neo-cogni-
tivists. See also Lorna Hutson, The Invention of Suspicion: Law and Mimesis in 
Shakespeare and Renaissance Drama (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
6, 116–20, 128: Hutson locates Hamlet’s interiority in his reflexive, spoken 
resistance to the “forensic habit of inference . . . associated with the mimesis of 
dramatic inference” (145).
11 In “‘Of the sicke virgin’: Britomart, greensickness, and the Man in the Mir-
ror,” Spenser Studies 25 (2010): 109–27, Jessica C. Murphy analyzes Britomart’s 
malady in physical terms, refusing the specificity of Britomart’s love insofar as 
Artegall, seen in the magic globe and described for two stanzas, is not an immedi-
ate bodily presence (109–10, 112). She relates glauce’s herbal remedies to green-
sickness without factoring in their failure—i.e., glauce is mistaken—(117) and 
reads Britomart’s arming simply as her “becoming a man” (119). On Britomart’s 
volcanic response to Artegall’s image, which recalls Orgoglio and the dragon of 
Book I, see also Rebecca Totaro, “Britomart’s Meteorological Wound,” Archiv 
für Studium der Neueren Sprachen und Literaturen 165 (1[250]) (2013): 42–65: 
56–57, 59 (wound); 60–62 (Busiranic imagery); cf. Marion A. Wells, The Secret 
Wound: Love-Melancholy and Early Modern Romance (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), 225. On Britomart’s response to Artegall’s image and its 
transformation by Merlin to ethical agency, see genevieve guenther, “Spenser’s 
Magic, or Instrumental Aesthetics in the 1590 Faerie Queene,” English Literary 
Renaissance 36.2 (2006): 194–226.
12 Lynn Enterline, The Rhetoric of the Body from Ovid to Shakespeare (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 19, 25–26; also Enterline’s Shake-
speare’s Schoolroom: Rhetoric, Discipline, Emotion (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 85–88.
13 For other influences on Britomart’s performance by the seaside, includ-
ing her virtual sonnet, see my Reading the Allegorical Intertext: Chaucer, Spenser, 
Shakespeare, Milton (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 70–74.
14 See Online OED, s.v. consciousness, 1. “Internal knowledge or conviction; 
the state of being mentally conscious or aware of something.” OED examples 
date from 1605 and 1614, but the first persuasive example of consciousness comes 
in 1642, from Massinger’s Maid of Honour, I.ii.sig. C4: “The consciousness of 
mine owne wants.” The two earlier examples offered are not persuasively differ-
ent from conscience, a word to which the OED’s entry directs additional reference. 
See OED, s.v. conscience, II. “Senses without a moral dimension” and II.7 “Inward 
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knowledge or consciousness of something within or relating to oneself; internal 
conviction, personal awareness.” Almost all the sixteenth-century examples of 
this definition are religious, which makes the OED’s general heading (“without a 
moral dimension”) puzzling and likely too modern for most of them, a recurrent 
problem in the updated OED. Finally, see OED, s.v., aware, 1. “Watchful, vigilant, 
cautious, on one’s guard”; 2. “Informed, cognizant, conscious” (entries accessed 
January 8, 2016).
15 On the implications of being “Venus mayd,” cf. Anne Paolucci, The Women 
in Dante’s “Divine Comedy” and Spenser’s “Faerie Queene” (Dover, DE: griffon 
House, 2005), 122–23: Amoret is “constantly having to fight . . . temptation from 
within,” namely, “a Venereal disposition”; regarding her transfiguration, cf. also 
69–70: “not Amoret at all,” the figure in Busirane’s masque is its “central symbol” 
or “central emblem.”
16 Faerie Queene, III. iv.6, 8–9, 12, ix.40.
17 On Malecasta’s tapestry, see William A. Oram, “Spenser’s Crowd of Cupids 
and the Language of Pleasure,” in Rhetorics of Bodily Disease and Health in Medi-
eval and Early Modern England, ed. Jennifer C. Vaught (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 
2010), 87–104 at 97–98.
18 Faerie Queene, III.x.60, xi.1, 26 (gealosy); xi.22, 26 (Mulciber). Busir-
ane, like Mammon, is a hoarder, as his second chamber, a golden one, and his 
imprisonment of Amoret, at once virgin wife and love-principle, show. Malbecco, 
another hoarder, is jealous of his wife and of his money; his story introduces the 
cantos of Busirane (III.xi.1). With respect to Scudamour, who is also a jealous 
possessor, Busirane tries to exercise adverse possession, a legal concept effectually 
holding that if you successfully encroach on another’s land long enough, you have 
a valid claim to it.
19 See Leonard Barkan, The Gods Made Flesh: Metamorphosis and the Pursuit 
of Paganism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 2–5; Ann Rosalind 
Jones and Peter Stallybrass, Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chap. 4, esp. 89–97; Heather 
James, “Ovid and the Question of Politics in Early Modern England,” ELH 70 
(2003): 343–73 at 358–63; Syrithe Pugh, Spenser and Ovid (Aldershot, UK: 
Ashgate, 2005), 146, 240.
20 Susanne Wofford, remarking puns on read (“rede”) in Faerie Queene, III.
xi–xii, focuses attention on Britomart’s gazing: “gendering Allegory: Spenser’s 
Bold Reader and the Emergence of Character in The Faerie Queene III,” Criticism 
30 (1988), 1–21. William Oram’s succinct remarks on the House of Busirane 
are to the point: “Spenserian Paralysis,” Studies in English Literature 41 (2001): 
49–70 at 60. On “rede,” in The Faerie Queene, see A. Leigh DeNeef, Spenser and 
the Motives of Metaphor (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1982), 142–56. 
Rachel Eisendrath differentiates Britomart’s responses to the tapestries from her 
responses to the more objectified decorations in Busirane’s second chamber: “Art 
and Objectivity in the House of Busirane,” Spenser Studies 27 (2012): 133–61.
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21 Along with the notion of a chameleon’s ability to take on the colors of its 
surroundings, “negatively capable” alludes here to the critical concept of nega-
tive capability, the Keatsian ability to empathize with or blend into a situation 
not one’s own or into what another is experiencing without being judgmental. 
At times, the Spenserian narrator is didactic or judgmental, at others at variance 
with his own story, and at still others surprisingly inside it. For a more precisely 
bounded explanation of Keats’s term, see M. H. Abrams, A Glossary of Literary 
Terms, fifth ed. (New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1988), 112–13. On the 
Spenserian narrator, see also my introduction to this volume.
22 Compare Jones’s and Stallybrass’s chap. 6 on women’s use of mythological 
sources in their needlework and its utilization for protest, for example, by Mary 
Stuart. For a witty instance, see Amoretti LXXI (the lady’s needlework depicting 
herself as a bee and her Spenserian suitor as a spider).
23 Katherine Eggert, “Spenser’s Ravishment: Rape and Rapture in The Faerie 
Queene,” Representations 70 (2000): 1–26 at 11–12.
24 Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. Frank Justus Miller, second ed., 2 vols. 
(London: Heinemann, 1921), 1:292–93; Bk. VI.51–128 at 68–69.
25 Hamilton, ed. (2001, 2007), 399n7–25; also Hamilton’s 1977 edition of 
The Faerie Queene (New York: Longman), 413n7–25.
26 Scholarship on the passions of the mind is extensive: for a recent, pro-
vocative discussion, rich with reference, see Steven Mullaney, The Reformation of 
Emotions in the Age of Shakespeare (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 
54–58.
27 I oppose recent critical efforts to reduce literary allegory to abstraction and 
then to oppose it to narrative, not recognizing that such allegory is itself a narra-
tive (or dramatic) mode.
28 Thomas P. Roche, Jr., The Kindly Flame: A Study of the Third and Fourth 
Books of Spenser’s “Faerie Queene” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1964), 82.
29 Compare graham Allen, Intertextuality (London: Routledge, 2000), 44: 
poetic, like metaphoric, language is double, both X and not X, whereas in tra-
ditional logic something is either X or not X. The virtual identification of poetic 
with metaphoric language is ancient and widespread.
30 See Dudley Fenner, The Artes of Logike and Rhetorike (Middleburg, Neth-
erlands: R. Schilders, 1584), sig. D1 v., for the translation “maidenly” of Latin 
“verecunda” in the discussion of metaphor in Cicero’s De Oratore (ed. g. P. goold, 
trans. E. W. Sutton, completed by H. Rackham, 2 vols. [London: Heinemann, 
1942], 2:128; Bk. III.xli.165).
31 Cicero, De Oratore, 2:123; Bk. III.xxxviii.156–xxxix.157. For fuller dis-
cussion, see my Translating Investments: Metaphor and the Dynamic of Cultural 
Change in Tudor-Stuart England (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 
129–65 (metaphor and catachresis).
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32 Online OED, s.v. derne, adv.; dern, a. and n.1, 1–2, 5–6 (accessed January 
9, 2016); Middle English Dictionary, s.v. derneli(che), adv., a-d. The spelling of 
the adverbial form in Spenser’s text suggests familiarity with medieval usage; the 
contextualized meaning does so more definitely. A current editorial exception is 
Hamilton, ed. (2007), 404n34: Hamilton still offers “earnestly or dismally,” but 
now prefers “secretly.” He rationalizes his preference on the ground that Amoret 
does not want Busirane to hear her plea. Though moving in the right direction, 
this gloss oversimplifies the situation. Busirane himself could tell Britomart about 
his power over Amoret in order to save his neck; at least, he could if he grasped its 
extent. In any event, Hamilton’s explanation would not preclude my less innocent 
reading. My argument would also lend a more knowing or sinister cast to Lauren 
Silberman’s view of Amoret as “the lady who says yes”: Transforming Desire: Erotic 
Knowledge in Books III and IV of “The Faerie Queene” (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995), 63.
33 Rhetoric, famously in Plato’s Ion, is associated with a chain. Alciati’s popu-
lar emblem book also depicts Hercules, representative of eloquence and rhetoric, 
“as an old man, trailing after him a crowd of people fastened by the ears with the 
chains issuing from his mouth.” The description is Jean Bodin’s in his Six Books of 
the Commonwealth, cited by Jane Aptekar, Icons of Justice: Iconography and The-
matic Imagery in Book V of “The Faerie Queene” (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1969), 229–30n18. Thomas Wilson uses this image of Hercules in the pref-
ace to his rhetoric: Wilson’s Arte of Rhetorique 1560, ed. g. H. Mair (Oxford, UK: 
Clarendon, 1909).
34 On Petrarchan imagery in Amoretti, Theresa M. Krier is enlightening: 
“generations of Blazons: Psychoanalysis and the Song of Songs in the Amoretti,” 
Texas Studies in Literature and Language 40.3 (1998): 293–327; and Birth 
Passages: Maternity and Nostalgia, Antiquity to Shakespeare (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), 82–105.
35 Paul Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and 
Feeling,” in On Metaphor, ed. Sheldon Sacks (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1978, 1979), 141–57 at 151; also Ricoeur’s Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Dis-
ciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language, trans. Robert Czerny 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 248, 254–56. I derive “perverse 
predication” from Ricoeur’s “deviant predication.” The word trope derives from 
greek tropos, “turn.” The rose affords a familiar example of metaphor that is and is 
not: my love is a rose; my love is not (really) a rose: A = B; A ≠ B.
36 Contrast Susan Frye, Elizabeth I: The Competition for Representation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 122–24, 129–30; cf. Michael Slater, 
“Spenser’s Poetics of ‘Transfixion’ in the Allegory of Chastity,” Studies in English 
Literature 54.1 (2014): 41–58 at 42–48. guenther’s discussion of Britomart and 
Amoret emphasizes “irresolvable doubt” and “wonder” (e.g., 219–26).
37 For more on traversal, see pages 103–4 and note 68 in this chapter.
38 Online OED, s.v. bowel, n., 3–4, but also 1–2 (accessed January 10, 2016).
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39 Online OED, s.v. as, adv. and conj., B.I.1.b; V.24 (accessed January 10, 
2016).
40 Ricoeur, Metaphorical Process,” 151; Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic 
Power, ed. John B. Thompson, trans. gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 142–43.
41 Jean Aitchison, Words in the Mind, second ed. (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 
1984), 215, 217, and chaps. 17–18. Aitchison favors an electrical model of 
selection and comprehension—a kind of electrical circuit board—to an army 
or “cohort” model. For economy of explanation, I use the cohort model, which 
Aitchison also recognizes.
42 Paper delivered July 7, 2001, at the International Spenser Society Confer-
ence in Cambridge, UK, to which I refer with Katherine Eggert’s permission.
43 On dead metaphor, see Anderson, Translating Investments, 15–22.
44 Online OED, s.v. stock, n.1, A.I.1.a. “A tree trunk deprived of its branches 
. . . a stump; b. “A log, block of wood”; c. “As the type of what is lifeless, motion-
less, or void of sensation. Hence, a senseless or stupid person” (accessed January 
11, 2016). On the grotesqueness of the hermaphroditic statue and its spectatorial 
distancing, see Donald Cheney, “Spenser’s Hermaphrodite and the 1590 Faerie 
Queene,” PMLA 87 (1972): 192–200; Eisendrath, 150–51; Catherine Nicholson, 
“‘Against the Brydale Day’: Envy and the Meanings of Spenserian Marriage,” ELH 
83.1 (2016): 43–70 at 44–55, 54–55; Nicholson, 54, notes the parodic resonance 
of Scudamour’s embrace of Amoret (III.xii.45.1 [1590]) with the earlier embrace 
of False Florimell by the witch’s son (III.viii.x.1).
45 On the relation of sex and gender, see Ania Loomba and Melissa E. San-
chez, “Feminism and the Burdens of History,” in Rethinking Feminism in Early 
Modern Studies: Gender, Race, and Sexuality, ed. Ania Loomba and Melissa E. 
Sanchez (London: Taylor & Francis, 2016), 15–41 at 29–32; also note 93 below 
in this chapter.
46 For further discussion of Artegall, see the entry on him in The Spenser 
Encyclopedia; my essay on him, “‘Nor Man It Is’: The Knight of Justice in Book V 
of Spenser’s Faerie Queene,” in Essential Articles for the Study of Edmund Spenser, 
ed. A. C. Hamilton (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1972), 447–70; or my “Spenser’s 
Faerie Queene, Book V: Poetry, Politics, and Justice,” in A Companion to Eng-
lish Renaissance Literature and Culture, ed. Michael Hattaway, 2 vols. (Oxford, 
UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), I:263–73. My discussion of Artegall’s confronta-
tion with the leveling giant of Book V is further relevant: Words That Matter: 
Linguistic Perception in Renaissance English (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1996), 167–89. See also references to Britomart and Artegall in chapter 1 
of the present volume and note 85 below in the present chapter.
47 Edgar Wind, Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance, rev. ed. (Harmondsworth, 
UK: Penguin, 1976), 91–92 (my emphasis); James Nohrnberg, The Analogy of 
“The Faerie Queene” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 455–57. 
See also note 56 below in this chapter.
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48 In the Limits of Eroticism in Post-Petrarchan Narrative: Conditional Plea-
sure from Spenser to Marvell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
Dorothy Stephens argues astutely for Britomart as a version of Minerva (e.g. 
74, “her Minervan military prowess”; 83, “a masculine goddess born from Zeus’s 
head”; 95, “Minerva, that most masculine of goddesses”). In the Malecasta epi-
sode, Stephens assumes that Britomart’s helmet is off and her golden hair (coded 
feminine) cascading (74), whereas, “the braue Mayd would not disarmed bee / 
But onely vented vp her vmbriere” (III.i.42). Britomart’s minimal exposure would 
actually give a harder edge to Stephens’s reading of this episode, and it supports 
my argument regarding the importance of Venus-Mars to Spenser’s Venus armata. 
For physiological background, see Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gen-
der from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 
preface and chaps. 1–2, esp. viii, 8, 11, 30–31; also Valerie Traub’s thoughtful 
introduction in Desire and Anxiety: Circulation of Sexuality in Shakespearean 
Drama (London: Routledge, 1992), 1–22.
49 See my Growth of a Personal Voice: “Piers Plowman” and “The Faerie 
Queene” (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976), 4–5.
50 Faerie Queene, III.iii.58–60 (Queen Angela’s armor). Malecasta’s reading 
of Britomart, although hardly reliable, is experienced, and it can no more sum-
marily be dismissed than can readings of other figures by vicious interpreters in 
later books of the poem. Some ambiguity, danger, or confusion is invariably 
involved.
51 The dubbing of knights is conventionally their creation (the verb create 
is employed). It coincides with their investment in heraldic arms. In The Faerie 
Queene VI.ii.33, Calidore’s dubbing Tristram squire (apprentice to knighthood) 
coincides with the latter’s acquisition of armor by conquest.
52 Compare Jan Kott’s classic essay “Shakespeare’s Bitter Arcadia,” in 
Shakespeare Our Contemporary, trans. Boleslaw Taborski, second ed., rev. (Lon-
don: Methuen, 1967), 226–27.
53 For parody in Arthur’s figuration, see my Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 
55–57, 130–34.
54 Artegall also wears the armor of the greek Achilles, which “Arthegall did 
win,” presumably an allusion to Hector’s killing the disguised Patroclus, which 
gave the Trojans possession of Achilles’s armor (III.ii.25): notable is the implicit 
fusion of greek with Trojan, comparable to the joining of Saxon with Briton in 
Britomart’s arming. See also Hamilton, ed. (2007), 306n25.6, 321n60.2. William 
E. Bolton, “Anglo-Saxons in Faerie Land?: A Note on Some Unlikely Charac-
ters in Spenser’s Britain moniments,” Spenser Studies 23 (2008): 293–301, aims 
to discredit Britomart’s cross-dressing along with her Saxon armor, overlooking 
the fact that Redcrosse is Saxon-born (I.x.65). Compare also Kathryn Schwarz, 
Tough Love: Amazon Encounters in the English Renaissance (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2000), 16–61: Schwarz perceptively discusses various ways of 
interpreting Britomart’s arming.
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55 On Pubidius, see Harry Berger, Jr., Revisionary Play: Studies in the Spen-
serian Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 104. Hamilton, 
ed. (2007), has further suggestions, 313n13, 630n29.3. Rather than finding comic 
male/female cooperation in the visit to Merlin, Mary Villeponteaux feminizes the 
whole visit, considering Merlin’s cave vaginal, the site of his emasculation by an 
enchantress, as well as of his own conception: “Displacing Feminine Authority in 
The Faerie Queene,” Studies in English Literature 35.1 (1995): 53–67 at 63. (Some 
figures of men have caves, too, in The Faerie Queene.)
56 Oskar Seyffert, Dictionary of Classical Antiquities, rev. ed. by Henry Net-
tleship and J. E. Sandys (1956; Cleveland, OH: World Publishing, 1963), s.v., 
Athēnē, 80–82 at 80; cf. s.v. Minerva, 394. Seyffert notes that Aphrodite (Venus) 
is also a goddess of storm and lightning ( Jovian thunderbolts!) and as such could 
be depicted in armor; he suggests that these attributes might explain how she 
came to be associated with Arēs (Mars): s.v. Aphrodite, 39.
57 In The Faerie Queene, II.x.25–26, Bladud is portrayed as a beneficial leader 
possessing wondrous arts, who eventually overreaches. Accordingly, perhaps to 
shield Britomart from such hubris, her Bladudian spear is rendered ineffectual in 
her climactic battle with Artegall, and, as part of her more general disfiguration in 
Book V, it goes missing in her battle with Radigund. Before these battles, it never 
fails her—whether against guyon, Marinell, or Paridell. In both the later excep-
tions, she continues to use a sword. John Lance griffith locates in Britomart’s vir-
tuous purpose the difference between her use of the spear and Bladud’s self-indul-
gent magic: “Britomart’s Spear and Merlin’s Magic Mirror: Magics Meaningful 
and Meaningless in Faerie Queene Book III,” Medieval and Early Modern Studies 
20 (2012): 73–91 at 81–83.
58 Hamilton, ed. (2007), 307n30.2.
59 For example, The Romaunt of the Rose, in Geoffrey Chaucer: The Works 
1532, with supplementary material from the Editions of 1542, 1561, 1598 and 
1602 (London: Scolar, 1969), f. cxliii v.
60 On Sidney’s speaking picture in Spenser’s poetry, cf. Adam McKeown, 
“Looking at Britomart Looking at Pictures,” Studies in English Literature 45.1 
(2005): 43–63 at 44–49.
61 See Susanne Wofford, “Britomart’s Petrarchan Lament: Allegory and Nar-
rative in The Faerie Queene, III, iv,” Comparative Literature 39 (1987): 28–57 at 
39–44.
62 Although Sir Gawain and the Green Knight was never published in Spen-
ser’s time and today exists in a single manuscript, the possibility remains of his 
having seen a manuscript of it or having encountered a source or some other ver-
sion of the castle trial. Be that as it may, intertextuality, which differs from source 
study, though it might include sources, can work in both directions for a reader, 
from former to later, or the reverse: e.g., see Anderson, Reading the Allegorical 
Intertext, 15–16.
174  NOTES
63 James Nohrnberg remarks Britomart’s virginal “attraction toward clois-
tered interiors” but finds it “somewhat paradoxical that Britomart is also the pen-
etrating agent” (532).
64 On this relation in Book I, see Claire McEachern, The Poetics of Eng-
lish Nationhood 1590–1612 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
chap. 2, and Harry Berger Jr.’s challenge to her view in “Sexual and Religious Poli-
tics in Book I of Spenser’s Faerie Queene,” English Literary Renaissance 34 (2004): 
201–42. Berger favors an all-encompassing inwardness, McEachern a nearly total 
outwardness.
65 Regarding Britomart’s faining, cf. Loomba and Sanchez, “Feminism and 
the Burdens of History,” 41: “Desdemona’s desire for such a man” as Othello “and 
her desire to be such a man, are inextricable.”
66 Quotation from Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, II.iv.138.
67 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 
(New York: Routledge, 1990), 128–49; and Bodies That Matter: On the Discur-
sive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993), 1–23. On performance, see 
also Kathryn Schwarz, “Whose Body?” in Rethinking Feminism in Early Modern 
Studies: Gender, Race, and Sexuality, ed. Ania Loomba and Melissa E. Sanchez 
(London: Taylor & Francis, 2016), 213–28 at 216. On cross-gender identifica-
tion, see Valerie Traub, Thinking Sex with the Early Moderns (Philadelphia: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 24–25.
68 On transference and traversal, see chaps. 10–19 of Jacques Lacan, The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, book XI of The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, 
ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981). 
Compare Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, “On Saracen Enjoyment: Some Fantasies of Race 
in Late Medieval France and England,” Journal of Medieval & Early Modern Stud-
ies 31 (2001), 113–46 at 128, 132–33; also Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of 
Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), 30–45; and his “Revisioning ‘Lacanian’ Social 
Criticism: The Law and Its Obscene Double,” The Journal for the Psychoanalysis of 
Culture & Society 1 (1996): 15–25. Žižek translates cultural ideology to individual 
fantasy and vice versa in a way that is more suggestive for my view of Busirane’s 
House as a cultural site than is unmediated Lacan. Compare note 70 in this chapter.
69 Pursuit of the relation of metaphor to metonymy would be distracting 
here, but my take on it can be found in Translating Investments, chaps. 4, 7, and, 
succinctly, in Light and Death: Figuration in Spenser, Kepler Donne, Milton (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2016), 160–62.
70 Žižek’s focus on a cultural problem either shifts back to the single character 
in whom it is internalized and on whom it is based or else it belies its own psy-
cho-basis. This Žižekian-Lacanian basis offers to overlook what specifically and 
dominantly differentiates Britomart from Amoret and Busirane. It also privileges a 
narrower conception of erotic desire as genital and woman as Busirane’s Amoret—
whole only when wanting—than is historically justified. Compare Debora Kuller 
Shuger’s argument that in the Renaissance “sexual desire is an inflection of erotic 
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longing, not its origin or essence”: The Renaissance Bible: Scholarship, Sacrifice, 
and Subjectivity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 178, 180.
71 Flower and boar are two major, binary forms of symbolism in Book III: see 
my Growth of a Personal Voice, 98–113.
72 Consider Stephens’s argument that Lust’s cave is a place where women find 
a kind of community or intimacy denied them elsewhere (25–26, 41–42).
73 Although I admire Stephens’s work on Spenser’s gender-bending, I am 
sometimes puzzled by her treating a figure such as Amoret—“Venus mayd” (and 
“made”) for coupling with “Cupids man”—as if she had, and we could grasp, her 
“consciousness,” her “thoughts” and her intentions (e.g., 28, 33, 37); cf. Faerie 
Queene, III.xi.7, IV.x.54. Long before the Temple of Venus, Scudamour’s name 
(Shield of Love), on which Cupid is emblazoned, identifies him as the relatively 
simple figure “Cupids man.” See also note 96 below on characterological infer-
ence.
74 On the Venerean veil, see my Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 135–53.
75 Compare this stanza with Britomart’s revelation in III.ix.20–24, where she 
doffs helmet and habergeon alike. In the present passage, the “firie light” suggests 
heat lightning to Hamilton, ed. (2007); he, too, is reminded of Florimell’s comet-
like hair (413n13.6–9).
76 See The Faerie Queene, IV.i.47–49: “I saw him [i.e., Britomart] haue your 
Amoret at will”; Ate alleges heterosexual sex (49: my emphasis). Compare Slander’s 
comparable reading of Amoret in IV.viii.28–29 (“conuersing”), 35 (“whores”); 
and Jonathan goldberg, Endlesse Worke: Spenser and the Structures of Discourse 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 59–60. On the read-
ing of “their loues,” see Hamilton, ed. (2007), 413n16, who cites Camille Paglia, 
Sexual Personae: Art and Decadence from Nefertiti to Emily Dickinson (New York: 
Random House, 1991), on the homoeroticism of Britomart and Amoret (182); 
also Stephens, 38, and Schwarz, Tough Love, 168–69. Paglia refers to “homo-
sexual touches” (182); cf. her “Apollonian Androgyne and The Faerie Queene,” 
English Literary Renaissance 9 (1979): 42–63 at 49–52. Stephens, 76, considers 
“foolishly anachronistic” the view that Spenser argues “for the virtues of sexual 
intercourse between women,” but she also observes Britomart’s “maturation into 
an intimate—though still highly problematical—friendship with Amoret” in the 
passages at issue. On homoerotic and other “imprecise” or “unintelligible” terms 
and linguistic uses, see Traub, Thinking Sex, 8–17, and on shared beds, 12–13. 
Textual evidence historically grounds and can refine (not define) such imprecise, 
catachrestic terminology.
77 The one lady, Poeana, is lascivious prior to her reform, and the other, 
Aemylia, was captured by Lust when she tried to elope with her squire of low 
degree, who was likewise captured by the lust-inducing Corflambo. See chapter 4 
for further discussion.
78 Compare Elizabeth Fowler’s point that, in the marriage of Thames and 
Medway (IV.xi), Medway, the bride, is there by her consent: Literary Character: 
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The Human Figure in Early English Writing (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2003), 202, cf. also 203–4. Aside from the retrospective raptus of Amoret 
in IV.x, consent is the dominant ethical emphasis in Book IV. Melissa E. Sanchez 
gives consent a more sinister, political cast in Book IV: Erotic Subjects: The Sexu-
ality of Politics in Early Modern English Literature (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), e.g., 64, 71–75.
79 For a negative perspective on the encounter between Britomart and Arte-
gall that leads to their accord, see Schwarz, Tough Love, 163–70. Schwarz is con-
cerned to expose the contradictions and disabling losses in “the transition from 
homoerotic violence to heterosexual marriage” (163); cf. Kent R. Lehnhof ’s read-
ing of Britomart’s armor as a bow to the poem’s homonormativity, which requires 
that “her uncomfortable anatomical otherness” be “covered up” as fully as pos-
sible: “Incest and Empire in The Faerie Queene,” ELH 73 (2006): 215–43, here 
236. I remain interested in the enabling possibilities of the encounter, insofar as 
they can be sustained. They cannot be sustained indefinitely. For an alternative, 
positive reading of the encounter, see Lisa Celovsky, “Early Modern Masculinities 
and The Faerie Queene,” English Literary Renaissance 35 (2005): 210–47 at 222.
80 William Oram observes that Spenser’s figure of Lust combines male and 
female genital imagery, proving a “demonic parallel to the bisexual Venus of canto 
x”: “Elizabethan Fact and Spenserian Fiction,” Spenser Studies 4 (1983): 33–47 
at 42. Stephens considers the figure of Lust “extravagantly male” (42); gold-
berg observes that Lust, when first described, is “little more than a gaping mouth 
dripping blood,” the embodiment of desire as a “devouring place” or “devouring 
mouth” (58). As he describes it, this place is female. With a trunk-like nose and 
long, wide ears to the waist, however, Lust is also elephantine (and Ollyphant-
ine) and male. On the bisexuality of the cave beneath the mount in the garden of 
Adonis, see my Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 221–23; also Silberman, 47–48.
81 Jean-François Lyotard, “The Dream-Work Does Not Think,” in his Dis-
course, Figure, trans. Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2011), 233–67; and Ricoeur, “Metaphorical Process,” 141–57.
82 Lyotard, “The Dream-Work Does Not Think,” 244; cf. Lyotard, Discourse, 
Figure, 15 (phantasm). Lyotard compares the matrix of narrative rhythm to “what 
Propp called form” (244). On Propp, see Discourse, Figure, 145, 406–7n12, 
425n26.
83 Faerie Queene, III.ii.25, IV.iv.39, vi.12.
84 Compare the related confusion/conflation of the roles of hunter and 
hunted in the imagery of IV.x.55, as Scudamour leads Amoret from the Temple of 
Venus, a passage I have treated in Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 150–51.
85 Masked Ate’s description of Britomart’s shield in IV.i.48 is ironically perti-
nent: telling Scudamour that she does not know the name of the knight who now 
possesses Amoret, namely armed Britomart, Ate continues, “but in his shield he 
beares / (That well I wote) the heads of many broken spears.” If Britomart’s spear 
and steeple need blunting, the Salvage Knight comparably needs bloodletting, as 
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earlier suggested: excess, wildness, crudeness (rawness and roughness) are implicit 
in his disguised figure, whose “mayle” gets “yriv’d” and whose “fingers [go] slacke,” 
his sword thereupon falling (IV.vi.15, 21); sexual allusion is obvious. Like Brit-
omart, Artegall is unmasked before an accord can be reached.
86 Compare Amoretti LXVII, in The Yale Edition of the Shorter Poems of 
Edmund Spenser, ed. William A. Oram, Einar Bjorvand, Ronald Bond, Thomas 
H. Cain, Alexander Dunlop, and Richard Schell (New Haven, CT: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1989): “till I . . . with her owne goodwill hir fyrmely tyde; / Strange 
thing me seemd to see a beast so wyld, / so goodly wonne with her owne will 
beguyld” (my emphasis). Context and genre make a difference, however.
87 Joseph Anthony Mazzeo’s exposition of Machiavelli’s virtù remains use-
ful: Renaissance and Revolution: Backgrounds in Seventeenth-Century Literature 
(London: Methuen, 1969), 91–94.
88 On the traditional gendering of wrath, which relates to hate as masculine, 
see Barbara H. Rosenwein, ed., Anger’s Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the 
Middle Ages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), esp. 1–6, 233–47; Les-
ter K. Little, “Anger in Monastic Curses,” ibid., 9–35; gerd Althoff, “Ira Regis: 
Prolegomena to a History of Royal Anger,” ibid., 59–74; and William V. Har-
ris, Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
89 On “fitt,” see chapter 2, 53–54.
90 On the difference between allegorical and allegory, adjective and noun, see 
my Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 5–7. Mihoko Suzuki observes that, “Brit-
omart, though androgynous, is not self-contained to the point of narcissism” 
because she seeks Artegall; in other words, she is not subject and object to herself: 
Metamorphoses of Helen: Authority, Difference, and the Epic (Ithaca, NY: Cor-
nell University Press, 1989), 154. In connection with Sidney’s Arcadia, Schwarz, 
Tough Love, 197, cites Marjorie garber’s illuminating remarks about the use of the 
term “androgyne” or “hermaphrodite,” but, I would add, without an orientation 
to figural or mythic thinking, which is not reducible to abstract binaries: garber 
denies that a “third term” is properly a term or “a sex, certainly not an instantiated 
‘blurred’ sex as signified by a term like ‘androgyne’ or ‘hermaphrodite.’ . . . The 
‘third’ is a mode of articulation, a way of describing a space of possibility”: Vested 
Interests: Cross-Dressing and Cultural Anxiety (New York: Routledge, 1992), 11. 
Mythic or figural thinking puts abstraction in question without positing a space, 
which by itself suggests emptiness to me, not a place of positive, creative possibil-
ity and openness. For yet another alternative, see Celovsky, 211, 214–17, 221.
91 Quitslund, Spenser’s Supreme Fiction: Platonic Natural Philosophy and “The 
Faerie Queene” (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 230–35. See also 
note 92 right below.
92 See Leone Ebreo [Leo Hebraeus] Dialoghi d’Amore [1535] (Heidelberg: 
Carl. gebhardt, 1929), Dialogo Terzo, 1–154 at 87 v. to 88 r.; in French, Dia-
logues d’Amour, trans. Pontus de Tyard (1551), ed. T. Anthony Perry (Chapel Hill: 
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University of North Carolina Press, 1974) 249, 260; in English, The Philosophy of 
Love, trans. F. Friedeberg-Seeley and Jean H. Barnes (London: Soncino, 1937), 
268–69, 302, 354–55, 371–72. Reprints and translations testify to the popu-
larity of Leone’s dialogue. Taken whole, his views support Elliot R. Wolfson’s 
explanation of the ultimately androcentric basis of kabbalistic hermaphroditism: 
Language, Eros, Being: Kabbalistic Hermeneutics and Poetic Imagination (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2005), chap. 2; cf. chaps. 3–4. Leone’s assertion 
that each male and female includes the other sex/gender illogically gives way to a 
more conventional allegory of man as intellect and woman as body. Relevant to 
Leone’s assertions is Shuger’s contention that, in the later seventeenth century, 
eros is relocated from the eyes and “brain to regions below the waist” (179). My 
“Artegall” in The Spenser Encyclopedia, 62–64 at 63, already notes that the princi-
ple of coupling in Spenser’s epic (and in its principal couple) involves four terms, 
not two.
93 Compare Laqueur on the so-called one-sex model, which is largely galen’s: 
“what we call sex and gender were . . . [in this model] explicitly bound up in a 
circle of meanings from which escape . . . was impossible” (8, 128–29). Laqueur 
acknowledges the existence of the Aristotelian two-sex model in the period, on 
which see my Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 376–77n10. Traub’s view, although 
not utopian, is somewhat more hopeful: Desire and Anxiety, 14–18. See also note 
45 above in this chapter and Traub, Thinking Sex, e.g., 8, 18.
94 Earlier, Scudamour has referred to the willingly disarmed Artegall as “a 
Ladies thrall” (IV.vi.28). Both the facts that Scudamour is the speaker and that he 
speaks at the anticlimax of the battle of Britomart and Artegall make a big differ-
ence. Scudamour, “Cupid’s man,” is not the most reliable of witnesses, a point his 
story and Amoret’s bring home.
95 Compare Ricoeur, “Metaphorical Process,” 151, on the split reference of 
metaphor; also Wolfgang Iser, The Fictive and the Imaginary: Charting Literary 
Anthropology (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), xiv–xv: 
Iser’s category of the fictive is not tied to “the old fiction/reality dichotomy.” Like 
Ricoeur’s metaphor, the fictive “keeps in view what has been overstepped” but is 
nonetheless “an act of boundary-crossing” that at once “disrupts and doubles the 
referential world.”
96 William Morse, “’The Play’s the Thing: Shakespeare’s Critique of Char-
acter (and Harold Bloom),” in Harold Bloom’s Shakespeare, 109–23 at 118, 120. 
Compare Lorna Hutson, “Law, Probability and Character in Shakespeare,” in 
Fictions of Knowledge: Fact, Evidence, Doubt, ed. Yota Baatsaki, Subha Mukherji, 
and Jan-Melissa Schramm (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 61–83. 
Hutson discusses the “hidden, causal or motivational elements” of speech and 
action that are “merely inferred” and encourage us to think of fictional persons as 
having an existence that exceeds the story in which they act (61, 63–64). It hardly 
requires a boy actor to make a fictive woman speak “from within about the system 
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of gender”: Yanchin and Slights, introduction to Shakespeare and Character, 1–18 
at 9. Are there limits to inferential reading? What role has evidence, and who is 
the judge?
97 Faerie Queene, V.vi.34, 37–38, vii.21–23.
98 Faerie Queene, V.vii.8, 16, 19.
99 For discussion, including Isis Church, see my essay in Essential Articles for 
the Study of Edmund Spenser, at 458–60; and in A Companion to English Renais-
sance Literature and Culture, I:263–73. Also McKeown, 52; and David Lee 
Miller, “gender, Justice, and the gods in The Faerie Queene, Book V,” in Reading 
Renaissance Ethics, ed. Marshall grossman (New York: Routledge, 2007), 19–37. 
Katherine Eggert comments perceptively about sex and gender in the Temple of 
Isis: Showing like a Queen: Female Authority and Literary Experiment in Spenser, 
Shakespeare, and Milton (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 
40; more recently, Eggert offers an alchemical interpretation of Britomart’s vision 
as a “coniunctio of equals” in the Temple: Disknowledge: Literature, Alchemy, and 
the End of Humanism in Renaissance England (Philadelphia: University of Penn-
sylvania Press, 2015), 187–90 at 188. Compare also Alice Miskimin, “Britomart’s 
Crocodile and the Legends of Chastity,” JEGP 77 (1978): 17–36; and Kathryn 
Walls, “Spenser and the ‘Medieval Past’: A Question of Definition,” in Spenser in 
the Moment, ed. Paul J. Hecht and J. B. Lethbridge (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dick-
inson University Press, 2015), 35–66 at 45–47.
100 Quotation from William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, as cited in Elizabeth Fowler, 107.
101 A foreign marriage increases the danger, but a domestic one also incurs it. 
On Alençon, see The Spenser Encyclopedia, 14–15; Andrew Hadfield, Spenser: A 
Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 101, 273.
102 Hamilton, ed. (2007), 558n30, suggests that the lioness is Britomart and 
the tiger Radigund, insofar as the lion is a “royal beast.” I am less confident of 
these identifications; cf. the blurring of Redcrosse and Sans Joy in Book I as a grif-
fin with “pray” and “rightfull rauine” and a dragon desirous of these (I.v.8). In 
the present battle, the lioness is female, and the tiger is not, but the combatants 
cannot so neatly be distinguished. The lack of a stable distinction between them is 
another instance of figural undoing and reversing: Mars and Venus wasting each 
other, an internal and figural matter and not simply a dynastic or political one. 
Compare Eggert, Showing like a Queen, 41: “Britomart’s task is evidently to sub-
due herself.” While Eggert reads Britomart and Radigund as “scarcely distinguish-
able,” she also reads tiger and lion as female, whereas I think it important that 
Britomart’s Martian and Venerean components alike are hemorrhaging in this 
battle; cf. Paglia, “Appollonian Androgyne,” 85; and Suzuki, 177–95. For final 
complications of gender, cf. V.iv.39 (Lioness), V.vii.30 (Lioness, Lion, she), and 
V.viii.49 (bitch, Tiger). Raging female at least momentarily morphs into male in 
the last two passages. See also note 88 in this chapter.
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103 Britomart’s progress in Books III–V can variously be translated and theo-
rized: e.g., her assumption of Busirane’s abuse of Amoret into theories of transfer-
ence (10–11, 103–4 ) or of sadism, masochism, or both; her journey in Book V 
into a process of sublimation or, again, of transference (see Anderson, “Nor Man 
It Is,” Essential Articles, 460); and her fight with Radigund into masochism. In 
New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trans. James Strachey (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1965), Freud (very) controversially wrote, “The suppression of 
women’s aggressiveness which is prescribed for them constitutionally [i.e., essen-
tially] and imposed on them socially favours the development of powerful mas-
ochistic impulses, which succeed, as we know, in binding erotically the destructive 
trends which have been diverted inwards” (155–16). Because my present concern 
is with figuration, with metaphorical allegory as a way of thinking, and with sig-
nificant form and tangible meaning, I want to minimize ahistorical, abstractive 
translation, even while acknowledging its possibility within a different kind of 
project.
104 Quotation from Colin Clouts Come Home Againe, l. 802: Shorter Poems 
of Edmund Spenser. On the birth of Venus, see also Hesiod, Theogony, in Hesiod 
and Theognis, trans. Dorothea Wender (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1973), 
27–29. For the positive aspects of Britomart’s rescue of Artegall, see the parallels 
to Una observed in my first chapter.
105 On the Chaucerian persona in the fifth proem, see my Growth of a Per-
sonal Voice, 184–86, and, for additional contextualization, see my Words That 
Matter, 172–73. Unlike Harry Berger, Jr., I do not find Spenser’s narrator consis-
tent even in his masking. Like the figures of The Faerie Queene, its narrator evolves 
and shifts. His own figure is contextualized: see Berger’s “Narrative as Rhetoric in 
The Faerie Queene,” in Situated Utterances (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2005), 173–217, and my “Chaucer’s and Spenser’s Reflexive Narrators,” in Read-
ing the Allegorical Intertext, 27–41. My discussion of Malfont and Duessa in chap-
ter 4 of the present volume is also relevant.
106 Artegall’s name suggests “art equal,” “art of equality,” or “equal [to] Arthur.” 
Prince Arthur is identified in the poem as Artegall’s maternal half-brother (III.
iii.27). In Book III, his name is spelled “Arthogall” or “Arthegall,” emphasizing his 
similarity to Arthur.
107 Metonymy is “referential, substitutive, coded, ideological,” as distin-
guished from metaphor, which is “deviant, constructive, creative—code-break-
ing”: Anderson, Translating Investments, 4.
108 Shekhar Kapur, Elizabeth (1998). Reading Britomart throughout the 
poem as an allegory of Elizabeth I, Julia M. Walker suggestively sees Mercilla as 
the icon that replaces Britomart: Medusa’s Mirrors: Spenser, Shakespeare, Milton, 
and the Metamorphosis of the Female Self (Newark, NJ: University of Delaware 
Press, 1998), chap. 3, esp. 112–13. To my mind, replacement comes earlier and for 
a larger complex of reasons.
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4 Phantasies, Pains, and Punishments: A Still-Moving Coda
1 Quotations from Edmund Spenser: The Faerie Queene, ed. A. C. Hamilton, 
text edited by Hiroshi Yamashita, Toshiyuki Suzuki, and Shohachi Fukuda, rev. 
second ed. (Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2007), here III.xii.26. Notes are cited as Ham-
ilton, ed. (2007), unless otherwise indicated.
2 Paolucci, The Women in Dante’s “Divine Comedy” and Spenser’s “Faerie 
Queene” (Dover, DE: griffon House, 2005).
3 In order, see Kathryn Schwarz, Tough Love: Amazon Encounters in the 
English Renaissance (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000); Melissa E. 
Sanchez, Erotic Subjects: The Sexuality of Politics in Early Modern English Lit-
erature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Theresa M. Krier, Gazing on 
Secret Sights (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 67–82 (portrait of 
Belphoebe); Elizabeth Fowler, Literary Character: The Human Figure in Early 
English Writing (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 193–214 (Medway 
and Florimell).
4 For example, William Shakespeare, The Winter’s Tale, ed. Stephen Orgel 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), IV.4.140–43; Ben Jonson, The Forrest, 
in Works, ed. C. H. Herford and Percy and Evelyn Simpson, 11 vols. (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1925–52), 8; also my discussion of still movement in Jonson: Words 
That Matter: Linguistic Perception in Renaissance English (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1996), 116–21.
5 For various approaches to Mutability and Nature (mine included), see 
Celebrating Mutabilitie: Essays on Edmund Spenser’s Mutabilitie Cantos, ed. Jane 
grogan (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2010). See also note 15 
below in this chapter.
6 The argument that the rule of a woman is unnatural was familiar in Spen-
ser’s time and particularly associated with Protestant Reformers: e.g., see Patricia 
Parker, Literary Fat Ladies: Rhetoric, Gender, Property (London: Methuen, 1987), 
54–66. Parker also argues that Acrasia refers to Queen Elizabeth. On issues of sex 
and gender the figure of Acrasia raises, consider Harry Berger, Jr., “Wring out the 
Old: Squeezing the Text, 1951–2001,” Spenser Studies 18 (2003), 81–121, and 
Judith H. Anderson, Reading the Allegorical Intertext: Chaucer, Spenser, Shake-
speare, Milton (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), chap. 15.
7 See my Reading the Allegorical Intertext, chaps. 9, 15, and “Acrasia” in the 
index; the version offered here derives from pages 234–37. The chapters cited 
abound in critical annotation.
8 On the words “crime” and “sin,” see Stephen greenblatt, Renaissance Self-
Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1980), 172. See also the debate between Richard Danson Brown and J. B. Leth-
bridge regarding the significance (or its lack) of Spenser’s rhyming in their Con-
cordance to the Rhymes of “The Faerie Queene” (Manchester, UK: Manchester Uni-
versity Press, 2013), 1–180.
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9 William Shakespeare, Antony and Cleopatra, ed. John Wilders (London: 
Routledge, 1995), II.ii.245–47.
10 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort (New York: Ford-
ham University Press, 2005), 9, 20. On “exhilaration,” see “jouissance” (Nancy, 
9), plus Valerie Traub’s explanation of jouissance as a “complex, self-contradictory 
concept,” not simply equivalent to “pleasure”: Thinking Sex with the Early Mod-
erns (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 29.
11 On the Palmer as an artist, a spinner of myth, see my “Knight and the 
Palmer in The Faerie Queene, Book II,” Modern Language Quarterly 31 (1970): 
160–78, esp. 162–65. The Palmer is a rational, sometimes rationalizing spinner; 
even his “subtile” net is “formally,” or regularly, rationally, logically “frame[d]” 
(II.xii.81).
12 See Leonard Barkan, The Gods Made Flesh: Metamorphosis and the Pursuit 
of Paganism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 2–5; Ann Rosalind 
Jones and Peter Stallybrass, Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chap. 4, esp. 89–97; Heather 
James, “Ovid and the Question of Politics in Early Modern England,” ELH 70 
(2003): 343–73 at 358–63; Syrithe Pugh, Spenser and Ovid (Aldershot, UK: 
Ashgate, 2005), 146, 214, 266; Pamela Royston Macfie, “Text and Textura: Spen-
ser’s Arachnean Art,” in Traditions and Innovations: Essays on British Literature 
of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, ed. David g. Allen and Robert H. White 
(Newark, NJ: University of Delaware Press, 1990), 88–96.
13 Variously and at length on Venus and her refractions in The Faerie Queene, 
see my Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 14–15 and chaps. 9, 14. These chapters 
are another reason that I do not treat these figures in detail here.
14 Amavia has been a traveler, but she is in a single place when we see her and 
soon immobilized in death. The old hag Occasion in Book II is a boundary case: 
once fettered, she is certainly situated, but, by nature, she should always be hap-
pening, changing, moving on. As a figure, she only enters one scene of guyon’s 
quest: she is bound in it, then freed. Impatience and Impotence are extensions of 
Maleger, also in Book II.
15 For discussion of Lucifera, see my Light and Death: Figuration in Spenser, 
Kepler, Donne, Milton (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017), 57, and 
32–37, 46, 49 on the figure of Mutability.
16 On the descent through the woods/matter in Book I and its sources, see 
William Nelson, The Poetry of Edmund Spenser: A Study (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1963), 159; Judith H. Anderson, The Growth of a Personal Voice: 
“Piers Plowman” and “The Faerie Queene” (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1976), 36–37. On silva and hyle, see also my Words That Matter, 104–6. 
On Milton’s Satan in the preceding sentence, see my Reading the Allegorical Inter-
text, 305–7, including 418n103; and Light and Death, chap. 3 (“Satanic Ethos: 
Evil, Death, and Individuality”).
17 Faerie Queene, V.ix.36–50, x.1–4.
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18 For a start, see Michael O’Connell, Mirror and Veil: The Historical Dimen-
sion of Spenser’s “Faerie Queene” (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1977), 150–54; also my books Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 177–78, 
and Words That Matter, 187–88.
19 Faerie Queene, IV.i.19, V.ix.40–41, 47. A body matching the mind is hardly 
a feature exclusive to womanly figures, let alone to wicked ones. For examples 
among the figures of men, consider the goatish Malbecco, who makes the owl-like 
monster of his mind; grill, who chooses to remain a pig; and Orgoglio, a “mon-
strous masse of earthly slyme,” who effectually becomes “an emptie blader” (I.vii.
ix, viii.24).
20 Joan Copjec, “The Anxiety of the Influencing Machine,” October 23 
(1982): 43–59 at 44; cf. 52–56. Copjec’s observations could be applied to other 
episodes in Book V.
21 Over decades, I have repeatedly returned to the depiction of Lady Munera: 
for examples of the more recent discussions, Words That Matter, 169–71, and 
“Spenser’s Faerie Queene, Book 5: Poetry, Politics, and Justice,” in A New Compan-
ion to English Renaissance Literature and Culture, ed. Michael Hattaway, 2 vols. 
(Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), I:263–73 at 266–67; cf. also my entry 
on “Langland, William,” in The Spenser Encyclopedia, ed. A. C. Hamilton, Donald 
Cheney, W. F. Blissett, David A. Richardson, and William W. Barker (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1990), 425: Lady Munera’s “golden hands,” for exam-
ple, recall Lady Meed’s ringed “fyngres . . . fretted with gold wyr,” and Munera’s 
feet of “trye [precious]” silver suggest network slippers (V.ii.25). Hands held aloft 
in supplication and crying for mercy at Artegall’s feet, Lady Munera is summarily 
executed and, handless and footless, thrown over the castle wall, “But the streame 
washt away her guilty blood,” equivocably a biblical purgation of guilt or a merely 
natural cleansing (27). The problem of Lady Munera directly relates to the larger 
subject of Justice, the social (not personal) virtue that by definition has no respect 
of person. The first two discussions referenced in this note address this larger con-
text.
22 For discussion of the Burbon episode, see my chapter in Essential Articles 
for the Study of Edmund Spenser, ed. A. C. Hamilton (Hamden, CT: Archon, 
1972), 447–70 at 448–50, or, more recently and summarily, in A New Companion 
to English Renaissance Literature and Culture, 1:271–72. Burbon’s and Artegall’s 
identities are double in the episode, as is that of the Knight of Justice, Artegall, in 
much of Book V.
23 It is the election year, 2016, in the US as I make this observation.
24 See Faerie Queene, IV.vii.16, viii.50.
25 The spelling “Paeana” occurs at Faerie Queene IV.ix.9, 13. Hamilton, ed. 
(2007), 475n59.4, derives the name Placydas from Latin placidus. I find the Latin 
origin of placidus, namely placeo, a slightly fuller and more positive fit.
26 Jonathan goldberg, Endlesse Worke: Spenser and the Structures of Discourse 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).
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27 Poeana’s reform is what especially distinguishes her from Lady Munera, 
whose father, Pollente, and their toll-collector also operate outside their castle, 
although presumably on their land. Munera’s plea for mercy might suggest a 
capacity to change, but this possibility is not developed in the text beyond the 
ironic echo of purgation by water (V.ii.27.5). Lady Munera contrasts even more 
sharply with Briana in Book VI, who not only accepts the opportunity to reform 
but is also permitted to expose Calidore’s violence and call him out for it (VI.i.25, 
45).
28 In Growth of a Personal Voice, I have treated Serena and Mirabella in terms 
of free will (agency), responsibility, and fortune (Machiavelli’s virtù and fortuna).
29 For Turpine’s shaming, see Faerie Queene, VI.vi.36, vii.26–27; cf. V.iii.37; 
for Timias’s humiliation, see VI.vii.49, viii.5.
30 The figures Blandina and Enias might be said to touch Serena’s story, too. 
The connection of stories in romance goes on and on.
31 Compare Kathryn Schwarz’s suggestive critique of institutional priori-
ties that reduce Shakespeare’s “women to integers in a cold-blooded calculus”: 
“Whose Body?” in Rethinking Feminism in Early Modern Studies: Gender, 
Race, and Sexuality, ed. Ania Loomba and Melissa E. Sanchez (London: Taylor & 
Francis, 2016), 213–45 at 214–15.
32 A touchstone for this view is gordon Teskey, Allegory and Violence (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
33 See Mary Thomas Crane, Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in 
Sixteenth-Century England (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 
58. Crane refers specifically to the flowers of rhetoric and to florilegia, anthologies 
of poems.
34 Pertinently, on intention and will, see Kathy Eden, Poetic and Legal Fiction 
in the Aristotelian Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 
98–100, 130–31; also Elliott Visconsi, Lines of Equity: Literature and the Origins 
of Law in Later Stuart England (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 5–7. 
For more on Melibee, see Anderson, Reading the Allegorical Intertext, chap. 6.
35 Online OED, s.v. misfare, n.1; s.v., mis, prefix; s.v. fare, n. and v. (accessed 
March 23, 2016).
36 See Online OED, s.v. hapless; s.v. care, n.1, 1.a. (accessed March 21, 2016).
37 Online OED, s.v. spoil, v.1, 10.a.–b., 11.a., c. (accessed March 21, 2016).
38 Depending on context, horses are traditional symbols of passion, heroic or 
erotic.
39 See the latter portion of note 41 below.
40 Compare Joseph Campana on Amavia’s death: The Pain of Reformation: 
Spenser, Vulnerability, and the Ethics of Masculinity (New York: Fordham Univer-
sity Press, 2012), 121–22.
41 The word dame (< Latin domina) can signify a woman of rank or one in 
charge, as Serena now is, as well as a married woman, the latter a suggestion that 
could indicate this development during her time with Calepine in the Salvage 
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man’s dwelling: see Online OED, s.v. dame, I.2.a, II.5, 6.a, 7.a.–b. (accessed March 
22, 2016). In canon law, marriage is essentially an agreement between two people; 
cf. Andrew Zurcher, Spenser’s Legal Language: Law and Poetry in Early Modern 
England (Woodbridge, UK: D. S. Brewer, 2007), 90–94. (Although Thomas 
Wilson’s dialogic treatise, A Discourse Upon Usury (1572), ed. R. H. Tawney [New 
York: Harcourt Brace, 1925], treats a different subject, its inclusion of opinions 
drawing on canon as well as on civil and common law is exemplary and pertinent: 
e.g., 237, 272–73). The sequence of Calepine’s and Serena’s dwelling with the Sal-
vage, then Calepine’s rescue of a baby is suggestive with respect to the continu-
ation of Amoret’s story in Serena’s: Ralegh not only had seduced, then married 
Elizabeth Throckmorton; he had also impregnated her. The Ralegh/Throckmor-
ton affair hovers increasingly over Serena’s story, as it did insistently over Amoret’s 
in Book IV.
42 Citation from the Online OED, s.v. self pron., a., and n., C.sb. I. From the 
pronoun: 3, of which the first example given is 1674 (accessed December 14, 
2014). But see goldberg, 91–94n7, and my Light and Death, 68–69, includ-
ing notes 35–38. Examples earlier than 1674 exist in the sixteenth as well as the 
seventeenth century.
43 I agree with Hamilton, ed. (2007), 656n31.1–6, that Serena’s “former 
dread” refers to the beginning of her story, but it also includes the triggering sight 
of Mirabella, Timias, and their captors. See Online OED, s.v. infer, v., 3.a-b, 4; 
s.v. villainy, n., 1.a, 3.a.; s.v. villainous, adj., 1.b., 2.a. (accessed March 22, 2016). 
In the instance of Serena, inference is loaded with forensic nuance: on inference, 
see Lorna Hutson, The Invention of Suspicion: Law and Mimesis in Shakespeare 
and Renaissance Drama (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), e.g., 115–16, 
on the inference of motives and causes.
44 In the lines cited, as elsewhere, the story of Serena recalls that of Amoret, 
insistently at times: see Hamilton, ed. (2007), 656n31–51. There are also signifi-
cant differences between the two.
45 As clearly instanced in Duessa, a Spenserian figure can have many social, 
cultural, and historical dimensions, whether intermittently, successively, or all 
at once. The cannibal episode has been much studied: for a start, see Hamilton, 
ed. (2007), 657n35; Jonathan Crewe, “Spenser’s Saluage Petrarchanism: Pensées 
Sauvages in The Faerie Queene,” Bucknell Review 35 (1992): 89–103, is of particu-
lar interest. Compare Rufus Wood, Metaphor and Belief in “The Faerie Queene” 
(Houndmills, UK: Macmillan, 1997), 157–65; Joan Pong Linton, The Romance 
of the New World: Gender and the Literary Formations of English Colonialism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 109–17. Also Julia Major, “The 
Arch of Serena as Textual Monument,” Reformation 9 (2004): 131–71: Serena 
and the cannibals are a meta-allegory of “the possible fate of Spenser’s poem . . . 
among unfriendly readers” (131). Andrew Hadfield, “Another Look at Serena and 
Irena,” Irish University Review 26.2 (1996): 291–302, reads Serena as a type of 
Elizabeth (293, 299–302).
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46 On the afterimage, in Renaissance optics and psychology a controverted 
issue, see my Light and Death, 127–28, 130, on Kepler, and see my “Working 
Imagination in the Early Modern Period: Donne’s Secular and Religious Lyrics 
and Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Macbeth, and Leontes,” in Shakespeare and Donne: 
Generic Hybrids and the Cultural Imaginary, ed. Judith H. Anderson and Jenni-
fer C. Vaught (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 185–219 at 186–88, 
196–97.
47 Hamilton, ed. (2007), 658n42.5, on the planned sacrifice of Serena, is puz-
zling: “In a context that involves the fantasies of a woman in love, the Altar sug-
gests the nuptial bed on which the bride awaits the groom ‘Like an appointed 
lambe, when tenderly / The priest comes on his knees t’embowell her’ (Donne, 
‘Epithalamion made at Lincolnes Inne,’ 89–90).” This note signals something 
more salacious for Serena than a fear of further debasement and guilt about her 
earlier failing. As observed, the priest lowers his knife toward her “brest,” not 
toward her “bowels,” a more ambiguous word used of Amoret (but see chapter 3). 
See also note 48 right below.
48 See Dorothy Stephens on Serena at this point: The Limits of Eroticism in 
Post-Petrarchan Narrative: Conditional Pleasure from Spenser to Marvell (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 128–34. Stephens particularly exam-
ines the description of the naked Serena’s mood as “vnwomanly” when morning 
comes to her and Calepine (132–34). I take her unwomanly mood more simply to 
reflect her loss of identity, her namelessness as Serena—that is, her loss of herself. 
Exemplifying an older criticism, Walter F. Staton, Jr. (“Italian Pastorals and the 
Conclusion of the Serena Story,” Studies in English Literature 6.1 [1966]: 35–42) 
finds Spenser’s treatment of Serena far subtler than in Italian analogues, yet con-
cludes that she should have thanked Calepine instead of complaining about her 
embarrassment.
49 Hamilton, ed. (2007), 659n51.8, remarks that “the sexual meaning [of 
knowen] is suggested” in its second use. It could be, yet this suggestion settles 
nothing unless we assume Serena merely to be scared of sex, a common default 
setting for modern critics. Surely there are other possibilities, especially prior to 
the Victorians. Serena, after all, has spent much time in the forest with Calepine 
in the Salvage’s dwelling, a place with a natural valence (like that of the Salvage 
himself ). See also note 41 above in this chapter.
50 Meanings of case range from fortuitous to physical and mental ones, 
including conscience and awareness, to legal ones, including equity: e.g., see 
Online OED, s.v., case, n.1: e.g., 2.a. “an event, an occurrence; a chance happen-
ing”; 3. “Fortune, chance”; 5.a. “condition, physical or mental state”; 6.a. “A legal 
action, esp. one to be decided in a court of law”; P7. “case of conscience” (accessed 
April 18, 2016). For the sexual pun, see case (pudendum) in Eric Partridge, Shake-
speare’s Bawdy (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1969), 76–77; also Online OED, s.v. case, 
n.2, 1.a, 2.a., 8 (accessed October 21, 2016).
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51 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, second ed. (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1998), 237; cf. 243: I silently changed “himself ” to “herself.”
52 Hamilton, ed. (2007), 621n23.2.
53 See Louis Montrose, The Subject of Elizabeth: Authority, Gender, and Rep-
resentation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 193–200; also, Claire 
McEachern, The Poetics of English Nationhood, 1560–1612 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1996), 34–82.
54 Neither Hamilton’s notes nor the article on Mirabella in The Spenser Ency-
clopedia, 476, remark her connection to the queen, perhaps put off by descrip-
tion of her birth as base and mean (VI.vii.28). But this description could be a 
subterfuge that masks reference, or, in a book in which gentle is as gentle does, 
baseness and meanness could be as they do, too, especially since Elizabeth was 
regarded by some as a bastard: cf. Shakespeare’s Edmund on bastardy base in 
King Lear, ed. R. A. Foakes (London: Thomas Nelson, 1997), I.2.9–10. Spenser’s 
Mirabella is also described as “a Ladie of great dignitie . . . lifted vp to honorable 
place” (vii.28). Sheila Cavanagh offers one of the more detailed commentaries 
on Mirabella: Wanton Eyes and Chaste Desires: Female Sexuality in “The Faerie 
Queene” (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 110–24. Although not 
connecting Mirabella to the Queen-Ralegh-Serena story, Cavanagh suggests that 
Mirabella’s situation “inverts” the Belphoebe and Timias story, since both involve 
“a sadomasochistic dyad” (133). Anne Shaver makes the connection to the queen 
and her treatment of Ralegh explicit: “Rereading Mirabella,” Spenser Studies 9 
(1988 [1991]): 209–29 at 223–24, though without reference to the stanzas I cite 
and consider definitive. Compare also Zurcher, 173–74.
55 I include this parallel with Lucifera at the suggestion of an anonymous 
reader for MIP.
56 Quoted from the Knight’s portrait in Chaucer’s general Prologue to The 
Canterbury Tales: Works 1532, supplemented by material from the editions of 
1542, 1561, 1568, and 1602 (London: Scolar, 1969), fol. I r.
57 Harry Berger, Jr., The Allegorical Temper: Vision and Reality in Book 2 of 
Spenser’s Faerie Queene (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957), 66.
58 See Maurice Evans, Spenser’s Anatomy of Heroism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), 224; and Anderson, Growth of a Personal Voice, 182–83, 
including notes 48 (Italian brigante, “brigand,” meaning “devil”) and 50 (the Har-
rowing of Hell in Piers Plowman, including the unlocking and breaking open of 
gates; also the binding of Cerberus by Hercules, customarily seen as an analogy to 
the Harrowing of Hell).
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